Thopamma and ors. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
motor vehicles act 1939, (act 4 of 1939) section 110-d - appellant filed the appeal after delay of twelve years and filed an application for condonation of delay - request to condone the delay was rejected.;what has unfortunately compounded the matters is the fact that when the appeal came up for hearing in the year 1988 it was just about 3 years after the accident and the parties and the records could still have perhaps been traceable. to my mind, if the court was requested to dispose of the matter at the admission stage in 1988 the possibility of revising the processings may have been feasible. today, over 12 years have elapsed since the date of incident and there is not even the remotest possibility of been able to secure evidence on the basis of which the case can be decided. in matters of compensation, the court cannot proved on an ad-hoc basis as each of the ingredients would have to be established and that procedure would become impossible in the absence of both the documentary evidence. the appellant's learned advocate did submit that the delay should be condoned and the matter be remanded to the tribunal for purposes of an effort being made to secure the evidence and conduct the matter and in the absence thereof, if it became impossible, the tribunal could always dispose of the application. i am unable to agree to this because the tribunal's are already overburdened and at this late point of time no useful purpose would be served by remanding a more than dead matter to the tribunal with directions that judicial time should be spent making futile efforts. - re-valuation:[p.d. dinakaran, c.j. & v.g. sabhahit,j] prayer of appellant in writ petition to conduct revaluation of petitioners answer script for fifth semester examination - single judge dismissed writ petition petitioner had secured 31 marks in first revaluation and in second revaluation 30 marks -made application for 3rd revaluation - no provision for 3rd revaluation by an independent authority held, since there is no provision for third re-valuation by an independent authority, the said request of the petitioner was rejected and having regard to the said material facts, it is clear that the single judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition as there is no provisions for third revaluation by an independent authority and the impugned order passed by the single judge is justified and does not suffer from any error or illegality as to call for interference in this intra court appeal. - 1. this is an extremely sad case and to some extent, i sympathies with the submission made by the appellants' learned advocate when he points out that though a young man lost his life in the motor accident that his family is totally deprived of any compensation because of the delay. i do concede that this is a sad case but there is virtually nothing that the court can do in these circumstances. ironically enough, this is one more case where the failure of the proceeding is directly attributable to the appellants learned advocates both before the tribunal and before this court.orderm.f. saldanha, j.1. this is an extremely sad case and to some extent, i sympathies with the submission made by the appellants' learned advocate when he points out that though a young man lost his life in the motor accident that his family is totally deprived of any compensation because of the delay. the proceeding itself was instituted before the tribunal involving a delay of one year and 5 months and the respondents contested it on the point of limitation. even though the learned judge has held that the appellant's husband had also died sometime thereafter, that this ground would not be available because it is demonstrated that she has another grown up son. in these circumstances, the trial court has held that the delay cannot be condoned and has dismissed the application. the appeal is directed against that order.2. what has unfortunately compounded the matters is the fact that when the appeal came up for hearing in the year 1988 it was just about 3 years after the accident and the parties and the records could still have perhaps been traceable. to my mind, if the court was requested to dispose of the matter at the admission stage in 1988 the possibility of revising the processings may have been feasible. today, over 12 years have elapsed since the date of incident and there, is not even the remotest possibility of been able to secure evidence on the basis of which the case can be decided. in matters of compensation, the court cannot proved on an ad-hoc basis as each of the ingredients would have to be established and that procedure would become impossible in the absence of both the oral and documentary evidence. the appellant's learned advocate did submit that the delay should be condoned and the matter be remanded to the tribunal for purposes of an effort being made to secure the evidence and conduct the matter and in the absence thereof, if it became impossible, the tribunal could always dispose of the application. i am unable to agree to this because the tribunal's are already overburdened and at this late point of time no useful purpose would be served by remanding a more than dead matter to the tribunal with directions that judicial time should be spent making futile efforts. i do concede that this is a sad case but there is virtually nothing that the court can do in these circumstances. the appeal accordingly fails and stands disposed of. ironically enough, this is one more case where the failure of the proceeding is directly attributable to the appellants learned advocates both before the tribunal and before this court. one hopes such situations will never recur.

Judgment:
ORDER

M.F. Saldanha, J.

1. This is an extremely sad case and to some extent, I sympathies with the submission made by the appellants' learned advocate when he points out that though a young man lost his life in the motor accident that his family is totally deprived of any compensation because of the delay. The proceeding itself was instituted before the Tribunal involving a delay of one year and 5 months and the respondents contested it on the point of limitation. Even though the learned Judge has held that the appellant's husband had also died sometime thereafter, that this ground would not be available because it is demonstrated that she has another grown up son. In these circumstances, the trial Court has held that the delay cannot be condoned and has dismissed the application. The appeal is directed against that order.

2. What has unfortunately compounded the matters is the fact that when the appeal came up for hearing in the year 1988 it was just about 3 years after the accident and the parties and the records could still have perhaps been traceable. To my mind, if the Court was requested to dispose of the matter at the admission stage in 1988 the possibility of revising the processings may have been feasible. Today, over 12 years have elapsed since the date of incident and there, is not even the remotest possibility of been able to secure evidence on the basis of which the case can be decided. In matters of compensation, the Court cannot proved on an ad-hoc basis as each of the ingredients would have to be established and that procedure would become impossible in the absence of both the oral and documentary evidence. The appellant's learned advocate did submit that the delay should be condoned and the matter be remanded to the Tribunal for purposes of an effort being made to secure the evidence and conduct the matter and in the absence thereof, if it became impossible, the Tribunal could always dispose of the application. I am unable to agree to this because the Tribunal's are already overburdened and at this late point of time no useful purpose would be served by remanding a more than dead matter to the Tribunal with directions that judicial time should be spent making futile efforts. I do concede that this is a sad case but there is virtually nothing that the Court can do in these circumstances. The appeal accordingly fails and stands disposed of. Ironically enough, this is one more case where the failure of the proceeding is directly attributable to the Appellants Learned Advocates both before the Tribunal and before this Court. One hopes such situations will never recur.