Sri Saibaba Cloth Emporium, Adoni Vs. Kolli Sanjeevamma and Another - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
(i) tenancy - revisional jurisdiction - sections 20 and 22 of a.p. buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act, 1960 and order 41 rule 22 of code of civil procedure, 1908 - jurisdiction of high court to entertain cross objections while adjudicating revision filed under act - scope of power under sections 20 and 22 is wider than power given to high court under section 115 of code of civil procedure, 1908 - held, parties entitled to file cross objections in appealor revision filed under sections 20 and 22 of act. (ii) sublease - section10 (2) (ii) of a.p. buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act, 1960 - letting out of property based on oral lease - no specific bar against sub lease - lessor's consent to subletting - held, in circumstances of case prohibition under section 10 (2) (ii) against subletting not attracted. (iii) eviction - section 10 of a.p. buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act, 1960 - willingness on part of tenant to vacate premises - eviction can be ordered only on any of grounds enumerated in section 10 of act - held, eviction ordered on basis of willingness on part of tenant to vacate premises not maintainable. - motor vehicles act (59 of 1988)section 149 (2): [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers entitlement to defend the action joint appeal by insured and insurer - held, the language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. it shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of section 149 of the act, and no other grounds are available to it. the insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. if insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of sections 170 and 149 of the act. the insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. in the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. section 166: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] claim for compensation accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle held, it is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under workmens compensation act. the insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of section 149 of the act. the right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under workmens compensation act, but also under benevolent provisions under section 166 and 167 of the m.v. act. the right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the workmens compensation act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under section 167 of the act to choose either of the two forum. the only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under section 147 of the act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. in the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under section 167 of the act to seek compensation under section 166 of the act resulting in award passed by the tribunal. therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor. section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the act, instead of seeking compensation under the workmens compensation act. on facts, held, the material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. the settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. compensation of rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the tribunal was enhanced to rs.8,20,000/-. order1. the preliminary point that arises for decision in these matters is, whether cross-objections are maintainable in a revision filed under s. 22 of the a.p. buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act, 1960.2. the brief facts that led to this issue are that the eviction petition filed by the 1st respondent herein was ordered by the rent controller holding that the requirement of the premises by the 1st respondent was bona fide and that the sub-letting of the premises by the 2nd respondent-tenant to the petitioner (sub-tenant) herein was without consent of the land-lady (r. 1). on appeal by the present petitioner, the lower appellate court though found the two grounds, viz. bona fide requirement of the premises and sub-letting, against the land-lady (r. 1) ordered eviction on the ground that the tenant (r. 2) in his reply notice promised to vacate the premises. challenging this order of eviction the petitioner-sub-tenant came forward with this revision. may be, in view of the fact that there is an order of eviction in favour the land-lady (r. 1), no revision challenging the findings as regards bona fide requirement and sub-letting was filed by the land-lady. however in view ofrevision filed by the subtenant the land-lady filed cross-objections in the revision so as to challenge the two findings of the lower appellate court which are against her. the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the cross-objections are not maintainable in a revision filed under s. 22 of the rent control act since there is no provision in the act corresponding to 0.41, r. 22, c.p.c. hence this preliminary issue.3. before deciding the question it is necessary to look into s. 22 of the rent control act so as to find out its scope and ambit. it runs thus:--'the high court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this act by the controller in execution under s. 15 by the appellate authority on appeal under s. 20, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such reference thereto as it thinks fit.'considering s. 15(5) of the east punjab urban rent restriction act, which is in pari materia with s. 22 of the a, p. buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act, the supreme court in moti ram v. suraj bhan : [1960]2scr896 held that the revisionary power conferred upon the high court under s.15(5) is wider than that conferred by s. 115 of civil procedure code, and therefore the revisional court can examine the lagality and propriety of the order of the authorities. further, this court in mahaboob bi v. alvala lachmiah : air1964ap314 held that the words 'legality, regularity or propriety of the order' occurring in the section are wide enough to cover questions of both law and fact and that the high court can interfere with the orders of the courts below in a revision filed under s. 22 of the rent control act. the only limitation on the powers as held by this court is as regards making orders of remand.4. however, it is not in dispute that there is no provision in the rent control act or rules similar to the one under o.41, r. 22, c.p.c. in so far as appeals filed under s. 20of the act are concerned, this court had the occasion to decide whether cross-objections in such apeals are maintainable. it is relevant here to make a reference to the decision of this court in saleh begum v. bhupal prasad (1984 (2) an wr page 44) wherein it is held (at page 50; 1984 (2) an wr):'when a right of appeal is conferred under s. 20 of the rent control act on an aggrieved party and no provision is made therein or the rules, regarding filing of cross-objections, the applicability of civil p.c. is not excluded in respect of proceedings under the rent control act. there is no inconsistency between the provisions of the control act and rules made thereunder on one hand and the provisions o.41, r. 22, c.p.c., which conferred a right to take cross-objection in an appeal. the provisions of the c.p.c., apply to the proceedings in appeal under the r.c. act.'thus, the question in so far as maintenance of cross-objections in appeal filed and under s. 20 of the rent control act is concerned, it now stands resolved by this court holding that such cross-objections are maintainable since the provisions of the civil p.c. apply to the proceedings in an appeal under the rent control act. now, the question is whether the analogy in respect of maintenance of cross-objections in an appeal (applies to revision) filed under s. 22 of the act. it is apposite here to refer to a decision of a division bench of the madras high court in pattammh v. krishnaswami iyer (air 1928 mad 794) wherein philips, j,, relying on a decision of miller, j., in (1907) 17 mu 62 held as under:--'..... miller, j., was right in entertaining the question raised in the memo of objections on the further ground stated by him, viz., that the high court's powers of revision may be exercised even without any application by an aggrieved party and when a case is already before the court and the necessary parties are also before it, it has ample powers to entertain the question which may be raised by the respondent and deal with those questions also if it thinks fit.'again the jammu and kashmir high courtconsidering the scope and ambit of 0.41, r. 22 and s. 115, c.p.c., in jia lal v. mohan lal (air 1960 j & k 22) held (at page 23 j & k; air i960):'no doubt, r. 22 under which a memorandum of objections can be preferred by a respondent in an appeal does not extend to revision petition. but the high court has sufficient powers, when it is seized of a competent revision and when all the parties are before it, to entertain questions which may be raised by the respondent and deal with those questions as it thinks fit. but in order to succeeded, the respondent is bound to show that the grounds on which he attacks the findings of the trial court fall within the purview of s. 115 of the c.p.c. this requirement applies to him as much as it applies to the petitioner.'thus, justice k.v. gopal krishnan nairdeciding the question of applicability of the principle under o.41, r. 22, c.p.c., held that though the scope of r. 22 does not extend to revisions, still the high court has sufficient powers to entertain question which may be raised by the respondent, of course, subject to the only limitation that such questions should be within the purview of s. 115, c.p.c. it is not in dispute before me that the land-lady (r. 1) could have, if at all, filed a revision under s. 22 of the rent control act to challenge the findings in regard to the bona fide requirement and sub-letting before this court. thus, the findings sought to be challenged in the cross-objections are within the purview of revision under s. 22 of the act. that apart the amplitude of revisionary powers under s. 22 of the act is wider than those under s. 115, c.p.c., as was held by the supreme court in moti ram's case (supra). in these circumstances and for these reasons the analogy in regard to appeals filed under s. 20 of the act in so far as maintenance of cross-objections in such appeals is concerned can be extended to revisions filed under s. 22 of the act for purposes of holding that cross-objections in such revisions are equally maintainable. in this view of the matter, i shall now advert to the contentions of the learned counsel for the 1st respondent land-lady in regard to the correctness or otherwise of the findings of the lower appellate court which are adverse to the land-lady.5. the twin-grounds on which the landlady sought for eviction of the petitioner are (i) the 2nd respondent original tenant has sublet the premises to the petitioner without her knowledge and consent, and (ii) the premises is bona fide required for personal use of the land-lady to start a medical-store for her grandson. both the grounds were no doubt found by the rent controller in favour of the land-lady, but the appellate court on a reappraisal of the entire evidence reversed the findings and held them against the land-lady. as regards the first ground that the 2nd respondent sub-let the premises to the petitioner herein, it is to be noticed that in her cross-examination the land-lady as p.w. 1 admitted that the sub-letting was with her consent. the contention of the learned counsel for the land-lady is that there is nothing in writing to prove that the subletting was with the consent of the land-lady and therefore the oral consent, even if any, is not valid to constitute a legal-tenancy between the land-lady and the petitioner. in this connection the learned counsel sought to place reliance upon a decision of this court in lakshminarayana v. suryakantham : air1985ap38 (sic) wherein it is held :'when s. 10(2)(ii) specifically requires the written consent of the land-lord for subletting when the lease-deed does not confer any such right of subletting on the tenant, no oral consent or an inference of consent from the conduct of the parties can be permitted to be substituted in place of written consent as it amounts to alteration of the provisions of the act itself.'i in that case there was a written lease-deed and it recites specifically a condition disallowing sub-letting. in the present case there is no written lease deed and further there is an admission specifically of the land-lady that the sub-letting to the petitioner by the 2nd respondent was with her consent. therefore, this decision is of no help to the land-lady. it is next contended by the learned counsel for the land-lady that she being sufficiently old by thetime of her examination and therefore her admission that the sub-letting was with her consent may not be construed to be correct. this question cannot be gone into at this stage as no objection in this regard was taken either before the rent controller or before the appellate court. when the land-lady herself admitted this fact, it cannot be said that she deposed without knowledge of the said fact. accordingly, this ground of illegal sub-letting is of no avail to the land-lady.6. the next ground urged in support ofthe petition for eviction is that the land-lady bona fide requires the premises for herself to start a medical-store to be run by her grandson. the grandson is examined as p.w. 2. he deposed that he passed b.com., and was unemployed and that he wants to start a medical shop in the demised premises. the present petitioner as r.w. 2 deposed that p.w. 2 (grandson) was doing chartered accountancy at madras, that the father of p.w. 2 was doing business at adoni and that they own other buildings also. r.w. 2 also deposed that the requirement of the premises by the land-lady is not bona fide. nothing is elicited from r.w. 2 (the present petitioner) to show that p.w. 2 is not doing c.a. at madras. it is also not the case of the land-lady that p.w. 2 wants to stop doing c.a., and start business. the land-lady herself cannot carry on any business, being sufficiently old besides being a lady. therefore, the requirement of the premises for running a medical shop by p.w. 2 seems to be not bona fide. accordingly, the lower appellate court is right in holding that the requirement of the premises is not bona fide and that the subletting of the premises to the petitioner was to the knowledge and with the consent of the landlady.7. the next question is, whether the petitioner can be evicted on grounds other than those provided in s. 10 of the a.p. buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act, 1960. the lower appellate court has passed the order of eviction on the ground that in the reply notice, ex.b.3, the present petitioner expressed preparedness to vacate the premises if some time was granted to him.preparedness, the learned counsel submits, cannot form a ground in the eye of law to order eviction since it is not contemplated by s. 10 of the rent control act as one of the grounds for purposes of ordering eviction. s. 10 reads as under:'eviction of tenants : a tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section or ss, 12 and 13.....'it is not in dispute that preparedness or willingness to vacate is not a ground under s. 10 to lawfully order eviction. but if the parties compromise or agree for eviction, that is a different matter. that is not so in the instant case. in the circumstances, the order of eviction made by the lower appellate court on the ground that the petitioner expressed preparedness to vacate the demised premises, if sufficient time is granted, is set aside and the revision is allowed. cross objections dismissed. no costs.8. petition allowed.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. The preliminary point that arises for decision in these matters is, whether cross-objections are maintainable in a revision filed under S. 22 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960.

2. The brief facts that led to this issue are that the eviction petition filed by the 1st respondent herein was ordered by the Rent Controller holding that the requirement of the premises by the 1st respondent was bona fide and that the sub-letting of the premises by the 2nd respondent-tenant to the petitioner (sub-tenant) herein was without consent of the land-lady (R. 1). On appeal by the present petitioner, the lower appellate Court though found the two grounds, viz. bona fide requirement of the premises and sub-letting, against the land-lady (R. 1) ordered eviction on the ground that the tenant (R. 2) in his reply notice promised to vacate the premises. Challenging this order of eviction the petitioner-sub-tenant came forward with this revision. May be, in view of the fact that there is an order of eviction in favour the land-lady (R. 1), no revision challenging the findings as regards bona fide requirement and sub-letting was filed by the land-lady. However in view ofrevision filed by the subtenant the land-lady filed cross-objections in the revision so as to challenge the two findings of the lower appellate Court which are against her. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the cross-objections are not maintainable in a revision filed under S. 22 of the Rent Control Act since there is no provision in the Act corresponding to 0.41, R. 22, C.P.C. Hence this preliminary issue.

3. Before deciding the question it is necessary to look into S. 22 of the Rent Control Act so as to find out its scope and ambit. It runs thus:--

'The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by the Controller in execution under S. 15 by the appellate authority on appeal under S. 20, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such reference thereto as it thinks fit.'

Considering S. 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, which is in pari materia with S. 22 of the A, P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, the Supreme Court in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan : [1960]2SCR896 held that the revisionary power conferred upon the High Court under S.15(5) is wider than that conferred by S. 115 of Civil Procedure Code, and therefore the revisional Court can examine the lagality and propriety of the order of the authorities. Further, this Court in Mahaboob Bi v. Alvala Lachmiah : AIR1964AP314 held that the words 'legality, regularity or propriety of the order' occurring in the section are wide enough to cover questions of both law and fact and that the High Court can interfere with the orders of the Courts below in a revision filed under S. 22 of the Rent Control Act. The only limitation on the powers as held by this Court is as regards making orders of remand.

4. However, it is not in dispute that there is no provision in the Rent Control Act or Rules similar to the one under O.41, R. 22, C.P.C. In so far as appeals filed under S. 20of the Act are concerned, this Court had the occasion to decide whether cross-objections in such apeals are maintainable. It is relevant here to make a reference to the decision of this Court in Saleh Begum v. Bhupal Prasad (1984 (2) An WR page 44) wherein it is held (at page 50; 1984 (2) An WR):

'When a right of appeal is conferred under S. 20 of the Rent Control Act on an aggrieved party and no provision is made therein or the rules, regarding filing of cross-objections, the applicability of Civil P.C. is not excluded in respect of proceedings under the Rent Control Act. There is no inconsistency between the provisions of the Control Act and rules made thereunder on one hand and the provisions O.41, R. 22, C.P.C., which conferred a right to take cross-objection in an appeal. The provisions of the C.P.C., apply to the proceedings in appeal under the R.C. Act.'

Thus, the question in so far as maintenance of cross-objections in appeal filed and under S. 20 of the Rent Control Act is concerned, it now stands resolved by this Court holding that such cross-objections are maintainable since the provisions of the Civil P.C. apply to the proceedings in an appeal under the Rent Control Act. Now, the question is whether the analogy in respect of maintenance of cross-objections in an appeal (applies to revision) filed under S. 22 of the Act. It is apposite here to refer to a decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Pattammh v. Krishnaswami Iyer (AIR 1928 Mad 794) wherein Philips, J,, relying on a decision of Miller, J., in (1907) 17 MU 62 held as under:--

'..... Miller, J., was right in entertaining the question raised in the memo of objections on the further ground stated by him, viz., that the High Court's powers of revision may be exercised even without any application by an aggrieved party and when a case is already before the Court and the necessary parties are also before it, it has ample powers to entertain the question which may be raised by the respondent and deal with those questions also if it thinks fit.'

Again the Jammu and Kashmir High Courtconsidering the scope and ambit of 0.41, R. 22 and S. 115, C.P.C., in Jia Lal v. Mohan Lal (AIR 1960 J & K 22) held (at page 23 J & K; AIR I960):

'No doubt, R. 22 under which a memorandum of objections can be preferred by a respondent in an appeal does not extend to revision petition. But the High Court has sufficient powers, when it is seized of a competent revision and when all the parties are before it, to entertain questions which may be raised by the respondent and deal with those questions as it thinks fit. But in order to succeeded, the respondent is bound to show that the grounds on which he attacks the findings of the trial Court fall within the purview of S. 115 of the C.P.C. This requirement applies to him as much as it applies to the petitioner.'

Thus, Justice K.V. Gopal Krishnan Nairdeciding the question of applicability of the principle under O.41, R. 22, C.P.C., held that though the scope of R. 22 does not extend to revisions, still the High Court has sufficient powers to entertain question which may be raised by the respondent, of course, subject to the only limitation that such questions should be within the purview of S. 115, C.P.C. It is not in dispute before me that the land-lady (R. 1) could have, if at all, filed a revision under S. 22 of the Rent Control Act to challenge the findings in regard to the bona fide requirement and sub-letting before this Court. Thus, the findings sought to be challenged in the cross-objections are within the purview of revision under S. 22 of the Act. That apart the amplitude of revisionary powers under S. 22 of the Act is wider than those under S. 115, C.P.C., as was held by the Supreme Court in Moti Ram's case (supra). In these circumstances and for these reasons the analogy in regard to appeals filed under S. 20 of the Act in so far as maintenance of cross-objections in such appeals is concerned can be extended to revisions filed under S. 22 of the Act for purposes of holding that cross-objections in such revisions are equally maintainable. In this view of the matter, I shall now advert to the contentions of the learned counsel for the 1st respondent land-lady in regard to the correctness or otherwise of the findings of the lower appellate Court which are adverse to the land-lady.

5. The twin-grounds on which the landlady sought for eviction of the petitioner are (i) the 2nd respondent original tenant has sublet the premises to the petitioner without her knowledge and consent, and (ii) the premises is bona fide required for personal use of the land-lady to start a medical-store for her grandson. Both the grounds were no doubt found by the Rent Controller in favour of the land-lady, but the appellate Court on a reappraisal of the entire evidence reversed the findings and held them against the land-lady. As regards the first ground that the 2nd respondent sub-let the premises to the petitioner herein, it is to be noticed that in her cross-examination the land-lady as P.W. 1 admitted that the sub-letting was with her consent. The contention of the learned counsel for the land-lady is that there is nothing in writing to prove that the subletting was with the consent of the land-lady and therefore the oral consent, even if any, is not valid to constitute a legal-tenancy between the land-lady and the petitioner. In this connection the learned counsel sought to place reliance upon a decision of this Court in Lakshminarayana v. Suryakantham : AIR1985AP38 (sic) wherein it is held :

'When S. 10(2)(ii) specifically requires the written consent of the land-lord for subletting when the lease-deed does not confer any such right of subletting on the tenant, no oral consent or an inference of consent from the conduct of the parties can be permitted to be substituted in place of written consent as it amounts to alteration of the provisions of the Act itself.'

I In that case there was a written lease-deed and it recites specifically a condition disallowing sub-letting. In the present case there is no written lease deed and further there is an admission specifically of the land-lady that the sub-letting to the petitioner by the 2nd respondent was with her consent. Therefore, this decision is of no help to the land-lady. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the land-lady that she being sufficiently old by thetime of her examination and therefore her admission that the sub-letting was with her consent may not be construed to be correct. This question cannot be gone into at this stage as no objection in this regard was taken either before the Rent Controller or before the appellate Court. When the land-lady herself admitted this fact, it cannot be said that she deposed without knowledge of the said fact. Accordingly, this ground of illegal sub-letting is of no avail to the land-lady.

6. The next ground urged in support ofthe petition for eviction is that the land-lady bona fide requires the premises for herself to start a medical-store to be run by her grandson. The grandson is examined as P.W. 2. He deposed that he passed B.Com., and was unemployed and that he wants to start a medical shop in the demised premises. The present petitioner as R.W. 2 deposed that P.W. 2 (grandson) was doing Chartered Accountancy at Madras, that the father of P.W. 2 was doing business at Adoni and that they own other buildings also. R.W. 2 also deposed that the requirement of the premises by the land-lady is not bona fide. Nothing is elicited from R.W. 2 (the present petitioner) to show that P.W. 2 is not doing C.A. at Madras. It is also not the case of the land-lady that P.W. 2 wants to stop doing C.A., and start business. The land-lady herself cannot carry on any business, being sufficiently old besides being a lady. Therefore, the requirement of the premises for running a medical shop by P.W. 2 seems to be not bona fide. Accordingly, the lower appellate Court is right in holding that the requirement of the premises is not bona fide and that the subletting of the premises to the petitioner was to the knowledge and with the consent of the landlady.

7. The next question is, whether the petitioner can be evicted on grounds other than those provided in S. 10 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The lower appellate Court has passed the order of eviction on the ground that in the reply notice, Ex.B.3, the present petitioner expressed preparedness to vacate the premises if some time was granted to him.preparedness, the learned counsel submits, cannot form a ground in the eye of law to order eviction since it is not contemplated by S. 10 of the Rent Control Act as one of the grounds for purposes of ordering eviction. S. 10 reads as under:

'Eviction of tenants : A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section or Ss, 12 and 13.....'

It is not in dispute that preparedness or willingness to vacate is not a ground under S. 10 to lawfully order eviction. But if the parties compromise or agree for eviction, that is a different matter. That is not so in the instant case. In the circumstances, the order of eviction made by the lower appellate Court on the ground that the petitioner expressed preparedness to vacate the demised premises, if sufficient time is granted, is set aside and the revision is allowed. Cross objections dismissed. No costs.

8. Petition allowed.