Movva Anjamma and Another Vs. Abhineni Anasuya and Another - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
limitation - condonation of delay - section 5 of limitation act, 1963 - suit dismissed for default after ex parte decree passed - restoration application filed by plaintiffs - delay in filing application - delay occurred on account of staying of petitioners too far and non-receipt of any communication from their advocate - grounds of delay not well explained - application dismissed - revision petition filed - affidavit filed describing sufficient ground of delay - held, plaintiff to be given relief as condonation of delay reasonably explained. - motor vehicles act (59 of 1988)section 149 (2): [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers entitlement to defend the action joint appeal by insured and insurer - held, the language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. it shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of section 149 of the act, and no other grounds are available to it. the insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. if insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of sections 170 and 149 of the act. the insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. in the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. section 166: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] claim for compensation accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle held, it is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under workmens compensation act. the insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of section 149 of the act. the right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under workmens compensation act, but also under benevolent provisions under section 166 and 167 of the m.v. act. the right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the workmens compensation act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under section 167 of the act to choose either of the two forum. the only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under section 147 of the act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. in the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under section 167 of the act to seek compensation under section 166 of the act resulting in award passed by the tribunal. therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor. section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the act, instead of seeking compensation under the workmens compensation act. on facts, held, the material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. the settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. compensation of rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the tribunal was enhanced to rs.8,20,000/-. - 6,330/-was also paid on 21-3-1975 and that the 1 st respondent failed to execute the sale-deed. 144 of 1991. the suit was dismissed for default on 14-9-1992, as the plaintiffs failed to appear when the suit was posted for trial. 100/- and even by that date as the plaintiffs failed to turn up or pay the costs awarded the suit was dismissed for default on 14-9-1992. it is also stated that the plaintiffs have virtually abandoned the suit as they thought that they would not succeed in the suit since the suit agreement is a fabricated document and purposely they gave up their interest and there are no valid grounds whatsoever for condonation of the inordinate delay. it is well-settled that the expression 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction in order to advance the cause of justice.order1. this civil revision petition arises out of an application for the condonation of delay of one year, one month and ten days in filing application for setting aside the order dated 14-9-1992 dismissing the suit for default.2. this matter has had a long and checkered history. the parties are closely related. the petitioners and the respondents are sisters. the two petitioners herein and (he 2nd respondent filed the suit os. no.889 of 1981 on the file of the court of the v additional judge, city civil court, hyderabad against the 1st respondent herein for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 15-10-1965 alleged to have been executed by the 1 st respondent in their favour agreeing to sell the suit schedule property for a lotal consideration of rs.21,330/-. the suit was filed on the allegation that a sum of rs.15,000/- was paid as advance on the date of agreement and that subsequently, the balance of sale consideration of rs.6,330/-was also paid on 21-3-1975 and that the 1 st respondent failed to execute the sale-deed. so, the suit was filed on 17-8-1981. the 1st respondent-sole defendant in the suit appeared through her general power of attorney and filed a written statement conceding the suit claim. thereupon, the suit was decreed on 27-11-1981. but, subsequently, the 1st respondent filed an application being ia. no.237 of 1982 to set aside the decree on the ground that the same was obtained by fraud and in collusion with her general power of attorney. the said application was dismissed for default on 1-4-1984, but subsequently, it was restored and ultimately, it was allowedon 21-3-1991 and the decree was set aside. the 1st respondent thereafter filed her written statement afresh. the suit has been subsequently transferred to the court of the principal subordinate judge, rangareddy district and re-numbered as os. no. 144 of 1991. the suit was dismissed for default on 14-9-1992, as the plaintiffs failed to appear when the suit was posted for trial. on 14-6-1993, an application to set aside the order of dismissal for default and for restoration of the suit, was filed by all the three plaintiffs. in support of me said application, 311 affidavit of the 1st plaintiff, i.e., the 1st petitioner herein, was filed stating that the plaintiffs had no intimation or communication from their counsel regarding the developments in the suit after the decree was set aside by order dated 23-1-1991 and they could not also contact their counsel as they were ladies stationed at far off places and for want of proper communication, the plaintiffs could not be present on the date when the suit was posted for evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs. the said application appears to have been returned by the office with the objection that a separate application for condonation of delay should be filed. thereupon, the instant application i.e., ia. no.593 of 1995, for condonation of delay was filed on 13-12-1993. the number is, however, wrongly mentioned in the impugned order as 1a. no.2505 of 1993, which in fact is the number of the main application for restoration of the suit. in support of the application for condonation of delay, the affidavit of the counsel for the plaintiffs on record was filed stating that the application for restoration of the suit was filed on 14-6-1993, but the said application was reported to have been misplaced in the office of the honourable court, that the petitioners are, therefore, obliged to file a duplicate on 24-11-1993 and the same was returned by the office on 4-12-1993 with an objection to file a petition to condone delay within seven days and accordingly the application for condonation of delay is being filed, that tlie delay is neither wilful nordeliberate but due to the circumstances beyond the control of the petitioners and as such the same deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice. it may be mentioned that the actual delay in filing the application for restoration of the suit was 243 days. however, by the date of filing of the application for condonation of delay, it came to one year, one month and ten days and it was, therefore, prayed to condone the entire delay of one year, one month and ten days and to set aside the order dismissing the suit for default and to restore the same.3. a counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the 1st respondent opposing the application for condonation of delay disputing the allegation that the plaintiffs had no intimation from their counsel and stating that the matter was coming up for trial since 24-9-1991 and thereafter it was adjourned several times as the plaintiffs did not get ready for trial and finally the matter was adjourned to 14-9-1992 by awarding costs of rs. 100/- and even by that date as the plaintiffs failed to turn up or pay the costs awarded the suit was dismissed for default on 14-9-1992. it is also stated that the plaintiffs have virtually abandoned the suit as they thought that they would not succeed in the suit since the suit agreement is a fabricated document and purposely they gave up their interest and there are no valid grounds whatsoever for condonation of the inordinate delay.4. however, the trial court by its order dated 4-2-1995 condoned the delay subject to payment of rs.500/- by way of costs. questioning the said order, the 1st respondent filed crp no.1469 of 1995. by order dated 22-12-1995, this court set aside the order of the trial court on the ground that it is not a speaking order and remitted back the matter to the trial court for deciding the application for condonation of delay on merits and if that application is allowed, then the application for setting aside the order of dismissal of the suit could be decided onmerits. pursuant to the said order, the lower court re-considered the matter and dismissed the application for condonation of delay by the impugned order dated 8-7-1997. hence this revision petition by the petitioners, who are plaintiffs 1 and 2 in the suit. as the 3rd plaintiff did not join them in filing the revision petition, she is impleaded as the 2nd respondent.5. the 2nd respondent has tiled a counter-affidavit in this crp stating that the petitioners have misled her and she now bona fide believes that fraud was played by the petitioners and she is not, therefore, interested in further prosecuting the case by challenging the order of the lower court. it is further stated in the counter-affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent that she neither signed any affidavit in support of the application for setting aside the order of dismissal for default nor did she authorise the petitioners to swear to any affidavit on her behalf. hence, she is not bound by the statements made by the petitioners in 1a. no.2505 of 1993. it may, however, be mentioned that she did not take this stand earlier and in fact she joined the petitioners in opposing crp no. 1469 of 1995 filed by the 1st respondent questioning the order dated 4-2-1995 passed by the lower court condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the order dismissing the suit for default.6. the learned counsel for the 1st respondent has strenuously contended that initially the plaintiffs did not file any application for condonation of delay; that after an objection was taken by the office, they have come forward with the application for condonation of delay along with an affidavit of the advocate; that the affidavit filed by the advocate does not contain any explanation whatsoever for delay; that none of the plaintiffs has filed her own affidavit properly explaining the delay; that the allegation that the plaintiffs had no intimation from their advocate about the several adjournments granted in the suit is, on theface of it, false and unbelievable; and that there are no valid grounds whatsoever to interfere with the discretion properly exercised by the lower court in refusing to condone the delay. in support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent placed reliance on the judgment of the supreme court in p.k. ramachandran v. state of kerala, : 1997ecr785(sc) , wherein it has been held that the law of limitation has to be applied with all its rigour prescribed by statute and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.7. it is true that the discretion exercised by the lower court in the matter of condonation of delay is not to be lightly interfered with, unless the court has acted with material irregularity in the exercise of its discretion. section 5 of the limitation act undoubtedly vests in the court the power to condone the delay in making an application where the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period. what is sufficient cause must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. it is well-settled that the expression 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction in order to advance the cause of justice. the rules of procedure are primarily intended to do substantial justice but not to punish the parties for their mistakes or to destroy their legal rights.8. in n, balakrishnan v. m. krishna murthy, 1998 (7) supreme 209, the supreme court has drawn a distinction between a case where the lower court in the exercise of its discretion condones the delay and a case where it refuses to condone the delay. it is held that in the former case, the superior court should not normally disturb the order of the lower court. but, in the latter case, the supreme court held:'.....the superior court would be free toconsider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior courtto come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. the reason for such a different stance is thus: the primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. they are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. the object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. during efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. so a life-span must be fixed for each remedy. unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. it is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. they are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. a court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suilor from putting forth his cause. there is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. this court has held that the words 'sufficient cause' under seclion 5 of the limitation act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice.'the supreme court in that case further held:'.....length of delay is no matter,acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonablc due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory.....'9. in the instant case, admittedly, all the plaintiffs are ladies residing in different places far away from hyderabad. in the affidavit of the 1st plaintiff, which was filed along with the application for setting aside the order dismissing the suit for default, it is stated that the plaintiffs had no communication from their advocate after the decree was set aside on the application of the 1st respondent; that they are helpless ladies without any proper advice; and that they could not, therefore, take steps within time. the suit had been pending for more than ten years before it was dismissed for default in the year 1992. earlier, the suit was decreed, but the decree was set aside later on the application of the 1st respondent. having regard to all these facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that the conduct of the plaintiffs is such that it deserves to be castigated as being irresponsible. the lower court appears to have been swayed by the fact that in support of the application for condonation of delay, only the affidavit of the advocate was filed and that no affidavit of the party is filed. the lower court ignored the fact that along with the main application for restoration of the suit, the affidavit of the 1st plaintiff has been filed.10. in ramachandra row v. seshaiah, 1957 (2) an.w.r. 106, a division bench of this court held that it is not necessary that there should be a formal petition to excuse the delay; that it is always open to the court or tribunal to condone the delay, if the person concerned is able to convince that there are justifiable grounds for the delay in presentingan appeal or a petition; and that the filing of a formal petition for execusing the delay is not sine qua non for the exercise of that power.11. following the said judgment of the division bench of this court, a learned single judge of this court, in a. govindaiah v. v. venkatamma, : 1995(3)alt685 , held that delay can be condoned even without filing a separate application for condonation of delay, if the delay is otherwise explained in the affidavit filed in support of the application made to set aside ex parts decree. in that case, the petitioner was a rustic villager residing in a remote village and he is also an illiterate person. an ex parte decree was passed, as there was a communication gap between him and his advocate. having regard to the said facts, the court held that the petitioner had made out a sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the application to set aside the ex parte decree.12. in view of the said judgments, i am inclined to take the view that-on the facts and circumstances of this case, the petitioners have made out a sufficient cause for condonation of the delay, however, subject to payment of costs of rs. 1,000/- to the counsel appearing for the 1st respondent.13. accordingly, the civil revision petition is allowed, the impugned order is set aside, and the delay in filing the application to set aside the order dismissing the suit for default is condoned subject to the condition that the petitioners shall pay a sum of rs.1,000/- by way of costs to the counsel appearing for the 1st respondent within two weeks from today. in default of such payment, the crp stands dismissed. if the 2nd respondent does not want to prosecute the suit, it is open to the 2nd respondent to take appropriate steps in that behalf in the lower court. the lower court is directed to pass appropriate orders on ia. no.2505 of 1993 in the light of this order.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. This Civil Revision Petition arises out of an application for the condonation of delay of one year, one month and ten days in filing application for setting aside the order dated 14-9-1992 dismissing the suit for default.

2. This matter has had a long and checkered history. The parties are closely related. The petitioners and the respondents are sisters. The two petitioners herein and (he 2nd respondent filed the suit OS. No.889 of 1981 on the file of the Court of the V Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad against the 1st respondent herein for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 15-10-1965 alleged to have been executed by the 1 st respondent in their favour agreeing to sell the suit schedule property for a lotal consideration of Rs.21,330/-. The suit was filed on the allegation that a sum of Rs.15,000/- was paid as advance on the date of agreement and that subsequently, the balance of sale consideration of Rs.6,330/-was also paid on 21-3-1975 and that the 1 st respondent failed to execute the sale-deed. So, the suit was filed on 17-8-1981. The 1st respondent-sole defendant in the suit appeared through her General Power of Attorney and filed a written statement conceding the suit claim. Thereupon, the suit was decreed on 27-11-1981. But, subsequently, the 1st respondent filed an application being IA. No.237 of 1982 to set aside the decree on the ground that the same was obtained by fraud and in collusion with her General Power of Attorney. The said application was dismissed for default on 1-4-1984, but subsequently, it was restored and ultimately, it was allowedon 21-3-1991 and the decree was set aside. The 1st respondent thereafter filed her written statement afresh. The suit has been subsequently transferred to the Court of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Rangareddy District and re-numbered as OS. No. 144 of 1991. The suit was dismissed for default on 14-9-1992, as the plaintiffs failed to appear when the suit was posted for trial. On 14-6-1993, an application to set aside the order of dismissal for default and for restoration of the suit, was filed by all the three plaintiffs. In support of me said application, 311 affidavit of the 1st plaintiff, i.e., the 1st petitioner herein, was filed stating that the plaintiffs had no intimation or communication from their Counsel regarding the developments in the suit after the decree was set aside by order dated 23-1-1991 and they could not also contact their Counsel as they were ladies stationed at far off places and for want of proper communication, the plaintiffs could not be present on the date when the suit was posted for evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs. The said application appears to have been returned by the Office with the objection that a separate application for condonation of delay should be filed. Thereupon, the instant application i.e., IA. No.593 of 1995, for condonation of delay was filed on 13-12-1993. The number is, however, wrongly mentioned in the impugned order as 1A. No.2505 of 1993, which in fact is the number of the main application for restoration of the suit. In support of the application for condonation of delay, the affidavit of the Counsel for the plaintiffs on record was filed stating that the application for restoration of the suit was filed on 14-6-1993, but the said application was reported to have been misplaced in the Office of the Honourable Court, that the petitioners are, therefore, obliged to file a duplicate on 24-11-1993 and the same was returned by the Office on 4-12-1993 with an objection to file a petition to condone delay within seven days and accordingly the application for condonation of delay is being filed, that tlie delay is neither wilful nordeliberate but due to the circumstances beyond the control of the petitioners and as such the same deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice. It may be mentioned that the actual delay in filing the application for restoration of the suit was 243 days. However, by the date of filing of the application for condonation of delay, it came to one year, one month and ten days and it was, therefore, prayed to condone the entire delay of one year, one month and ten days and to set aside the order dismissing the suit for default and to restore the same.

3. A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the 1st respondent opposing the application for condonation of delay disputing the allegation that the plaintiffs had no intimation from their Counsel and stating that the matter was coming up for trial since 24-9-1991 and thereafter it was adjourned several times as the plaintiffs did not get ready for trial and finally the matter was adjourned to 14-9-1992 by awarding costs of Rs. 100/- and even by that date as the plaintiffs failed to turn up or pay the costs awarded the suit was dismissed for default on 14-9-1992. It is also stated that the plaintiffs have virtually abandoned the suit as they thought that they would not succeed in the suit since the suit agreement is a fabricated document and purposely they gave up their interest and there are no valid grounds whatsoever for condonation of the inordinate delay.

4. However, the Trial Court by its order dated 4-2-1995 condoned the delay subject to payment of Rs.500/- by way of costs. Questioning the said order, the 1st respondent filed CRP No.1469 of 1995. By order dated 22-12-1995, this Court set aside the order of the Trial Court on the ground that it is not a speaking order and remitted back the matter to the Trial Court for deciding the application for condonation of delay on merits and if that application is allowed, then the application for setting aside the order of dismissal of the suit could be decided onmerits. Pursuant to the said order, the lower Court re-considered the matter and dismissed the application for condonation of delay by the impugned order dated 8-7-1997. Hence this revision petition by the petitioners, who are plaintiffs 1 and 2 in the suit. As the 3rd plaintiff did not join them in filing the revision petition, she is impleaded as the 2nd respondent.

5. The 2nd respondent has tiled a counter-affidavit in this CRP stating that the petitioners have misled her and she now bona fide believes that fraud was played by the petitioners and she is not, therefore, interested in further prosecuting the case by challenging the order of the lower Court. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent that she neither signed any affidavit in support of the application for setting aside the order of dismissal for default nor did she authorise the petitioners to swear to any affidavit on her behalf. Hence, she is not bound by the statements made by the petitioners in 1A. No.2505 of 1993. It may, however, be mentioned that she did not take this stand earlier and in fact she joined the petitioners in opposing CRP No. 1469 of 1995 filed by the 1st respondent questioning the order dated 4-2-1995 passed by the lower Court condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the order dismissing the suit for default.

6. The learned Counsel for the 1st respondent has strenuously contended that initially the plaintiffs did not file any application for condonation of delay; that after an objection was taken by the Office, they have come forward with the application for condonation of delay along with an affidavit of the Advocate; that the affidavit filed by the Advocate does not contain any explanation whatsoever for delay; that none of the plaintiffs has filed her own affidavit properly explaining the delay; that the allegation that the plaintiffs had no intimation from their Advocate about the several adjournments granted in the suit is, on theface of it, false and unbelievable; and that there are no valid grounds whatsoever to interfere with the discretion properly exercised by the lower Court in refusing to condone the delay. In support of his contentions, the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, : 1997ECR785(SC) , wherein it has been held that the Law of Limitation has to be applied with all its rigour prescribed by Statute and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.

7. It is true that the discretion exercised by the lower Court in the matter of condonation of delay is not to be lightly interfered with, unless the Court has acted with material irregularity in the exercise of its discretion. Section 5 of the Limitation Act undoubtedly vests in the Court the power to condone the delay in making an application where the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period. What is sufficient cause must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is well-settled that the expression 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction in order to advance the cause of justice. The Rules of Procedure are primarily intended to do substantial justice but not to punish the parties for their mistakes or to destroy their legal rights.

8. In N, Balakrishnan v. M. Krishna Murthy, 1998 (7) Supreme 209, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between a case where the lower Court in the exercise of its discretion condones the delay and a case where it refuses to condone the delay. It is held that in the former case, the superior Court should not normally disturb the order of the lower Court. But, in the latter case, the Supreme Court held:

'.....the superior Court would be free toconsider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Courtto come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower Court. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause.

Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a life-span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suilor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words 'sufficient cause' under Seclion 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice.'

The Supreme Court in that case further held:

'.....Length of delay is no matter,acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonablc due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory.....'

9. In the instant case, admittedly, all the plaintiffs are ladies residing in different places far away from Hyderabad. In the affidavit of the 1st plaintiff, which was filed along with the application for setting aside the order dismissing the suit for default, it is stated that the plaintiffs had no communication from their Advocate after the decree was set aside on the application of the 1st respondent; that they are helpless ladies without any proper advice; and that they could not, therefore, take steps within time. The suit had been pending for more than ten years before it was dismissed for default in the year 1992. Earlier, the suit was decreed, but the decree was set aside later on the application of the 1st respondent. Having regard to all these facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that the conduct of the plaintiffs is such that it deserves to be castigated as being irresponsible. The lower Court appears to have been swayed by the fact that in support of the application for condonation of delay, only the affidavit of the Advocate was filed and that no affidavit of the party is filed. The lower Court ignored the fact that along with the main application for restoration of the suit, the affidavit of the 1st plaintiff has been filed.

10. In Ramachandra Row v. Seshaiah, 1957 (2) An.W.R. 106, a Division Bench of this Court held that it is not necessary that there should be a formal petition to excuse the delay; that it is always open to the Court or Tribunal to condone the delay, if the person concerned is able to convince that there are justifiable grounds for the delay in presentingan appeal or a petition; and that the filing of a formal petition for execusing the delay is not sine qua non for the exercise of that power.

11. Following the said judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, a learned single Judge of this Court, in A. Govindaiah v. V. Venkatamma, : 1995(3)ALT685 , held that delay can be condoned even without filing a separate application for condonation of delay, if the delay is otherwise explained in the affidavit filed in support of the application made to set aside ex parts decree. In that case, the petitioner was a rustic villager residing in a remote village and he is also an illiterate person. An ex parte decree was passed, as there was a communication gap between him and his Advocate. Having regard to the said facts, the Court held that the petitioner had made out a sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the application to set aside the ex parte decree.

12. In view of the said judgments, I am inclined to take the view that-on the facts and circumstances of this case, the petitioners have made out a sufficient cause for condonation of the delay, however, subject to payment of costs of Rs. 1,000/- to the Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent.

13. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed, the impugned order is set aside, and the delay in filing the application to set aside the order dismissing the suit for default is condoned subject to the condition that the petitioners shall pay a sum of Rs.1,000/- by way of costs to the Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent within two weeks from today. In default of such payment, the CRP stands dismissed. If the 2nd respondent does not want to prosecute the suit, it is open to the 2nd respondent to take appropriate steps in that behalf in the lower Court. The lower Court is directed to pass appropriate orders on IA. No.2505 of 1993 in the light of this order.