H.S. Rangaramu Vs. the Management of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/383867
SubjectLabour and Industrial
CourtKarnataka High Court
Decided OnMay-28-2002
Case NumberWrit Petition No. 4524 of 2002
JudgeN.K. Jain, C.J., ;V.G. Sabhahit and ;N. Kumar, JJ.
Reported in[2002(94)FLR592]; ILR2002KAR2768; 2002(5)KarLJ538; (2002)IIILLJ32Kant
ActsIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Sections 2, 2A, 10(4A) and 15; Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 - Sections 45; Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Servants (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations, 1971 - Regulations 30 and 35
AppellantH.S. Rangaramu
RespondentThe Management of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and ors.
Appellant AdvocateM.C. Narasimhan, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateP.R. Ramesh, Adv. for Respondent-2 and ;J.Y. Martin, Additional Government Adv. for Respondent-3
Excerpt:
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labour and industrial - termination - section 15 of industrial disputes act, 1947 and karnataka state road transport corporation servants (conduct and discipline) regulations, 1971 - petitioner working with first respondent (state road transport corporation) for last 15 years before filing present petition - petitioner alleged to have remained absent from 07.11.1997 to 07.01.1998 - divisional commissioner terminated services of petitioner-workmen - whether workmen employed by ksrtc who is discharged, dismissed, retrenched of otherwise terminated from service has to exhaust remedy of appeal or revision provided under regulations before approaching labour court for redressal of grievance under provisions of act - keeping in view object of act there is no prohibition or restriction under act.....
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ordern.k. jain, c.j.1. the matter has been referred to this full bench as per the directions of the chief justice and has come up before us.2. the matrix of the case leading upto this reference in brief are that the petitioner was working with the 1st respondent-karnataka state road transport corporation ('ksrtc' for short), for the last 15 years before the filing of this petition. on the allegation that the petitioner remained absent from duty from 7-11-1997 to 7-1-1998, the divisional commissioner (disciplinary authority) of the 1st respond ent-ksrtc, by order dated 13-4-1999, terminated the services of the petitioner-workman. an industrial dispute was raised under section 10(4-a) of the industrial disputes act ('id act' for short), which was registered as lid. no. 179 of 1999. after.....
Judgment:
ORDER

N.K. Jain, C.J.

1. The matter has been referred to this Full Bench as per the directions of the Chief Justice and has come up before us.

2. The matrix of the case leading upto this reference in brief are that the petitioner was working with the 1st respondent-Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation ('KSRTC' for short), for the last 15 years before the filing of this petition. On the allegation that the petitioner remained absent from duty from 7-11-1997 to 7-1-1998, the Divisional Commissioner (Disciplinary Authority) of the 1st respond ent-KSRTC, by order dated 13-4-1999, terminated the services of the petitioner-workman. An industrial dispute was raised under Section 10(4-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act ('ID Act' for short), which was registered as LID. No. 179 of 1999. After the pleading, the Labour Court posted the matter for recording the evidence on the validity of the domestic enquiry. In the meanwhile the order of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore Central Division, Bangalore v. G.M.D. Murthy, : 2002(2)KarLJ484 , was circulated to all the Labour Courts and the Industrial Tribunals in the State with certain directions. The Judges of the Division Bench in that case held that till the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination did not attain its finality upto revisional stage contemplated under Regulation 35 of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Servants (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations, 1971 ('Regulations' for short), the action of the Corporation could not be said to have matured into an industrial dispute entitling the workman to invoke the provisions of reference under the ID Act. The Division Bench further observed that the Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts in the State were required to obtain statements both from the workman and the Corporation to the effect that the workman has exhausted all the statutory remedies under the regulations and if so, to furnish copies of the orders passed by the Appellate and Revisional Authorities, if there had been any appeal or revision, and thereupon the Tribunal or Labour Court could examine the validity of final order only since earlier orders stood merged in the final order. The Division Bench directed that the Appellate or Revisional Authority, as and when cases of the workman are transferred to them, should examine the grievances of the workman in accordance with law by treating such proceedings to have been instituted within the period of limitation and must dispose off the appellate or revisional proceedings within a period of six months from the date of transfer or institution.

3. The Labour Court, Mysore in view of the directions in the said judgment, by its order dated 22-1-2002 held that the Court was bound to follow the Division Bench decision of this Court and comply with the directions and as such directed the office to separate the cases of the workman of the State Road Transport Corporation for transferring them to appropriate authorities as indicated by the High Court.

4. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner-workman preferred a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge on consideration, ultimately by his order dated 6-3-2002 held that:

'In the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Divisional Controller's case, referred to earlier, the decision in the case of Jai Bhagwan v. Ambala Central Co-operative Bank Limited and Anr., : (1984)ILLJ52SC , is not brought to the notice of the Division Bench. Having regard to the said decision of the Supreme Court and also having regard to the importance of the matter, I refer the writ petition to the Division Bench in exercise of power under Section 9 of the High Court Act, without expressing any opinion. Matter may be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for necessary orders in this regard'.

5. The Division Bench of this Court while considering the point as the decision of Jai Bhagwan's case, supra, has not been brought to the notice of earlier Division Bench in Divisional Controller's case, supra arid on consideration found that it will be appropriate to refer the matter to the Full Bench and the case has come up before us as stated.

6. The question that arises for decision in this reference is:

'Whether a workman employed by the KSRTC, who is discharged, dismissed, retrenched or otherwise terminated from service by the employer has to exhaust the remedy of appeal/revision provided under the regulations framed by the employer before approaching the Labour Court for redressing the grievance under the provisions of ID Act?'

In other words when exactly an industrial dispute is said to arise when a remedy appeal/revision is available and till that remedy is exhausted can it be said that no industrial dispute exists notwithstanding the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority.

7. Learned Counsel Mr. M.C. Narasimhan submitted that the Labour Court's order dated 22-1-2002 is contrary to law and facts. He submits that the Labour Court merely on the basis of a circular issued by the Registrar General in pursuance of the Division Bench decision in Divisional Controller's case, supra, separated the case from being transferred to KSRTC to enable the workman to avail the alternative remedy holding that till it was exhausted, no reference could be entertained. The learned Counsel submits that the Labour Court has wrongly relied on the direction which has nothing to do, rather this reference I.I.D. No. 179 of 1999 is entirely different. He further submits that at the most the decision is per incuriam and it cannot affect retrospectively more than 6,000 cases pending in various Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals. The learned Counsel further argued that there is no bar either in the Regulations or the I.D. Act and therefore, the finding of the Division Bench is wholly erroneous and has to be reversed and since the Labour Court has passed the order only on the basis of the direction given in the judgment of the Division Bench the impugned order is liable to be set aside. He relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Commissioner of Income-tax, Orissa v. Dhadi Sahu, 1994 S (1) SCO 257 and in the case of Workmen employed by Hindustan Lever Limited v Hindustan Lever Limited, : (1984)IILLJ391SC .

8. The learned Counsel Mr. P.R. Ramesh appearing for the respondent 1-KSRTC and respondent 2 submitted that the regulations have been framed under Section 45 of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Act, they have statutory force and they have been upheld by this Court and Regulation 30 provides for an appeal and Regulation 35 provides for revision which would enable the workman to redress his grievance in the appeal and revision, powers have been exercised by the concerned authorities and the errors committed while passing the order of termination, retrenchment or dismissal or termination of services have been rectified in appeal or revision and wherefore, if the workman files an appeal under Regulation 30 and thereafter revision under Regulation 35, the same would enable the Corporation to correct the error or mistake if any committed by the officials of the Corporation and the workman need not unnecessarily go to the Labour Court for the same reliefs as the Appellate Authority has got all the powers which can be exercised by the Labour Court and wherefore, the Division Bench of this Court was justified in holding that the termination, retrenchment, dismissal or discharge would not mature into an industrial dispute unless the remedy of appeal and revision provided under regulation is exhausted and in directing the Labour Courts to relegate the dispute to the authorities under the regulation where such remedies have not been exhausted. The reference is uncalled for and is liable to be dismissed. He relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Life Insurance Corporation of India v D.J. Bahadur and Ors. : (1981)ILLJ1SC and N.S. Giri v The Corporation of City of Mangalore and Ors. : (1999)IILLJ690SC .

9. In rejoinder, the learned Counsel for petitioner submits that before the Labour Court as well as before the learned Single Judge the point was not raised regarding exhausting the remedy under the regulations. He submits that the regulations under another enactment cannot be construed to have an overriding effect on the main provisions of the I.D. Act. Learned Additional Government Advocate, Mr. J.Y. Martin supporting the contention of Mr. M.C. Narasimhan submitted that the Division Bench has virtually given an overriding effect to provisions of the Act by interpreting the regulations and that the present reference is maintainable.

10. Before proceeding with the matter, it will be appropriate to consider the relevant provisions of the Act and the Regulations.

Section 2(k) of the Act defines 'Industrial Dispute' as hereunder.--

'(k) 'Industrial Dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person'.

Section 2-A of the Act further clarifies the position by saying that dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute which reads as under.--

'2-A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute.--Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services, of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute'.

Section 10(4-A) of the Act reads as under.--

'(4-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 9-C and in this section, in the case of a dispute falling within the scope of Section 2-A, the individual workman concerned may, within six months from the date of communication to him of the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination or the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is later, apply, in the prescribed manner, to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute and the. Labour Court shall dispose of such application in the same manner as a dispute referred under sub-section (1)'.

Section 45 of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Act enables the Corporation to make regulations not inconsistent with this Act and the Rules made thereunder, for the administration of the affairs of the Corporation.

Regulation 30 gives statutory right to the servants of the Corporation to prefer appeal against an order of Disciplinary Authority.

Regulation 35 deals with revision notwithstanding anything contained in any other regulation. The Corporation or Appellate Authority, within six months of the date of the order proposed to be revised, confirm, modify or set aside the order or pass any such order as it may deem fit. However, this power may be exercised after giving opportunity and making enquiry as required under Regulation 14.

Regulation 38 provides for operation of other enactments.

11. It is necessary to bear in mind the facts under which the Division Bench of this Court considered the question about the maintainability of the industrial dispute before the Labour Court without exhausting the remedy under the regulations. In the said case (Divisional Controller, supra) the service of the workman was terminated by the KSRTC, the respondent-Corporation by order dated 12-12-2001. Being aggrieved by the said order, he preferred appeal under Regulation 30 of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Servants (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations, 1971 (in short 'the Regulations') and the Appellate Authority by its order dated 17-2-1998 rejected the appeal on merits upholding the order of Disciplinary Authority dismissing the workman. Being aggrieved by the said order, the revision was filed under Regulation 35 of the Regulations and the Revisional Authority by its order dated 15-6-1998 remanded the matter to the Appellate Authority for reconsideration on the quantum of punishment. In the meanwhile, the workman had initiated proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act (for short 'the Act') by making an application under Section 10(4-A) of the Act before the Labour Court, Bangalore, which passed an award on 4-6- 1999 directing reinstatement of the respondent with continuity of service and other consequential benefits, but without back wages and wherefore, having regard to the above said facts wherein the workman had chosen to pursue both the remedies which had led to problem of conflicting orders, the Division Bench of this Court held that the Labour Court was not justified in interfering with the order of dismissal as on the date of the order, the order had become non est in the eye of law having merged with the order of the Appellate Authority which was passed pursuant to the directions of this Court in W.P. No. 23961 of 1998, DD: 21/22-9-1998 and having regard to the peculiar facts of the said case, this Court has observed in para 16 of the judgment that in discharge of constitutional obligation of superintendence over Courts and Tribunals cast on this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the said question as to whether the workman can approach the Labour Court directly under Section 10(4-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act when equally efficacious alternative remedies were available and had not been availed by the workman under the provisions of the statutory regulations was considered and this Court concluded that the workman has to exhaust the remedy of appeal and revision under Regulations 30 and 35 of the Regulations before approaching the Labour Court under Section 10(4-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act as the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination does not attain its finality upto revisional stage contemplated under Regulation 35 of the Regulations and the action of the Corporation taken against the workman cannot be said to have matured into an industrial dispute entitling the workman to invoke the provisions of reference and adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Division Bench also observed that the above view will avoid chances of conflicting orders and the Corporation will have full opportunity to rectify any error committed by its officers may be disciplinary or appellate and this will also reduce the load on the dockets of the Labour Court which are already overburdened

12. The learned Single Judge before whom this writ petition was pending consideration by a detailed order dated 6-3-2002 felt that the said view of the Division Bench that the workman cannot approach the Labour Court under Section 10(4-A) of the Act without exhausting the remedy of appeal and revision under the regulations, had been taken without considering the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jai Bhagwan, supra.

13. We have heard the learned Counsels for the parties M.C. Narasimhan, P.R. Ramesh and J.Y. Martin at length and perused the material on record, the relevant provisions and the case-laws.

14. The Industrial Disputes Act has come into effect from 1-4-1947. The object of the Act is to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes which means adjudication of such disputes also. The Act creates rights and obligations. The rights and obligations created under the Act can be redressed only as per the remedy available to the suitor by adjudication under the Act. A reference can be made to the decision in the case of Ajib Singh u The Sirfiind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Limited and Another, : (1999)ILLJ1260SC , wherein the Supreme Court observed to the effect that while interpreting and construing the provisions of the Act, the Courts have to give them a construction which should help in achieving the object of the Act. The Division Bench has not considered the observations in Jai Bhag-wan's case, supra, wherein, on termination, in an identical situation, it was argued that an appeal to the Board was available and raising an industrial dispute without pursuing that remedy, their Lordships held that raising of industrial dispute is well-recognized and once the reference has been made to an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court, the dispute has to be duly resolved by it and cannot be avoided on the ground that the workman has failed to pursue some other remedy.

15. On giving anxious consideration to the submissions and keeping in view the object of the Act and the above provisions and the case-laws, there is no prohibition or restriction under the I.D. Act that reference can only be made after exhausting the remedy under the regulations. As per the scheme of the Act, once an industrial dispute is referred to Labour Court, the Labour Court is bound to pass an award under Section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act and in our view the regulations are not intended or required to resolve any dispute between the workman and the management.

16. The aforesaid sections make it clear any dispute or difference between an employer and an employee, which is connected with the employment or non-employment is an industrial dispute under Section 2(k) of the Act. Similarly, Section 2-A categorically states that when an employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment, dismissal shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute. Section 10(4-A) makes it clear that when an industrial dispute exists under Section 2-A within six months from the date of communication of the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination, the employee could approach the Labour Court for adjudication of the industrial dispute. Therefore, it becomes clear an order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination is passed only once and the moment it is passed it comes into operation putting an end to the jural relationship of master and servant. Merely because the workman has a remedy against such order by way of an appeal or a revision, it cannot be said the said order of discharge, dismissal or termination would not be effective until such remedy is exhausted. The Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority will only consider, whether the order of dismissal is to be sustained or it requires modification. If the workman does not avail of such remedies available to him, the order of dismissal becomes final. Therefore, an industrial dispute arises the moment the order of dismissal or termination is passed. Raising an industrial dispute is a well-recognized and legitimate mode of redress available to a workman which has achieved statutory recognition under the ID Act and this statutorily recognised mode of redress cannot be denied to a workman merely because of the existence or availability of alternate remedy. It is incorrect to state that the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination does not attain its finality and it does not mature into an industrial dispute unless the remedy by way of an appeal or a revision provided under the Standing Orders is exhausted. The remedy by way of an appeal or revision is provided against the order of dismissal. In other words, the appellate jurisdiction or the revisional jurisdiction is provided under the Standing Orders as a remedy against the order of dismissal. Similarly, the other remedy available to a dismissed workman is to raise an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act. It is one thing to say that when alternate remedy by way of appeal and revision is available under the Standing Orders the workman is not entitled to approach the Labour Court by raising industrial dispute. But it is another thing to say that unless the remedy by way of appeal or revision is exhausted, no industrial dispute exists which entitles him to approach the Labour Court for redressal. After a domestic enquiry if the workman is found guilty of the charges levelled against him and the Disciplinary Authority imposes a penalty by way of removal, dismissal or termination if the workman does not accept the said decision of the management an industrial dispute exists and there is nothing like the said dispute maturing into an industrial dispute only after the aggrieved workman exhausts the remedy of appeal and revision. Therefore, we are of the opinion immediately after the passing of an order of penalty, an industrial dispute exists and there is nothing like the said dispute maturing into industrial dispute only after the workman exhausts the remedy of appeal and revision as contemplated under the Act. The Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority does not pass an order of dismissal or termination. They only confirm an order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority or modify such order of the Disciplinary Authority. The very first order, i.e., the original order passed by the management terminating the services of the workman, is deemed to give rise to the industrial dispute and, in our opinion, not the order of Appellate or Revisional Authority as contemplated under the regulations.

17. Now we consider the case-law wherein the relevant point was considered. We find that their Lordships while considering the case of Jai Bhagwan, supra, wherein the service of Jai Bhagwan was terminated with effect from January 31, 1975. Their Lordships, as per head-note (A), have held as under.--

'(A) Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), Section 10(1) -- Termination of services of a workman -- Existence of other remedy does not bar him from raising industrial dispute.

Raising an industrial dispute is a well-recognized and legitimate mode of redress available to a workman which has achieved statutory recognition under the Industrial Disputes Act and this statute recognised mode of redress should not be denied to a workman because of the existence or availability of another remedy. An Industrial Tribunal to whom a dispute has been referred for adjudication cannot refuse to adjudicate upon it and surrender jurisdiction which it undoubtedly has to some other authority. While the Government may exercise their discretion in deciding whether to refer or not to refer a dispute for adjudication, the Tribunal to whom the dispute has been referred has no discretion to decide whether to adjudicate or not. Once a reference has been properly made to an Industrial Tribunal, the dispute has to be duly resolved by the Industrial Tribunal. Resolution of the dispute cannot be avoided by the Tribunal on the ground that the workman had failed to pursue some other remedy'.

18. Again, the Supreme Court in the case of Syndicate Bank Limited v. K. Ramanath V. Bhat, : (1967)IILLJ745SC , has held as under.--

'(17)....... An order of discharge or dismissal in our opinion, can be

passed only once; and, in this case, the order of dismissal is the one passed, by the Managing Director, on November 12, 1963. No doubt, either by virtue of the Standing Orders, or by virtue of a contract, of service, a right of appeal may be given to a workman concerned, to challenge an order of dismissal. But the Appellate Authority only considers whether the order of dismissal has to be sustained, or whether it requires modification. Therefore, there is no question of the Appellate Authority passing, again, an order of dismissal. .........

(18)............ the order of discharge or dismissal, is the original or the very first order passed by the management;.....'.

19. In the case of Sahakari Vipnan (Marketing) Sanstha Maryadit, Bhurwaha v. Labour Court, Indore and Ors., 1994-III-LLJ-906 (MP) : 1987 Lab. l.C. 344 (MP), the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held as follows:

'As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat State Co-operative Land Development Bank Limited v. P.R. Mankad and Anr., : [1979]2SCR1023 , the law of industrial disputes or industrial relations is a special law dealing with rights and obligations specially created by it. It cannot be disputed that in the instant case, the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are applicable in the case of the petitioner-Society, which is a Marketing Society and that respondent 3, an employee of the petitioner-Society has a right under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to raise an industrial dispute arising out of termination of his services. If such an industrial dispute is referred to a Labour Court for adjudication under the provisions of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the jurisdiction of a Labour Court to make an award cannot be held to be barred merely because the employee could have also got that relief from the Registrar under Section 55(2) of the Act had he referred the dispute to the Registrar within 30 days of the order appealed against, as provided by the proviso to Section 55(2) of the Act. It is significant to note, as already observed by us, that under the provisions of Section 82 of the Act, what has been barred is the jurisdiction of a Civil Court and a Revenue Court in respect of matters required to be referred to a Registrar under the Act. The jurisdiction of a Labour or Industrial Court has not been barred under the provisions of Section 82 of the Act. The contention that by virtue of the provisions of Section 55(2) of the Act, an employee of a Marketing Co-operative Society cannot raise an industrial dispute before a Labour Court, cannot be upheld.

9. ...... In this connection, the following observations of the Supreme Court in Gujarat State Co-operative Land Development Bank Limited's case, supra, are pertinent:

'The matter can be looked at from another angle also. The law of industrial disputes or industrial relations is a special law dealing with rights and obligations specially created by it. As against this the provision in Section 54 of the Act of 1925/Section 96 of the Act of 1961 is a general provision. In accordance with the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, therefore, nothing in these general provisions can derogate from BIR Act and the Co-operative Societies Act must yield to the special provisions in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, whenever a dispute clearly comes within the language of the latter Act' '.

20. It is well-settled that exclusion of jurisdiction of the Courts established under the Act is not to be readily inferred and such exclusion must be either implicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is a principle by no means to be whittled down and mere fact that regulations provide for certain remedies, would not by itself necessarily exclude the jurisdiction of the Courts established under the Act. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 196:5 SC 946 : : [1962]45ITR414(SC) ), the Supreme Court has observed as follows;

'The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 also furnishes an example of an Act which creates new rights and obligations and provides machinery for adjudication of disputes pertaining to them. If an industrial dispute relates to the endorsement of a right or an obligation created under the Act then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act'.

21. So far as the case-laws cited by learned Counsel Mr. P. Ramesh axe concerned, they are not helpful to resolve the controversy in this reference. So far as the decision in Dhadi Sahu's case, supra, is concerned, their Lordships at paragraph 21 of the judgment held as follows:

'It is also true that no litigant has any vested right in the matter or procedural law but where the question is of change of forum it ceases to be a question of procedure only. The forum of appeal or proceedings is a vested right as opposed to pure procedure to be followed before a particular forum. The right becomes vested when the proceedings are initiated in the Tribunal or the Court of first instance and unless the legislature has by express words or by necessary implication clearly so indicated, that vested, right will continue in spite of the change of jurisdiction of the different Tribunals or forums'.

In Workmen employed by Hindustan Lever Limited's case, supra, the Supreme Court disapproved the practice of raising preliminary objections to the reference, where the same was validly made by appropriate Government to the Tribunal to adjudicate the dispute on merits.

22. Under the circumstances, the finding that the order of discharge, etc., does not attain finality and no industrial dispute can be raised is bad. Considering this aspect in another angle if this analogy stands, the purpose of providing for a reference under Section 10(4-A) of the I.D. Act will be frustrated as stated.

23. This Court while reserving the order on 16-4-2002 observed that 'In the meanwhile, pending decision, the observations made by the Division Bench in paragraphs 24 and 33 (last paragraph) of the judgment rendered in Divisional Controller's case, supra, shall not be given effect to and are hereby stayed'. It was also observed that 'The workman is also free to approach the Appellate Authority, if so advised. Since the judgment of the Division Bench in the aforesaid writ appeal is communicated by the Registry to all the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals, it will be appropriate to communicate this order also'.

24. In view of what we have discussed above, we are of the opinion that the finding of the Division Bench is not correct and acceptable. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the law declared by the Division Bench in the case of Divisional Controller, supra, is not good law and the directions issued in paragraphs 24, 26, 27 and 33 in the aforesaid judgment cannot be sustained. Instead of remitting the matter to the Single Bench, as agreed on the date the case was argued on 16-4-2002, the order passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Mysore in I.I.0. No. 179 of 1999, dated 22-2-2002 (Annexure-A) is set aside. The Labour Court, Mysore shall dispose off the dispute in accordance with law as per the observations made therein. As per the direction of the Division Bench, the order in the case of Divisional Controller, supra, has been circulated to all the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals in the State. Therefore, it is necessary for us to give direction to the Registry to circulate a copy of this order. The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to take steps to circulate copy of this order to all the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals in the State for guidance to dispose off the disputes pending before them in accordance with law. It is made clear, if any case has already been separated and transferred in pursuance of Division Bench order, in order to avoid further delay, the same may continue and be disposed off as per the directions made therein in accordance with law.

Accordingly, the question referred to the Bench in this reference is answered in the negative.