Commissioner of Wealth Tax and ors. Vs. Sb. Zainab Noorul Sayeed and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- - 19. one of the rules of interpretation of a statute that related provisions in different acts but having bearing on the same subject have to be read together is too well known. sriyanesh knitters, 1999(112)elt373(sc) an interesting question had fallen for consideration before the supreme court, viz. from the aforesaid decisions it clearly follows that it is permissible to read the provisions of two acts together when the same are complementary to each other. unless a contrary intention is clearly apparent from the provisions of the wealth tax act there is no embargo to look into the definition of 'art treasure' as defined in antiquities act, which includes 'works of art' having regard to the artistic or aesthetic value. shorn of the context, the words by themselves are 'slippery.....orderb. sudershan reddy, j. 1. these r.cs., may be disposed of by a common order, since the question referred for the opinion of this court is common in all theses cases.2. the income tax appellate tribunal, hyderabad bench referred the following question, said to be a question of law, for the opinion of this court:'whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the tribunal was correct in law in allowing the exemption under section 5(1)(xii) of the wealth tax act in respect of 7 items of jewellery claimed to represent art treasures?'3. in this batch of cases, we are concerned only with the said question.4. in order to express our opinion, it is just and necessary to notice the relevant facts:the issue relates to the assessment years 1980-81 to 1986-87. 5. his exalted.....

Judgment:
ORDER

B. Sudershan Reddy, J.

1. These R.Cs., may be disposed of by a common order, since the question referred for the opinion of this Court is common in all theses cases.

2. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench referred the following question, said to be a question of law, for the opinion of this Court:

'Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in allowing the exemption under Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act in respect of 7 items of jewellery claimed to represent art treasures?'

3. In this batch of cases, we are concerned only with the said question.

4. In order to express our opinion, it is just and necessary to notice the relevant facts:

The issue relates to the assessment years 1980-81 to 1986-87.

5. His Exalted Highness, the late Nb. Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur, created 'HEH the Nizam's Jewellery Trust' by the Indenture dated 29-3-1951. The said Settlor specified the names of the beneficiaries, their respective shares and also indicated the purposes wherever required for which the Trust was created. The specified items of jewellery were handed over to the persons named therein and the balance 89 items of the jewellery formed the principal fund of the Trust. The power of the Trustees to sell the jewellery is contained in clause 13 of the Trust Deed. The sale of jewellery could take place only after the death of the settlor and his eldest son Prince Azam Jah Bahadur.

6. The Settlor died in February, 1967 and his eldest son, Prince Azam Jah Bahadur, died on 9-10-1970. It is an admitted fact that the trustees have been making herculean efforts to sell/dispose of all the items of jewellery of the Principal Fund right from July, 1972. In the said process, the Trustees approached the then Prime Minister of India and submitted a memorial requesting the Government of India to acquire the items of jewellery suitable for preservation and display and allow the rest of the items to be exported for sale outside India. The Government of India appointed Expert Committees from time to time for inspection and evaluation of items of jewellery. The Director General, Archaeological Survey of India had also constituted an Expert Committee for the purpose of determining the items, which may fall under the purview of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972 (for short 'the Antiquities Act'). The Government of India declared the 23 items of jewellery of the Trust as antiquities. But, however, issued non-antiquity/export certificates for 65 items of jewellery of the Trust vide letter dated 27th February, 1978. The Government of India also communicated its unwillingness to purchase any items of jewellery of the Trust.

7. In the meanwhile, the Wealth Tax Officer referred the matter of valuation of the jewellery of the Trust to the Valuation Officer for determining the value of the jewellery for the purpose of the wealth tax for assessment years 1957-58 to 1979-80.

8. The Trustees decided to sell/dispose of 37 items out of the 65 items, which were permitted to be sold outside India. Tenders were received by the Trustees from various purchasers. This has resulted in some litigation, the details of which are not required to be noticed. Suffice it to notice that the matter went upto the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court gave directions in September, 1979 appointing the Chairman of the Trust as Court Officer 'for auctioning of the 37 items out of 65 items which were permitted to be sold outside India'. While steps were being taken for conducting auction, the Government of India intervened and stopped the sale of jewellery by duly submitting in the Supreme Court of its intention not to allow the jewellery of the Trust to go outside the country.

9. The Trustees challenged the unilateral decision of the Union of India in W.P. No. 1429 of 1979 in the Supreme Court. The 37 items of the jewellery of the Trust had become the subject matter of litigation and the Supreme Court issued directions directing the Union Finance Secretary, who is also the Chairman of the Trust, for taking custody of the jewels. Thus the possession of the most valuable 37 items out of 89 items of the jewellery of the Trust was taken away from the Trust and remained with the Union Finance Secretary.

10. The Director General, Archaeological Survey of India declared the 7 most valuable items out of 37 items of the jewellery as 'Art Treasure', by Notification No. 664 (E), dated 8-11-1982 published in the Gazette. The Trustees are admittedly prohibited to sell any of these items, since the sale of these items is prohibited under the provisions of the Antiquities Act.

11. The case of the assessees is that those 7 items, declared as 'Art Treasure', shall be exempted under Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. These items were prohibited for sale on the valuation dates under consideration. The Tribunal accepted the submissions made by the assessees and accordingly held that 7 items, declared as 'Art Treasure', could be considered to be the 'works of art' belonging to the assessees and not intended for sale. Therefore, these 7 items qualify all the conditions precedent for enabling exemption under Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act. The Tribunal accordingly directed the Wealth Tax Officer to give exemption in respect of the said 7 items.

12. In this batch of cases, Sri S.R. Ashok, learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for and on behalf of the Revenue contended that the view taken by the Tribunal is totally erroneous and contrary to the scheme of the provisions of the Wealth Tax Act. It is submitted by the learned Senior Standing Counsel that for the purposes of the Wealth Tax Act, even those 7 items continued to be the jewellery and, therefore, they are not exempted and are liable to be included in the net wealth of the assessees.

13. It is submitted by the learned Senior Standing Counsel that the expression 'any works of art' used in Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act cannot be read in isolation, but is required to be read along with the other provisions of the Wealth Tax Act and if so read those 7 pieces of jewellery cannot be construed as 'any works of art'. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Standing Counsel that even if those pieces of jewellery are to be considered as 'any works of art', the assessees are not entitled for any benefit of exemption since the Trust admittedly made several attempts to sell them. The contention is that the 'work of art' is not automatically exempted from the provisions of the Wealth Tax Act unless such 'work of art' is not intended for sale. In the instant case, there was no lack of intention on the part of the assessees to sell the items in question. There is no restriction in the Trust Deed prohibiting the sale of these 7 items of jewellery also.

14. Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of some of the assessees contended that Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act is a special provision providing exemption in respect of certain assets, such as 'works of art', and the nature of the very provision indicates that the value of such assets shall not be included in the net wealth of the assessee. The amount of value of such assets is totally insignificant for the purposes of construing the provision. It was submitted that even a jewellery can be a 'work of art'. Such assets may have to be identified as 'works of art' and not as any jewellery. The assessees have not claimed exemption on the ground that those items are precious. The assessees have not claimed such benefit with regard to any such jewellery. The exemption is claimed on the ground that those 7 items of assets are 'works of art'. In nutshell, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the assessees contended that when once the asset falls under Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act, the same is liable to be exempted from being included in the net wealth of the assessee.

15. The Wealth Tax Act is an Act to provide for the levy of wealth-tax. It is a self-contained code. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Wealth-Tax Bill, 1957, it is averred that 'the object of this Bill is to impose an annual tax on the net wealth of individuals, Hindu undivided families and companies. The proposed tax is an important constituent of an integrated tax structure which Government have been aiming at for sometime........it is consistent with the avowed goal of the attainment of a socialistic pattern of society' - a forgotten expression.

16. The learned Senior Standing Counsel contended that the jewellery, which is considered to be an asset, in respect of which wealth tax is liable to be paid under the provisions of the Wealth Tax Act, by inclusion of such asset in the net wealth, cannot be exempted under the guise of characterising such jewellery as 'any works of art'. The learned Senior Standing Counsel pressed into service the definition of 'jewellery' in the Wealth Tax Act, which includes ornaments made of gold, silver, platinum or any other precious metal or any alloy containing one or more of such precious metals, whether or not containing any precious or semi-precious stones, and whether or not worked or sewn into any wearing apparel. No piece of jewellery can ever be equated to that of any 'works of art' is the submission.

17. The 'work of art' is not defined under the provisions of the Wealth Tax Act. The expression 'Art Treasure' is defined under the provisions of the Antiquities Act, according to which 'art treasure' means any 'human work of art'. The Director General, Archaeological Survey of India is conferred with the power to determine whether or not an article is an antiquity or art treasure. In the instant case, there is no dispute whatsoever that the 7 items with which we are concerned for the present have been declared as 'art treasure' by the Director General, Archaeological Survey of India.

18. The learned Senior Counsel, however, contended that the definition of 'art treasure', which includes any human work of art as such may not be imported into the provisions of the Wealth Tax Act. In our considered opinion, the decision of the competent authority determining whether any article, object or thing is or is not an art treasure altogether cannot be ignored. The decision so taken for the purposes of the Antiquities Act may be final for the purposes of the said Act. But in the absence of contrary in the provisions of the Wealth Tax Act, the decision so taken by an expert body cannot altogether be excluded from the consideration while considering whether an article is or is not a 'work of art' within the meaning of that expression in Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act.

19. One of the rules of interpretation of a statute that related provisions in different Acts but having bearing on the same subject have to be read together is too well known. In Common Cause, A Registered Society V. Union of India, : [1996]222ITR260(SC) the Supreme Court interpreted Explanation (1) to Section 77(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950. The Explanation provides that 'any expenditure incurred or authorised in connection with the election of a candidate by a political party - shall not be deemed to be - expenditure in connection with the election incurred or authorised by the candidate'. The Supreme Court while construing this provision read Section 13A and 139(4B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which though exempting the income of political parties from house property, other sources or voluntary contributions require them to maintain audited accounts and to file income-tax return for each assessment year. The Supreme Court took the view that the political parties which are not maintaining audited and authentic accounts and are not filing returns of income, are not entitled to plead that they have incurred or authorised any expenditure in connection with the election of a candidate within the meaning of Explanation (1) to Section 77 (1) and held that the said provision does not give protection to the expenditure which comes from an unknown or black source. In the same context, the Supreme Court observed that the main income of a political party comes from contributions from companies which are permitted to make these contributions under the conditions laid down in Section 293A of the Companies Act and are required to disclose them in their profit and loss account. Thus the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the provisions of the Companies Act have been read together in interpreting the Explanation (1) to Section 77 (1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950.

20. In Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Sriyanesh Knitters, : 1999(112)ELT373(SC) an interesting question had fallen for consideration before the Supreme Court, viz., whether the Board of Trustees of the Port Trust constituted under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 have a general lien for their dues over the present or future consignments imported by the importers at the Bombay Port when the said dues are in respect of the past imports made by the said importers.

21. The respondents-importers filed writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the Bombay High Court assailing the Circular dated 2-10-1979 issued by the Port Trust which inter alia stated that 'the Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay have been advised that under Section 171 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, they have a general lien which they can exercise on the goods which come into their custody of importers, exporters, owners, consignees who have for any reason whatsoever not paid the Port Trust charges such as wharf age .......or any other dues in respect of any earlier consignment/s imported/exported or sought to be exported by them. In the circumstances this Department will exercise a lien for general balance of account in respect of wharf age....... against the importers/ exporters........of the goods taken charge of by the Board of Trustees.'

22. It was contended that the Port of Bombay was not entitled to claim a general lien under Section 171 of the Indian Contract Act, as it was not permissible for the Port Trust to rely upon the Indian Contract Act so as to claim a general lien. The High Court allowed the said writ petitions.

23. The Supreme Court observed that 'the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (for short 'the MPT Act') is not an exhaustive and comprehensive code and the said Act has to be read together with other Acts wherever the MPT Act is silent in respect of any matter. The preamble of the Act does not show that it is a codifying Act so as to exclude the applicability of other laws of the land. Even if it is a codifying Act unless a contrary intention appears it is presumed not to be intended to change the law. Furthermore where codifying statute is silent on a point then it is permissible to look at other laws. The Supreme Court observed:

'In J.K. Steel Ltd. V. Union of India : 1978(2)ELT355(SC) it was held that cognate and pari materia legislation should be read together as forming one system and as interpreting and enforcing each other. In Vidyacharan Shukla V. Khubchand Baghel : [1964]6SCR129 it was held that the Code of Civil Procedure has to be read along with the Limitation Act. In State of Madras V. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer : 1958CriLJ232 it was held that the Prevention of Corruption Act should be read along with the Evidence Act. In Mannan Lal V. Chhotaka Bibi : [1971]1SCR253 it was held that the Code of Civil Procedure has to be read along with the Court Fees Act. In Vasudev Ramchandra Shelat V. Pranlal Jayanand Thakkar : [1975]1SCR534 , this Court observed that the Companies Act should be read along with the Transfer of Property Act.

From the aforesaid decisions it clearly follows that it is permissible to read the provisions of two Acts together when the same are complementary to each other. In fact some provisions of the MPT Act themselves show that other laws are applicable.

It is an Act which makes provision for the constitution of port authorities and vests the administrative control and management of such ports in such authorities and provides for matters connected therewith. To the extent the provisions of the said Act are applicable, there can be little doubt that any provision which is in conflict therewith contained in any other Act would not apply. The enactment of the MPT Act does not ipso facto exclude the operation of other laws which may be applicable. Wherever a departure from the general law has to be made the Act specifically provides for the same.'

24. The decisions referred to hereinabove make it abundantly clear that the provisions of more than one Act can be read together when the same are complementary to each other. There is nothing in the provisions of the Wealth Tax Act suggesting exclusion of the provisions of the Antiquities Act insofar as it defines 'Art Treasures'. The Antiquities Act is a comprehensive law made to regulate the export trade in antiquities and art treasures and to provide for the prevention of smuggling of, and fraudulent dealings in, antiquities. The Parliament having considered that it is necessary to make provision in such law for the compulsory acquisition of antiquities and art treasures for preserving in public places enacted the law intended to achieve the said objectives.

25. We have already noticed the expression 'art treasure' which means any human work of art, not being an antiquity, declared by the Central Government to be an art treasure for the purposes of this Act having regard to its artistic or aesthetic value. These 7 items have been declared as 'art treasures' thereby meaning as pieces of 'works of art' having regard to their artistic and aesthetic value. Unless a contrary intention is clearly apparent from the provisions of the Wealth Tax Act there is no embargo to look into the definition of 'art treasure' as defined in Antiquities Act, which includes 'works of art' having regard to the artistic or aesthetic value.

What is a 'work of art'?

26. According to the Chambers Dictionary, 'work of art' means a painting, sculpture or other production in the fine arts, esp., one of high quality; anything constructed or composed with manifest skill. Problems of definition as to what are the arts and 'work of art' elude solution. In The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol.2, 15th edn., it is stated: What are the arts, and what is art in general? This is still a controversial question after centuries of debate. No particular definition commands universal assent. Several meanings are still frequently used, of which the oldest is the broad, technical sense. In this sense, the English term art and its equivalents in Greek and Latin covered not only what are now called 'fine arts' or 'aesthetic arts' but any kind of transmitted, useful skill, such as agriculture, medicine, and war.......In the 19th and 20th centuries, there has been a tendency to abandon the term art in speaking of the purely utilitarian skills and to call them instead 'industries,' 'technics,' 'branches of engineering,' or 'applied sciences.' Without the prefix fine, the word art alone is now commonly understood to mean the fine or aesthetic arts. To produce an experience of beauty or aesthetic satisfaction is said to be their distinguishing function or characteristic but not necessarily their only one. In this moderately broad, technical sense, some, but not all, architecture, furniture, and clothing can qualify as arts in spite of their useful purposes..........The decorative arts are a species of visual art whose main function is to combine utility with beauty or aesthetic satisfaction. They tend to emphasize visual ornamentation and design along with fitness for some useful end or ends. Although Western painting and sculpture in the past traditionally tended to emphasize representation, the decorative arts used both abstract and representational design. Utility, design, and representation appear with varying degrees of emphasis in such arts as medieval book illumination, jewellery, Greek or Chinese vase panting, Persian rugs, and French rococo furniture.

27. It would not be possible to exclude an article even if it is a jewellery from the expression 'work of art' if it is made or composed with manifest skill. It is not as if the Revenue found these 7 articles to be not of any 'works of art' based on expert assessment of the articles.

28. It is, however, difficult for this Court to make any value judgment.

29. The learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Revenue, however, contended that the meaning to be given to the expression 'work of art' must be gathered from the provisions of the very Wealth Tax Act and if so gathered, the expression 'work of art' includes jewellery in all its forms, whatever may be its form or composition. The Wealth Tax Act never intended to exempt the assets of jewellery, in whatever form, and the assets of jewellery shall be included in the net wealth of the assessee.

30. The learned Senior Standing Counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Nyadar Singh V. Union of India, : (1988)IILLJ506SC in support of the submission that the meaning to be given to a particular statutory expression depends on the evaluation of a number of interpretative criteria. In the said decision, the Supreme Court observed:

'The meaning to be given to a particular statutory language depends on the evaluation of a number of interpretative criteria. Shorn of the context, the words by themselves are 'slippery customers'. The general presumption is that these criteria do not detract or stand apart from, but are to be harmonized with, the well accepted legal principles. In a difficult case, the number of relevant interpretative criteria may be so high that the task of the court in assessing their effect is, correspondingly, difficult. Even the statutory language apparently free from the sins of semantic ambiguity might not, in the context of the purpose, connote or convey its lexicographic thrust; but would acquire a different shade or colour imparted to it by the variations of the interpretation criteria. The ambiguity need not necessarily be a grammatical ambiguity, but one of appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context. Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation, 1984 edn., p. 390 refers to the nature of the task in weighing the facts:

....it is necessary for the interpreter to assess the respective weights of the relevant interpretative factors and determine which of the opposing constructions they favour on balance.....

We may speak of the factors tending in a certain direction as a bundle of factors. This is figurative, but then so is the idea of factors being 'weighed'. The court is unlikely even to consider the factors one by one, and certainly will not proceed in any mechanistic way.....

We find that one bundle of factors favours one of the opposing constructions of the enactment, while the other bundle favours the other construction. (As to opposing constructions see Section 84 of this Code.) There may be factors drawn from a single interpretative criterion in both bundles.......

It is true that where statutory language should be given its most obvious meaning - 'to accord with how a man in the street might answer the problems posted by the words' - the statute must be taken as one finds it. Considerations relevant to interpretation are not whether a differently conceived or worded statute would have yielded results more consonant with fairness and reasonableness. Consequences do not alter the statutory language, but may only help to fix its meaning.'

31. For the very same proposition, the learned Senior Standing Counsel placed reliance upon another decision of the Supreme Court in C.I.T. v. N.C. Budharaja and Co. (S.C.), : [1993]204ITR412(SC) .

32. There cannot be any dispute that in case of any difficulty in construing any particular provision or expression used in any particular provision within a statute, one may have to look at the whole scheme of the Act and not to read the provisions in isolation. Even if it is so read, the conclusion is inescapable that Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act is a special provision providing for exemption in respect of certain assets. If the case falls under any one of those exemptions, the assessee shall be entitled for the benefit of the same. Section 5 of the Wealth Tax Act cannot be so read in the manner defeating the very purpose for which the same has been introduced into the Act. In the circumstances, it is not possible to read the expression 'any works of art' in the manner suggested by the learned Senior Standing Counsel. Therefore, we find it difficult to accept the submission that once it is established that an article is a jewellery, being an asset, even if it is a work of art, the same is to be included in the net wealth of the assessee. On the other hand, if once it is established that an asset is a 'work of art', the assessee would be entitled for the benefit under Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act.

33. The learned Senior Standing Counsel alternatively contended that even if the articles in question are to be considered to be 'any works of art' they are not entitled for the exemption under Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act, since the assessees have made efforts for selling those articles also. The learned Senior Standing Counsel submitted that it would not be enough to claim exemption under Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act on the ground that the asset is a 'work of art', but the assessee must further plead and establish that such 'work of art' is not intended for sale. The burden is on the assessees. There is no dispute with the proposition canvassed by the learned Senior Standing Counsel.

34. It is very well settled that where the statute's meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated. But if the words of an instrument are ambiguous in the sense that they can reasonably bear more than one meaning, that is to say, if the words are semantically ambiguous, or if a provision, if read literally, is patently incompatible with the other provisions of that instrument, the court would be justified in construing the words in a manner which will make the particular provision purposeful. That, in essence is the rule of harmonious construction. (See: Union of India V. Sankalchand, 0065/1977 : [1978]1SCR423 )

35. It is submitted by the learned Senior Standing Counsel that the intention on the part of the assessees to sell the said articles itself would be enough to deny the benefit of exemption under Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act. It is a different matter altogether whether the intention on the part of the assessees has fructified or not. The learned Senior Standing Counsel laid emphasis on the expression 'not intended for sale'. No 'work of art' is entitled for an automatic exemption under Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act unless it is pleaded and established that such 'work of art' is not intended for sale is the precise submission made by the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Revenue.

36. In the instant case, there is no dispute whatsoever that the assessees never claimed the benefit of any exemption as such upto the assessment year 1979-80. Undoubtedly, the assessees were making efforts to sell the jewellery including the 7 items which were later held to be 'works of art' under the provisions of the Antiquities Act. We have already noticed that in September, 1979 the Government of India intervened in the matter and stopped the sale of 37 items of jewellery out of 65 items in all for which non-antiquity certificates were issued by the Government of India for the purpose of export. The possession of these articles was taken away under the orders of the Supreme Court directing the Union Finance Secretary to take custody of the items of jewellery including the 7 items. The Trust lost the possession of these 7 items and they were always in the custody of the Union Finance Secretary throughout the assessment years 1980-81 to 1986-87. The earlier attempts, if any, made by the assessees to sell the articles in question are of no consequence. For the assessment years, with which we are concerned in this batch of cases, the Trust never had the control and custody of these articles and there were no attempts as such expressing any intention to sell ever since September, 1979. In view of the lawful directions preventing the sale of the articles, mere intention, if any, on the part of the assessees at an earlier point of time becomes irrelevant. The assessees could not have transgressed or violated the prohibition from alienating the articles and sold the same. The mere feeling, if any, entertained at the initial stages and the attempts made to sell cannot be a ground for denying the exemption under Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act. Therefore, these 7 items qualify the twin requirement for claiming exemption under the provisions of Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act, viz., those articles are of 'works of art' and not intended for sale.

37.Sri Y. Ratnakar, learned counsel appearing for some of the assessees contended that this Court could express its opinion only on questions of law and under no circumstances can interfere with the findings of the Tribunals unless such findings are also challenged. The question whether the 7 items are of 'works of art' is a question of fact and the Tribunal as a finding of fact found the said articles to be the 'works of art'. Such findings do not give rise to any question of law. The learned counsel also submitted that the finding by the Tribunal that these articles were not intended for sale is also a finding of fact and this Court cannot disturb such finding of fact. The learned counsel relied upon various authorities in support of the submission that this Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal. It is unnecessary to burden this judgment with those reported decisions, since it is so well settled that this Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunals, unless such findings themselves are challenged as perverse and about which there is a reference to this Court.

38. We have already examined the issue as to whether the assessees are entitled and qualified to claim the benefit of exemption under Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act and accordingly found that they are entitled to the benefit provided under the said provision. In view of our conclusion that the 7 items in question are the 'works of art' and they were not 'intended for sale' by the assessees, the various contentions urged by the learned counsel need not be gone into.

39. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the Tribunal rightly allowed the exemption under Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act in respect of the 7 items of jewellery, being the 'works of art'.

40. For the aforesaid reasons, we re-frame the question as follows:

'Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in allowing the exemption under Section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth Tax Act in respect of 7 items of jewellery claimed to represent 'works of art' and 'not intended for sale'?

41. The question is accordingly answered in favour of the assessees and against the Revenue.