idpl Employees Co-operative House Building Society Vs. Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, Hyderabad - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
property - judicial review - articles 14 and 226 of constitution of india - whether under article 226 aggrieved party can seek judicial review of order passed by statutory authority - unless reasons for decision are not mentioned right conferred under article 226 cannot be exercised. - motor vehicles act (59 of 1988)section 149 (2): [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers entitlement to defend the action joint appeal by insured and insurer - held, the language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. it shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of section 149 of the act, and no other grounds are available to it. the insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. if insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of sections 170 and 149 of the act. the insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. in the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. section 166: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] claim for compensation accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle held, it is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under workmens compensation act. the insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of section 149 of the act. the right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under workmens compensation act, but also under benevolent provisions under section 166 and 167 of the m.v. act. the right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the workmens compensation act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under section 167 of the act to choose either of the two forum. the only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under section 147 of the act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. in the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under section 167 of the act to seek compensation under section 166 of the act resulting in award passed by the tribunal. therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor. section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the act, instead of seeking compensation under the workmens compensation act. on facts, held, the material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. the settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. compensation of rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the tribunal was enhanced to rs.8,20,000/-. - with reference to your letter 5th cited we would like to bring to your kind notice that the government of a. when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of an affidavit, or otherwise an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validity by additional ground, later brought out'.17. after referring to the judgment in the case of gordhan das (supra), the supreme court in the case of mohinder singh gill (supra), held as follows' orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older. further, the reasons mentioned in the counter-affidavit can neither be a substitute nor a justification for failure to record reasons in the order itself.order1. this writ petition is filed to declare the order bearing no. 8109/mp2/ huda/94, dated 10-12-1999, as illegal and arbitrary and for a consequential direction to the respondent to release the draft layout.2. the petitioner is a society. its case, in brief, is that ft is the owner of the property in question admeasuring ac. 50-00. situated in s. no. 163, having purchased the same in the year 1987, and is in continuous possession and enjoyment thereof since then. in the year 1987 the petitioner-society approached the government for change of land use from conservation zone to residential zone, under the a.p. urban development act, 1975. the government after considering the representation of the petitioner-society issued draft notification on 8-12-1989 inviting objections, subject to certain conditions. on 25-7-1994 the government addressed a letter to the vice-chairman, huda, to confirm the draft notification subject to conditions mentioned therein. in pursuance of the said letter, the respondent vide his letter, dated 28-7-1994, directed the petitioner-society and another society to remit an amount of rs. 4,04,687/-towards developmental charges and an amount of rs. 50,000/- towards processing charges within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of the said letter and that in case the said amount was not paid, the government will be informed to close the case. it is further contended that since the petitioner-society paid the said amounts on 5-8-1994 in compliance with the said directions, the respondent by his letter, dated 2-9-1994, requested the government to approve the draft notification by issuing a go and accordingly the government issued g.o.ms. no. 511, dated 20-9-1994, permitting the petitioner-society to change the land use from conservation to resideraial subject to two conditions mentioned therein. on 18-11-1994, after receiving approval of the final notification from the government, the petitioner-society applied to the respondent for draft lay out. in spite of several representations made by the petitioner-society, there is neither any reply from the respondent nor the lay out has been released. therefore, the petitioner-society initially filed the present writ petition for the following relief:'to direct the respondent to release the draft layout for s.no. 163 of hydernagar village, balanagar mandal, rangareddy district.'3. while admitting the writ petition on 27-2-1998, this court granted interim directions in wpmp no. 3837 of 1998, which are as follows:'there shall be interim directions as prayed for on condition the petitioner files an affidavit within two weeks from today, declaring that the total extent of land held by such holder does not exceed the ceiling limit, and in compliance of with other rules and regulations in force.'4. aggrieved by the said interim directions, the respondent preferred writ appeal no. 1414 of 1998, which was dismissed by a division bench of this court on 21-9-1998.5. in compliance with the interim directions of this court, dated 27-2-1998, the petitioner-society fled an affidavit before the chairman, huda, on 7-3-1998. the vice-chairman, huda, in his letter, dated 12-5-1998, requested the petitioner-society to produce no objection certificate from the district collector, rangareddy district, for approval of draft lay out. on 19-5-1998 the president of the petitioner-society, in reply to the said letter, addressed a letter to the vice-chairman, huda, stating as follows:'with reference to your letter 5th cited we would like to bring to your kind notice that the government of a.p., issued memo no.1278/ja/86-28 rev, dated 24-6-1989, directing the collector, r.r. district, to mutate our 50 acres of land in s.no. 163 in the revenue records in our favour (xerox copy is enclosed). subsequently, the mro, balanagar mandal, issued proceedings no. 8/ 1057/93, dated 23-06-1993, declaring our society as the owner of 50 acres of land in s.no. 163 of hydernagar village (a xerox copy is enclosed). these two documents are self-explanatory.we are also enclosing a xerox copy of faisalpatti issued by the mro, balanagar mandal, in respect of our society land ins.no. 163.'6. again, the secretary of the petitioner-society addressed a letter, dated 3-6-1998, to the vice chairman, huda, requesting to furnish the relevant provision under which the application has to be made and further requested to keep the file pending till the reply is received from the vice chairman. huda, and thereafter till the petitioner-society gets no-objection certificate. finally, the vice-chairman, huda, by his order, dated 10-12-1999, informed the secretary of the petitioner-society that the proposals for lay-out in s.no. 163 of hydernagar are rejected and not considered.7. the respondent filed counter-affidavit contending that section 14 (2) of act 7 of 1992 was amended whereby the following words are inserted in section 14 (2) of the a.p. urban areas (development) act, 1975, 'and a copy of the title deed of the land duty attested by a gazetted officer of the government together with an urban land ceiling clearance certificate if the extent of the land exceeds the ceiling limit or an affidavit declaring that the total extent of the land held by such holder, his or her spouse and unmarried minor children, does not exceed the ceiling limit.' it is further contended that in view of the said amendment, for processing the application for issuing draft lay out, production of ceiling clearance certificate, if the extent of the land exceeds the ceiling limit, is mandatory. it is further contended that the application submitted under section 14(2) of the act shall accompany with fee as may be prescribed by the authority along with a copy of the title deed of the land duly attested by a gazetted officer together with urban land ceiling clearance certificate, if the extent of the land exceeds the ceiling limit. it is further contended that the petitioner-society submitted an application for permission to carry on development in an extent of ac.49-51 cents. except production of urban land ceiling clearance certificate, the respondent is not insisting for any other documents. it is further contended that the government while permitting change of land use from conservation to residential, in exercise of powers under section 12 (2) of the act, imposed two conditions viz., (1) the lay out for the site should be approved by the huda and (2) the applicants should submit urban land ceiling clearance certificate before release of final lay out.8. the learned counsel for the petitioner-society submits that the impugned order, by which permission for, the lay out to the petitioner-society is rejected is a very cryptic and the same was issued without giving any reasons. the said order is a non-speaking order of one line. thus contending he requested to quash the same.9. the learned additional advocate-general appearing on behalf of the respondent submits that under section 14(2) of the act the petitioner-society has to file an affidavit and also urban land ceiling clearance certificate from the urban land ceiling authorities stating that the land in question is within the land ceiling limit and as the petitioner-society has not compiled with the said objections raised by the respondent, the impugned order, dated 10-12-1999, has been passed. he further submits that in the present case since the petitioner-society has not filed the urban land ceiling clearance certificate, the respondent has not processed the application of the petitioner-society for release of draft lay out.10. i have perused the impugned order, dated 10-12-1999, passed by the respondent, which is as follows:'with reference to your application cited abuse, it is to inform that the layout proposals submitted by you in sy. no. 163 of hydernagar village is hereby rejected and not considered.11. i am not inclined to go into the legal issues involved in this writ petition. however, a perusal of the impugned order, dated 10-12-1999, shows that the same was passed without application of mind and without any reasons, and is not a speaking order. apart from that, the conduct of the respondents shows that except dragging on the matter for years together, it does not want to take a decision in this regard. further, when this court has granted interim directions, the respondent, while passing the impugned order rejecting the request of the petitioner-society, should have explained the circumstances for such a rejection. the tenor of the impugned order shows that the same was passed without application of mind.12. therefore, i have no hesitation to quash the impugned order since it is bereft of reasons and without application of mind. the requirement of recording reasons is one of the facets of principles of natural justice, which govern the exercise of power by administrative authorities. by recording reasons, the chance of arbitrariness in the mode and manner of exercise of power is excluded and a degree of fairness in the process of decision making is ensured.13. in s.n. mukarjee v. union of india, : 1990crilj2148a , the supreme court held that the exercise of power by an administrative authority, exercising quasi-judicial functions, would require the authority to record reasons in the order and communicate the same to the aggrieved party. except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with, expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record reasons for its decision.14. the salutary principle of recording reasons by an administrative authority can also be examined from another angle. the aggrieved party has a right to approach the high court under article 226 of the constitution of india and seek judicial review of the order passed by the statutory authorities or public functionaries. unless, reasons for the decisions are spelt-out in the order, the right conferred on the aggrieved party to seek judicial review under article 226 of the constitution of india is rendered meaningless. unless the order, on the face of it, reflects the reasons for arriving at the decision, it is not possible for courts to adjudicate whether or not the order suffers from arbitrariness or any other illegality. it is, therefore, necessary that the administrative authorities exercising statutory powers should record the reasons for their decision. while the reasons need not be elaborate, it should be sufficient to reflect proper application of mind by the authority and should indicate the factors, which weighed with the authority in arriving at his decision.15. the contentions advanced to the effect that the reasons for passing the order of rejection though not stated in the order itself, and has been stated in the counter-affidavit cannot be accepted. in commissioner of police v. gordhan das bhanji, : [1952]1scr135 , the supreme court held as follows :'public orders, publicity made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in light of the explanation subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in mind, or what he intended to do.'16. in mohinder singh gill v. chief election commissioner, : [1978]2scr272 , the supreme court held as follows:'when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of an affidavit, or otherwise an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validity by additional ground, later brought out'.17. after referring to the judgment in the case of gordhan das (supra), the supreme court in the case of mohinder singh gill (supra), held as follows''orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.'18. the learned additional advocate-general tried to justify the impugned order, dated 10-12-1999, on the ground that the reason for rejection of the request of the petitioner-society was explained in the counter-affidavit, which cannot be accepted. further, the reasons mentioned in the counter-affidavit can neither be a substitute nor a justification for failure to record reasons in the order itself. therefore, the impugned order is liable to be quashed for the aforementioned reasons.19. at this stage the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in pursuance of the interim directions of this court, dated 27-2-1998, the petitioner-society has in fact filed an affidavit and the respondent has not passed any orders in this regard yet. he seeks for a direction to the respondent to pass a speaking order particularly in the light of the interim directions of this court, dated 27-2-1998, as the petitioner-society has complied with the directions of this court by filing an affidavit and till date the respondent has not passed any order in this regard.20. keeping in view the said position, while quashing the impugned order, dated 10-12-1999, which is a non-speaking order. i direct the respondent to taken into consideration all the circumstances and the affidavit filed by the petitioner-society, in pursuance of the interim directions of this court, and pass appropriate order in the light of the observations made above, and in accordance with law.21. accordingly the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order, dated 10-12-1999, issued by the respondent, is quashed. however, in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. This writ petition is filed to declare the order bearing No. 8109/MP2/ HUDA/94, dated 10-12-1999, as illegal and arbitrary and for a consequential direction to the respondent to release the draft layout.

2. The petitioner is a Society. Its case, in brief, is that ft is the owner of the property in question admeasuring Ac. 50-00. situated in S. No. 163, having purchased the same in the year 1987, and is in continuous possession and enjoyment thereof since then. In the year 1987 the petitioner-society approached the Government for change of land use from conservation zone to residential zone, under the A.P. Urban Development Act, 1975. The Government after considering the representation of the petitioner-society issued draft notification on 8-12-1989 inviting objections, subject to certain conditions. On 25-7-1994 the Government addressed a letter to the Vice-Chairman, HUDA, to confirm the draft notification subject to conditions mentioned therein. In pursuance of the said letter, the respondent vide his letter, dated 28-7-1994, directed the petitioner-society and another society to remit an amount of Rs. 4,04,687/-towards developmental charges and an amount of Rs. 50,000/- towards processing charges within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of the said letter and that in case the said amount was not paid, the Government will be informed to close the case. It is further contended that since the petitioner-society paid the said amounts on 5-8-1994 in compliance with the said directions, the respondent by his letter, dated 2-9-1994, requested the Government to approve the draft notification by issuing a GO and accordingly the Government issued G.O.Ms. No. 511, dated 20-9-1994, permitting the petitioner-society to change the land use from conservation to resideraial subject to two conditions mentioned therein. On 18-11-1994, after receiving approval of the final Notification from the Government, the petitioner-society applied to the respondent for draft lay out. In spite of several representations made by the petitioner-society, there is neither any reply from the respondent nor the lay out has been released. Therefore, the petitioner-society initially filed the present writ petition for the following relief:

'To direct the respondent to release the draft layout for S.No. 163 of Hydernagar Village, Balanagar Mandal, Rangareddy District.'

3. While admitting the writ petition on 27-2-1998, this Court granted interim directions in WPMP No. 3837 of 1998, which are as follows:

'There shall be interim directions as prayed for on condition the petitioner files an affidavit within two weeks from today, declaring that the total extent of land held by such holder does not exceed the ceiling limit, and in compliance of with other Rules and Regulations in force.'

4. Aggrieved by the said interim directions, the respondent preferred Writ Appeal No. 1414 of 1998, which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 21-9-1998.

5. In compliance with the interim directions of this Court, dated 27-2-1998, the petitioner-society fled an affidavit before the Chairman, HUDA, on 7-3-1998. The Vice-Chairman, HUDA, in his letter, dated 12-5-1998, requested the petitioner-society to produce No Objection Certificate from the District Collector, Rangareddy District, for approval of draft lay out. On 19-5-1998 the President of the petitioner-society, in reply to the said letter, addressed a letter to the Vice-Chairman, HUDA, stating as follows:

'With reference to your letter 5th cited we would like to bring to your kind notice that the Government of A.P., issued Memo No.1278/JA/86-28 Rev, dated 24-6-1989, directing the Collector, R.R. District, to mutate our 50 Acres of land in S.No. 163 in the Revenue Records in our favour (Xerox copy is enclosed). Subsequently, the MRO, Balanagar Mandal, issued proceedings No. 8/ 1057/93, dated 23-06-1993, declaring our society as the owner of 50 Acres of land in S.No. 163 of Hydernagar Village (A Xerox copy is enclosed). These two documents are self-explanatory.

We are also enclosing a Xerox copy of Faisalpatti issued by the MRO, Balanagar Mandal, in respect of our society land in

S.No. 163.'

6. Again, the Secretary of the petitioner-society addressed a letter, dated 3-6-1998, to the Vice Chairman, HUDA, requesting to furnish the relevant provision under which the application has to be made and further requested to keep the file pending till the reply is received from the Vice Chairman. HUDA, and thereafter till the petitioner-society gets No-Objection Certificate. Finally, the Vice-Chairman, HUDA, by his order, dated 10-12-1999, informed the Secretary of the petitioner-society that the proposals for lay-out in S.No. 163 of Hydernagar are rejected and not considered.

7. The respondent filed counter-affidavit contending that Section 14 (2) of Act 7 of 1992 was amended whereby the following words are inserted in Section 14 (2) of the A.P. Urban Areas (Development) Act, 1975, 'and a copy of the title deed of the land duty attested by a Gazetted Officer of the Government together with an Urban Land Ceiling Clearance Certificate if the extent of the land exceeds the ceiling limit or an affidavit declaring that the total extent of the land held by such holder, his or her spouse and unmarried minor children, does not exceed the ceiling limit.' It is further contended that in view of the said amendment, for processing the application for issuing draft lay out, production of Ceiling Clearance Certificate, if the extent of the land exceeds the ceiling limit, is mandatory. It is further contended that the application submitted under Section 14(2) of the Act shall accompany with fee as may be prescribed by the authority along with a copy of the title deed of the land duly attested by a Gazetted Officer together with Urban Land Ceiling Clearance Certificate, if the extent of the land exceeds the ceiling limit. It is further contended that the petitioner-society submitted an application for permission to carry on development in an extent of Ac.49-51 cents. Except production of Urban Land Ceiling Clearance Certificate, the respondent is not insisting for any other documents. It is further contended that the Government while permitting change of land use from conservation to residential, in exercise of powers under Section 12 (2) of the Act, imposed two conditions viz., (1) the lay out for the site should be approved by the HUDA and (2) the applicants should submit Urban Land Ceiling Clearance Certificate before release of final lay out.

8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner-society submits that the impugned order, by which permission for, the lay out to the petitioner-society is rejected is a very cryptic and the same was issued without giving any reasons. The said order is a non-speaking order of one line. Thus contending he requested to quash the same.

9. The learned Additional Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the respondent submits that under Section 14(2) of the Act the petitioner-society has to file an affidavit and also Urban Land Ceiling Clearance Certificate from the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities stating that the land in question is within the land ceiling limit and as the petitioner-society has not compiled with the said objections raised by the respondent, the impugned order, dated 10-12-1999, has been passed. He further submits that in the present case since the petitioner-society has not filed the Urban Land Ceiling Clearance Certificate, the respondent has not processed the application of the petitioner-society for release of draft lay out.

10. I have perused the impugned order, dated 10-12-1999, passed by the respondent, which is as follows:

'With reference to your application cited abuse, it is to inform that the layout proposals submitted by you in Sy. No. 163 of Hydernagar Village is hereby rejected and not considered.

11. I am not inclined to go into the legal issues involved in this writ petition. However, a perusal of the impugned order, dated 10-12-1999, shows that the same was passed without application of mind and without any reasons, and is not a speaking order. Apart from that, the conduct of the respondents shows that except dragging on the matter for years together, it does not want to take a decision in this regard. Further, when this Court has granted interim directions, the respondent, while passing the impugned order rejecting the request of the petitioner-society, should have explained the circumstances for such a rejection. The tenor of the impugned order shows that the same was passed without application of mind.

12. Therefore, I have no hesitation to quash the impugned order since it is bereft of reasons and without application of mind. The requirement of recording reasons is one of the facets of principles of Natural Justice, which govern the exercise of power by administrative authorities. By recording reasons, the chance of arbitrariness in the mode and manner of exercise of power is excluded and a degree of fairness in the process of decision making is ensured.

13. In S.N. Mukarjee v. Union of India, : 1990CriLJ2148a , the Supreme Court held that the exercise of power by an administrative authority, exercising quasi-judicial functions, would require the authority to record reasons in the order and communicate the same to the aggrieved party. Except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with, expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record reasons for its decision.

14. The salutary principle of recording reasons by an administrative authority can also be examined from another angle. The aggrieved party has a right to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and seek judicial review of the order passed by the statutory authorities or public functionaries. Unless, reasons for the decisions are spelt-out in the order, the right conferred on the aggrieved party to seek judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is rendered meaningless. Unless the order, on the face of it, reflects the reasons for arriving at the decision, it is not possible for Courts to adjudicate whether or not the order suffers from arbitrariness or any other illegality. It is, therefore, necessary that the administrative authorities exercising statutory powers should record the reasons for their decision. While the reasons need not be elaborate, it should be sufficient to reflect proper application of mind by the authority and should indicate the factors, which weighed with the authority in arriving at his decision.

15. The contentions advanced to the effect that the reasons for passing the order of rejection though not stated in the order itself, and has been stated in the counter-affidavit cannot be accepted. In Commissioner of Police v. Gordhan Das Bhanji, : [1952]1SCR135 , the Supreme Court held as follows :

'Public orders, publicity made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in light of the explanation subsequently given by the Officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in mind, or what he intended to do.'

16. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, : [1978]2SCR272 , the Supreme Court held as follows:

'When a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of an affidavit, or otherwise an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validity by additional ground, later brought out'.

17. After referring to the judgment in the case of Gordhan Das (supra), the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), held as follows'

'Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.'

18. The learned Additional Advocate-General tried to justify the impugned order, dated 10-12-1999, on the ground that the reason for rejection of the request of the petitioner-society was explained in the counter-affidavit, which cannot be accepted. Further, the reasons mentioned in the counter-affidavit can neither be a substitute nor a justification for failure to record reasons in the order itself. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be quashed for the aforementioned reasons.

19. At this stage the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that in pursuance of the interim directions of this Court, dated 27-2-1998, the petitioner-society has in fact filed an affidavit and the respondent has not passed any orders in this regard yet. He seeks for a direction to the respondent to pass a speaking order particularly in the light of the interim directions of this court, dated 27-2-1998, as the petitioner-society has complied with the directions of this court by filing an affidavit and till date the respondent has not passed any order in this regard.

20. Keeping in view the said position, while quashing the impugned order, dated 10-12-1999, which is a non-speaking order. I direct the respondent to taken into consideration all the circumstances and the affidavit filed by the petitioner-society, in pursuance of the interim directions of this court, and pass appropriate order in the light of the observations made above, and in accordance with law.

21. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order, dated 10-12-1999, issued by the respondent, is quashed. However, in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.