P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment

Judgment:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
)
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ORDER

B. Subhashan Reddy, J.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
)
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'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
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		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
)
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(1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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(2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'

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			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
)
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3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the Constitution of India. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
)
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9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.

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			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
)
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10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the Constitution of India. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
)
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'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
)
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18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
)
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From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
)
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20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:

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			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
)
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(ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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(iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
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		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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(iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
)
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(v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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(vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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(vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
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22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.

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			'id' => '424144',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
			'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
			'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '424144',
		(int) 1 => 'p-katama-reddy-vs-divisional-anantpur'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'P Katama Reddy Vs Revenue Divisional Officer Anantpur and ors - Citation 424144 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '424144',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; <a href="/act/51883/essential-commodities-act-1955-complete-act">Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a> - Sections 3',
		'appealno' => 'W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch',
		'appellant' => 'P. Katama Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Constitution - reservation for women - Article 15 of Constitution of India - State allotted all fair price shops to women after dishing it out on standard reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Handicapped - action of State challenged on grounds of excessive reservation - State contended that it had absolute monopoly over all fair price shops and it was their discretion to allot them in any manner they liked - State's contention refuted - held, action of State illegal - reservation for women not to exceed thirty percent.


 - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT (59 OF 1988)Section 149 (2): [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers entitlement to defend the action  Joint appeal by insured and insurer - Held, The language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. It shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, and no other grounds are available to it. The insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. If insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the Legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of Sections 170 and 149 of the Act. The insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. In the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. Therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. 

Section 166: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Claim for compensation  Accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle  Held, It is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. Statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under Workmens Compensation Act. The insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. The right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under Workmens Compensation Act, but also under benevolent provisions under Section 166 and 167 of the M.V. Act. The right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the Workmens Compensation Act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (Sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under Section 167 of the Act to choose either of the two Forum. The only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under Section 147 of the Act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the Tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. In the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under Section 167 of the Act to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act resulting in award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. Undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. The owner is therefore, tortfeasor. 

Section 168: [V. Gopala Gowda & Jawad Rahim, JJ] Insurers limit of liability -  Held, It is well settled that the liability of the Insurance Company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. Is for the Insurance Company to show that the Insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. That issue was neither raised before the Tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. Thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under Section 149 (1) of the Act. Where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Act, instead of seeking compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. On facts, held, The material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the Tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. The settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. Compensation of Rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the Tribunal was enhanced to Rs.8,20,000/-.  -  The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo ? Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Advocate-General',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1997-11-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.</p><p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.</p><p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :</p><p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.</p><p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.</p><p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.</p><p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.</p><p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.</p><p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'</p><p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.</p><p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.</p><p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.</p><p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.</p><p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.</p><p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.</p><p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :</p><p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'</p><p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.</p><p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.</p><p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category </p><p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.</p><p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.</p><p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.</p><p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :</p><p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'</p><p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.</p><p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,</p><p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :</p><p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.</p><p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'</p><p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :</p><p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'</p><p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :</p><p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:</p><p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;</p><p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;</p><p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;</p><p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.</p><p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and </p><p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.</p><p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548',
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		'respondent' => 'Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>B. Subhashan Reddy, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Whether women-reservation can be provided in the matter of allotment of fair-price shops and if so what should be the extent of such reservation and as to whether the said reservation can be 100% - are the vital questions for consideration in this batch of writ petitions.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Fair price shops have been set-up by promulgating an order titled 'Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 in exercise of the powers contained under Section 3 of the <a>Essential Commodities Act, 1955</a>. At the inception, no reservation was stipulated, but preference was being given to the Co-operative Societies to run the fair-price shops. Class reservations grouped on caste basis were introduced in the year 1987 for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at 15% and 6% respectively. 3% reservation was also provided to physically handicapped. Coming to 1988, there was a little change in the policy because of acute unemployment problem for education and as such, preference was being given to them by maintaining the reservations as stated above. In 1990, preference was directed to be given to women when other things and qualifications are equal. In 1991, a specific percentage i.e. 10% of the shops sanctioned after 24-7-1991 was reserved for women and in 1993, the same was amended reserving the same for educated unemployed women eligible for appointment. This is contained in Government Memo No.15361/ CS.IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993 by which 100% reservation is provided for women, which is assailed in this batch of writ petitions. Both the above proceedings are extracted herewith. Government Memo No.40203/CS/IV/91, dated 21-4-1991 states 'according to Government instructions now in force, preference has to be given to women candidates over men in the matter of appointment of fair price shopdealers. However, it is observed that number of shops held by women candidates is very negligible. Government, therefore, hereby order that 10% of fair price shops of newly created hereafter shall be allotted to women candidates.' The educational qualification was fixed as VII Class. A condition was put that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly opened hereinafter shall be allotted to women candidates subject to the condition that the shops thus allotted should be run personally by such women allottees. Now coming to the impugned Memo No.l5361/CS/IV/93-1, dated 13-4-1993, it reads as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Keeping in view the growing unemployment, orders were issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited that all fair price shops shall be allotted only to unemployed persons, subject to reservation of 15% to Scheduled Castes, 6% to Scheduled Tribes and 3% to Physically Handicapped. Subsequently, orders were issued in the reference 3rd cited that 10% of the fair price shops to be newly created shall be allotted to women candidates only.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> The matter relating to allotment of fair price shops has been further examined carefully in the light of the Government of India's recent policy directives to promote the visibility of women in different administrative, economic and social sectors specially fair price shops as women arc the main providers of nutrition within the household, it has been decided that henceforth all the fair price shops vacancies shall be allotted only to women candidates. The reservations already prescribed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Physically Handicapped sliall continue. In other words, out of the P.P. shops held by individuals, 15% shall be reserved for SCs, 6% for STs and 3% for Physically Handicapped, taking both men and women into account. For the purpose of computing the percentage of reservation, each circle in the cities of Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada and each Revenue Division in districts, shall be taken as a Unit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Accordingly, the following amendments are hereby ordered to the instructions issued in Government Memo No.18835/CS.II/90-1, dated 22-3-1990.',
	(int) 6 => '<p> (1) Under item (i) of Para 1.3.0 of the said Memo, for the words 'unemployed persons' the words 'unemployed women' shall be substituted.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> (2) Under Para 1.4.0, the note relating to reservation of 10% of P.P. shops for women shall be omitted.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> These orders shall come into force with immediate effect.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. There arc other Governmental orders issued later in G.O.Ms.No.235, dated 8-5-1994, G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 6-8-1994 and G.O. Ms. No.497, dated 10-12-1995, which are all women oriented, directing allotment of fair price shops to women either individually or as part of the organisation or society. The crux of the pleas and arguments is the ire shown by the petitioners, who are all men, against the total reservation of all fair price shops to women, women organisations or societies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We need not detail all the other pleadings in various writ petitions either elaborately or individually for the reason that the consequential actions in all the writ petitions depend upon the verdict with regard to the validity or otherwise of the women reservation.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners mainly led by Mr. C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, touching upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. In fact, only one Article which has got relevance for adjudication in this case in Article 15 and even if the contentions can be traced to other articles partially, particularly, Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) as also Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 300A of the Constitution is totally irrelevant. As there is a specific article i.e. Article 15, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, contentions based on other Articles become general in nature. On behalf of the petitioners, two contentions are raised,namely, (1) that in the matter of allotment of fair price shops, no reservation can be made in favour of women and that in fact, they are not suitable for that job; and (2) that in no event, the reservation can be cent per cent and that the cent per cent reservation is quite arbitrary and unreasonable.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Mr. V. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Advocate-General in his counter arguments submitted that running of fair price shop is the monopoly of the Government and that nobody can claim allotment of a fair price shop as of right; as such, the State is entitled to evolve a policy to allot the fair price shops to anybody and the challenge is unsustainable. Alternatively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that at the inception there was no reservation for women, that thereafter some reservation was made, which the Government felt not adequate and that women being socially backward and to do gender justice and remove the inequality and as there are more number of men allottees of fair price shops and to equalise the number with women, all the fair price shops which were available from the date of impugned Memo and thereafter will be filled up 100% with women and the Government may revise the policy again after the men and women become equal in number in the allotment of fair price shops. Thus, he submitted that on either of the grounds, the discrimination of 100% reservation in favour of women is sustainable and is not a hostile discrimination and that there is a nexus for the object to be achieved and intelligible differentia in discrimination, as the State Government, pursuant to the directive policy as also under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a> felt an obligation that women should be brought on par with men in the running of fair price shops. Certain judicial precedents have been cited on either side and we will refer the same having regard to the relevancy.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>6. In so far as the provision for reservation for women is concerned, it is too late in the day to say that such reservations should not be provided for women. Unlike in by-gone days, women now occupy every area of avocation, the latest being the space researchalso. There are women among pilots, drivers, conductors, policy, weight-lifters, in sports and games and what not. and we have seen the transformation of Indian women from kitchen to police to defence and then the sky and outer space. There is no reason to say that women should be given 'soft jobs and are not suitable to run the fair price shops. In fact, it is the duty of the society to train women for professions other than those known as 'soft jobs' providing them with right type of education. Hence, we reject the contention of the petitioners with regard to unsuitability of women to run the fair price shops.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>7. Equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> which has two facets i.e. (a) equals shall be treated equally; and (b) unequals cannot be treated equally, but have to be treated unequally. The above equality clause is general in nature. Article 15 is an instance of the right of equality. Unlike Article 14 which is available to all persons, Article 15 is applicable only to citizens. Again, while Article 16(1) relates to public employment, Article 15(1) covers the entire field of discrimination. The fundamental right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated in the matter of rights etc. conferred on the citizen is individual and personal in nature. A glance at Article 15(1) would make one feel that there should not be discrimination of any kind, be it on the ground of sex or any other ground. If understood so plainly, it satisfies de jure equality. But, the avoidance of discrimination aimed at by the Constitution makers will not become real until the State strives by its affirmative action to achieve de facto equality. Provision for equal employment opportunity is one such important affirmative action, as centuries of gender discrimination can be set right only by affirmative action. Women being weaker sex and thus weaker section of the society, need different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between men and women. Emancipation of women can be made real, only if they are made self-reliant by economic independence. The State, from time to time has been taking effective steps for women empowerment in all fronts -Educational Economic and Political. Women reservation in fair price shops is an act of Economic empowerment of women. Gender disparity existed between men and women in the matter of running fair price shops. There was male domination and the State's action to provide equal opportunity for women to run the fair-price shops is a welcome measure. What is directly intended to abolish the existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>8. It was held by the Supreme Court in that historical judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, : AIR1993SC477 that the content of the expression 'equality before law' is illustrated not only by Articles 15 - 18, but also by several Articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 29A, 31 and 46 and that equality postulates not mere equality in law, but also equality in fact and mat equality is a positive right. It was also held that to make the equality real, State is under an obligation to undertake affirmative action as equal protection clause requires affirmative action for those placed unequally, that equality for unequals is secured by treating them unequally, that positive discrimination or affirmative action is required, and that reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and its continuing ill-effects, while other affirmative action programmes are intended to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical. It was, therefore, held that women are vulnerable section of the society whatsoever strata to which they belong and as they are more disadvantaged than men in their own social class, reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. The proposition laid down in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) was reiterated by Ms. Sujatha V. Manohar, J speaking for the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, : AIR1995SC1648 and held :',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3) is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16. The special provision, whichthe State may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the fonn of either affirmative action or reservation. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1), employment under the Slate. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go together.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>It was further held in that decision that the power conferred by Article 15 of the Constitution is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment under the State, that the insertion of Clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped, and that it is in order to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Clause (3) is placed in Article 15, that the avowed object is to strengthen and improve the state of the women and that an important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. The Supreme Court also condemned that to say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created, would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this Article.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. As such, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and hold that the reservation made for women in the matter of allotment of fair price shops is constitutionally valid, being directly traceable to the fundamental right under Article 15(3) specifically provided in favour of women read with Article 15(1) of the Constitution.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The second and the most important question is - to what extent, reservations for women can be permitted. Merely because for centuries women were kept at bay and werenot permitted to mingle socially including participation in avocations on par with men, can it be said that our constitutional scheme permits to make reservation of cent per cent to women as is done by the impugned Governmental Memo Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether there can be a further discrimination for men from reserved categories like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Physically Handicapped and the other men from the unreserved category, i.e. general category ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. The impugned Governmental Memo is not happily and appropriately worded. While the emphasis is on the allotment of fair price shops to women candidates, again there is a contradiction that out of the fair price shops held by the individuals, 15% shall be reserved for S.Cs. 6% for STs., and 3% for physically handicapped taking both men and women into account. Then, it has to be understood that while S.C., S.T., and Physically Handicapped reservations shall be intact wherein both men and women can be appointed in accordance with their merit, the other vacancies conforming to 76% have to be filled-up by all women candidates only. We do not really appreciate this kind of classification in a classification where men are to be excluded by a Governmental policy in toto to be replaced by women in toto reserving all future vacancies for women, but again carving out an exception, insofar as S.Cs., S.Ts., and Physically handicapped are concerned, allowing men also to participate. If 100% reservation is to be achieved, there can be any exception of that nature as women is a class by itself not based on the caste or any such thing, but only based on gender and if that is the criterion, then again providing exception of participation of men for the reserved class - SC/ST/PH - will have no nexus to stand and there will be lack of intelligible differentia too. As such, the said discrimination among men one from reserved and another from unreserved violates equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>13. In support of his contention that State has got absolute monopoly over the fair priceshops and can allot to any person to the exclusion of any other person, the learned Advocate General has cited the decisions in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. : [1982]1SCR750 , Sarkari Sasta Ana/ Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P., : AIR1981SC2030 as also J.R. Clement Regis and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) law Weekly 230.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>14. In both the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society's case (supra) and Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh's case (supra) the point in issue was whether the Consumers Co-operative Societies can be given preference over the retail traders in the allotment of fair price shops. The issue was not of gender discrimination and was no way concerned with any facet of Article 15 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. Both the decisions were rendered on the touch stone of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution regarding the validity of classification of consumer co-operative societies for giving preference over the individual traders in allotment of fair price shops and that too not ousting the retail traders completely from the claim for allotment of fair price shops, but only to the extent of preference being given to the consumers cooperative societies and it is pertinent to mention that the composition of the same was not on gender basis; as such, have got no bearing on the instant cases.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>15. As the Government framed a scheme for running fair price shops by appointing agents (dealers), it cannot discriminate ousting men from being allotted in entirety, as that will be violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution in general and Article 15(1) in particular and that ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 is applicable, in which, dealing with the excise business, it was held that it is the monopoly of the State and the State can run the same, but once a decision is taken by the State to allot it to private individuals, then equality clause is applicable and if there is a violation of equality clause under Article 14, then the Governmentalaction can be set at naught. It is apt to extract the above relevant proposition :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'But, before we do so, we may, at this stage, conveniently refer to a contention of a preliminary nature advanced on behalf of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 against the applicability of Article 14 in a case dealing with the grant of liquor licences. The contention was that trade or business in liquor, so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot, therefore, be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled b several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, : [1975]3SCR254 : that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to cany on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants - its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But, when the State decides to grant such right or privileges to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondent Nos.5-11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State Government cannot ride roughshed over the requirement of that Article.'',
	(int) 25 => '<p>16. As such, we hold that in the allotment of fair price shops, the Government cannot act at its will and pleasure and has got to follow the equality clause contained under Article 14in general and Article 15(1) of the Constitution in particular, subject to such discrimination, which is permissible under Article 15(1) read with special reservation, which can be made under Article 15(3) of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>17. In J.R. Clement Regis. and others v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra), Somasundaram, J speaking for the Madras High Court, held that Article 15(3) is a proviso to Article 15(1) of the Constitution and full effect must be given to the proviso, that the proper way to construe Article 15(3) is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Articles 15(1) and 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it cannot discriminate in favour of men against women and that if the above provision is applied, then the special provision, which was made for women under Article 15(3) against men in the matter of employment reserving all 100% posts of Secondary Grade Teachers appointing women Teachers only for handling classes I to V, is tenable. With respect to the learned Judge, we do not concur with the above reasoning.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>18. Firstly, Article 15(3) of the Constitution is not an exception to Article 15(1) and we need not go into the reasoning for the above statement of law, for, it is already authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) dealing with analogous provision contained under Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was held in the said case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Clause (1) of Article 16 and that it is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by Clause (1), that Clause (4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony with Clause (1) and even without Clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision forreservation of appointments/posts in their favour and that Clause (4) merely puts the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. The same analogy is applicable in interpreting Clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution,',
	(int) 28 => '<p>19. Secondly, even with regard to the maximum percentage of reservations which can be carved-out, the ratio laid down by the majority decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is an authoritative proposition limiting the reservation within 50% and not beyond 50%. Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not accept the theory of proportionate representation and the emphasis was on adequate representation. Even if the proportionate representation theory, which is not the criterion, is to be considered the women forming equal or less than that of men population can never bargain more than 50%. The other theory that because the visibility of the women in running the fair price shops was less and to have more of such visibility of women, there should be a total reservation in their favour till they are equally visible in number, in running the fair price shops on par with men, is also totally unacceptable and in fact, such an argument advanced regarding the need for total reservation for S.Cs., S.Ts., and B.Cs., on the ground that previously their participation in public employment was very less because of want of reservation and that there was a need to make-up that deficiency, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. As such, reservations can be carved-out for women for vacancies arising in fair price shops from the date of impugned Memo without any reference to making-up the deficiency. The other ground mentioned in the impugned Memo that since women manage the kitchen, the entire future vacancies in fair price shops should be allotted to them is totally irrelevant has got absolutely no intelligible differentia and is also devoid of any nexus. It is also apt to extract what B.P. Jeevan Reddy, i in his leading judgment speaking for the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) has held :',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 isequality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority of seats' (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in Para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. If is, thus, clear that reservation of a majority of scats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.',
	(int) 30 => '<p> From the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.'',
	(int) 31 => '<p>This is the law of the land and the exception mentioned in the Indra Sawhney's case (supra) though in certain extraordinary situations 50% rule may be relaxed, is not applicable here either in the facts of these cases or the situation enumerated in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Even while upholding the women reservation, the Supreme Court in a later judgment in Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar (supra) held :',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.'',
	(int) 33 => '<p>20. In fact, 30% theory of reservations to women in professional courses, jobs etc. in the State of Andhra Pradesh is a well accepted theory. Even all over the country, a draft Bill amending Representation of People's Act, which is pending in the Parliament, proposes women reservation in the Legislative bodies, be it Assemblies or Parliament, to the extent of 1/3. When there is no reservation prescribed by the State, the constitutional Courts like ours can always prescribe such limit so as to see that it is fair and reasonable; as otherwise excessive reservation will result in invidious discrimination destroying the very concept of equality and ultimately undermining the democracy. It has to be understood that in totality, the reservation of fair price shops for women and other categories like S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. shall not exceed 50% and 50% shall be made available for open category. The 30% reservation to women, which we held supra as reasonable, has to be adjusted cutting across the other reservations as also open category. In the words of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and applying to the fair price shops, the reservations provided to S.Cs., S.Ts., and P.H. and to B.Cs. (if provided) and other traceable to Article 15(4) are vertical reservations while reservations for women traceable to Article 15(3) of the Constitution are horizontal reservations and as horizontal reservation cuts across the vertical reservation - what is called inter-locking reservations, the persons selected against the women quota will be placed in the appropriate category and to say for clarity, women belonging to Scheduled Caste category will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments and similarly the women belonging to open category will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing both the vertical and horizontal reservations, the overall reservations, on all counts, should not exceed 50% and each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>21. In view of what is stated supra, we hold :',
	(int) 35 => '<p>(i) that women reservation in the matter of allotment of fair price shops shall be fixed at 30%:',
	(int) 36 => '<p> (ii) that while making the women reservation as specified above, the Government has to follow the other reservations already in vogue;',
	(int) 37 => '<p> (iii) that the fair price shop dealers selected from women quota shall have to be adjusted both in the reserved category and also open category;',
	(int) 38 => '<p> (iv) that the Government, while making reservations both for women and other categories, shall ensure that reservations should not exceed 50% of the fair price shops;',
	(int) 39 => '<p> (v) all notifications persuant to the impugned memo stand set aside.',
	(int) 40 => '<p> (vi) that the Government shall issue instructions in accordance with the above directions, to all the appointing authorities for fair price shops dealers; and ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> (vii) that each revenue division/circle shall be taken as a unit.',
	(int) 42 => '<p>22. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 43 => '<p>'
)
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$i = (int) 43
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Subject	Constitution
Court	Andhra Pradesh High Court
Decided On	Nov-28-1997
Case Number	W.P.Nos. 6729 of 1993 and Batch
Judge	B. Subhashan Reddy and ;T. Ranga Rao, JJ.
Reported in	1998(1)ALD136; 1997(6)ALT548
Acts	Constitution of India - Articles 14, 15, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4), 16(1), 17, 18, 19(1), 21, 29A, 31, 38, 39, 46 and 300A; Representation of People's Act, 1951; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973; Essential Commodities Act, 1955 - Sections 3
Appellant	P. Katama Reddy
Respondent	Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors.
Appellant Advocate	Mr. J. Venugopal Rao, Adv.
Respondent Advocate	Advocate-General

P. Katama Reddy Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantpur and ors. - Court Judgment