The State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Chowdary Brothers - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
sales tax - auto rickshaws - section 2 (1) of andhra pradesh general sales tax act, 1957 - assessee collected charges of painting from its customers on separate bills - job of painting of auto rickshaws found to be an integral and inseparable part of transaction of sale of auto rickshaws effected by assessee - definition of 'turnover' contained in section 2 (1) is wide enough to take in all sums charged by assessee while selling auto rickshaws - order of tribunal granting exemption on turnover of assessee's business relating to collection of charges on painting auto rickshaws unjustified and erroneous. - maximssections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] ghee as a live stock product held, [per v.v.s. rao & n.v. ramana, jj - majority] since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. the first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. the shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. by simmering unsalted butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. so to say, milk is converted to dahi, then butter. scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. it would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the act used the plural products of livestock. the legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the act. thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in section 2(xv) of the act. whatever products are declared as such by the government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the act. consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under section 3(1) read with section 3(3) of the act on them it is competent for the government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [per p.s. narayana, j,(dissenting)]if livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. in view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] declaration of notified area held, it is only under section 3 that government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. it is very conspicuous that section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. thus, except ordaining government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under section 3(3) of the act nowhere much less under section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. when the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. in such a case, maxim, expressum facit cessare tacitum (when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. section 7: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] levy of market fee element of quid pro quo - held, levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of sttaes taxing power. there is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. it is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified. expressum facit cessare tacitum sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] meaning when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. g. ramanujulu naidu, j. 1. in these two revision cases preferred by the state against the orders of the sales tax appellate tribunal, a.p., hyderabad, the learned government pleader for commercial taxes appearing for the state urges that the tribunal is in error in granting exemption on the turnover of the assessee's business relating to collection of charges on painting auto rickshaws sold by the assessee. both the assessing authority and the assistant commissioner for commercial taxes (appeals), hyderabad, rejected the assessee's plea of exemption. 2. admittedly the job of painting of auto rickshaws sold by the assessee was executed by the assessee. in fact no auto rickshaw will be allowed to ply in the twin cities of hyderabad and secunderabad unless the same are painted with yellow colour. it is true that the assessee collected charges of painting from its customers on separate bills, but it must be observed that the job of painting of auto rickshaws was an integral and inseparable part of the transactions of sale of auto rickshaws effected by the assessee. the definition of 'turnover' contained in section 2(1)(s) of the a.p. general sales tax act, 1957 is wide enough to take in all sums charged by the assessee while parting with the auto rickshaws sold. the view taken by the tribunal is undoubtedly erroneous. we accordingly set aside that portion of the orders of the tribunal and partly allow both the tax revision cases. no costs. advocate's fee rs. 150 in each. 3. petitions partly allowed.