Rabia Bee @ Khaja Bee Vs. R. Subrahmanyam, Collector, Hyderabad and anr. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
(i) property - legality of award - section 11 of land acquisition act, 1894 - legality of award passed by collector challenged - collector not taken prior approval of government - held, awards passed in disregard of authority invalid. (ii) contempt of court - violation of direction - section 2 (b) of contempt of courts act, 1971 and section 18 of land acquisition act, 1894 - validity of direction issued by high court challenged on grounds of contempt of court - held, proceedings cannot be reviewed on basis of contempt of court proceedings - validity can only be challenged by procedure enshrined in section 18 of land acquisition act. - motor vehicles act (59 of 1988)section 149 (2): [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers entitlement to defend the action joint appeal by insured and insurer - held, the language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. it shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of section 149 of the act, and no other grounds are available to it. the insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. if insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of sections 170 and 149 of the act. the insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. in the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. section 166: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] claim for compensation accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle held, it is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under workmens compensation act. the insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of section 149 of the act. the right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under workmens compensation act, but also under benevolent provisions under section 166 and 167 of the m.v. act. the right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the workmens compensation act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under section 167 of the act to choose either of the two forum. the only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under section 147 of the act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. in the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under section 167 of the act to seek compensation under section 166 of the act resulting in award passed by the tribunal. therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor. section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the act, instead of seeking compensation under the workmens compensation act. on facts, held, the material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. the settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. compensation of rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the tribunal was enhanced to rs.8,20,000/-. - l on 14-12-1995 and requested to approve the draft award as the petitioner is facing great hardships and she is badly in need of the amount. apart from that, if the petitioner is not satisfied with the award, it is open to her to seek reference under section 18 of the land acquisition act and obtain appropriate reliefs in accordance with law. but before parting with this case, we would like to drawattention to the unsatisfactory manner in which the respondents, who are highly placed officials, have made some prevaricating statements in the counter-affidavits and additional counter-affidavits filed by them from tune to time in this case and the several discrepancies noticed in the file.orderc.v.n. sastri, j.1. this contempt case has come to us on an order of reference dated 5-7-1996 made by our learned brother mr. justice moiilal b. naik who felt that the case involves substantial questions of law and it is, therefore, desirable to place it before a division bench. the facts leading to the contempt case are as follows :2. the petitioner, claiming to be the owner of a premises bearing municipal no. 5-6-386 admeasuring 230 sq.yards situatedat fathesultan lane (chcragali lane of hyderabad, which was acquired by the respondents along with some other lands for the purpose of allotment to hut-dwellers belonging to s.cs., b.cs., and other weaker sections, filed w.p.no.18992 of 1994 seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to issue a fresh notification under section 4(1) of the land acquisition act in respect of the said premises and pass award after due enquiry. the said writ petition was disposed of on 23-3-1995 directing the respondents to issue fresh notification under section 4(1) of the land acquisition act in respect of the said premises and pass award after due enquiry within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of the said order.3. pursuant to the said directions, the second respondent, deputy director of social welfare (land acquisition), kachiguda, issued notification under section 4(1) and declaration under section 6 of the land acquisition act which were published in the gazette dated 17-6-1995. after completing the award enquiry, the second respondent prepared a draft award and forwarded the same to the first respondent i.e., the collector, hyderabad, for approval on 26-10-1995. alleging that the first respondent did not finalise the matter and no compensation was paid to her even after the lapse of 9 months from the date of the high court's order, the petitioner filed the above contempt case on 21-12-1995 praying to take action against the respondents for wilful disobedience of the court's order dated 23-3-1995.4. it is the case of the petitioner that, after the contempt case was filed, the respondents have changed the earlier award dated 26-10-1995 whereunder the compensation payable to her was fixed at rs.34,36,468/- and passed another award dated 30-12-1995 reducing the compensation to rs.7,72,537/- without any notice to the petitioner and that the second award dated 30-12-1995 is illegal, void and without jurisdiction and that it amounts to a deliberate and wilful violation of the order passed in the writ petition. in proof of the said allegations, the petitioner produced a xerox copy of thealleged original award dated 26-10-1995 and also axerox copy of the letter dated 26-10-1995 addressed by the second respondent to the first respondent in mat behalf.5. the stand of the respondents, on the other hand, is that though a draft award was initially prepared by the second respondent on 26-10-1995, the same was subsequently revised after collecting various statistics and the award was finalised and approved by the first respondent on 30-12-1995 for rs.7,72,557/-and the same was duly communicated to the petitioner under section 12(2) of the act on 6-1-1996 calling upon the petitioner to receive the payment, but the petitioner did not choose to accept the same. it is the further contention of the respondents that the second respondent ' cannot pass an award without the approval of the collector and that as per g.o.ms.no. 1843 revenue (k) department dated 13-12-1984, the competent authority to accord approval is the district collector/joint collector/special collector in the districts who is looking after the land acquisition cases. in the present case the joint collector, who was looking after the land acquisition cases, granted approval on 30-12-1995. the draft award prepared on 26-10-1995 is no award in the eye of law as the same was neither approved by the competent authority nor was it communicated to the petitioner. the petitioner managed to obtain copies of the same by the use of fraudulent means and disciplinary action is being taken against the employees who facilitated the same.6. before the learned single judge two questions were raised :(1) when once an award is passed by the second respondent who is authorised officer, is it open to the first respondent to change, modify or pass a fiesh award ? (2) whether the said action of the first respondent amounts to proper compliance of the order passed by this court on 23-3-1995? the learned judge felt that a further question arises as to whether in a contempt case this court can enter into and examine the questionsraised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned judge, being of the view that the said questions arc important questions, referred the matter to a division bench.7. section 11 of the land acquisition act deals.,with enquiry and award by the collector. the first proviso to sub-section (1) of the said section, which was inserted by act 68 of 1984, provides that no award shall be made by the collector under this sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate government or of such officer as the appropriate government may authorise in this behalf. in exercise of the powers conferred by the said proviso to sub-section (1) of section 11, the government of andhra pradesh issued orders in g.o.ms .no. 1843, revenue (k) department, dated 13-12-1984 authorising the district collectors, joint collectors and special collectors in the districts looking after the land acquisition cases to accord approval to the awards for payment of compensation in all the land acquisition cases. it is thus clear that the second respondent herein has no power to pass the award without the previous approval of the competent authority prescribed in g.o.ms.no.1843, dated 13-12-1984. in para 4 of the affidavit filed in support of this contempt case, it is stated as follows :'respondent no.2 has also completed the award enquiry and has forwarded draft award to respondent no. 1 for approval under section 12(1) (sic. section 11(1) on 26-10-1995 but till today respondent no. 1 has not taken any decision for approval of the draft award and kept the matter pending.'it is further stated in para 5 of the said affidavit that on enquiries made in the office of respondent no.l to find out the reasons for not disposing of the matter, the deponent came to know that respondent no.l will take his own time for disposal of the matter irrespective of the directions given by the high court. it is further stated in the same para that the deponent met respondent no.l on 14-12-1995 and requested to approve the draft award as the petitioner is facing great hardships and she is badly in need of the amount. on this thedeponent was directed by respondent no. 1 to sec the law officer who informed the deponent that they were considering to file an appeal against the order passed in the writ petition.' it is thus obvious from the said averments that though the second respondent prepared a draft award on 26-10-1995, it was not approved by the competent authority.8. we have perused the concerned file which was produced by the learned government pleader before us. the file does not show that the said draft award dated 26-10-1955 was approved by the competent authority. on the other hand, the file discloses that an errata to section 4(1) notification was published in the gazette on 28-10-1995 and subsequently a revised draft award was prepared by the second respondent on 1-11-1995 which was approved by the joint collector on 30-12-1995 and the same was communicated to the petitioner along with section 12(2) notice on 6-1-1996. it is, therefore, difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the award dated 26-10-1995 itself should be treated as the final award and mat the award dated 30-12-1995 is illegal and void.9. at any rate, we are of the view that this question need not be gone into in its contempt case. in j.s. parihar v. ganpat duggar, : air1997sc113 , it is held by the apex court that once there is an order passed by the government on the basis of directions issued by the court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. the order may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions, but that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of assailing the same in appropriate proceedings. the same cannot be reviewed in a contempt proceeding. apart from that, if the petitioner is not satisfied with the award, it is open to her to seek reference under section 18 of the land acquisition act and obtain appropriate reliefs in accordance with law. in this view of the matter, we think it unnecessary to take any further steps against the respondents in this proceeding. but before parting with this case, we would like to drawattention to the unsatisfactory manner in which the respondents, who are highly placed officials, have made some prevaricating statements in the counter-affidavits and additional counter-affidavits filed by them from tune to time in this case and the several discrepancies noticed in the file.10. initially a counter-affidavit was sworn to by the first respondent, district collector, hyderabad, on 22-2-1996 stating that second respondent has prepared the draft award on 26-10-1995 which was subsequently revised on 30-12-1995 and the same was finalised by respondent no. 1 for rs.7,72,557/-. in the additional counter-affidavit sworn to by the first respondent on 23-3-1996, it is, however, stated that the award was approved by the joint collector who was looking after the land acquisition cases. subsequently another additional counter-affidavit of sri sunil sarma in-charge district collector & district magistrate of hyderabad was filed on 22-8-1996 stating that the second respondent prepared a draft award on 1-11-1995 and the same was forwarded to the office of the joint collector and the joint collector approved the award on 30-12-1995. in the counter-affidavit of the second respondent filed on 22-8-1996, it is asserted that though she (second respondent) prepared a draft award along with a letter to forward it to the joint collector on 26-10-1995, it was not sent for approval as she found it was not correct and instead, she prepared another draft award on 1-11-1995, sent it for approval to the joint collector on 1-11-1995 and the same was approved by the joint collector on 30-12-1995. the file, however, discloses that the second respondent submitted preliminary valuation inspection report and preliminary valuation statement to the collector, hyderabad district along with her letter dated 1-9-1995 recommending that the market value of the land be fixed at rs.928/- per sq.yard and the same were approved by sri sunil sarma on 23-10-1995. this is the value that was finally adopted in the award dated 30-12-1995. when the said valuation was approved by the joint collector on 23-10-1995 itself, it is understandable how the second respondent could have prepared a draft award on 26-10-1995fixing the market value at rs.3,600/- per sq.yard. subsequently the second respondent submitted a fresh draft award for approval on 1-11-1995. the date of the covering letter with which the draft award was submitted for approval appears to have been corrected from '26-10-1995' to '01-11-1995'. the date put on the award was also similarly corrected from '26-10-1995' to ''01-11-1995'. it was approved by sri sunil sarma on 30-12-1995. the original of the alleged draft award prepared on 26-10-1995 is not found in the file at all. the file contains a xerox copy of the same which appears to have been sent by the petitioner along with her representation dated -1-1996. the said xerox copy of the award dated 26-10-1995 and the covering letter dated 26-10-1995 accompanying it read as if it is a final award passed and pronounced in open court by the second respondent but not a mere draft award which is being submitted for approval. these discrepancies give rise to suspicion that the records might have been doctored and the same do not redound to the credit of the officials. we would have been, under the circumstances, inclined to probe the matter a little more deeply but for the categorical averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the contempt case and also the legal position enunciated by the supreme court with regard to the scope of a contempt proceeding. we, therefore, leave the matter at that.11. having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that it is a fit case to grant one month's time from today to the petitioner to file objections to the award dated 30-12-1995 and seek a reference under section 18 of the land acquisition act. it shall also be open to the petitioner to receive the compensation as per the award dated 30-12-1995 without prejudice to her right to seek a reference under section 18 of the land acquisition act within the time stipulated above. the contempt case is disposed of accordingly with the above directions and observations.12. no order as to costs.

Judgment:
ORDER

C.V.N. Sastri, J.

1. This contempt case has come to us on an order of reference dated 5-7-1996 made by our learned Brother Mr. Justice Moiilal B. Naik who felt that the case involves substantial questions of law and it is, therefore, desirable to place it before a Division Bench. The facts leading to the contempt case are as follows :

2. The petitioner, claiming to be the owner of a premises bearing Municipal No. 5-6-386 admeasuring 230 Sq.yards situatedat Fathesultan Lane (Chcragali Lane of Hyderabad, which was acquired by the respondents along with some other lands for the purpose of allotment to hut-dwellers belonging to S.Cs., B.Cs., and other weaker sections, filed W.P.No.18992 of 1994 seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to issue a fresh notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the said premises and pass award after due enquiry. The said writ petition was disposed of on 23-3-1995 directing the respondents to issue fresh notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the said premises and pass award after due enquiry within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of the said order.

3. Pursuant to the said directions, the second respondent, Deputy Director of Social Welfare (Land Acquisition), Kachiguda, issued notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act which were published in the Gazette dated 17-6-1995. After completing the award enquiry, the second respondent prepared a draft award and forwarded the same to the first respondent i.e., the Collector, Hyderabad, for approval on 26-10-1995. Alleging that the first respondent did not finalise the matter and no compensation was paid to her even after the lapse of 9 months from the date of the High Court's order, the petitioner filed the above contempt case on 21-12-1995 praying to take action against the respondents for wilful disobedience of the Court's order dated 23-3-1995.

4. It is the case of the petitioner that, after the contempt case was filed, the respondents have changed the earlier award dated 26-10-1995 whereunder the compensation payable to her was fixed at Rs.34,36,468/- and passed another award dated 30-12-1995 reducing the compensation to Rs.7,72,537/- without any notice to the petitioner and that the second award dated 30-12-1995 is illegal, void and without jurisdiction and that it amounts to a deliberate and wilful violation of the order passed in the writ petition. In proof of the said allegations, the petitioner produced a xerox copy of thealleged original award dated 26-10-1995 and also axerox copy of the letter dated 26-10-1995 addressed by the second respondent to the first respondent in mat behalf.

5. The stand of the respondents, on the other hand, is that though a draft award was initially prepared by the second respondent on 26-10-1995, the same was subsequently revised after collecting various statistics and the award was finalised and approved by the first respondent on 30-12-1995 for Rs.7,72,557/-and the same was duly communicated to the petitioner under Section 12(2) of the Act on 6-1-1996 calling upon the petitioner to receive the payment, but the petitioner did not choose to accept the same. It is the further contention of the respondents that the second respondent ' cannot pass an award without the approval of the Collector and that as per G.O.Ms.No. 1843 Revenue (K) Department dated 13-12-1984, the competent authority to accord approval is the District Collector/Joint Collector/Special Collector in the districts who is looking after the land acquisition cases. In the present case the Joint Collector, who was looking after the land acquisition cases, granted approval on 30-12-1995. The draft award prepared on 26-10-1995 is no award in the eye of law as the same was neither approved by the competent authority nor was it communicated to the petitioner. The petitioner managed to obtain copies of the same by the use of fraudulent means and disciplinary action is being taken against the employees who facilitated the same.

6. Before the learned single Judge two questions were raised :

(1) When once an award is passed by the second respondent who is authorised officer, is it open to the first respondent to change, modify or pass a fiesh award ?

(2) Whether the said action of the first respondent amounts to proper compliance of the order passed by this Court on 23-3-1995?

The learned Judge felt that a further question arises as to whether in a contempt case this Court can enter into and examine the questionsraised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Judge, being of the view that the said questions arc important questions, referred the matter to a Division Bench.

7. Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act deals.,with enquiry and award by the Collector. The first proviso to sub-section (1) of the said Section, which was inserted by Act 68 of 1984, provides that no award shall be made by the Collector under this sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf. In exercise of the powers conferred by the said proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued orders in G.O.Ms .No. 1843, Revenue (K) Department, dated 13-12-1984 authorising the District Collectors, Joint Collectors and Special Collectors in the districts looking after the land acquisition cases to accord approval to the awards for payment of compensation in all the land acquisition cases. It is thus clear that the second respondent herein has no power to pass the award without the previous approval of the competent authority prescribed in G.O.Ms.No.1843, dated 13-12-1984. In Para 4 of the affidavit filed in support of this contempt case, it is stated as follows :

'Respondent No.2 has also completed the award enquiry and has forwarded draft award to Respondent No. 1 for approval under Section 12(1) (sic. Section 11(1) on 26-10-1995 but till today Respondent No. 1 has not taken any decision for approval of the draft award and kept the matter pending.'

It is further stated in Para 5 of the said affidavit that on enquiries made in the office of Respondent No.l to find out the reasons for not disposing of the matter, the deponent came to know that Respondent No.l will take his own time for disposal of the matter irrespective of the directions given by the High Court. It is further stated in the same Para that the deponent met Respondent No.l on 14-12-1995 and requested to approve the draft award as the petitioner is facing great hardships and she is badly in need of the amount. On this thedeponent was directed by Respondent No. 1 to sec the law officer who informed the deponent that they were considering to file an appeal against the order passed in the writ petition.' It is thus obvious from the said averments that though the second respondent prepared a draft award on 26-10-1995, it was not approved by the competent authority.

8. We have perused the concerned file which was produced by the learned Government Pleader before us. The file does not show that the said draft award dated 26-10-1955 was approved by the competent authority. On the other hand, the file discloses that an errata to Section 4(1) notification was published in the Gazette on 28-10-1995 and subsequently a revised draft award was prepared by the second respondent on 1-11-1995 which was approved by the Joint Collector on 30-12-1995 and the same was communicated to the petitioner along with Section 12(2) notice on 6-1-1996. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the award dated 26-10-1995 itself should be treated as the final award and mat the award dated 30-12-1995 is illegal and void.

9. At any rate, we are of the view that this question need not be gone into in its contempt case. In J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar, : AIR1997SC113 , it is held by the Apex Court that once there is an order passed by the Government on the basis of directions issued by the Court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The order may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions, but that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of assailing the same in appropriate proceedings. The same cannot be reviewed in a contempt proceeding. Apart from that, if the petitioner is not satisfied with the award, it is open to her to seek reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and obtain appropriate reliefs in accordance with law. In this view of the matter, we think it unnecessary to take any further steps against the respondents in this proceeding. But before parting with this case, we would like to drawattention to the unsatisfactory manner in which the respondents, who are highly placed officials, have made some prevaricating statements in the counter-affidavits and additional counter-affidavits filed by them from tune to time in this case and the several discrepancies noticed in the file.

10. Initially a counter-affidavit was sworn to by the first respondent, District Collector, Hyderabad, on 22-2-1996 stating that second respondent has prepared the draft award on 26-10-1995 which was subsequently revised on 30-12-1995 and the same was finalised by Respondent No. 1 for Rs.7,72,557/-. In the additional counter-affidavit sworn to by the first respondent on 23-3-1996, it is, however, stated that the award was approved by the Joint Collector who was looking after the land acquisition cases. Subsequently another additional counter-affidavit of Sri Sunil Sarma In-Charge District Collector & District Magistrate of Hyderabad was filed on 22-8-1996 stating that the second respondent prepared a draft award on 1-11-1995 and the same was forwarded to the office of the Joint Collector and the Joint Collector approved the award on 30-12-1995. In the counter-affidavit of the second respondent filed on 22-8-1996, it is asserted that though she (second respondent) prepared a draft award along with a letter to forward it to the Joint Collector on 26-10-1995, it was not sent for approval as she found it was not correct and instead, she prepared another draft award on 1-11-1995, sent it for approval to the Joint Collector on 1-11-1995 and the same was approved by the Joint Collector on 30-12-1995. The file, however, discloses that the second respondent submitted Preliminary Valuation Inspection Report and Preliminary Valuation Statement to the Collector, Hyderabad district along with her letter dated 1-9-1995 recommending that the market value of the land be fixed at Rs.928/- per Sq.yard and the same were approved by Sri Sunil Sarma on 23-10-1995. This is the value that was finally adopted in the award dated 30-12-1995. When the said valuation was approved by the Joint Collector on 23-10-1995 itself, it is understandable how the second respondent could have prepared a draft award on 26-10-1995fixing the market value at Rs.3,600/- per Sq.yard. Subsequently the second respondent submitted a fresh draft award for approval on 1-11-1995. The date of the covering letter with which the draft award was submitted for approval appears to have been corrected from '26-10-1995' to '01-11-1995'. The date put on the award was also similarly corrected from '26-10-1995' to ''01-11-1995'. It was approved by Sri Sunil Sarma on 30-12-1995. The original of the alleged draft award prepared on 26-10-1995 is not found in the file at all. The file contains a xerox copy of the same which appears to have been sent by the petitioner along with her representation dated -1-1996. The said xerox copy of the award dated 26-10-1995 and the covering letter dated 26-10-1995 accompanying it read as if it is a final award passed and pronounced in open Court by the second respondent but not a mere draft award which is being submitted for approval. These discrepancies give rise to suspicion that the records might have been doctored and the same do not redound to the credit of the officials. We would have been, under the circumstances, inclined to probe the matter a little more deeply but for the categorical averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the contempt case and also the legal position enunciated by the Supreme Court with regard to the scope of a contempt proceeding. We, therefore, leave the matter at that.

11. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that it is a fit case to grant one month's time from today to the petitioner to file objections to the award dated 30-12-1995 and seek a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. It shall also be open to the petitioner to receive the compensation as per the award dated 30-12-1995 without prejudice to her right to seek a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act within the time stipulated above. The contempt case is disposed of accordingly with the above directions and observations.

12. No order as to costs.