Sri M.G. Prakash Rao and anr. Vs. the Regional Transport Authority and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
motor vehicles act, 1988 - sections 90, 214 - powers of tribunal - timings of various routes - whether the reason assigned by the tribunal to prohibit the appellants from operating the services in terms of the impugned timings is or is not germane to the decision making - held - the tribunal is of the opinion that if the appellants are permitted to run the services in terms of the impugned timings, that would lead to unhealthy competition between the appellants and the contesting private respondents and that would be totally against the interest of the travelling public. it is not for this court to sit in judgment over the judgment of the tribunal and decide which timings would better serve the public interest or interest of the commuters. it if for the statutory authority like the tribunal to decide by fairly exercising the power vested in it and taking into account the totality of the circumstances germane to the decision making. that is exactly the reason why the tribunal, directed the chairman and secretary, rta to assign fresh timings for the appellants for their services after giving them an opportunity of being heard and bearing in mind the principles and norms to be followed while assigning timings for the services of any stage carriage operator. if, for any reason, the rta does not adhere to the direction issued by the tribunal and arbitrarily and unreasonably assigns timings, the appellants may call in question such timings in an appropriate legal proceeding.;since the tribunal is of the opinion that if the appellants are directed to run the services in terms of the timings impugned before it, that would not serve the public interest in general and the interest of the commuters, in particular, it goes without saying that there is failure of justice within the meaning of that term occurring in sub - section (3) of section 214 of the act. this would dispose of the contention of sri kumar that the tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction, because, there is no failure of justice. it is true that the revisional power vested in the tribunal under section 90 of the act has to be exercised on an application to be made by a person. in the instant case, applications were made by the contesting respondents. once applications are made, it cannot be said that the tribunal should step in and interfere with the order impugned before it only when it finds infraction or violation of the rights of the applicant and not when it finds any violation of the public interest. initiation of a proceeding before a court or a tribunal is different from the adjudication of the lis brought before it for decision - making in such proceeding. in the instant case, the tribunal as well as the learned single judge have, according to us, quite rightly, held that if the appellants are permitted to run services in terms of the impugned timings, that would not be in public interest. the order of the tribunal and order of the learned single judge rest in the premise of public interest only, not in the premise of infraction of the rights of the contesting private respondents. it cannot be said that though the tribunal comes to the conclusion on the basis of the evidence laid before it that the impugned action, if sustained, would be against the public interest, it should not interfere with the impugned action and thereby perpetuate the public injury. that is not the intendment of the act. alternately, it needs to be noticed that that locus standi of the contesting private respondents to question the validity of the impugned timings under section 90 of the act cannot be doubted in view of the judgment of a coordinate bench of this court dated 12.6.1990 in w.a. nos. 1160 to 1163 of 1990 and it cannot be said that they are not aggrieved persons.;writ appeal dismissed. - section 70: [p.d. dinakaran, c.j. &v.g. sabhahit,j] sale transaction between a co-operative bank and charitable trust - sale of property by president of co-operative bank to a charitable trust represented by his wife who is not a member of society - bank at taken date raised a dispute before authorities - whether dispute relating this transaction is purely of civil in nature and to be dealt with civil court or a matter touching upon conduct of business of society and attracts provisions of karnataka co-operative societies act - whether such disputes can be referred to registrar of societies held, petitioner-trust purchased the property belonging to the bank during the period when the husband of the petitioner was the president of bank through registered sale deed; the bank had raised a dispute before authorities. trust contended that it has purchased the property in question for valuable consideration through registered sale deed; and the relief sought in the said dispute does not fall within the ambit of section 70 of the act; as the relief sought in the said dispute pertains to the right, title, interest and possession, the same is purely of civil in nature and therefore, only a civil court has the jurisdiction to deal with such matter. on the other hand, bank contended that the property in question belong to the bank and it was fraudulently purchased for a meager amount. single judge, held that the transaction having taken place between former president of the bank while in office on behalf of the society and his wife, though she is not a member of the society, it cannot be totally ruled out that the transaction does not touch upon the conduct and business of the society in the sense the president of the society transacting and having a transaction with his wife in respect of the property of the society, it is not a fit case to stall the proceedings pending before the authority. being aggrieved by the said order, the writ appeal is filed. the appellants vehemently contended that as none of the appellants are members of bank, the dispute against non-members of the bank cannot be maintained; the transaction entered between the appellants and the bank cannot be made subject-matter of dispute under sub-section (1) of section 70; as the dispute was raised against a non-member of the society and as the same is not touching upon the business or activities of the society, the interim order passed rejecting the application filed by the appellants under section 70(3) or the act is liable to be set aside. held, it is clear that the property of the bank was purchased by the appellant-trust represented by a person who is none else than the wife of erstwhile president of the bank. the said transaction squarely attracts section 70(2)(e) of the act, which has caused deficiency in the assets of the bank. under these circumstances, no illegality or error in the order and there is no good grounds to interfere with such well-reasoned order and consequently, the writ appeal is liable to be dismissed. - kumar would draw our attention to sub-section (3) of section 214 of the act and contend that the tribunal ought not to have interfered with the impugned timings allotted by the rta, because, there is no failure of justice. the learned counsel appearing for the contesting private respondents, per contra, would support the order of the tribunal as well as the order of the learned single judge. it is not for this court to sit in judgment over the judgment of the tribunal and decide which things would better serve the public interest or interest of the commuters. it is for the statutory authority like the tribunal to decide by fairly exercising the power vested in it and taking into account the totality of the circumstances germane to the decision-making. 4. since the tribunal is of the opinion that if the appellants are directed to run the services in terms of the timings impugned before it, that would not serve the public interest in general and the interest of the commuters, in particular, it goes without saying that there is failure of justice within the meaning of that term occurring in sub-section (3) of section 214 of the act. this would dispose of the contention of sri kumar that the tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction, because, there is no failure of justice. in the instant case, the tribunal as well as the learned single judge have, according to us, quite rightly, held that if the appellants are permitted to run services in terms of the impugned timings, that would not be in public interest.s.r. nayak, j.1. this writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single judge dated 12th september 2005 passed in w.r no. 20795 of 2005. the respondents 2,3 and 4 are the existing operators on the routes covering davanagere, channagiri and bhadravathi sectors. the appellants made applications for grant of stage carriage permits before the first respondents, regional transport authority (for short, 'the rta') between the routes davanagere and bhadravathi. the rta, davanagere, granted two permits in favour of the first appellant, between bhadravathi and davanagere and back in sub. no. scp/ 220/03 - 04 and 221/03 - 04 dated 27.7.2004 (results announced on 10.10.2004). similarly, the rta granted a stage carriage permit to the second appellant for the route davanagere to bhadravathi and back by its order dated 17.2.2005 in sub no. scp/141/04 - 05. thereafterwards, the rta sanctioned a timetable in favour of the appellants 1 and 2 for their services. the timings assigned to the appellants was called in question by the respondents 2, 3 and 4 in r.p. nos. 493, 494 and 495 of 2004 filed under section 90 of the motor vehicles act, 1988 (for short, 'the act') on various grounds before the karnataka state transport appellate tribunal (for short, 'the tribunal'). the tribunal, having opined that if the appellants are permitted to run the services in terms of the approved timetable, that would lead to unhealthy competition between the operation of the services by the appellants and contesting respondents and it would not be in the public interest, directed the appellants herein to stop operation of the services as per the impugned timings. however, the tribunal issued direction to the chairman and secretary, rta to assign fresh timings for the services of the appellants, after hearing both the sides and bearing in mind the principles and norms to be followed while assigning the timings for the services of any stage carriage operator, within 15 days from the date of the order. the above order was handed down by the tribunal on 24th august 2005. being aggrieved by the above order of the tribunal, the appellant herein preferred w.p. no. 20795 of 2005. the learned single judge, having opined that the impugned order passed by the tribunal is intended to safeguard the interest of travelling public, refused to interfere with the order of the tribunal and resultantly dismissed the writ petition by his order dated 12th september 2005. hence, this writ appeal by the aggrieved writ petitioners.2. we have heard the learned counsel for the parties. sri c.v. kumar, learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the timings assigned by the rta. sri c.v. kumar would draw our attention to sub-section (3) of section 214 of the act and contend that the tribunal ought not to have interfered with the impugned timings allotted by the rta, because, there is no failure of justice. sri c.v. kumar would also contend that it is the intendment of the act to allow healthy competitions between the operators, and simply because there is time gap of 2 minutes between the two services, that fact itself would not be a valid ground for the tribunal to upset the timings assigned by the rta after taking into account the public interest element. sri c.v. kumar would lastly contend that, be that as it may, the contesting respondents should not be regarded as aggrieved persons investing in them a right to make a grievance against the impugned timings before the tribunal. the learned counsel appearing for the contesting private respondents, per contra, would support the order of the tribunal as well as the order of the learned single judge. sri s.v. krishnaswamy, learned counsel appearing for some of the contesting respondents would place before us an unreported judgment of the division bench of this court dated 12th june 1990 in w.a. no. 1160-1163 of 1990 to contend that the existing operators should undeniably be considered as 'aggrieved persons' and their locus to question the grant of timings assigned to the new operators on the same route, in appropriate legal proceedings, cannot be questioned.3. having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the only question that arises for decision-making is whether any ground is made out for us to interfere with the order of the learned single judge. at the threshold, it needs to be noticed that the tribunal is also a statutory authority which is entrusted with a duty to safeguard the public interest in the matter of granting permits or allotting timings for the operators. the question for consideration is whether the reason assigned by the tribunal to prohibit the appellants from operating the services in terms of the impugned timings is or is not germane to the decision-making. we are of the considered opinion that undeniably the reasons set out by the tribunal are reasons/grounds which are germane to the decision-making. the tribunal is of the opinion that if the appellants are permitted to run the services in terms of the impugned timings, that would lead to unhealthy competition between the appellants and the contesting private respondents and that would be totally against the interest of the travelling public. although, sri c.v. kumar would repeatedly tell us that the rta before assigning the timings, it had taken into account all relevant materials, but when we pointedly asked him to refer to those relevant materials, the only thing he could show us is a chart of timings produced at pages 158-162 marked as annexure-q. we have perused annexure-q chart. annexure- q in no way would aid or support the apprehension of sri c.v. kumar made on behalf of the appellants that if the appellants are not permitted to run the services in terms of the impugned timings, they would be left with no option but to run the services only in the midnight. per contra, annexure-q itself would show that there is every possibility and scope for the rta to assign timings to the appellants between the gaps, ranging from 5 minutes to 20 minutes and more. it is not for this court to sit in judgment over the judgment of the tribunal and decide which things would better serve the public interest or interest of the commuters. it is for the statutory authority like the tribunal to decide by fairly exercising the power vested in it and taking into account the totality of the circumstances germane to the decision-making. that is exactly the reason why the tribunal, quite fairly, we should say, directed the chairman and secretary, rta to assign fresh timings for the appellants for their services after giving them an opportunity of being heard and bearing in mind the principles and norms to be followed while assigning timings for the services of any stage carriage operator. that would take care of the apprehension highlighted before us by sri kumar on behalf of the appellants. if, for any reason, the rta does not adhere to the direction issued by the tribunal and arbitrarily and unreasonably assigns timings, the appellants may call in question such timings in an appropriate legal proceeding. that stage is not yet reached. we are told that after the disposal of the writ petition, though the rta wanted to consider the subject of assigning fresh timings to the appellants; however, the consideration was deferred at the instance of the appellants themselves on the ground that they intended to prefer writ appeal against the order of the learned single.4. since the tribunal is of the opinion that if the appellants are directed to run the services in terms of the timings impugned before it, that would not serve the public interest in general and the interest of the commuters, in particular, it goes without saying that there is failure of justice within the meaning of that term occurring in sub-section (3) of section 214 of the act. this would dispose of the contention of sri kumar that the tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction, because, there is no failure of justice. it is true that the revisional power vested in the tribunal under section 90 of the act has to be exercised on an application to be made by a person. in the instant case, applications were made by the contesting respondents. once applications are made, it cannot be said that the tribunal should step in and interfere with the order impugned before it only when it finds infraction or violation of the rights of the applicant and not when it finds any violation of the public interest. initiation of a proceeding before a court or a tribunal is different from the adjudication of the lis brought before it for decision-making in such proceeding. in the instant case, the tribunal as well as the learned single judge have, according to us, quite rightly, held that if the appellants are permitted to run services in terms of the impugned timings, that would not be in public interest. the order of the tribunal and order of the learned single judge rest in the premise of public interest only, not in the premise of infraction of the rights of the contesting private respondents. it cannot be said that though the tribunal comes to the conclusion on the basis of the evidence laid before it that the impugned action, if sustained, would be against the public interest, it should not interfere with the impugned action and thereby perpetuate the public injury. that is not the intendment of the act. alternately, it needs to be noticed that that locus standi of the contesting private respondents to question the validity of the impugned timings under section 90 of the act cannot be doubted in view of the judgment of a co-ordinate bench of this court dated 12.6.1990 in w.a. nos. 1160 to 1163 of 1990 and it cannot be said that they are not aggrieved persons.5. looking from any angle, we do not find any merit in any of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. writ appeal is devoid of merit and it is, accordingly, dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.sri s. prakash shetty, learned government advocate is permitted to file memo of appearance within four weeks.