Tci Finance Limited Vs. Deputy Transport Commissioner, Vijayawada and Others - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
motor vehicles - incorporation of hire purchase agreement - section 51 (1) of motor vehicles act, 1988 - subsequent application of financier to incorporate hire purchase agreement in certificate of registration - registering authority not liable to entertain such application made after issuance of certificate - held, rejection of application justified. - maximssections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] ghee as a live stock product held, [per v.v.s. rao & n.v. ramana, jj - majority] since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. the first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. the shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. by simmering unsalted butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. so to say, milk is converted to dahi, then butter. scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. it would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the act used the plural products of livestock. the legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the act. thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in section 2(xv) of the act. whatever products are declared as such by the government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the act. consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under section 3(1) read with section 3(3) of the act on them it is competent for the government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [per p.s. narayana, j,(dissenting)]if livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. in view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] declaration of notified area held, it is only under section 3 that government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. it is very conspicuous that section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. thus, except ordaining government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under section 3(3) of the act nowhere much less under section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. when the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. in such a case, maxim, expressum facit cessare tacitum (when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. section 7: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] levy of market fee element of quid pro quo - held, levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of sttaes taxing power. there is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. it is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified. expressum facit cessare tacitum sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] meaning when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. - but, suffice it to say that a reading of section 51(1) of the act clearly mandates that such an entry should be made only at the time of making an application for registration.order1. this writ petition is filed assailing the order of the 1 st respondent, dated 12-5-1998, refusing to register the hire-purchase agreement in the registration certificate in respect of vehicles bearing nos. ap 16 w 838 and ap 16 w 848 which are registered in the names of 2nd and 3rd respondents.2. the petitioner is a financier. according to the averments in the petition, the petitioner has financed the 2nd and 3rd respondents for purchase of the above stated two vehicles in the year 1996. thereafter, the vehicles are registered in the names of 2nd and 3rd respondents. however, it is the case of the petitioner that for sometime the 2nd and 3rd respondents have paid the installments under the hire-purchase agreement but subsequently they committed default and thereafter the vehicles arc seized by the petitioner inpursuance of the hire purchase agreement. after the seizure, the petitioner made an application to the 1st respondent to effect the entry relating to hire-purchase agreement in the registration book and to issue the new registration book in favour of the petitioner as required under section 51 of the motor vehicles act. on an earlier occasion the petitioner approached this court for similar direction and the writ petition was disposed of with a direction that the application of the petitioner shall be considered in accordance with the rules and appropriate orders shall be passed. consequently, the authority passed an order on 12-5-1998. the said order is assailed before this court.3. the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that under section 51(1) of the motor vehicles act a duty is cast on the registering authority to make an entry in the registration book with regard to hire-purchase agreement in order to protect the interests of the financiers. the principal purpose for engrafting section 51 is to ensure that the financiers are not put to undue inconvenience and loss in case the registered owner commits default in payment of installments or of other terms and conditions of the hire-purchase agreement, lease deed or hypothecation deed. the learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the entry can be effected at any time after the registration of the vehicle. he submits that the 2nd and 3rd respondents in fact played fraud on the petitioner by not producing the hire-purchase agreement with the registering authority at the time of initial registration. the petitioner was under the bona fide impression that the 2nd and 3rd respondents had produced the agreement and got an entry made relating to hire-purchase agreement in the respective registration books. but, in reality, that has not been done and when vehicles were seized and the authorities were approached to make necessary entries in the registration certificate, it was found that there was no such entry. the learnedcounsel for the petitioner further submits that the order dated 12-5-1998 is illegal and contrary to the rules.4. on the other hand, the learned government pleader submits that the action was not taken under section 51 of the act since the petitioner did not submit the hire-purchase agreement at the time of making application for registration of the vehicles. it is not open for the 1st respondent to effect the same at a subsequent date.5. the learned counsel for the 2nd and 3rd respondents submits that there was no proper hire-purchase agreement as required under the law and, therefore, the same was not presented before the registering authority. however, it is open for the petitioner to proceed under the common law if there are any violations of the agreement.6. for proper appreciation of the case, it is necessary to consider section 51 of the act. however, in this case we are only concerned with the initial registration of the vehicle but not with a transfer after registration. only sub-section (1) of section 51 of the act applies in this case. the same is extracted hereunder:'section 51. special provisions regarding motor vehicle subject to hire-purchase agreement, etc. : (1) where the application for registration of a motor vehicle which is held under a hire-purchase, lease or hypothecation agreement (hereafter in this section referred to as the said agreement) is made, the registering authority shall make an entry in the certificate of registration regarding the existence of the said agreement.' 7. the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that when an application for registration of the motor vehicle which is held under hire-purchase agreement, lease deed or hypothecation deed is made theregistering authority shall make an entry in the certificate of registration about the existence of the said agreement or deed. he further submits that it is not only at the time of making application for registration but also at a later stage that the authorities are under the obligation to make such an entry when the necessary papers are presented by the financier in this regard. he submits that by inadvertence and under bonafide impression that the hire-purchase agreement must have been produced by the beneficiaries, the petitioner did not take steps to see whether the entry is made in the registration certificate or not. but we are not concerned with it. in this case we are confining ourselves to section 51(1) of the act. a bare reading of the said section would only lead to a conclusion that any entry relating to the hire-purchase agreement has to b made only at the time of making application for registration of a vehicle viz., at the time of registration of a vehicle. if such an entry is not made at that point of time there is no provision under section 51 to present the papers at a subsequent stage and get an endorsement to that effect though the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that such a procedure is being followed by the authorities and there should not be any objection for making an entry in the registration certificate, i am not inclined to consider this aspect. if the authorities are following a procedure which is not contemplated under the act, it is for them to take necessary consequences. but, suffice it to say that a reading of section 51(1) of the act clearly mandates that such an entry should be made only at the time of making an application for registration. if the hire-purchase agreement or lease deed or hypothecation deed is filed along with the application for registration of a vehicle, in such an event, an obligation is cast on the authority to make the entry in the certificate of registration. but, however, once the certificate of registration is issued there is no obligation cast on the registering authority to make such entries subsequently, more especially, when the agreement was existingon the date of application for registration. the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the 2nd and 3rd respondents played fraud on the petitioner and, therefore, this court has to protect the interests of the financier. i am unable to agree with this contention. however, it is open for the petitioner to pursue the appropriate remedy as available under the law. therefore, i have to necessarily hold that the order of the is1 respondent cannot be found fault with even though he considered section 51(2) of the act which is not relevant for the purpose of this case and the refusal by the 1 st respondent to make an entry with regard to hire-purchase agreement cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary.8. thus, i do not see any merit in thewrit petition. it is accordingly dismissed.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. This writ petition is filed assailing the order of the 1 st respondent, dated 12-5-1998, refusing to register the hire-purchase agreement in the registration certificate in respect of vehicles bearing Nos. AP 16 W 838 and AP 16 W 848 which are registered in the names of 2nd and 3rd respondents.

2. The petitioner is a financier. According to the averments in the petition, the petitioner has financed the 2nd and 3rd respondents for purchase of the above stated two vehicles in the year 1996. Thereafter, the vehicles are registered in the names of 2nd and 3rd respondents. However, it is the case of the petitioner that for sometime the 2nd and 3rd respondents have paid the installments under the hire-purchase agreement but subsequently they committed default and thereafter the vehicles arc seized by the petitioner inpursuance of the hire purchase agreement. After the seizure, the petitioner made an application to the 1st respondent to effect the entry relating to hire-purchase agreement in the registration book and to issue the new registration book in favour of the petitioner as required under Section 51 of the Motor Vehicles Act. On an earlier occasion the petitioner approached this Court for similar direction and the writ petition was disposed of with a direction that the application of the petitioner shall be considered in accordance with the rules and appropriate orders shall be passed. Consequently, the authority passed an order on 12-5-1998. The said order is assailed before this Court.

3. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that under Section 51(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act a duty is cast on the registering authority to make an entry in the registration book with regard to hire-purchase agreement in order to protect the interests of the financiers. The principal purpose for engrafting Section 51 is to ensure that the financiers are not put to undue inconvenience and loss in case the registered owner commits default in payment of installments or of other terms and conditions of the hire-purchase agreement, lease deed or hypothecation deed. the learned Counsel for the petitioner also submits that the entry can be effected at any time after the registration of the vehicle. He submits that the 2nd and 3rd respondents in fact played fraud on the petitioner by not producing the hire-purchase agreement with the registering authority at the time of initial registration. The petitioner was under the bona fide impression that the 2nd and 3rd respondents had produced the agreement and got an entry made relating to hire-purchase agreement in the respective registration books. But, in reality, that has not been done and when vehicles were seized and the authorities were approached to make necessary entries in the registration certificate, it was found that there was no such entry. The learnedCounsel for the petitioner further submits that the order dated 12-5-1998 is illegal and contrary to the rules.

4. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader submits that the action was not taken under Section 51 of the Act since the petitioner did not submit the hire-purchase agreement at the time of making application for registration of the vehicles. It is not open for the 1st respondent to effect the same at a subsequent date.

5. the learned Counsel for the 2nd and 3rd respondents submits that there was no proper hire-purchase agreement as required under the law and, therefore, the same was not presented before the registering authority. However, it is open for the petitioner to proceed under the common law if there are any violations of the agreement.

6. For proper appreciation of the case, it is necessary to consider Section 51 of the Act. However, in this case we are only concerned with the initial registration of the vehicle but not with a transfer after registration. Only sub-section (1) of Section 51 of the Act applies in this case. the same is extracted hereunder:

'Section 51. Special provisions regarding motor vehicle subject to hire-purchase agreement, etc. :

(1) Where the application for registration of a motor vehicle which is held under a hire-purchase, lease or hypothecation agreement (hereafter in this Section referred to as the said agreement) is made, the registering authority shall make an entry in the certificate of registration regarding the existence of the said agreement.'

7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that when an application for registration of the motor vehicle which is held under hire-purchase agreement, lease deed or hypothecation deed is made theregistering authority shall make an entry in the certificate of registration about the existence of the said agreement or deed. He further submits that it is not only at the time of making application for registration but also at a later stage that the authorities are under the obligation to make such an entry when the necessary papers are presented by the financier in this regard. He submits that by inadvertence and under bonafide impression that the hire-purchase agreement must have been produced by the beneficiaries, the petitioner did not take steps to see whether the entry is made in the registration certificate or not. but we are not concerned with it. In this case we are confining ourselves to Section 51(1) of the Act. A bare reading of the said Section would only lead to a conclusion that any entry relating to the hire-purchase agreement has to b made only at the time of making application for registration of a vehicle viz., at the time of registration of a vehicle. If such an entry is not made at that point of time there is no provision under Section 51 to present the papers at a subsequent stage and get an endorsement to that effect Though the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that such a procedure is being followed by the authorities and there should not be any objection for making an entry in the registration certificate, I am not inclined to consider this aspect. If the authorities are following a procedure which is not contemplated under the Act, it is for them to take necessary consequences. But, suffice it to say that a reading of Section 51(1) of the Act clearly mandates that such an entry should be made only at the time of making an application for registration. If the hire-purchase agreement or lease deed or hypothecation deed is filed along with the application for registration of a vehicle, in such an event, an obligation is cast on the authority to make the entry in the certificate of registration. But, however, once the certificate of registration is issued there is no obligation cast on the registering authority to make such entries subsequently, more especially, when the agreement was existingon the date of application for registration. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the 2nd and 3rd respondents played fraud on the petitioner and, therefore, this Court has to protect the interests of the financier. I am unable to agree with this contention. However, it is open for the petitioner to pursue the appropriate remedy as available under the law. Therefore, I have to necessarily hold that the order of the Is1 respondent cannot be found fault with even though he considered Section 51(2) of the Act which is not relevant for the purpose of this case and the refusal by the 1 st respondent to make an entry with regard to hire-purchase agreement cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary.

8. Thus, I do not see any merit in thewrit petition. It is accordingly dismissed.