inspector General of Registration and Stamps, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad Vs. Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and anr. - Court Judgment

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civil - revision - section 61 of stamp act, 1899 - petitioner sought to file revision under section 61 (1) against decision of collector in matter related to stamping - question involved that before whom revision filed under section 61 (1) placed for hearing - revision can be filed before appellate court as well as before court of reference - in present case high court is the appellate court and also court of reference - petitioner can file revision in high court. - motor vehicles act (59 of 1988)section 149 (2): [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers entitlement to defend the action joint appeal by insured and insurer - held, the language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. it shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of section 149 of the act, and no other grounds are available to it. the insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. if insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of sections 170 and 149 of the act. the insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. in the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. section 166: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] claim for compensation accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle held, it is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under workmens compensation act. the insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of section 149 of the act. the right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under workmens compensation act, but also under benevolent provisions under section 166 and 167 of the m.v. act. the right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the workmens compensation act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under section 167 of the act to choose either of the two forum. the only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under section 147 of the act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. in the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under section 167 of the act to seek compensation under section 166 of the act resulting in award passed by the tribunal. therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor. section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the act, instead of seeking compensation under the workmens compensation act. on facts, held, the material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. the settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. compensation of rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the tribunal was enhanced to rs.8,20,000/-. - sub-section (2) of section 60 then goes on to say that the high court shall deal with the case as if it had been referred under section 57. that would evidently mean that such a reference also ,like a reference made under section 57 has to be decided by not less than 3 judges of the high court. 9. since in this case the appellate court as well as the court of reference is the high court, therefore, the revision has been properly filed before the high court. mukundlal ,(air 1942 all 147) (fb) by full bench, that cannot ,however be taken as an authority for the proposition that a revision under section 61(1) must also be heard by a full bench as if it is a reference made either under section 57 or section 60. there are no words to that effect in section 61(1). on the other hand the forum for hearing revision is clearly indicated in section 61(1) of the act.ekbote, c.j.1. we have before us the matter of clarification sought by the office as to before whom the revision filed under section 61(1) of the stamp act should be placed for hearing.2. the facts in brief are that sri bhagat ram undertook to construct a house at himyatnagar on behalf of sri p.v. narayana for an estimated construction value of rs. 17,500/- . the contractor received rs. 12,000/- and agreed to receive the balance of rs. 5,500/- after completion of the construction. he drew up a receipt for rupees 12,000/- in favour of the owner sri p.v. narayana on 21-2-1963 with the agreement referred to above. he also stated that he delivered the title deeds of his house situate at beer bhan hyderabad as security for the advance.3. the said document is entitled 'a receipt'. it was filed before the i. addl. chief judge , city civil court in o.p. 47/67. the court acting under section 35 of the indian stamp act , found that the document was unstamped. he found that under article 53 of schedule i to the indian stamp act, it requires a stamp of rs. 0-10 ps. the court therefore, levied a penalty of re. 1/- under provisio (b) of section 35 of the indian stamp act. the said amount thus collected was remitted to the government by challan dated 7-8-1971 and bank receipt of the same date. the court also sent a copy of the document to the applicant under section 30(1) of the indian stamp act.4. the inspector general of registration and stamps , who happens to be the collector under the indian stamps act for the twin cities of hyderabad and secunderabad held the view that the document does not fall under the term receipt. he is also of the opinion that it does not fall under art. 6 of schedule 1-a of the act viz., agreement relating to deposit of title deeds as the advance received and the purpose for which the deposit of title deeds was made was not for repayment of the loan or debt. he therefore expressed the opinion that the document creates a right over specific property falling under the definition of 'mortgage deed' as defined by section 2(17) of the indian stamps act. he therefore opined that the document requires a stamp duty of rs. 360/- under article 35 (a) read with art. 20 of schedule 1-a of the indian stamp act.5. since the high court is the court to which appeals lie from the chief judge, city civil court, hyderabad and it is also a court of reference , the applicant, that is to say the collector , referred this application under section 61(1) of the act.6. there are three provisions under the act which one has to bear in mind before the forum for such revision petitions is identified. section 57 relates to a reference made by the chief controlling revenue authority. section 57(2) in such cases, expressly enjoins that every such reference shall be decided by not less than 3 judges of the high court to which it is referred. section 60 is the second provision which relates to the reference made by any court other than the court mentioned in section 57 which provides that if such court feels doubt as to the amount of duty to be paid in respect of any instrument etc., it may draw up a statement of case and refer it with its own opinion thereon for the decision of the high court to which , if he were the chief controlling revenue authority, he would under sec. 57 refer the same. sub-section (2) of section 60 then goes on to say that the high court shall deal with the case as if it had been referred under section 57. that would evidently mean that such a reference also , like a reference made under section 57 has to be decided by not less than 3 judges of the high court.7. we then come to section 61 , which is the third provision relevant for our purpose. this section does not deal with references , but deals with revisions. in the first part of section 61(1) it is stated that when any court in the exercise of its civil or revenue jurisdiction or any criminal court in any proceeding, mentioned therein, makes any order admitting any document in evidence as duty stamped or as not requiring a stamp or upon payment of duty and a penalty under section 35 , then in the second part , it says that the court to which the appeal lies from such first-mentioned court (meaning the court which made the order under the first part of the sub-section) or to which references are made by such first mentioned court (meaning the court which made the order) either of its own motion or on the application of the collector take the order made by the court into consideration and decide the same in accordance with law.8. a reading of this section would make it clear that whenever a court makes an order relating to stamp duty on any document, then a revision alone lies and there can be no references in such cases where such orders are made. the forum for filing such revisions is the court to which appeals lie from the orders or decrees of the court which made that order. a revision also may lie in the alternative to the high court to which references under section 60 can be made by any court. thus a concurrent jurisdiction has been conferred on the appellate court if it happens to be a court other than the high court and the high court. the collector thus has a choice to prefer the revision to the court to which appeals lie from the order of the first-mentioned court in sub-section (1) or to the high court.9. since in this case the appellate court as well as the court of reference is the high court, therefore, the revision has been properly filed before the high court.10. the question then is whether such a revision should be registered as such and be heard by a learned single judge or a bench or a full bench of this court. it naturally depends upon the subject-matter of the case in which such order is made by the court. if the appeal from the final order or decree of the court lies to a single judge or a bench of two or more judges then the matter should be placed before the respective courts. it is therefore clear that although a revision may lie to the high court and would be registered as such, the high court would obviously consider such a case of revision in accordance with the appellate side rules of the high court because the forum of the appeal is to be identified even though it is a revision. such a case therefore need not be posted before the full bench. it may be that a case of revision although preferred under section 61(1) of the act was heard in referred case no. 4 of 1891 in (1892) ilr 15 mad 259 (fb) and firm shyam lal bidhi chand v. mukundlal , (air 1942 all 147) (fb) by full bench, that cannot , however be taken as an authority for the proposition that a revision under section 61(1) must also be heard by a full bench as if it is a reference made either under section 57 or section 60. there are no words to that effect in section 61(1). on the other hand the forum for hearing revision is clearly indicated in section 61(1) of the act.11. since in this case the subject matter of the o.p. is only rs. 12,000/- and in any case it does not exceed rs. 20,000/- this revision shall be placed before a learned single judge for disposal in accordance with law.12. answer accordingly.