Uma Devi and Another Vs. Shaik HussaIn and Another - Court Judgment

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civil - admissibility of document - sections 17 and 18 of registration act, 1908 - suit over property - compromise agreement between petitioner and deceased (husband of respondent) stating that on payment of fixed amount all rights of deceased over suit land will be relinquished in favour of petitioner - whether such document can be treated as relinquishment deed - document falls under section 18 (b) - registration not compulsory but optional - held, document admissible. - motor vehicles act (59 of 1988)section 149 (2): [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers entitlement to defend the action joint appeal by insured and insurer - held, the language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. it shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of section 149 of the act, and no other grounds are available to it. the insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. if insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of sections 170 and 149 of the act. the insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. in the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. section 166: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] claim for compensation accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle held, it is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under workmens compensation act. the insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of section 149 of the act. the right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under workmens compensation act, but also under benevolent provisions under section 166 and 167 of the m.v. act. the right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the workmens compensation act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under section 167 of the act to choose either of the two forum. the only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under section 147 of the act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. in the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under section 167 of the act to seek compensation under section 166 of the act resulting in award passed by the tribunal. therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor. section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the act, instead of seeking compensation under the workmens compensation act. on facts, held, the material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. the settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. compensation of rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the tribunal was enhanced to rs.8,20,000/-. - 6. it is well settled that the question whether a document is admissible in evidence or not primarily depends upon the nature and the contents of the document and also the facts and circumstances of each case.order1. heard the learned counsel on both sides.2. the question raised in this civil revision petition relates to the admissibilityof a document dated 6-6-1984 which is styled as (relinquishment deed) in evidence. the facts leading to the revision may be briefly stated:3. the petitioners herein are the defendants in os no.66 of 1 992 on the file of the court of the district munsif, medchal, rangareddy district. the said suit is filed by the first respondent herein for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of the suit schedule property consisting of about 473 sq yards of site. the said property originally belonged to asha ramanujam, the husband of the first petitioner and the father of the second petitioner. he sold the property to the first respondent herein under two sale-deeds dated 30-7-1979 and 4-11-1981. however, some disputes arose between the parties in regard to the same. thereupon the first respondent filed os.47 of 1983 against ramanujam for declaration of title and injunction. during the pendency of that suit, there was a compromise or settlement of the dispute on 6-6-1984. as per the said compromise, ramanujam is stated to have paid a sum of rs.36,300/- to the first respondent in consideration of which the first respondent relinquished all his rights in the property and agreed to withdraw the suit. as per the said settlement the suit os no.47 of 1983 was not pursued and the same was dismissed for default on 15-4-1985. the alleged settlement is stated to have been recorded in a document dated 6-6-1984 allegedly executed by the first respondent on a stamp paper. during the course of the trial of the present suit, the petitioners sought to tender the document dated 6-6-1984 in evidence. on an objection raised by the first respondent with regard to its admissibility, the lower court, by the impugned order dated 3-12-1997, held that the said document is a relinquishment deed in respect of immoveable property worth more than rs.100/- which is compulsorily registerable and the document is not admissible in evidence as it is not registered. hence this revision.4. the learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the documentcannot be treated as a relinquishment deed. it is only an agreement or acknowledgment evidencing the compromise arrived at between the parties, that the document by itself does not create or extinguish rights in the property and as such it is not compulsorily registerable. it is also pointed out that there is a specific recital in the document to the effect that in case ramanujam desires to have a registered document, the first respondent shall execute and register proper conveyance as and when demanded by ramaanjuam the learned counsel for the petitioners has also made an alternative submission that the document in question docs not attract section 17 of the indian registration act but it falls under section 18 and as such registration is only optional but not compulsory.5. on the other hand, the learnedcounsel appearing for the first respondent has contended that there are clear recitals in the document to the effect that a sum of rs.36,300/- was paid 35 consideration, that possession of the property was also delivered and that the executant has given up all his rights in the property and as such the document is a deed of rclinquishment whereby the executant of the document purported to give up all his rights in the property and create rights in favour of ramanujam. the learned counsel for the first respondent, placing reliance on the judgment of this court in b. ramathulasamma v. yedem masthan reddy, : 1998(5)ald502 , contended that merely because the document contains a provision for execution of a registered deed in future, it cannot alter or change the nature of the document and it cannot be treated as an agreement.6. it is well settled that the question whether a document is admissible in evidence or not primarily depends upon the nature and the contents of the document and also the facts and circumstances of each case. the nomenclature given to the document is not decisive. the primary question to beconsidered is whether the document by itself creates of extinguishes rights in immovcable property worth more than rs.100/-. in ascertaining the true nature of the document, the contextual facts also have to be borne in mind.7. admittedly the property in question originally belonged to ramanjuam and the same was sold to the first respondent under two registered sale-deeds executed in the years 1979 and 1981. but as some disputes arose between the parties, the first respondent filed a suit against ramanujam for declaration of title and injunction. during the pendency of the suit, the dispute was settled by the intervention of some mediators. as per the decision of the mediators, ramanujam had to pay besides the sale consideration of rs.6,300/ - under the two sale-deeds executed by him, a further sum of rs.30,000/- to the first respondent who on receipt of the same, gave up all his claims to the property and abandoned the suit filed by him. it is in that context that the document dated 6-6-1994 came to be allegedly executed. it cannot, therefore, be said that for the first time any rights in the property were sought to be created by and under the document dated 6-6-1984. the document merely records the terms of the settlement arrived at between the parties through the intervention of the mediators and it acknowledges the receipt of rs.36,300/- by the first respondent. the document specifically recites that hereafter the executant of the document shall not have any concern with the land which is the subject matter of the suit and that ramanujam shall be in possession and enjoyment of the suit propeity along with the property on the eastern side which is already in his possession and it also recites that hereafter ramamijam shall be the absolute owner of the entire property and that the executant of the document shall not have any rights in the property. there is a further recital that in case ramanujam desires to have a registered deed, the executant shall execute and register a proper deed whenever demanded.8. having regard to all these circumstances and the recitals in the document, i am of the view that this document cannot be construed as a relinquishment deed whereunder rights in immoveable property arc extinguished or created for the first time. i am inclined to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the document falls under section 18(b) of the registration act and as such registration is not compulsory but it is only optional.9. for the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order is set aside and the crp is allowed. the question of truth and validity of the document is, however, a matter to be decided in the suit. no costs.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. Heard the learned Counsel on both sides.

2. The question raised in this Civil Revision Petition relates to the admissibilityof a document dated 6-6-1984 which is styled as (relinquishment deed) in evidence. The facts leading to the revision may be briefly stated:

3. The petitioners herein are the defendants in OS No.66 of 1 992 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Medchal, Rangareddy District. The said suit is filed by the first respondent herein for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of the suit schedule property consisting of about 473 sq yards of site. The said property originally belonged to Asha Ramanujam, the husband of the first petitioner and the father of the second petitioner. He sold the property to the first respondent herein under two sale-deeds dated 30-7-1979 and 4-11-1981. However, some disputes arose between the parties in regard to the same. Thereupon the first respondent filed OS.47 of 1983 against Ramanujam for declaration of title and injunction. During the pendency of that suit, there was a compromise or settlement of the dispute on 6-6-1984. As per the said compromise, Ramanujam is stated to have paid a sum of Rs.36,300/- to the first respondent in consideration of which the first respondent relinquished all his rights in the property and agreed to withdraw the suit. As per the said settlement the suit OS No.47 of 1983 was not pursued and the same was dismissed for default on 15-4-1985. The alleged settlement is stated to have been recorded in a document dated 6-6-1984 allegedly executed by the first respondent on a stamp paper. During the course of the trial of the present suit, the petitioners sought to tender the document dated 6-6-1984 in evidence. On an objection raised by the first respondent with regard to its admissibility, the lower Court, by the impugned order dated 3-12-1997, held that the said document is a relinquishment deed in respect of immoveable property worth more than Rs.100/- which is compulsorily registerable and the document is not admissible in evidence as it is not registered. Hence this revision.

4. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has contended that the documentcannot be treated as a relinquishment deed. It is only an agreement or acknowledgment evidencing the compromise arrived at between the parties, that the document by itself does not create or extinguish rights in the property and as such it is not compulsorily registerable. It is also pointed out that there is a specific recital in the document to the effect that in case Ramanujam desires to have a registered document, the first respondent shall execute and register proper conveyance as and when demanded by Ramaanjuam The learned Counsel for the petitioners has also made an alternative submission that the document in question docs not attract Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act but it falls under Section 18 and as such registration is only optional but not compulsory.

5. On the other hand, the learnedCounsel appearing for the first respondent has contended that there are clear recitals in the document to the effect that a sum of Rs.36,300/- was paid 35 consideration, that possession of the property was also delivered and that the executant has given up all his rights in the property and as such the document is a deed of rclinquishment whereby the executant of the document purported to give up all his rights in the property and create rights in favour of Ramanujam. The learned Counsel for the first respondent, placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in B. Ramathulasamma v. Yedem Masthan Reddy, : 1998(5)ALD502 , contended that merely because the document contains a provision for execution of a registered deed in future, it cannot alter or change the nature of the document and it cannot be treated as an agreement.

6. It is well settled that the question whether a document is admissible in evidence or not primarily depends upon the nature and the contents of the document and also the facts and circumstances of each case. The nomenclature given to the document is not decisive. The primary question to beconsidered is whether the document by itself creates of extinguishes rights in immovcable property worth more than Rs.100/-. In ascertaining the true nature of the document, the contextual facts also have to be borne in mind.

7. Admittedly the property in question originally belonged to Ramanjuam and the same was sold to the first respondent under two registered sale-deeds executed in the years 1979 and 1981. But as some disputes arose between the parties, the first respondent filed a suit against Ramanujam for declaration of title and injunction. During the pendency of the suit, the dispute was settled by the intervention of some mediators. As per the decision of the mediators, Ramanujam had to pay besides the sale consideration of Rs.6,300/ - under the two sale-deeds executed by him, a further sum of Rs.30,000/- to the first respondent who on receipt of the same, gave up all his claims to the property and abandoned the suit filed by him. It is in that context that the document dated 6-6-1994 came to be allegedly executed. It cannot, therefore, be said that for the first time any rights in the property were sought to be created by and under the document dated 6-6-1984. The document merely records the terms of the settlement arrived at between the parties through the intervention of the mediators and it acknowledges the receipt of Rs.36,300/- by the first respondent. The document specifically recites that hereafter the executant of the document shall not have any concern with the land which is the subject matter of the suit and that Ramanujam shall be in possession and enjoyment of the suit propeity along with the property on the eastern side which is already in his possession and it also recites that hereafter Ramamijam shall be the absolute owner of the entire property and that the executant of the document shall not have any rights in the property. There is a further recital that in case Ramanujam desires to have a registered deed, the executant shall execute and register a proper deed whenever demanded.

8. Having regard to all these circumstances and the recitals in the document, I am of the view that this document cannot be construed as a relinquishment deed whereunder rights in immoveable property arc extinguished or created for the first time. I am inclined to agree with the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the document falls under Section 18(b) of the Registration Act and as such registration is not compulsory but it is only optional.

9. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order is set aside and the CRP is allowed. The question of truth and validity of the document is, however, a matter to be decided in the suit. No costs.