Government of Andhra Pradesh and Another Vs. Y.S. Vivekananda Reddy and Others - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
(i) property - sub-lease - section 4a of mines and minerals (regulation and development) act, 1957 and rule 37 of mineral concession rules, 1960 - state government entered into mining lease of barytes with lessee - consent under rule 37 to grant sub-lease given to lessee - sub-lease cancelled by lessor state due to facts which proved mining operation of barytes illegal - high court set aside cancellation orders as no opportunity of being heard provided under section 4a (3) - state government not empowered to set aside sub-lease until central government makes request with state government to cancel sub-lease in respect of minor mineral - barytes is major mineral and included in schedule 1 - sub-lease cannot be terminated. (ii) legislative power - section 2 of mines and minerals (regulation and development) act, 1957 and article 162 of constitution of india - state discarded of legislative power to enact any law in respect of mines - termination of sub-lease by state government cannot subsist under article 162 under executive power of state government. (iii) consent - section 21 of general clauses act, 1897 and article 14 of constitution of india - state government once consenting for sub-lease cannot withdraw it later if sub-lessee had started mining operations - consent cannot be terminated even through provisions of section 21 of general clauses act. - motor vehicles act (59 of 1988)section 149 (2): [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers entitlement to defend the action joint appeal by insured and insurer - held, the language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. it shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of section 149 of the act, and no other grounds are available to it. the insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. if insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer and will be negation of the intention of the legislature and annihilate mandate of the provisions of sections 170 and 149 of the act. the insured can pursue appeal only after giving up the insurer as the appellant and not otherwise. in the instant case, the insurer has not withdrawn from party array but has remained prosecuting the appeal with the insured on the grounds which are available only to the insured. therefore, the joint appeal as filed by the insured and the insurer is not maintainable. section 166: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] claim for compensation accident due to mechanical defect in the vehicle held, it is not in dispute that the claimant suffered injuries in an accident, which occurred during the course of his employment, albeit due to his negligence but law does not render him remediless. statutory right is conferred on him, accruing by virtue of his employment under insured to claim compensation under workmens compensation act. the insurer is statutorily duty bound to discharge the liability of the owner of the vehicle, to pay such compensation to the employee, as mandated under the provisions of section 149 of the act. the right of an injured employee or his dependents as the case may be to be compensated, when injury is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under workmens compensation act, but also under benevolent provisions under section 166 and 167 of the m.v. act. the right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the workmens compensation act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under section 167 of the act to choose either of the two forum. the only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under section 147 of the act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. in the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under section 167 of the act to seek compensation under section 166 of the act resulting in award passed by the tribunal. therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor. section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the act, instead of seeking compensation under the workmens compensation act. on facts, held, the material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. the settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye. compensation of rs.4,15,150/- awarded by the tribunal was enhanced to rs.8,20,000/-. - 5. the learned advocate general appearing for the 'lessor-state' as well as the 'lessee-corporation',has contended that the subleases are not statutory, but are ordinary contracts without any statutory flavour, so the termination of the sub-leases cannot be questioned in the writ petitions; in any event, submits the learned advocate general, assuming the court has rightly come to the conclusion that the impugned orders are bad for want of notice or for non-compliance of s. , not obtaining the approval of the- central government before granting sub-leases and in any event, there has been implied approval of the central government in view of the letter dated september 4, 1990 and that had notice been given before passing the impugned order, the sub-lessees would have satisfied of the existence of implied consent.ordersyed shah mohammed quadri,j.1. these ten writ appeals arise out of the common judgment dated february 1, 1994 of a learned single judge allowing five writ petitions filed by sub-lessees of barytes ore granted by ahdhra pradesh mineral development corporation limited tin their favour, five writ appeals are filed by the government of andhra pradesh and five writ appeals are filed by the andhra pradesh mineral development corporation limited. the division bench which dealt with these appeals, having referred to the aspects debated before it, came to the conclusion that the question of justiciability of rights and pri-vileges claimed by the parties and the obligations and the duties cast upon the authorities in such contingencies and many other questions which may relevantly arise for consideration by the court are of considerable significance to the public at large and they require adjudication and resolution by a larger bench. accordingly these appeals are posted before us.2. to appreciate the contentions raised before us, which we shall refer to presently, it would be necessary to notice the factual background which gave rise to these appeals. there are large extents of lands bearing gray varieties of barytes in anantarajupet village and mangampet village-erstwhile inam village of cuddapah district. the government of andhra pradesh issued orders in' g.o.ms. no. 27, industries and commerce (mines. iii) department dated january 7, 1974 declaring that the barytes ore bearing areas in the villages of mangampet and anantarajupet of cuddapah district except those already leased out were reserved with immediate effect for exploitation in the public sector. in pursuance of the said orders, the government of andhra pradesh (hereinafter referred to as the 'lessor-state') sanctioned the mining lease of barytes over an extent of 22.799 hectares (on various survey nos., specified in g.o., mentioned hereunder) for a period of 20 years in favour of m/s. the andhra pradesh mining corporation limited, hyderabad which subsequentlycame to be known as the andhra pradesh mineral development corporation (hereinafter, referred to as the 'lessee-corporation') in g.o.ms.no. 151, industries & commerce (mines. iii) department dated february 10, 1975, subject to the provisions of mines and minerals (regulation & development) act, 1957 (for short the act) and the rules made thereunder and also subject to the condition in form 'k' prescribed under the mineral concession rules, 1960 (for short the rules).3. it appears that the surface rights in the said lands vested in the pattedars. they filed revision petitions before the central government challenging the validity of the order granting the lease in favour of the lessee-corporation and also obtained stay of the operation of the lease granted in favour of the lessee-corporation in g. o.ms.no. 151. thus, the lessee-corporation was disabled from undertaking the mining operation. this impasse was resolved by a tripatite agreement entered into among the lessor-state, lessee-corporation and the pattedars. by virtue of that agreement, as modified subsequently, the pattedars were obliged to withdraw the revision petitions and request the central government for dismissal of the revision petitions and the stay petitions; the lessor-state undertook to give consent for granting of sub-leases under the rules in respect of the defined extents in favour of the pattedars and the lessee-corporation had agreed to grant sub-leases of the said defined extents of the land in favour of the pattedars. accordingly, the revision petitions were withdrawn, consent under r. 37 for grant of sub-leases was given and the sub-lease deeds were executed between the lessee-corporation and the pattedars-sub-lessees. while so, the andhra pradesh legislative assembly appointed a house-committee to go into the complaints of illegal mining operations of barytes. the house-committee submitted its report on may 24, 1993. accepting the recommendation of the house committee, the government of andhra pradesh have taken a policy decision reserving the entire barytes deposits in mangampet and anantarajupet of cuddapah district for exclusive exploitation by the lessee-corporation and ordered cancellation of the sub-leases granted by the lessee-corporation in favour of the pattedars-sub-lessees for mining operations of barytes which is reflected in g.o.ms.no. 402, industries & com-merce (mines i) department dated december 1, 1993. further to the orders issued in the said g.o.ms.no. 402, the government of andhra pradesh withdrew, with immediate effect, the consent granted to the lessee-corporation to enter into sub-leases of lands bearing barytes ore in anantarajupet and mangampet of cuddapah district with the pattedars sub-lessees in g. o.ms.no. 4^7, industries and commerce (mines. i) department dated december 7, 1993. in compliance with the said orders, the lessee-corporation cancelled the sub-leases. the legality of the said g.o.ms.nos. 402 and 417 and the consequent cancellation of the sub-leases were assailed by the pattedars-sub-lessees in the above said writ petitions.4. the learned single judge who dealt with these writ petitions came to the conclusion that before passing the impugned orders directing cancellation of the sub-leases and withdrawal of the consent, the government have not given an opportunity of being heard to the sub-lessees which is violative of the principles of natural justice and also of s. 4 a of the act quashed the impugned g.os., and the orders passed by the lessee-corporation cancelling the sub-leases and thus allowed the writ petitions.5. the learned advocate general appearing for the 'lessor-state' as well as the 'lessee-corporation', has contended that the subleases are not statutory, but are ordinary contracts without any statutory flavour, so the termination of the sub-leases cannot be questioned in the writ petitions; as the impugned g.os., and the other proceedings are neither statutory orders nor executive orders but they are made in exercise of the rights conferred under the terms of the contract, the remedy, if any, for the pattedars-sub-lessees lies under the ordinary civil law, but not under art. 226 of the constitution of india. r. 37 of the rules has no application for withdrawal of the consent; even if thewithdrawal is treated as action under r. 37, no notice need be given as the provisions of the act and the rules constitute a complete code and exclude by necessary implication the necessity of issuance of notice to the sublessees before withdrawing consent; it is pointed out that the c6nsent given by the government of andhra pradesh in favour of the petitioners in w.p. no. 18499 of 1993 and 18537 of 1993 are void by virtue of s. 19 of the act as prior approval of the central government was not obtained as contemplated by the amended r. 37. with regard to w.p. no. 19953 of 1993, it is urged that the lease was granted in violation of the proceedings of the government of india dated september 4, 1990 and also in violation of s. 5(1) of the act and rr. 59 and 60 of the rules framed thereunder; even the consent given to the pattedars who filed w.p. no. 18538 of 1993 and 19122 of 1993 for sub-lease of the land, was without de-reserving the area, as such the consent given in all cases is illegal; -the pattedars get no right under'a void contract of sub-leases in view of s. 19 of the act. the transactions between the corporation-lessee and the pattedars are 'transfers in any other manner' and not 'sub-leases' or in the alternative the sub-leases in question are not in form 'c', so they do not fall within the meaning of the 'lease' and therefore, s. 4a of the act has no application. in any event, submits the learned advocate general, assuming the court has rightly come to the conclusion that the impugned orders are bad for want of notice or for non-compliance of s. 4 a of the act, the writ petitions ought not to have been allowed as it resulted in reviving void orders and perpetuating the illegality.6. the learned additional solicitor general appearing for the union of india and the 2nd respondent in these appeals, brought to our notice the contents of para 3 of the counter-affidavit to the effect that the matter relating to sub-leases does not fall within the purview of the central government, but is within the purview of the state government. however, he submits that the state government was not competent to grant consent under r. 37 of the rules, which is not attracted where the area has been reserved for exploitation by a public sector undertaking. he elaborated his submission with reference to r. 59 which provides, inter alia, that an area which has been reserved for exploitation by a public sector undertaking is not available for grant of leases; if a sub-lease is granted in respect of such area by the lessee-corporation, it would be contrary to the orders of reservation from which the lessee derives sustenance. his contention is that when a notification under r. 58 is in force, r.37 cannot be invoked. though the learned counsel conceded that s.4a of the act applies to sub-leases, yet he contended that as the arrangement to grant sub-leases pursuant to the tripartite agreement is itself void, s. 4a of the act will not be attracted for such illegal sub-leases. according to the learned counsel, no notice need be given to the sub-lessees before withdrawal of the consent as the rights claimed by them whether treated as arising under the contract of sub-lease or under statutory order under r. 37 of the rules or executive action of tripartite arrangement, really emanate from a void order of consent being in violation of declaration of reservation.7. shri kapil sibal, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents-writ petitioners in w.a. nos. 131, 134, 170 and 175 of 1994, brought to our notice s. 2 of the act and has contended that in view of the concept of occupied field', all matters relating to regulation of mines and development of minerals have been brought under the control of the union government and that the state government has no residuary power in those matters. his contention is, application of r. 37 to the leases granted to public sector undertakings in respect of the reserved areas cannot be excluded; once the consent contemplated under r.37 was given and it resulted in execution of the sub-leases, the question of withdrawal of the consent does not arise as the order granting consent has worked out itself and there remain nothing to be withdrawn; the sub-leases having been granted with the consent of the state government, rights have accrued to the sublessees and so, the consent cannot be withdrawn without giving notice to theaffected parties. he also argued that as lease includes sub-lease, s. 4a of the act is applicable 19 sub-leases as such premature determination of the sub-leases has to be strictly in accordance with the terms of the said section which enjoins notice to the affected party. as admittedly no notice was given either before ordering the termination of the leases or withdrawing the consent, the impugned government orders were rightly quashed by the learned single judge. on the question of granting consent illegally and the leases themselves being void on the ground of violative of the provisions of the act and the rules, the learned senior counsel submits that the impugned orders themselves are not based on those grounds and that the impugned orders cannot now be improved or supported on grounds othe^ than those mentioned in the orders. referring to the clauses in the sub-lease deeds where under the sub-lessees have agreed not to claim any damages in the event of termination of subleases due to withdrawal of consent or taking of policy decision to determine sub-leases, the learned counsel argued that the clauses themselves being void cannot be given effect to and that having regard to the cases put forth by the parties before the learned single judge no new plea can be allowed to be raised at the stage of appeal. on the question of the absence of prior consent of the central government in w.p.nos. 18499 and 19537 of 1993, the learned counsel puts his case on two grounds viz., that it was not the case of the lessor-state in the impugned order and there was no plea that for want of the consent of the central government, the sub-leases would be void.8. shri j. v. suryanarayaria rao the learned counsel appearing for the respondents in w.a nos. 132 and 133 of 1993, adopted the arguments of shri kapil sibal. he however added that it was the duty of the state government to obtain the approval of the central government and that the state government cannot take advantage of its own wrong, yiz., not obtaining the approval of the- central government before granting sub-leases and in any event, there has been implied approval of the central government in view of the letter dated september 4, 1990 and that had notice been given before passing the impugned order, the sub-lessees would have satisfied of the existence of implied consent. as the sub-leases have been cancelled en bloc which is a clear indication of the non-application of mind, therefore, for that reason also the cancellation of leases is illegal and has been rightly held to be so by the learned single judge.9. shri jagadish, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents-pattedars in writ appeals nos. 169, 171, 172 and 173 of 1994, adopted the arguments of shri kapil sibal and prayed that the appeals be dismissed.10. the learned single judge quashed the impugned orders on the ground of non-compliance of the principles of natural justice and of the requirements of sub-sec. (3) of s. 4a of the act. the substance of the arguments of the learned advocate general is that the impugned order directing termination of sub-leases is not in exercise of power under s. 4a of the act but under power reserved by terms of sub-lease deed. we shall read with the impugned order, viz., g.o.ms. no. 402, industries and commerce (mines i) department dated december 1, 1993 which runs thus:--'govt. of andhra pradesh abstractreport of the house committee on illegal mining at mangampet, cuddapah district --acceptance of the recommendations --orders -- issued.

Judgment:
ORDER

Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri,J.

1. These ten writ appeals arise out of the common judgment dated February 1, 1994 of a learned single Judge allowing five writ petitions filed by sub-lessees of Barytes Ore granted by Ahdhra Pradesh Mineral Development Corporation Limited tin their favour, Five Writ Appeals are filed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and five Writ Appeals are filed by the Andhra Pradesh Mineral Development Corporation Limited. The Division Bench which dealt with these appeals, having referred to the aspects debated before it, came to the conclusion that the question of justiciability of rights and pri-vileges claimed by the parties and the obligations and the duties cast upon the authorities in such contingencies and many other questions which may relevantly arise for consideration by the Court are of considerable significance to the public at large and they require adjudication and resolution by a larger Bench. Accordingly these appeals are posted before us.

2. To appreciate the contentions raised before us, which we shall refer to presently, it would be necessary to notice the factual background which gave rise to these appeals. There are large extents of lands bearing gray varieties of barytes in Anantarajupet village and Mangampet village-erstwhile Inam village of Cuddapah District. The Government of Andhra Pradesh issued orders in' G.O.Ms. No. 27, Industries and Commerce (Mines. III) Department dated January 7, 1974 declaring that the Barytes Ore bearing areas in the villages of Mangampet and Anantarajupet of Cuddapah District except those already leased out were reserved with immediate effect for exploitation in the public sector. In pursuance of the said orders, the Government of Andhra Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as the 'lessor-State') sanctioned the mining lease of Barytes over an extent of 22.799 hectares (on various Survey Nos., specified in G.O., mentioned hereunder) for a period of 20 years in favour of M/s. The Andhra Pradesh Mining Corporation Limited, Hyderabad which subsequentlycame to be known as the Andhra Pradesh Mineral Development Corporation (hereinafter, referred to as the 'Lessee-Corporation') in G.O.Ms.No. 151, Industries & Commerce (Mines. III) Department dated February 10, 1975, subject to the provisions of Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957 (for short the Act) and the rules made thereunder and also subject to the condition in Form 'K' prescribed under the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (for short the rules).

3. It appears that the surface rights in the said lands vested in the pattedars. They filed Revision Petitions before the Central Government challenging the validity of the order granting the lease in favour of the lessee-Corporation and also obtained stay of the operation of the lease granted in favour of the lessee-Corporation in G. O.Ms.No. 151. Thus, the Lessee-Corporation was disabled from undertaking the mining operation. This impasse was resolved by a tripatite agreement entered into among the lessor-State, lessee-Corporation and the pattedars. By virtue of that agreement, as modified subsequently, the pattedars were obliged to withdraw the revision petitions and request the Central Government for dismissal of the revision petitions and the stay petitions; the lessor-State undertook to give consent for granting of sub-leases under the Rules in respect of the defined extents in favour of the pattedars and the lessee-Corporation had agreed to grant sub-leases of the said defined extents of the land in favour of the pattedars. Accordingly, the revision petitions were withdrawn, consent under R. 37 for grant of sub-leases was given and the sub-lease deeds were executed between the lessee-Corporation and the pattedars-sub-lessees. While so, the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly appointed a House-Committee to go into the complaints of illegal mining operations of Barytes. The House-Committee submitted its report on May 24, 1993. Accepting the recommendation of the House Committee, the Government of Andhra Pradesh have taken a policy decision reserving the entire Barytes deposits in Mangampet and Anantarajupet of Cuddapah district for exclusive exploitation by the lessee-Corporation and ordered cancellation of the sub-leases granted by the lessee-Corporation in favour of the pattedars-sub-lessees for mining operations of Barytes which is reflected in G.O.Ms.No. 402, Industries & Com-merce (Mines I) Department dated December 1, 1993. Further to the orders issued in the said G.O.Ms.No. 402, the Government of Andhra Pradesh withdrew, with immediate effect, the consent granted to the lessee-Corporation to enter into sub-leases of lands bearing Barytes Ore in Anantarajupet and Mangampet of Cuddapah District with the pattedars sub-lessees in G. O.Ms.No. 4^7, Industries and Commerce (Mines. I) Department dated December 7, 1993. In compliance with the said orders, the lessee-Corporation cancelled the sub-leases. The legality of the said G.O.Ms.Nos. 402 and 417 and the consequent cancellation of the sub-leases were assailed by the pattedars-sub-lessees in the above said writ petitions.

4. The learned single Judge who dealt with these writ petitions came to the conclusion that before passing the impugned orders directing cancellation of the sub-leases and withdrawal of the consent, the Government have not given an opportunity of being heard to the sub-lessees which is violative of the principles of natural justice and also of S. 4 A of the Act quashed the impugned G.Os., and the orders passed by the lessee-Corporation cancelling the sub-leases and thus allowed the writ petitions.

5. The learned Advocate General appearing for the 'lessor-State' as well as the 'lessee-Corporation', has contended that the subleases are not statutory, but are ordinary contracts without any statutory flavour, so the termination of the sub-leases cannot be questioned in the writ petitions; as the impugned G.Os., and the other proceedings are neither statutory orders nor executive orders but they are made in exercise of the rights conferred under the terms of the contract, the remedy, if any, for the pattedars-sub-lessees lies under the ordinary civil law, but not under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. R. 37 of the Rules has no application for withdrawal of the consent; even if thewithdrawal is treated as action under R. 37, no notice need be given as the provisions of the Act and the Rules constitute a complete code and exclude by necessary implication the necessity of issuance of notice to the sublessees before withdrawing consent; it is pointed out that the c6nsent given by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in favour of the petitioners in W.P. No. 18499 of 1993 and 18537 of 1993 are void by virtue of S. 19 of the Act as prior approval of the Central Government was not obtained as contemplated by the amended R. 37. With regard to W.P. No. 19953 of 1993, it is urged that the lease was granted in violation of the proceedings of the Government of India dated September 4, 1990 and also in violation of S. 5(1) of the Act and Rr. 59 and 60 of the Rules framed thereunder; even the consent given to the pattedars who filed W.P. No. 18538 of 1993 and 19122 of 1993 for sub-lease of the land, was without de-reserving the area, as such the consent given in all cases is illegal; -the pattedars get no right under'a void contract of sub-leases in view of S. 19 of the Act. The transactions between the Corporation-lessee and the pattedars are 'transfers in any other manner' and not 'sub-leases' or in the alternative the sub-leases in question are not in Form 'C', so they do not fall within the meaning of the 'lease' and therefore, S. 4A of the Act has no application. In any event, submits the learned Advocate General, assuming the Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the impugned orders are bad for want of notice or for non-compliance of S. 4 A of the Act, the writ petitions ought not to have been allowed as it resulted in reviving void orders and perpetuating the illegality.

6. The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Union of India and the 2nd respondent in these appeals, brought to our notice the contents of para 3 of the counter-affidavit to the effect that the matter relating to sub-leases does not fall within the purview of the Central Government, but is within the purview of the State Government. However, he submits that the State Government was not competent to grant consent under R. 37 of the rules, which is not attracted where the area has been reserved for exploitation by a Public sector undertaking. He elaborated his submission with reference to R. 59 which provides, inter alia, that an area which has been reserved for exploitation by a public sector undertaking is not available for grant of leases; if a sub-lease is granted in respect of such area by the lessee-Corporation, it would be contrary to the orders of reservation from which the lessee derives sustenance. His contention is that when a notification under R. 58 is in force, R.37 cannot be invoked. Though the learned counsel conceded that S.4A of the Act applies to sub-leases, yet he contended that as the arrangement to grant sub-leases pursuant to the tripartite agreement is itself void, S. 4A of the Act will not be attracted for such illegal sub-leases. According to the learned counsel, no notice need be given to the sub-lessees before withdrawal of the consent as the rights claimed by them whether treated as arising under the contract of sub-lease or under statutory order under R. 37 of the rules or executive action of tripartite arrangement, really emanate from a void order of consent being in violation of declaration of reservation.

7. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents-writ petitioners in W.A. Nos. 131, 134, 170 and 175 of 1994, brought to our notice S. 2 of the Act and has contended that in view of the concept of occupied field', all matters relating to regulation of mines and development of minerals have been brought under the control of the Union Government and that the State Government has no residuary power in those matters. His contention is, application of R. 37 to the leases granted to public sector undertakings in respect of the reserved areas cannot be excluded; once the consent contemplated under R.37 was given and it resulted in execution of the sub-leases, the question of withdrawal of the consent does not arise as the order granting consent has worked out itself and there remain nothing to be withdrawn; the sub-leases having been granted with the consent of the State Government, rights have accrued to the sublessees and so, the consent cannot be withdrawn without giving notice to theaffected parties. He also argued that as lease includes sub-lease, S. 4A of the Act is applicable 19 sub-leases as such premature determination of the sub-leases has to be strictly in accordance with the terms of the said section which enjoins notice to the affected party. As admittedly no notice was given either before ordering the termination of the leases or withdrawing the consent, the impugned Government orders were rightly quashed by the learned single Judge. On the question of granting consent illegally and the leases themselves being void on the ground of violative of the provisions of the Act and the Rules, the learned Senior Counsel submits that the impugned orders themselves are not based on those grounds and that the impugned orders cannot now be improved or supported on grounds othe^ than those mentioned in the orders. Referring to the clauses in the sub-lease deeds where under the sub-lessees have agreed not to claim any damages in the event of termination of subleases due to withdrawal of consent or taking of policy decision to determine sub-leases, the learned counsel argued that the clauses themselves being void cannot be given effect to and that having regard to the cases put forth by the parties before the learned single Judge no new plea can be allowed to be raised at the stage of appeal. On the question of the absence of prior consent of the Central Government in W.P.Nos. 18499 and 19537 of 1993, the learned counsel puts his case on two grounds viz., that it was not the case of the lessor-State in the impugned order and there was no plea that for want of the consent of the Central Government, the sub-leases would be void.

8. Shri J. V. Suryanarayaria Rao the learned counsel appearing for the respondents in W.A Nos. 132 and 133 of 1993, adopted the arguments of Shri Kapil Sibal. He however added that it was the duty of the State Government to obtain the approval of the Central Government and that the State Government cannot take advantage of its own wrong, yiz., not obtaining the approval of the- Central Government before granting sub-leases and in any event, there has been implied approval of the Central Government in view of the letter dated September 4, 1990 and that had notice been given before passing the impugned order, the sub-lessees would have satisfied of the existence of implied consent. As the sub-leases have been cancelled en bloc which is a clear indication of the non-application of mind, therefore, for that reason also the cancellation of leases is illegal and has been rightly held to be so by the learned single Judge.

9. Shri Jagadish, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents-pattedars in Writ Appeals Nos. 169, 171, 172 and 173 of 1994, adopted the arguments of Shri Kapil Sibal and prayed that the appeals be dismissed.

10. The learned single Judge quashed the impugned orders on the ground of non-compliance of the principles of natural justice and of the requirements of sub-sec. (3) of S. 4A of the Act. The substance of the arguments of the learned Advocate General is that the impugned order directing termination of sub-leases is not in exercise of power under S. 4A of the Act but under power reserved by terms of sub-lease deed. We shall read with the impugned order, viz., G.O.Ms. No. 402, Industries and Commerce (Mines I) Department dated December 1, 1993 which runs thus:--

'GOVT. OF ANDHRA PRADESH ABSTRACT

Report of the House Committee on illegal mining at Mangampet, Cuddapah District --Acceptance of the recommendations --Orders -- Issued.