V. Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka and Others - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- motor vehicles act (59 of 1988)sections 168 & 173: [v. jagannathan, j] appeal by insurance company - plea of guilt by the driver and conviction in the criminal case - can the plea of guilt by the driver become the sole criterion for allowing the claim petition by the m.a.c.t. a case of insurance company disputing the very factum of accident sustainability of the award passed by the m.a.c.t. - held, the m.a.c.t. should not and ought not to place sole reliance on the judgment of the criminal court while considering the issue of the factum of the accident and the consequent negligence, as stated in the claim petition filed before the tribunal. but, the tribunal will have to assess the evidence before it independently of any finding of the criminal court on the question of the driver pleading guilty. at the most, the circumstance of the driver pleading guilty may be considered as one of the pieces of evidence to support the case of the claimant. but, the tribunal should not place implicit reliance only on the circumstance of the driver having pleaded guilty before the criminal court and such an approach by the tribunal will be not only an one sided approach but, at the same time, there is every likelihood of the pleading of guilt by a driver before the criminal court having been obtained by adopting various methods so as to ensure that the claimant succeeds before the m.a.c.t. in getting compensation. further, there has been spate of cases wherein false claims have been made before the claims tribunal and false implications are also on the increase. the m.a.c.ts are constituted not only to allow the claim petitions which are genuine in nature but, at the same time, the tribunals also will have to keep in view that compensation should not be awarded mechanically in every case and to accept the case of the claimant as if all that the claimant says about the accident and the injuries is a truthful one. merely because a claimant in a particular case comes out with the evidence that the driver of the vehicle is convicted on his pleading guilty, the tribunal should not go by the plead guilty factor alone, but it is required to appreciate the evidence before it from every angle and if there is a good reason to question the very case of the claimant or doubt the very manner of the accident, in such cases, the tribunal will have to view the factor of pleading guilty along with the entire evidence placed before it and make an assessment of the whole situation. order1. i have heard the petitioner's learned advocate as also the learned government pleader.2. mr. ramesh on behalf of the petitioner states that a clear reading of the intendment of the legislature while promulgating the karnataka scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (prohibition of transfer of certain lands) act, 1978 was in order to prescribe a bar to the transfer of lands granted to persons of this category to others who may either want to deprive them of their lands or who may want to deceive them into parting with their lands or who may want to exploit them by depriving them of their lands through any other unfair means. learned counsel submits that the scheme of the legislation is very clear insofar as it is intended to protect a particular social strata and he contends that if this be the objective, that it would not prohibit a transfer inter se within persons belonging to the sc/st. he has placed reliance on a division bench decision reported in lakshmamma v state of karnataka and others , wherein the division bench while dealing with a group of writ petitions had occasion to deal with the ambit and scope of rule 29-a. the division bench has upheld the contention that, a transfer that is made to a person belonging to the sc/st category would not come within the bar prescribed by the statute. mr. ramesh submits that, this contention was specifically pleaded by the petitioner and has been wrongly rejected. learned counsel even points out to me that, a fundamental issue of this type has neither been properly recorded nor has it been considered leave alone recording a finding thereon and therefore he assails the impugned orders.3. i need to record here that, the learned government pleader has vehemently opposed the interference by this court because she has submitted that an examination of the scheme of the act would indicate that every transfer or alienation irrespective of who is the beneficiary that has taken place in violation of the provisions of the act would be void and she submits that the act has not made any specific exceptions leastof all, to the effect that the members of the sc/st would be permitted inter transfers. her submission is that, if this is the scheme of the act, that the petitioner's learned advocate is not justified in reading intentions into it or relying on some stray provision of a rule because it is the act which should prevail. she also points out to the court that, even among persons belonging to the sc and st, that the eligibility for grant or regrant be required to be examined by the government and that not all persons belonging to this category are eligible for the grant of leasehold lands. under these circumstances, she submits that the impugned orders are correct and that no interference is warranted.4. i do concede, as pointed out by the learned government pleader that under the normal rules of interpretation the provisions of the act would ordinarily prevail. however, under the doctrine of harmonious construction unless there is a conflict, which i do not find in the present case, court is obliged to construe the act in consonance with the rules framed thereunder which are framed in furtherance of the objectives of the act. to my mind, rule 29-a does not in any manner conflict with the provisions of the act and it is capable of being interpreted to further the objectives of the act. it is very clear that the government was of the view that the bar prescribed, which is almost total, should not adversely apply to the very small category of persons whom the law was intended to benefit which is why we have rule 29-a. in this view of the matter, the law laid-down by the division bench would have to be applied to the facts of the present case.in the result, the impugned orders are quashed and set aside. the petition succeeds. no order as to costs.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. I have heard the petitioner's learned Advocate as also the learned Government Pleader.

2. Mr. Ramesh on behalf of the petitioner states that a clear reading of the intendment of the Legislature while promulgating the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 was in order to prescribe a bar to the transfer of lands granted to persons of this category to others who may either want to deprive them of their lands or who may want to deceive them into parting with their lands or who may want to exploit them by depriving them of their lands through any other unfair means. Learned Counsel submits that the scheme of the legislation is very clear insofar as it is intended to protect a particular social strata and he contends that if this be the objective, that it would not prohibit a transfer inter se within persons belonging to the SC/ST. He has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision reported in Lakshmamma v State of Karnataka and Others , wherein the Division Bench while dealing with a group of writ petitions had occasion to deal with the ambit and scope of Rule 29-A. The Division Bench has upheld the contention that, a transfer that is made to a person belonging to the SC/ST category would not come within the bar prescribed by the statute. Mr. Ramesh submits that, this contention was specifically pleaded by the petitioner and has been wrongly rejected. Learned Counsel even points out to me that, a fundamental issue of this type has neither been properly recorded nor has it been considered leave alone recording a finding thereon and therefore he assails the impugned orders.

3. I need to record here that, the learned Government Pleader has vehemently opposed the interference by this Court because she has submitted that an examination of the scheme of the Act would indicate that every transfer or alienation irrespective of who is the beneficiary that has taken place in violation of the provisions of the Act would be void and she submits that the Act has not made any specific exceptions leastof all, to the effect that the Members of the SC/ST would be permitted inter transfers. Her submission is that, if this is the scheme of the Act, that the petitioner's learned Advocate is not justified in reading intentions into it or relying on some stray provision of a Rule because it is the Act which should prevail. She also points out to the Court that, even among persons belonging to the SC and ST, that the eligibility for grant or regrant be required to be examined by the Government and that not all persons belonging to this category are eligible for the grant of leasehold lands. Under these circumstances, she submits that the impugned orders are correct and that no interference is warranted.

4. I do concede, as pointed out by the learned Government Pleader that under the normal rules of interpretation the provisions of the Act would ordinarily prevail. However, under the doctrine of harmonious construction unless there is a conflict, which I do not find in the present case, Court is obliged to construe the Act in consonance with the rules framed thereunder which are framed in furtherance of the objectives of the Act. To my mind, Rule 29-A does not in any manner conflict with the provisions of the Act and it is capable of being interpreted to further the objectives of the Act. It is very clear that the Government was of the view that the bar prescribed, which is almost total, should not adversely apply to the very small category of persons whom the law was intended to benefit which is why we have Rule 29-A. In this view of the matter, the law laid-down by the Division Bench would have to be applied to the facts of the present case.

In the result, the impugned orders are quashed and set aside. The petition succeeds. No order as to costs.