Andhra Pradesh Mills Ltd. Rajahmundary Rep. by Its Legal Officer N. Srinivasa Rao Vs. the Industrial Tribunal Cum Labour Court and anr. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- all india services act, 1951. sections 32(c) (as amended by section 3 of amendment act, 2005] & 10 & general clauses act, 1897, section 6: [g.s. singhvi, cj, dr.g. yethirajulu, ramesh ranganathan, g.bhavani prasad, c.v. nagarjuna reddy, jj] exemption of building from applicability of provisions of act held, (per majority) section 32(c) of the act provides that the provisions of the act shall not apply to any building the rent of which as on the date of the commencement of the a.p. buildings ( lease, rent and eviction) control (amendment) act 2005 exceeds rs.3,500/- per month in the areas covered by the municipal corporations in the state and rs.2,000/- per month in other areas. there is nothing in the provisions of the amendment act which either expressly or by necessary implication suggests that the act is given retrospective operation. section 32 (c) of the amendment act is prospective in operation and this provision does not affect the proceedings pending as on the date of its coming into force before the civil courts or appellate, revisional or executing courts. these cases are required to be decided without reference to and applications of the provisions of the amendment act, 2005. undisputedly when the landlords filed their suits, the rent prescribed in the notification in force for the purpose of exempting buildings was rs.1,000/- and above. the landlords were therefore entitled under common law to approach the civil courts for seeking eviction of their tenants by availing the remedy of civil suits. in the absence of the amended provision being given retrospective operation, the crystallised rights of landlords on dates of their filing the civil suits cannot be taken away by reading amended provisions of section 32 (c) into section 10(1) of the act. as the amendment act is not retrospective in operation pending proceedings are saved by the aforementioned provisions. therefore, apart from the vested rights acquired by the landlords in these cases, by application of section 6(c) and (e) of the general clauses act, 1897 and section 8(d) and (f) of the a.p. general clauses act, 1891, the landlords have got acquired or accrued right to continue the proceedings despite the coming into force of the amended provision. - - where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a labour court, tribunal or national tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the labour court, tribunal or national tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct re-instatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require: the material brought on record before the labour court was the same as that in the domestic enquiry and clearly indicated that there was sufficient proof to indict the second respondent/workman. in this regard, reference may be made to the observations of the supreme court in usha breco mazdoor sangh's case (2008)iillj945sc (supra). it is one thing to say that the finding of an enquiry officer is perverse or betrays the well-known doctrine of proportionality but it is another thing to say that only because two views are possible, the labour court shall interfere therewith. this is clearly a case of the labour court substituting its own view of the matter for that of the enquiring authority, which is unsustainable in law.orderp.s. narayana, j.1. the andhra pradesh paper mills limited, rajahmundry, the respondent in i.d. no. 87 of 1996 on the file of the industrial tribunal-cum-labour court, visakhapatnam (for brevity, ' the labour court') is before this court challenging the award dated 09.08.1999, whereby the labour court directed it to reinstate the second respondent/ workman in service with continuity of service but without back wages. the second respondent/workman was held entitled to wages from the date of filing of the i.d. till the date of his reinstatement.2. in spite of service of notice on the second respondent/ workman, he has not chosen to put in an appearance before this court, either in person or through counsel.3. heard sri vedula srinivas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/management. 4. it is his contention that the labour court, having held that the domestic enquiry conducted in this case was valid, ought not to have reappreciated the evidence, thereby coming to the conclusion that there was not 'much' evidence to support the termination of the second respondent/workman from service. the learned counsel submitted that once the labour court came to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry held against the second respondent/workman was valid and proper, unless specific circumstances exist warranting the labour court to re- appreciate the evidence, it was not open to the labour court to embark upon such an enquiry. he stated that no such special circumstances existed in the present case warranting the exercise undertaken by the labour court. learned counsel also pointed out that the labour court did not even record the reasons as to why it felt the necessity to re-appreciate the evidence and arrive at a contrary conclusion in so far as the guilt of second respondent/workman is concerned.5. the learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgments of the supreme court in west bokaro colliery (tisco ltd) v. ram pravesh singh : (2009)illj220sc and usha breco mazdoor sangh v. management of usha breco limited and anr. : (2008)iillj945sc in support of his contentions.6. the issue raised in this litigation revolves around the exercise of power by the labour court under section 11a of the industrial disputes act, 1947 (for brevity, 'the act of 1947'). section 11a reads as follows:-11a. power of labour courts, tribunals and national tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen:- where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a labour court, tribunal or national tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the labour court, tribunal or national tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct re-instatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require:provided that in any proceeding under this section the labour court, tribunal or national tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter.7. section 11a was introduced in the statute by way of an amendment vide act no. 45 of 1971 with effect from 15.12.1971. the section fell for consideration before the supreme court in the workmen of firestone tyre & rubber co. of india p. ltd. v. the management and ors. : (1973)illj278sc . the supreme court in paras 36 and 40 of the said judgment stated as hereunder:36. ...the tribunal is now at liberty to consider not only whether the finding of misconduct recorded by an employer is correct; but also to differ from the said finding if a proper case is made out. what was once largely in the realm of the satisfaction of the employer, has ceased to be so; and now it is the satisfaction of the tribunal that finally decides the matter.40. therefore, it will be seen that both in respect of cases where a domestic enquiry has been held as also in cases where the tribunal considers the matter on the evidence adduced before it for the first time, the satisfaction under section 11a, about the guilt or otherwise of the workman concerned, is that of the tribunal. it has to consider the evidence and come to a conclusion one way or other. even in cases where an enquiry has been held by an employer and a finding of misconduct arrived at, the tribunal can now differ from that finding in a proper case and hold that no misconduct is proved.8. a reading of the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel would show that while reiterating the principle laid down by it in its earlier judgment in firestone's case, the apex court expressed the opinion that it was not in every case that the labour court would be entitled, in exercise of its power under section 11a of the act of 1947, to re-appreciate and evaluate the evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry. in this regard, the observations of the supreme court in usha breco mazdoor sangh's case are apposite. .but, in a case where the materials brought on record by the enquiry officer fall for re-appreciation by the labour court, it should be slow to interfere therewith. it must come to a conclusion that the case was a 'proper' one therefor. the labour court shall not interfere with the findings of the enquiry officer only because it is lawful to do so. it would not take recourse thereto only because another view is possible. even assuming that, for all intent and purport, the labour court acts as an appellate authority over the judgment of the enquiry officer, it would exercise appropriate restraint. it must bear in mind that the enquiry officer also acts as a quasi-judicial body....9. it would also be relevant to refer to the opinion expressed by the supreme court in divl. controller, ksrtc (nwkrtc) v. a.t. mane : (2004)iiillj1074sc . from the above it is clear that once a domestic tribunal based on evidence comes to a particular conclusion, normally it is not open to the appellate tribunals and courts to substitute their subjective opinion in the place of the one arrived at by the domestic tribunal....10. the above judgment was referred to and relied upon by the supreme court in west bokaro colliery's case, wherein it reiterated that: .in a case where two views are possible on the evidence on record, then the industrial tribunal should be very slow in coming to a conclusion other than the one arrived at by the domestic tribunal by substituting its opinion in place of the opinion of the domestic tribunal.11. in the light of the afore stated legal position, it is pertinent to note that the labour court in the present case, having found that the enquiry conducted against the second respondent/workman was valid, gave no reasons, as to why it felt that this was a 'proper' case to re-appreciate the evidence. the material brought on record before the labour court was the same as that in the domestic enquiry and clearly indicated that there was sufficient proof to indict the second respondent/workman. even if the labour court was of the opinion that two views were possible on the basis of the said evidence, as held by the supreme court in the aforestated decisions, it was not open to the labour court to substitute its view and come to a contrary finding. further, the material before the labour court being the same as the material adduced in the domestic enquiry, the labour court normally ought not to undertake reappreciation of the same evidence unless any special circumstance is made out qualifying the case as a 'proper one' for such an exercise. this could be in the event of a manifestly perverse finding recorded in the domestic enquiry or the overlooking of material evidence or misinterpretation thereof by the enquiring authority. in this regard, reference may be made to the observations of the supreme court in usha breco mazdoor sangh's case : (2008)iillj945sc (supra). it is one thing to say that the finding of an enquiry officer is perverse or betrays the well-known doctrine of proportionality but it is another thing to say that only because two views are possible, the labour court shall interfere therewith. in other words, it is one thing to say that on the basis of the materials on record, the labour court comes to a conclusion that a verdict of guilt has been arrived at by the enquiry officer where the materials suggested otherwise but it is another thing to say that such a verdict was also a possible view.12. in the present case, the labour court did not come to the conclusion that there was any perversity in the findings of the domestic enquiry or that there were other circumstances warranting it to re-appreciate the evidence. further, the bald statement of the labour court that 'the evidence was not sufficient to come to the conclusion that the second respondent/workman had a dishonest intention in committing the theft or taking away the property of the management' is neither here nor there. this is clearly a case of the labour court substituting its own view of the matter for that of the enquiring authority, which is unsustainable in law. in such circumstances, i am of the opinion that this was not a case where the labour court could have re-appreciated the evidence and come to a contrary conclusion. given the fact that the domestic enquiry was already held to be valid and this was not a 'proper' case for reappreciation of the evidence, the finding of the labour court that the termination of the second respondent/workman from service was not justified is unsustainable and consequently the relief granted to the second respondent/workman cannot be upheld. 13. the writ petition is accordingly allowed, setting aside the award dated 09.08.1999 in i.d. no. 87 of 1996 on the file of the industrial tribunal-cum- labour court, visakhapatnam. in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

Judgment:
ORDER

P.S. Narayana, J.

1. The Andhra Pradesh Paper Mills Limited, Rajahmundry, the respondent in I.D. No. 87 of 1996 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Visakhapatnam (for brevity, ' the Labour Court') is before this Court challenging the Award dated 09.08.1999, whereby the Labour Court directed it to reinstate the second respondent/ workman in service with continuity of service but without back wages. The second respondent/workman was held entitled to wages from the date of filing of the I.D. till the date of his reinstatement.

2. In spite of service of notice on the second respondent/ workman, he has not chosen to put in an appearance before this Court, either in person or through counsel.

3. Heard Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner/management.

4. It is his contention that the Labour Court, having held that the domestic enquiry conducted in this case was valid, ought not to have reappreciated the evidence, thereby coming to the conclusion that there was not 'much' evidence to support the termination of the second respondent/workman from service. The learned Counsel submitted that once the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry held against the second respondent/workman was valid and proper, unless specific circumstances exist warranting the Labour Court to re- appreciate the evidence, it was not open to the Labour Court to embark upon such an enquiry. He stated that no such special circumstances existed in the present case warranting the exercise undertaken by the Labour Court. Learned Counsel also pointed out that the Labour Court did not even record the reasons as to why it felt the necessity to re-appreciate the evidence and arrive at a contrary conclusion in so far as the guilt of second respondent/workman is concerned.

5. The learned Counsel placed reliance upon the Judgments of the Supreme Court in West Bokaro Colliery (Tisco Ltd) v. Ram Pravesh Singh : (2009)ILLJ220SC and Usha Breco Mazdoor Sangh v. Management of Usha Breco Limited and Anr. : (2008)IILLJ945SC in support of his contentions.

6. The issue raised in this litigation revolves around the exercise of power by the Labour Court under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for brevity, 'the Act of 1947'). Section 11A reads as follows:-

11A. Power of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of Workmen:- Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct re-instatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require:Provided that in any proceeding under this Section the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter.

7. Section 11A was introduced in the statute by way of an amendment vide Act No. 45 of 1971 with effect from 15.12.1971. The Section fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in The Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India P. Ltd. v. The Management and Ors. : (1973)ILLJ278SC . The Supreme Court in paras 36 and 40 of the said Judgment stated as hereunder:

36. ...The Tribunal is now at liberty to consider not only whether the finding of misconduct recorded by an employer is correct; but also to differ from the said finding if a proper case is made out. What was once largely in the realm of the satisfaction of the employer, has ceased to be so; and now it is the satisfaction of the Tribunal that finally decides the matter.

40. Therefore, it will be seen that both in respect of cases where a domestic enquiry has been held as also in cases where the Tribunal considers the matter on the evidence adduced before it for the first time, the satisfaction under Section 11A, about the guilt or otherwise of the workman concerned, is that of the Tribunal. It has to consider the evidence and come to a conclusion one way or other. Even in cases where an enquiry has been held by an employer and a finding of misconduct arrived at, the Tribunal can now differ from that finding in a proper case and hold that no misconduct is proved.

8. A reading of the Judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel would show that while reiterating the principle laid down by it in its earlier judgment in FIRESTONE's case, the apex Court expressed the opinion that it was not in every case that the Labour Court would be entitled, in exercise of its power under Section 11A of the Act of 1947, to re-appreciate and evaluate the evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry. In this regard, the observations of the Supreme Court in Usha Breco Mazdoor Sangh's case are apposite. .But, in a case where the materials brought on record by the enquiry officer fall for re-appreciation by the Labour Court, it should be slow to interfere therewith. It must come to a conclusion that the case was a 'proper' one therefor. The Labour Court shall not interfere with the findings of the enquiry officer only because it is lawful to do so. It would not take recourse thereto only because another view is possible. Even assuming that, for all intent and purport, the Labour Court acts as an appellate authority over the Judgment of the enquiry officer, it would exercise appropriate restraint. It must bear in mind that the enquiry officer also acts as a quasi-judicial body....

9. It would also be relevant to refer to the opinion expressed by the Supreme Court in Divl. Controller, Ksrtc (Nwkrtc) v. A.T. Mane : (2004)IIILLJ1074SC .

From the above it is clear that once a domestic tribunal based on evidence comes to a particular conclusion, normally it is not open to the Appellate Tribunals and Courts to substitute their subjective opinion in the place of the one arrived at by the domestic tribunal....

10. The above Judgment was referred to and relied upon by the Supreme Court in West Bokaro Colliery's case, wherein it reiterated that: .In a case where two views are possible on the evidence on record, then the Industrial Tribunal should be very slow in coming to a conclusion other than the one arrived at by the domestic tribunal by substituting its opinion in place of the opinion of the domestic tribunal.

11. In the light of the afore stated legal position, it is pertinent to note that the Labour Court in the present case, having found that the enquiry conducted against the second respondent/workman was valid, gave no reasons, as to why it felt that this was a 'proper' case to re-appreciate the evidence. The material brought on record before the Labour Court was the same as that in the domestic enquiry and clearly indicated that there was sufficient proof to indict the second respondent/workman. Even if the Labour Court was of the opinion that two views were possible on the basis of the said evidence, as held by the Supreme Court in the aforestated decisions, it was not open to the Labour Court to substitute its view and come to a contrary finding. Further, the material before the Labour Court being the same as the material adduced in the domestic enquiry, the Labour Court normally ought not to undertake reappreciation of the same evidence unless any special circumstance is made out qualifying the case as a 'proper one' for such an exercise. This could be in the event of a manifestly perverse finding recorded in the domestic enquiry or the overlooking of material evidence or misinterpretation thereof by the enquiring authority. In this regard, reference may be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in Usha Breco Mazdoor Sangh's case : (2008)IILLJ945SC (supra).

It is one thing to say that the finding of an enquiry officer is perverse or betrays the well-known doctrine of proportionality but it is another thing to say that only because two views are possible, the Labour Court shall interfere therewith. In other words, it is one thing to say that on the basis of the materials on record, the Labour Court comes to a conclusion that a verdict of guilt has been arrived at by the enquiry officer where the materials suggested otherwise but it is another thing to say that such a verdict was also a possible view.

12. In the present case, the Labour Court did not come to the conclusion that there was any perversity in the findings of the domestic enquiry or that there were other circumstances warranting it to re-appreciate the evidence. Further, the bald statement of the Labour Court that 'the evidence was not sufficient to come to the conclusion that the second respondent/workman had a dishonest intention in committing the theft or taking away the property of the Management' is neither here nor there. This is clearly a case of the Labour Court substituting its own view of the matter for that of the enquiring authority, which is unsustainable in law. In such circumstances, I am of the opinion that this was not a case where the Labour Court could have re-appreciated the evidence and come to a contrary conclusion. Given the fact that the domestic enquiry was already held to be valid and this was not a 'proper' case for reappreciation of the evidence, the finding of the Labour Court that the termination of the second respondent/workman from service was not justified is unsustainable and consequently the relief granted to the second respondent/workman cannot be upheld.

13. The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed, setting aside the Award dated 09.08.1999 in I.D. No. 87 of 1996 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court, Visakhapatnam. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.