SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/387657 |
Subject | Labour and Industrial |
Court | Karnataka High Court |
Decided On | Mar-14-2001 |
Case Number | M.F.A. No. 2045 of 1999 |
Judge | Chandrashekaraiah, J. |
Reported in | 2002ACJ1413 |
Appellant | Laxmibai and anr. |
Respondent | Manager, Vijayanand Roadlines Ltd. and anr. |
Appellant Advocate | P.G. Upanal and ;H.N. Kasal, Advs. |
Respondent Advocate | N.S. Murthy, ;Somashekar and ;K. Suresh, Advs. |
Disposition | Appeal dismissed |
Excerpt:
- code of civil procedure, 1908.[c.a. no. 5/1908]. section 100: [n. kumar, j] decree in suit for declaration of title states appeal against it delay of 9 years and 7 months lower appellate court refusing to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal second appeal held, state which represent the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant. refusing to condone the delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out, at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. the technicalities of procedure should yield to considerations which would promote public interest and substantial justice. when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a case would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. delay was condoned. order of lower appellate court was set aside. matter remitted to lower appellate court for disposal of appeal on merits.
section 5; condonation of delay - decree in suit for declaration of title states appeal against it delay of 9 years and 7 months lower appellate court refusing to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal second appeal held, state which represent the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant. refusing to condone the delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out, at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. the technicalities of procedure should yield to considerations which would promote public interest and substantial justice. when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a case would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. delay was condoned. order of lower appellate court was set aside. matter remitted to lower appellate court for disposal of appeal on merits. - venkataraju (1999)iillj272kant ,is no longer a good law.chandrashekaraiah, j.1. appellants are the claimants before the commissioner for workmen's compensation claiming compensation for the accident occurred to one suresh ghodke, son of appellant no. 1 and husband of appellant no. 2.2. the only contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants in this appeal is that the appellants are entitled for compensation as per the amendment act introduced in the year 1995 to the workmen's compensation act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act'). the commissioner taking into consideration that the death is prior to the amendment act has awarded the compensation in accordance with law that was prevailing as on the date of the accident. learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the commissioner is not right in awarding compensation under the unamended act in view of the decision in united india insurance co. ltd. v. venkataraju : (1999)iillj272kant . this court in the above decision has held that the amendment introduced by substituting the words 'rs. 2,000' in place of rs. 1,000 is per se a part of the procedural law and evidence and, therefore, it is retrospective in operation. but, the apex court in case of kerala state electricity board v. valsala k. : (1999)iillj1112sc , has held the contrary. the question that was considered by the supreme court in this case is: whether the amendment of sections 4 and 4-a of workmen's compensation act, 1923 made by act no. 30 of 1995 with effect from 15.9.1995 enhancing the amount of compensation and the rate of interest, would be attracted to cases where the claims in respect of death or permanent disablement resulting from an accident caused during the course of employment, took place prior to 15.9.1995? the said question has been answered by the apex court accepting the view expressed by the full bench of the kerala high court as follows:it took the view that the injured workman becomes entitled to get compensation the moment he suffers personal injuries of the types contemplated by the provisions of the workmen's compensation act and it is the amount of compensation payable on the date of accident and not the amount of compensation payable on account of the amendment made in 1995, which is relevant.3. in view of the above said decision of the supreme court, the law declared by this court in united india insurance co. ltd. v. venkataraju : (1999)iillj272kant , is no longer a good law.4. therefore, the commissioner is right in applying the law that was prevailing as on the date of death for the purpose of quantifying the compensation.5. in the result, i pass the following order.
Judgment:Chandrashekaraiah, J.
1. Appellants are the claimants before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation claiming compensation for the accident occurred to one Suresh Ghodke, son of appellant No. 1 and husband of appellant No. 2.
2. The only contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants in this appeal is that the appellants are entitled for compensation as per the Amendment Act introduced in the year 1995 to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The Commissioner taking into consideration that the death is prior to the Amendment Act has awarded the compensation in accordance with law that was prevailing as on the date of the accident. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the Commissioner is not right in awarding compensation under the unamended Act in view of the decision in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Venkataraju : (1999)IILLJ272Kant . This court in the above decision has held that the amendment introduced by substituting the words 'Rs. 2,000' in place of Rs. 1,000 is per se a part of the procedural law and evidence and, therefore, it is retrospective in operation. But, the Apex Court in case of Kerala State Electricity Board v. Valsala K. : (1999)IILLJ1112SC , has held the contrary. The question that was considered by the Supreme Court in this case is: whether the amendment of Sections 4 and 4-A of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 made by Act No. 30 of 1995 with effect from 15.9.1995 enhancing the amount of compensation and the rate of interest, would be attracted to cases where the claims in respect of death or permanent disablement resulting from an accident caused during the course of employment, took place prior to 15.9.1995? The said question has been answered by the Apex Court accepting the view expressed by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court as follows:
It took the view that the injured workman becomes entitled to get compensation the moment he suffers personal injuries of the types contemplated by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and it is the amount of compensation payable on the date of accident and not the amount of compensation payable on account of the amendment made in 1995, which is relevant.
3. In view of the above said decision of the Supreme Court, the law declared by this Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Venkataraju : (1999)IILLJ272Kant , is no longer a good law.
4. Therefore, the Commissioner is right in applying the law that was prevailing as on the date of death for the purpose of quantifying the compensation.
5. In the result, I pass the following order.