Bharat Hybrid Seeds and Agro Enterprises and anr. Vs. the State - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- maximssections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] ghee as a live stock product held, [per v.v.s. rao & n.v. ramana, jj - majority] since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. the first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. the shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. by simmering unsalted butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. so to say, milk is converted to dahi, then butter. scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. it would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the act used the plural products of livestock. the legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the act. thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in section 2(xv) of the act. whatever products are declared as such by the government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the act. consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under section 3(1) read with section 3(3) of the act on them it is competent for the government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [per p.s. narayana, j,(dissenting)]if livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. in view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] declaration of notified area held, it is only under section 3 that government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. it is very conspicuous that section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. thus, except ordaining government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under section 3(3) of the act nowhere much less under section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. when the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. in such a case, maxim, expressum facit cessare tacitum (when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. section 7: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] levy of market fee element of quid pro quo - held, levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of sttaes taxing power. there is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. it is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified. expressum facit cessare tacitum sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] meaning when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. - 66 of 1977, observed that while taking cognizance of the complaint, he had taken into consideration that investigation had to be made at kurnool, yellandu, kothagudem and bangalore which were situated in two states end that he was satisfied that delay in filing the complaint was unavoidable and properly explained. pc enables the court to extend time while taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. 4. in the present case, there is no doubt that the lower court was satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay had been properly explained. however there must be a well-laid practice in the matter of extending the period of limitation. however, section 473 enables the court to extend that period if it is satisfied that the delay has been properly explained. consequently, the lower court thought that reasons for condonation of the delay could be given after the accused entered their appearance, though it was satisfied that the delay was satisfactorily explained even at the time of taking cognizance of the offence. going by its finding that it wag satisfied about the explanation given for the delay even at the time of taking cognizance of the offence, i dismiss this petition for quashing the proceeding.ordersambasiva rao, j.1. this petition for quashing the entire proceedings in c. c. no. 17 of 1977 on the file of the special judicial second class magistrate, kurnool, is filed under section 482 cr.pc the petitioner, a firm end its managing partner, were charged with the offence under section 7 read with section 19(a), seeds act. the offence is alleged to have been committed on 7th sept. 1973. the complaint was lodged on 8th nov. 1976. the punishment that can be imposed for the alleged offence, even if it is proved and a conviction is based thereon, is only a fine; and, therefore, as prescribed by section 468 (2) (a), the period of limitation for taking cognizance of such an offence is only six months. in this case, there is no doubt that the case has been filed long after the expiry of the period of six months which is the period of limitation. however, the court took cognisance of the case. the present petitioners, when they appeared as accused, filed crl. m. p. no. 66 of 1977 for throwing out the complaint as time-barred and to acquit them. the lower court refused to comply with this application and so the accused have filed the present application for quashing the entire proceedings.2. sri s. venkata reddy appearing for the petitioners, contends that, admittedly, the cognizance of the offence for which a period of six months is fixed as limitation, was taken long after the expiry of that period. the complainant did not give satisfactory explanation for the long delay that elapsed between the commission of the offence and the filing of the complaint. what all was stated in the complaint is,the inquiry has been conducted in different places in andhra pradesh and karnataka states, and thus there was delay in filing the complaint.the learned magistrate, while rejecting crl. m. p. no. 66 of 1977, observed that while taking cognizance of the complaint, he had taken into consideration that investigation had to be made at kurnool, yellandu, kothagudem and bangalore which were situated in two states end that he was satisfied that delay in filing the complaint was unavoidable and properly explained. since the accused were not then present on the scene and he took cognizance, he did not pass any specific order in writing. he took cognizance of the complaint under section 190(1)(a), crl. p. c. he said that the actual reason for extending the period of limitation and taking cognisance of the complaint, though it was presented after the prescribed period of limitation, could be given at a later stage when the point was raised and after giving opportunity to both sides to be heard. he concluded the order saying that delay in filing the complaint was properly explained and it was necessary to take cognizance of the offence in the interests of justice. he accordingly condoned the delay under section 473 cr.pc3. section 473, cr.pc enables the court to extend time while taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice.4. in the present case, there is no doubt that the lower court was satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay had been properly explained. since investigation had to take place in several places in the states of andhra pradesh and karnataka, the delay occurred. i do not think i would be justified in interfering with this judicial exercise of the discretion vested in the lower court. however there must be a well-laid practice in the matter of extending the period of limitation.5. the cr.pc does not contain any procedure for condoning the delay in filing the complaint and extending time of the period of limitation. section 468 and other provisions prescribe the period of limitation for taking cognizance. in fact, section 468 imposes a bar on the court in taking cognizance of offences which are brought to its notice after the prescribed period of limitation. however, section 473 enables the court to extend that period if it is satisfied that the delay has been properly explained. it must be noted that once the period of limitation prescribed under the code or any other law for launching a prosecution has expired, certain rights would accrue to the accused to the effect that there would be no prosecution thereafter. it is true that the court is clothed with power to extend time if it so thinks fit on the basis of the evidence adduced by the complainant. when the court extends that time, it means it is interfering with the rights of the accused which have vested in him by virtue of the expiry of the period of limitation. therefore, even though there is no rule of law requiring the court to issue notice to the proposed accused and to give him an opportunity for meeting the case of the complainant in regard to the extension of time, interests of justice and principles of natural justice require that the condonation of the delay and extension of time can be done only after giving a reasonable opportunity to the proposed accused. it would be violating the very principles of natural justice and, in fact, the very spirit of the administration of justice, if a party is prosecuted in a court of law after the period prescribed for the launching of the prosecution has been over and without giving him an opportunity to explain his case 3is to why the delay should not be condoned. absence of a rule of law shall not enable the courts to extend time for filing prosecution without hearing the proposed accused. this rule of practice which is necessarily a rule of justice, must always be followed i am supported in this view by a decision of the madhya pradesh high court in krishna y. state of m. p. 1977 cri. lj 90.6. however, the decision of the calcutta high court in c. r. irani v. state 1977 cri lj 160 (cal) lays down that reasons for the extension of time can be given by the court even in a later stage when the accused enter their appearance and object to the prosecution having been barred by: limitation. as i have said it is not only desirable but also essential in the interests of justice that even before cognizance of the offence is taken by the court after the period of limitation, it should be given notice and opportunity to the proposed accused and satisfy itself as to the adequacy of the reason for the delay. this rule of practice should always the followed by courts.7. now, having laid down the procedure as to how to extend the period of limitation after the expiry of the prescribed period, the question arises as to whether the proceedings in this case should be quashed. as far as i am aware, there are no decided cases of this court on this aspect. consequently, the lower court thought that reasons for condonation of the delay could be given after the accused entered their appearance, though it was satisfied that the delay was satisfactorily explained even at the time of taking cognizance of the offence. going by its finding that it wag satisfied about the explanation given for the delay even at the time of taking cognizance of the offence, i dismiss this petition for quashing the proceeding. i am certain that the courts will hereafter follow the procedure which i have indicated above while taking cognizance of the offence.

Judgment:
ORDER

Sambasiva Rao, J.

1. This petition for quashing the entire proceedings in C. C. No. 17 of 1977 on the file of the Special Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Kurnool, is filed Under Section 482 Cr.PC The petitioner, a firm end its Managing Partner, were charged with the offence Under Section 7 read with Section 19(a), Seeds Act. The offence is alleged to have been committed on 7th Sept. 1973. The complaint was lodged on 8th Nov. 1976. The punishment that can be imposed for the alleged offence, even if it is proved and a conviction is based thereon, is only a fine; and, therefore, as prescribed by Section 468 (2) (a), the period of limitation for taking cognizance of such an offence is only six months. In this case, there is no doubt that the case has been filed long after the expiry of the period of six months which is the period of limitation. However, the Court took cognisance of the case. The present petitioners, when they appeared as accused, filed Crl. M. P. No. 66 of 1977 for throwing out the complaint as time-barred and to acquit them. The Lower Court refused to comply with this application and so the accused have filed the present application for quashing the entire proceedings.

2. Sri S. Venkata Reddy appearing for the petitioners, contends that, admittedly, the cognizance of the offence for which a period of six months is fixed as limitation, was taken long after the expiry of that period. The complainant did not give satisfactory explanation for the long delay that elapsed between the commission of the offence and the filing of the complaint. What all was stated in the complaint is,

The inquiry has been conducted in different places in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka States, and thus there was delay in filing the complaint.

The learned Magistrate, while rejecting Crl. M. P. No. 66 of 1977, observed that while taking cognizance of the complaint, he had taken into consideration that investigation had to be made at Kurnool, Yellandu, Kothagudem and Bangalore which were situated in two States end that he was satisfied that delay in filing the complaint was unavoidable and properly explained. Since the accused were not then present on the scene and he took cognizance, he did not pass any specific order in writing. He took cognizance of the complaint Under Section 190(1)(a), Crl. P. C. He said that the actual reason for extending the period of limitation and taking cognisance of the complaint, though it was presented after the prescribed period of limitation, could be given at a later stage when the point was raised and after giving opportunity to both sides to be heard. He concluded the order saying that delay in filing the complaint was properly explained and it was necessary to take cognizance of the offence in the interests of justice. He accordingly condoned the delay Under Section 473 Cr.PC

3. Section 473, Cr.PC enables the court to extend time while taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice.

4. In the present case, there is no doubt that the lower court was satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay had been properly explained. Since investigation had to take place in several places in the States of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, the delay occurred. I do not think I would be justified in interfering with this judicial exercise of the discretion vested in the Lower Court. However there must be a well-laid practice in the matter of extending the period of limitation.

5. The Cr.PC does not contain any procedure for condoning the delay in filing the complaint and extending time of the period of limitation. Section 468 and other provisions prescribe the period of limitation for taking cognizance. In fact, Section 468 imposes a bar on the Court in taking cognizance of offences which are brought to its notice after the prescribed period of limitation. However, Section 473 enables the Court to extend that period if it is satisfied that the delay has been properly explained. It must be noted that once the period of limitation prescribed under the Code or any other law for launching a prosecution has expired, certain rights would accrue to the accused to the effect that there would be no prosecution thereafter. It is true that the Court is clothed with power to extend time if it so thinks fit on the basis of the evidence adduced by the complainant. When the Court extends that time, it means it is interfering with the rights of the accused which have vested in him by virtue of the expiry of the period of limitation. Therefore, even though there is no rule of law requiring the court to issue notice to the proposed accused and to give him an opportunity for meeting the case of the complainant in regard to the extension of time, interests of justice and principles of natural justice require that the condonation of the delay and extension of time can be done only after giving a reasonable opportunity to the proposed accused. It would be violating the very principles of natural justice and, in fact, the very spirit of the administration of justice, if a party is prosecuted in a Court of law after the period prescribed for the launching of the prosecution has been over and without giving him an opportunity to explain his case 3iS to why the delay should not be condoned. Absence of a rule of law shall not enable the Courts to extend time for filing prosecution without hearing the proposed accused. This rule of practice which is necessarily a rule of justice, must always be followed I am supported in this view by a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Krishna y. State of M. P. 1977 Cri. LJ 90.

6. However, the decision of the Calcutta High Court in C. R. Irani v. State 1977 Cri LJ 160 (Cal) lays down that reasons for the extension of time can be given by the Court even in a later stage when the accused enter their appearance and object to the prosecution having been barred by: limitation. As I have said it is not only desirable but also essential in the interests of justice that even before cognizance of the offence is taken by the Court after the period of limitation, it should be given notice and opportunity to the proposed accused and satisfy itself as to the adequacy of the reason for the delay. This rule of practice should always the followed by Courts.

7. Now, having laid down the procedure as to how to extend the period of limitation after the expiry of the prescribed period, the question arises as to whether the proceedings in this case should be quashed. As far as I am aware, there are no decided cases of this Court on this aspect. Consequently, the Lower Court thought that reasons for condonation of the delay could be given after the accused entered their appearance, though it was satisfied that the delay was satisfactorily explained even at the time of taking cognizance of the offence. Going by its finding that it wag satisfied about the explanation given for the delay even at the time of taking cognizance of the offence, I dismiss this petition for quashing the proceeding. I am certain that the Courts will hereafter follow the procedure which I have indicated above while taking cognizance of the offence.