Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:

Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120]
Code Context
                                echo "<div class='table-bordered'><b>Excerpt:</b><br/>";

                                    if (trim($desc['Judgement']['casenote'])) {

                                        echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['casenote']))), $query);
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120]
Code Context
                                echo "<div class='table-bordered'><b>Excerpt:</b><br/>";

                                    if (trim($desc['Judgement']['casenote'])) {

                                        echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['casenote']))), $query);
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

family - bequeathing property - section 106 of indian succession act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy. - maximssections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] ghee as a live stock product held, [per v.v.s. rao & n.v. ramana, jj - majority] since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. the.....

Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]
Code Context
                                    }

                                //highest occurence of word in the judgement

                                echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]
Code Context
                                    }

                                //highest occurence of word in the judgement

                                echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

chandra reddy, c.j.1. these appeals are under clause 15 of the letters patent against the judgment of our learned brother, bhimasankaram j., in s. a. nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.2. the plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. he instituted two suits (o. s. nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the d. m. c. nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under exhibits b.12 and b.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. the facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. one hanumantha reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in.....

Judgment:

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 0
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Chandra Reddy, C.J.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 1
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 2
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 3
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 4
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 5
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 6
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 7
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 8
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 9
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 10
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 11
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 12
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.''

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 13
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 14
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 15
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 16
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 17
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 18
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 19
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 20
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 21
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 22
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 23
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 24
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 25
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 26
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 27
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 28
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '432119',
			'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
			'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
			'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
			'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Family;Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '432119',
		(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Koppula Surareddy Died and ors Vs Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors - Citation 432119 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '432119',
		'acts' => 'Hindu Law; <a href="/act/52003/indian-succession-act-1925-complete-act">Succession Act, 1925</a> - Sections 106',
		'appealno' => 'Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1958',
		'appellant' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Koppula Surareddy (Died) and ors. Vs. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Family - bequeathing property - Section 106 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 - property bequeathed by will in favour of wife and son - under terms of will on death of son wife will enjoy property - whether will creates joint tenancy or enables survivor to enjoy property - matter to be decided according to of testator - intention can be derived from language of will - under circumstance intention of testator was that wife should enjoy property on death of son - joint gift cannot be construed as joint tenancy - held, gift did not create joint tenancy.


 - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product  Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ -  Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted  butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then  butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. 

Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area  Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. 

Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee  Element of quid pro quo -  Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion  of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified.  

Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.  -  But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus. 13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. 17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => 'X X                      X                      X                        X',
		'counselplain' => 'A. Kuppuswamy, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'A. Bhujanga Rao, Adv. for ;R. Ramalinga Reddi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1959-11-04',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Chandra Reddy, C.J. and ;Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.</p><p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.</p><p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :</p><p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.</p><p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. </p><p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.</p><p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.</p><p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.</p><p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.</p><p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.</p><p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.</p><p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;</p><p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' </p><p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.</p><p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.</p><p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.</p><p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.</p><p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.</p><p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.</p><p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.</p><p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.</p><p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :</p><p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'</p><p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.</p><p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.</p><p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.</p><p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.</p><p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.</p><p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1960AP368',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Koppula Venkata Subbareddi and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Family;Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '432119',
	(int) 1 => 'koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/432119/koppula-surareddy-died-vs-venkata-subbareddi'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Chandra Reddy, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. These appeals are under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J., in S. A. Nos. 923 and 924 of 3953.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals. He instituted two suits (O. S. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1950 on the file of the D. M. C. Nandyal) impeaching two alienations made by the 1st defendant, under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 dated 27-8-1937, and for a declaration in both the suits that' the relative alienations would not bind the reversion. The facts which have contributed to this litigation lie in a narrow compass and could be narrated in a few words. One Hanumantha Reddy, who was a divided brother of the appellant, had an only son who was afflicted with serious illness and which caused an apprehension in the mind of Hanumantha Reddy that his son might not survive long. He, therefore, made a will dated 18th June 1923 (Ex. B. 45), the relevant contents of which are given, hereunder :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'I have a son by name Sanjeevi Reddi who is aged only three years. He and I have been suffering from very serious illness. But apprehending that both of us may not recover from the illness we have been suffering from, I have made the following provision that after my death, both my wife and my son Sanjeevi Reddi shall enjoy the entire movable and immovable properties, the cattle, etc. which belong to me.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> X X X X X This will, undeniably, reveals the intention of the testator that his properties should be enjoyed by his wife and son and none else, and that they should not go to his divided brother, i.e., the present plaintiff. Subsequently, two daughters were born to him, Subbamma, the 1st defendant herein and China Subbamma. Sanjeevi Reddi died in 1925. Despite this, Hanumantha Reddi did not think ot altering the will. He passed away on 17th October 1931. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. On the assumption that she got the whole property under the will by reason of the death of her only son, Lingamma made a gift of it to the 1st defendant, as China Subbamma had pre-deceased her. Lingamma died within a month of this settlement. After coming into possession of these properties, the first defendant alienated them under Exhibits B.12 and B.13 in favour of the second defendant in O. S. No. 293 of 1950 and the pre-decessor-in-interest of defendants 2 and 3 in O. S. No. 294 of 1950. Several years thereafter, the present litigation was started by the divided brother of Hanumantha Reddi for purposes mentioned above.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The basis of these two suits was that the will was inoperative, that on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi the gift in his favour had lapsed, that in the other half Lingamma had only a life estate, that on her death the whole of the estate of Hanumantha Reddy devolved on the plaintiff and that, consequently, the sales were invalid and would not bind the reversion.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. The defence was that the will could not be impeached on any ground and that as the gift was a joint one, the whole property was taken by Lingamma on the death of Sanjeevi Reddi and, consequently, no exception could be taken to the alienations.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The trial court, agreeing with the objection of the defendants, dismissed the suits. In its opinion, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925) was applicable to the will in question.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>7. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act were inapplicable to the will in question, as it was executed before 1-1-1927, that no reliance could be placed on Section 106 in construing the will in question and that the dispositions in favour of Sanjeevi Reddi and Lingamma made them ten ants-in-common and, therefore, the share of Sanjeevi Reddi vested in the testator. The Subordinate Judge did not consider whether Lingamma did not get her moiety absolutely and whelher the sales in regard to her share were not good. In the result, he decreed the suit in toto. The aggrieved defendants brought two second appeals against the decrees and judgment of the lower appellate court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>8. In the second appeals no attack was directed against the will. It was further conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the validity of the sales could be challenged only to the extent they bore on the share of Sanjeevi Reddi and they were effective as regards the other moiety of Lingamma. The learned Judge, who heard the second appeals, thought that the intention of the testator, as could be gathered from the document, was not to give his property to his wife and son in two distinct shares but to confer a right on them to the property jointly and that the principle underlying Section 108 of the Indian Succession Act governed the instant case. In this view, he allowed the appeals preferred by the defendant and dismissed the suit in toto. He, however, granted leave under Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, these appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>9. The main point for consideration in these appeals is whether the construction placed by the learned Judge, namely, that the gift was a joint one, is correct. Before we proceed to consider the cases cited by Sri Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the appellant, and the circumstances attending the execution of the will, it is convenient to read section 106 of the Indian Succession Act which is called in aid by the learned Judge in interpreting the will. It reads;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'If a legacy is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. Illustration : The legacy is simply to A and B. A dies before the testator. B takes the legacy.'' ',
	(int) 13 => '<p>This section, in terms, could not apply as this governs only wills executed after 1-1-1927, as could be seen from Section 57 read with III Schedule. It had extended the operation of the rule embodied in Section 106 only to wills made after 1-1-1927. Therefore, the question is whether the principle enshrined in this section could be invoked in regard to wills made prior to 1-1-1927.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Kuppuswami that as joint tenancy is unknown in Hindu law, a gift made to two individuals by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law should be deemed to be in equal shares and that the donees or the legatees, as the case may be, would take it only as tenants-in-common.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. The foundation for this argument is the ruling of the Privy Council in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramachandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal 670. There a Hindu testator made a bequest of a four anna share of a Zamindari to his youngest wife, Durga Kumari and her son for their maintenance with a right to alienate this property by sale or gift. Some time after the death of her husband, Durga Kumari sold the property without any reference to her son. The question arose whether the alienation made by the widow without the consent of the other legatee was ineffectual.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Ultimately, when the matter came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council, they upheld the sale in the view that the legatees did not become joint tenants in the sense of English law and the alienation of her share before it was served was effective. Their Lordships observed that the principle of joint tenancy was unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided Hindu family.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>They overruled Vydi'nada v. Nagammal, ILR 11 Mad 258, which applied the principle of joint tenancy to the case of a will by a Hindu, observing that the Judges of the Madras High Court were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>12. This rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mt. Bahurani v. Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 PC 72. The doctrine of these cases was followed by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami v. Avayambal, AIR 1933 Mad 204 and Seshureddi v. Mallareddi, AIR 1935 Mad 852. It is now well settled that the concept of joint tenancy as understood in English law is foreign to Hindu law and, therefore, could not be imported in construing the wills made by Hindus.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>13. We have now to consider whether the principle enunciated in ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC), and that line of cases governs a will like the present one. In our opinion, without extending the rule of joint tenancy as understood in English law, a gift in favour of two or three individuals could be interpreted as a joint one, enabling the survivor of them to enjoy the subject matter of the bequest wholly. A joint gift does not involve the notion that they take the property as joint tenants as conceived in English Conveyancing.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>It cannot be postulated that whenever a gift is made to two or more jointly they take it only as tenants-in-common, irrespective of the intention of the donor. It all depends On the intention of the testator as could be gathered from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Such a construction does not in any way violate principles of Hindu law.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>14. In this view of ours, we are supported by the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nandi Singh v. Sitaram, ILR 16 Cal 677. In that case, the last male-holder executed a deed of gift of the property in dispute to his daughter and her husband and the gift was invalid as regards his son-in-law. For that reason, it was contended that the whole gift lapsed. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council in agreement with the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh who upheld the gift. In repelling the contrary proposition, their Lordships observed thus :',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'The gift is to the two donees jointly, and in Humphrey v. Tayleur (Ambler, 138) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said : 'If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable shall take the whole.' This principle does not depend upon any peculiarity in English law, and is applicable to this deed of gift.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>It is immediately clear that their Lordships were making a distinction between a gift in favour of two persons jointly and the creation of joint tenancy, peculiar in English law. This being the position, we are unable to accede to the contention pressed upon us by Sri Kuppuswami that this decision of the Privy Council runs counter to ILR 23 Cal 670 (PC) as also AIR 1933 PC 72.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. It must be mentioned here that in no subsequent case was this dissented from by the Privy Council. That being the situation, we should take it that the two sets of decisions embody two different principles, one stating that a joint gift is valid and the other enunciating the doctrine that joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. Further, Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act does not embody any principle of law but it contains only a rule of construction of statutes. It is not as if for the first time the legislature was introducing a new concept as applicable to wills made by Hindus. The legislature merely laid down the rule fo enable Courts in construing wills. It is axiomatic that Courts should ascertain the wishes and the indentions of the testator in construing a will.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narasimha v. Parthasarathy, ILR 37 Mad 199 (PC), the Courts must consider 'the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationships, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The Court is entitled to put itself into a testator's arm-chair.' Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that although Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act in itself is inapplicable, the rule underlying it could be made use of in construing a will of this type.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>17. Now, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator and considering the will as a whole and the attendant circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the testator was that the property should be solely enjoyed by his wife and son. He was also conscious of the fact that his son might not survive long, which means that in the event of the death of his son, he wanted that his wife should take the property as a whole and that under no circumstances should the property be inherited by his brother. There is no scope on the language ofthe will to interpret it as creating a tenancy in common. It is clear that the wish of the testator was thathis wife and son should enjoy the property together.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>18. For these reasons, we agree with the conclusions of our learned brother, Bhimasankaram J.,and dismiss these appeals with costs.',
	(int) 29 => ''
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 30
$i = (int) 29
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109