B. Peda Baliah Vs. Rajeshwar Rao and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- maximssections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] ghee as a live stock product held, [per v.v.s. rao & n.v. ramana, jj - majority] since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. the first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. the shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. by simmering unsalted butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. so to say, milk is converted to dahi, then butter. scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. it would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the act used the plural products of livestock. the legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the act. thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in section 2(xv) of the act. whatever products are declared as such by the government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the act. consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under section 3(1) read with section 3(3) of the act on them it is competent for the government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [per p.s. narayana, j,(dissenting)]if livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. in view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] declaration of notified area held, it is only under section 3 that government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. it is very conspicuous that section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. thus, except ordaining government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under section 3(3) of the act nowhere much less under section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. when the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. in such a case, maxim, expressum facit cessare tacitum (when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. section 7: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] levy of market fee element of quid pro quo - held, levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of sttaes taxing power. there is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. it is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified. expressum facit cessare tacitum sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] meaning when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. ordermuktadar, j.1. the only point for consideration in this revision, petition is whether the reference made by the learned sessions judge, medak in crl. revision petition no. 50 of 1966 should be accented or not. the facts are that the complainant filed a complaint under section 379. i. pc. against the accused who are the executive officer and the bill collector of the ga.iwel gram pancha-yat to the effect that on 26-3-1966 the accused have committed a theft of a gold chain weighing about 6 tolas and cash rs. 498-50 from the house of the complainant, after the filing of the complaint, an objection was raised by the accused that under section 143 of the andhra pradesh gram panchayats act; permission has not been obtained by the complainant to prosecute the accused persons. the learned magistrate dismissed the complaint on the ground that the complainant ought to have obtained the permission before prosecuting the accused persons. a revision petition was preferred by the complainant. the learned sessions judge allowed the revision holding that no permission was necessary under section 143 of the gram panchayts act. aggrieved by the judgment of the learned sessions judge, the accused preferred crl, r. c. no. 820 of 1968 to the high court. on 27-12-1969 the high court allowed the revision petition on the ground that the learned sessions judge had no jurisdiction to allow the revision. he was only entitled to make a reference to the high court in case he was of the opinion that the revision should be allowed. consequently, on remand by the high court, the learned sessions judge has again by his order dated 31-8-1970 made a reference to this court.2. section 143 of the andhra pradesh gram panchayat act provides that 'when the sarpanch. executive authority or any member of a gram panchayat or the nyaya adhyaksha or any member of a nyaya panchayat or the president or any member of a conciliation board is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the government.3. it will thus be seen that if an offence is committed within the course of duty, then only sanction of the government is necessary. obviously it is not within the course of the duty of the executive officer or the bill collector to go and steal the gold chain or cash. hence no sanction is necessary under section 143 of the gram panchayats act because the stealing of the gold chain does not fall within the ambit of the course of the duty of the executive officer or the bill collector. as such the order of the learned sessions judge is correct and the reference is accepted. the learned magistrate will proceed with the case as per the provisions of law.

Judgment:
ORDER

Muktadar, J.

1. The only point for consideration in this revision, petition is whether the reference made by the learned Sessions Judge, Medak in Crl. Revision Petition No. 50 of 1966 should be accented or not. The facts are that the complainant filed a complaint under Section 379. I. PC. against the accused who are the Executive Officer and the Bill Collector of the Ga.iwel gram pancha-yat to the effect that on 26-3-1966 the accused have committed a theft of a gold chain weighing about 6 tolas and cash Rs. 498-50 from the house of the complainant, After the filing of the complaint, an objection was raised by the accused that under Section 143 of the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayats Act; permission has not been obtained by the complainant to prosecute the accused persons. The learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint on the ground that the complainant ought to have obtained the permission before prosecuting the accused persons. A revision petition was preferred by the complainant. The learned Sessions Judge allowed the revision holding that no permission was necessary under Section 143 of the Gram Panchayts Act. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, the accused preferred Crl, R. C. No. 820 of 1968 to the High Court. On 27-12-1969 the High Court allowed the revision petition on the ground that the learned Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to allow the revision. He was only entitled to make a reference to the High Court in case he was of the opinion that the revision should be allowed. Consequently, on remand by the High Court, the learned Sessions Judge has again by his order dated 31-8-1970 made a reference to this Court.

2. Section 143 of the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayat Act provides that 'When the Sarpanch. executive authority or any member of a Gram Panchayat or the Nyaya Adhyaksha or any member of a nyaya panchayat or the president or any member of a conciliation board is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the Government.

3. It will thus be seen that if an offence is committed within the course of duty, then only sanction of the Government is necessary. Obviously it is not within the course of the duty of the executive Officer or the Bill Collector to go and steal the gold chain or cash. Hence no sanction is necessary under Section 143 of the Gram Panchayats Act because the stealing of the gold chain does not fall within the ambit of the course of the duty of the Executive Officer or the Bill Collector. As such the order of the learned Sessions Judge is correct and the reference is accepted. The learned Magistrate will proceed with the case as per the provisions of law.