Kalagarla Appalaraju Vs. Assistant Inspector of Labour and anr. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- maximssections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] ghee as a live stock product held, [per v.v.s. rao & n.v. ramana, jj - majority] since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. the first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. the shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. by simmering unsalted butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. so to say, milk is converted to dahi, then butter. scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. it would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the act used the plural products of livestock. the legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the act. thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in section 2(xv) of the act. whatever products are declared as such by the government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the act. consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under section 3(1) read with section 3(3) of the act on them it is competent for the government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [per p.s. narayana, j,(dissenting)]if livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. in view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] declaration of notified area held, it is only under section 3 that government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. it is very conspicuous that section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. thus, except ordaining government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under section 3(3) of the act nowhere much less under section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. when the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. in such a case, maxim, expressum facit cessare tacitum (when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. section 7: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] levy of market fee element of quid pro quo - held, levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of sttaes taxing power. there is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. it is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified. expressum facit cessare tacitum sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] meaning when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. - in this case, the offence, as already stated, had been committed on 15-9-1967 and the complaint in this case was filed on 18-7-1970. it is clearly beyond six months and therefore the corn-plaint is barred by time.a.d.v. reddy, j.1. the owner of a petrol bunk at visakapatnam, who had commenced his business on 25-8-1965 and had engaged one p. venkatarao as the manager, was prosecuted for the violation of rule 32 of the rules framed under the shops and establishments act, for not furnishing the said venkatarao the letter of appointment in form 's' an offence punishable under section 56 (3) of the act and also under rule 33 of the rules framed under the act. the evidence adduced was that when p. w. 1 the assistant labour inspector visited the petrol bunk at 9-30 a. m. on 13-2-1970 he found that no such order of appointment has been issued and that he gave notice and waited for three months and thereafter also the defect was not rectified and hence the complaint.2. the magistrate accepting the evidence, convicted the accused and sentenced him to pay a fine of rs. 25/-. on a revision filed before the sessions judge, he has made a reference under section 438, criminal procedure code to this court for setting aside the conviction, as the prosecution was barred by time.3. there is no dispute that the accused had started his business of running the petrol bunk on 25-8-1965. there is also no dispute that p. venkatarao was appointed as manager of the bunk at that time. at the time of the appointment, there was no duty cast on the owner to issue any appointment order. under section 60 (4) of the act, a duty was cast on the employer to give an order of appointment within three months from the date of the commencement of the act. the act came into force on 15-6-1967 under g. o. ms. no. 990 home labour-v-department dated 6-6-1967, published in the andhra pradesh gazette dated 15-6-1967. it was incumbent on the accused to have issued the appointment order within 15-9-1967. by not.issuing that order within that prescribed time, he had committed the offence under section 56 (3) of the act read with rule 33 of the rules framed under the act.4. section 56 (3) of the act provides that for the contravention of any rule made under section 62 of the act, a complaint should be lodged within six months from the date on which the offence or contravention is alleged to have been committed. in this case, the offence, as already stated, had been committed on 15-9-1967 and the complaint in this case was filed on 18-7-1970. it is clearly beyond six months and therefore the corn-plaint is barred by time.5. the reference is therefore accepted. the conviction and sentence of the accused under rule 33 of the rules framed under the shops and establishments act are set aside and he is acquitted of the charge. fine, if paid will be refunded to the accused.