Asad Jangu Sheik Vs. Transport Corporation of India - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
civil procedure code, 1908 (central act no. 5 of 1908) - section 151 - court exercising inherent powers can direct any of the parties to suit to furnish names & addresses of legal representatives. ;the court in exercise of its inherent powers, in the exceptional circumstances not covered by the situation envisaged under order 22 rule 4 of the cpc can issue a direction to any of the parties to the suit to give the names and addresses in order to bring the legal representatives on record whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. - section 6: [d.v.shylendra kumar,j] arrears of sale tax -simultaneous recovery proceedings whether maintainable - held, yes. government is not prevented from having recourse to simultaneous recovery proceedings under several modes. simultaneous recovery proceedings under revenue recovery act and karnataka land revenue act were not bad in law. revenue recovery act is an enabling piece of legislation to recover the arrears of land revenue found due under karnataka land revenue act. order of forfeiture was quashed. karnataka sales tax act, 1957 section 8-a: [d.v.shylendra kumar,j] exemption - whether state government has power to withdraw the exemption given by later notification held, yes. an exemption can never be permanent in nature as that will be quite contrary to the purpose and object of the act levying sales tax. government is not bound to retain the permanent exemption for any particular period or for all times to come. it is for this reason, the principles of promissory estoppel is also not attracted as there is no promise held out by the government granting exemption for any specific period, within which period the exemption is withdrawn. section 8-a: [d.v.shylendra kumar,j] recovery of arrears of tax as arrears of land revenue - held, karnataka sales tax act does not envisage any forfeiture of any of the property belonging to an assessee in default. an order of forfeiture is a very serious order which is in the nature of penalty and until and unless it is an express provision, there is no question of reading the power of forfeiture in favour of any authority. a recovery is different from forfeiting the properties. even the kst act does not envisage any forfeiture of any of the property belonging to an assessee in default - the respondent while bringing themselves on record as legal representatives of deceased first respondent disclosed that there are two daughters to the deceased respondent, and they are proper and necessary parties, but failed to disclose their names and addresses. 2. the petitioner inspite of his best efforts could not get the names and addresses of those two daughters of deceased respondent. 5. this is a case of exceptional circumstances cropped in and the court has justly in the interest of justice, in exercise of inherent power, passed the order directing the respondent to furnish the names and addresses of two other legal representatives of deceased respondent. the question as to whether the court in exceptional circumstances has got inherent power to issue such an order is not res integra. it is well settled that the provisions of the code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. ' therefore, i am of the opinion that the court in exercise of its inherent powers, in the exceptional circumstances not covered by the situation envisaged under order 22 rule 4 of the c.orderjagannatha shetty, j.1. in this revision petition, the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the iii additional civil judge, belgaum, directing the petitioner to furnish the names and addresses of two daughters of the deceased respondent so as to bring them on record as legal representatives of deceased first respondent in regular appeal no. 70/1982. the respondent herein is the appellant in the above referred appeal on the file of the civil judge, belgaum, filed an application under section 151 c.p.c. praying therein to direct the legal representatives of the deceased respondent to give the names of two daughters and their addresses. the respondent while bringing themselves on record as legal representatives of deceased first respondent disclosed that there are two daughters to the deceased respondent, and they are proper and necessary parties, but failed to disclose their names and addresses.2. the petitioner inspite of his best efforts could not get the names and addresses of those two daughters of deceased respondent. the petitioners in the application pray for a direction to the legal representatives of the deceased respondent who have already been brought on record, to disclose the names of those two daughters and their addresses.3. this application was resisted by the respondents on the ground that an application under section 151 c.p.c. is not maintainable and the court cannot call up on the respondents to furnish their names. the learned civil judge has considered the matter in proper prospective, and in the ends of justice, directed the respondents-legal representatives, who have already been brought on record, to give the names of those two daughters and their addresses, and allowed the application under section 151 of the c.p.c.4. learned counsel for the petitioners sri s.k. joshi strenuously contended that the civil judge has no jurisdiction to compel the petitioner to furnish the names and addresses of legal hairs under order 22 of c.p.c. and the scope of section 151 of c.p.c. does not clothe the court with jurisdiction to issue a direction, for the procedural law does not provide for such direction. in other words, he contended that when there is a specific provision to bring the legal representatives on record, an application under section 151 c.p.c. is not maintainable.5. this is a case of exceptional circumstances cropped in and the court has justly in the interest of justice, in exercise of inherent power, passed the order directing the respondent to furnish the names and addresses of two other legal representatives of deceased respondent. the petitioners, main contention is that when an order under section 22 rule 4 of c.p.c. do not provide for giving such direction to the respondent and for that matter to any party to the suit, to furnish names and addresses of the legal representatives, the court cannot exercise its inherent power under section 151 of c.p.c., and the very order passed by the civil judge is without jurisdiction. the question as to whether the court in exceptional circumstances has got inherent power to issue such an order is not res integra. the question has been authoritatively decided by the supreme court of india in the case of manohar lal chopra v. rai bahadur rao raja seth hiralal : air1962sc527 , which reads as follows;-'we are of opinion that the latter view is correct and that the courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of order xxxix c.p.c. there is no such expression in section 94 which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by order xxxix or by any rules made under the code. it is well settled that the provisions of the code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. the effect of the expression 'if it is so prescribed' is only this that when the rules prescribe the circumstances in which the temporary injunction can be issued, ordinarily the court is not to use its inherent powers to make the necessary orders in the interest of justice but is merely to see whether the circumstances of the case bring it within the prescribed rule. if the provisions of section 94 were not there in the code, the court could still issue temporary injunctions, but it could do that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. no party has a right to insist on the court's exercising that jurisdiction and the court exercises its inherent jurisdiction only when it considers it absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to do so. it is in the incidence of the exercise of the power of the court to issue temporary injunction that the provisions of section 94 of the code have their effect and not in taking away the right of the court to exercise, its inherent power.'the supreme court has made it clear that inherent powers of the court under section 151 is not controlled by the other provisions of the code. in padam sen and anr. v. the state of uttar pradesh : 1961crilj322 , the supreme court has further observed as follows;-'the inherent powers of the court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the court by the code. they are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in section 151 of the code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the code or against the intentions of the legislature.'therefore, i am of the opinion that the court in exercise of its inherent powers, in the exceptional circumstances not covered by the situation envisaged under order 22 rule 4 of the c.p.c. can issue a direction to any of the parties to the suit to give the names and addresses in order to bring the legal representatives on record whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.6. in that view of the matter, i find no merit in the revision petition and the same is dismissed at the admission stage itself.

Judgment:
ORDER

Jagannatha Shetty, J.

1. In this Revision Petition, the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the III Additional Civil Judge, Belgaum, directing the petitioner to furnish the names and addresses of two daughters of the deceased respondent so as to bring them on record as legal representatives of deceased first respondent in Regular Appeal No. 70/1982. The respondent herein is the Appellant in the above referred appeal on the file of the Civil Judge, Belgaum, filed an application under Section 151 C.P.C. praying therein to direct the legal representatives of the deceased respondent to give the names of two daughters and their addresses. The respondent while bringing themselves on record as legal representatives of deceased first respondent disclosed that there are two daughters to the deceased respondent, and they are proper and necessary parties, but failed to disclose their names and addresses.

2. The petitioner inspite of his best efforts could not get the names and addresses of those two daughters of deceased respondent. The petitioners in the application pray for a direction to the legal representatives of the deceased respondent who have already been brought on record, to disclose the names of those two daughters and their addresses.

3. This application was resisted by the respondents on the ground that an application under Section 151 C.P.C. is not maintainable and the Court cannot call up on the respondents to furnish their names. The learned Civil Judge has considered the matter in proper prospective, and in the ends of justice, directed the respondents-legal representatives, who have already been brought on record, to give the names of those two daughters and their addresses, and allowed the application under Section 151 of the C.P.C.

4. Learned Counsel for the petitioners Sri S.K. Joshi strenuously contended that the Civil Judge has no jurisdiction to compel the petitioner to furnish the names and addresses of legal hairs under Order 22 of C.P.C. and the scope of Section 151 of C.P.C. does not clothe the Court with jurisdiction to issue a direction, for the procedural law does not provide for such direction. In other words, he contended that when there is a specific provision to bring the legal representatives on record, an application under Section 151 C.P.C. is not maintainable.

5. This is a case of exceptional circumstances cropped in and the Court has justly in the interest of justice, in exercise of inherent power, passed the order directing the respondent to furnish the names and addresses of two other legal representatives of deceased respondent. The petitioners, main contention is that when an order under Section 22 Rule 4 of C.P.C. do not provide for giving such direction to the respondent and for that matter to any party to the suit, to furnish names and addresses of the legal representatives, the Court cannot exercise its inherent power under Section 151 of C.P.C., and the very order passed by the Civil Judge is without jurisdiction. The question as to whether the Court in exceptional circumstances has got inherent power to issue such an order is not res integra. The question has been authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court of India in the case of MANOHAR LAL CHOPRA v. RAI BAHADUR RAO RAJA SETH HIRALAL : AIR1962SC527 , which reads as follows;-

'We are of opinion that the latter view is correct and that the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order XXXIX C.P.C. There is no such expression in Section 94 which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order XXXIX or by any rules made under the Code. It is well settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the Legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. The effect of the expression 'if it is so prescribed' is only this that when the rules prescribe the circumstances in which the temporary injunction can be issued, ordinarily the Court is not to use its inherent powers to make the necessary orders in the interest of justice but is merely to see whether the circumstances of the case bring it within the prescribed rule. If the provisions of Section 94 were not there in the Code, the Court could still issue temporary injunctions, but it could do that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. No party has a right to insist on the Court's exercising that jurisdiction and the Court exercises its inherent jurisdiction only when it considers it absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to do so. It is in the incidence of the exercise of the power of the Court to issue temporary injunction that the provisions of Section 94 of the Code have their effect and not in taking away the right of the Court to exercise, its inherent power.'

The Supreme Court has made it clear that inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 is not controlled by the other provisions of the Code. In PADAM SEN AND ANR. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH : 1961CriLJ322 , the Supreme Court has further observed as follows;-

'The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature.'

Therefore, I am of the opinion that the Court in exercise of its inherent powers, in the exceptional circumstances not covered by the situation envisaged under Order 22 Rule 4 of the C.P.C. can issue a direction to any of the parties to the suit to give the names and addresses in order to bring the legal representatives on record whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.

6. In that view of the matter, I find no merit in the Revision Petition and the same is dismissed at the admission stage itself.