N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment

Excerpt:

Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120]Code Context                                echo "<div class='table-bordered'><b>Excerpt:</b><br/>";

                                    if (trim($desc['Judgement']['casenote'])) {

                                        echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['casenote']))), $query);
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '381370',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
			'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
			'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Writ petitions allowed. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '381370',
		(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '381370',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
		'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '381370',
	(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/381370/n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$ctype = ' High Court'
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120]Code Context                                echo "<div class='table-bordered'><b>Excerpt:</b><br/>";

                                    if (trim($desc['Judgement']['casenote'])) {

                                        echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['casenote']))), $query);
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '381370',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
			'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
			'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Writ petitions allowed. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '381370',
		(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '381370',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
		'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '381370',
	(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/381370/n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$ctype = ' High Court'
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

- prevention of corruption act, 1988 [c.a. no. 49/1988]sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [r.b. naik, j] sanction for prosecution -accused was officer of co-operative department - complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -complainant lodged with lokayukta -trap laid - subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office trial court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - held, prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-this order was not challenged. thus refusal has reached finality. absence of sanction and want of sanction are two.....

Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]Code Context                                    }

                                //highest occurence of word in the judgement

                                echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '381370',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
			'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
			'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Writ petitions allowed. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '381370',
		(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '381370',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
		'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '381370',
	(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/381370/n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$ctype = ' High Court'
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]Code Context                                    }

                                //highest occurence of word in the judgement

                                echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '381370',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
			'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
			'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Writ petitions allowed. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '381370',
		(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '381370',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
		'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '381370',
	(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/381370/n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$ctype = ' High Court'
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

k. shivashankar bhat, j. 1. since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. 2. the relevant facts are stated with reference to w.p. no. 13054 of 1987. the petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the karnataka sales tax act, 1957 ('the act'). the petitioner buys leco from m/s. neyveli lignite corporation limited. according to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. the petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. all these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the fifth schedule to the act. the goods enumerated in the fifth schedule to the act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the act. item.....

Judgment:

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '381370',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
			'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
			'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Writ petitions allowed. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '381370',
		(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '381370',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
		'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '381370',
	(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/381370/n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p>',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 12
$i = (int) 0
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '381370',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
			'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
			'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Writ petitions allowed. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '381370',
		(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '381370',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
		'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '381370',
	(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/381370/n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p>',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 12
$i = (int) 1
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '381370',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
			'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
			'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Writ petitions allowed. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '381370',
		(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '381370',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
		'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '381370',
	(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/381370/n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p>',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 12
$i = (int) 2
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '381370',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
			'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
			'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Writ petitions allowed. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '381370',
		(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '381370',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
		'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '381370',
	(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/381370/n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p>',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 12
$i = (int) 3
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows :

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '381370',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
			'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
			'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Writ petitions allowed. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '381370',
		(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '381370',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
		'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '381370',
	(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/381370/n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p>',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 12
$i = (int) 4
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.'

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '381370',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
			'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
			'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Writ petitions allowed. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '381370',
		(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '381370',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
		'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '381370',
	(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/381370/n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p>',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 12
$i = (int) 5
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows :

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '381370',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
			'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
			'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Writ petitions allowed. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '381370',
		(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '381370',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
		'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '381370',
	(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/381370/n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p>',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 12
$i = (int) 6
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.'

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '381370',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
			'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
			'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Writ petitions allowed. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '381370',
		(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '381370',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
		'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '381370',
	(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/381370/n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p>',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 12
$i = (int) 7
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '381370',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
			'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
			'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Writ petitions allowed. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '381370',
		(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '381370',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
		'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '381370',
	(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/381370/n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p>',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 12
$i = (int) 8
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '381370',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
			'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
			'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Writ petitions allowed. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '381370',
		(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '381370',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
		'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '381370',
	(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/381370/n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p>',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 12
$i = (int) 9
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '381370',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
			'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
			'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Writ petitions allowed. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '381370',
		(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '381370',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
		'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '381370',
	(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/381370/n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p>',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 12
$i = (int) 10
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

5. Writ petitions allowed.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '381370',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
			'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
			'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Writ petitions allowed. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
			'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '381370',
		(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'N Ratanchand Jain Vs Commercial Tax Officer Circle Iv - Citation 381370 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '381370',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/62040/karnataka-sales-tax-act-1957-complete-act">Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> - Sections 5(4) and 8 ',
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988',
		'appellant' => 'N. Ratanchand Jain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'casenote' => ' - PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 49/1988]Sections 7,13(1)(d), 13(2) &19; [R.B. Naik, J] Sanction for prosecution -Accused was officer of Co-operative Department - Complainant alleged that the officer-accused demanded money to register an association -Complainant lodged with Lokayukta -Trap laid - Subsequently accused was charge-sheeted - Prosecution applied for sanction to prosecute the officers but refused by authorities -subsequently delinquent ceased to hold office  Trial Court held accused was not a public servant on date of taking cognizance as such no sanction necessary - Held, Prosecuting agency applied for sanction and sanctioning authority refused-This order was not challenged. Thus refusal has reached finality. Absence of sanction and want of sanction are two different issues. As long as Section 19 is on statute book sanction is a must. Trial Court has no power to take cognizance. Order passed by Trial Court is an apparent error. Accused was discharged of the offence.  -  Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B.P. Gandhi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1991-01-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. </p><p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. </p><p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. </p><p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : </p><p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' </p><p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : </p><p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' </p><p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. </p><p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. </p><p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. </p><p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[1992]85STC470(Kar)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv',
		'sub' => 'Sales Tax',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '381370',
	(int) 1 => 'n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/381370/n-ratanchand-jain-vs-commercial-officer'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Since identical question is involved in all these writ petitions they are taken up together. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The relevant facts are stated with reference to W.P. No. 13054 of 1987. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the <a>Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957</a> ('the Act'). The petitioner buys leco from M/s. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner it is a trade name and it is ordinarily understood as charcoal used as domestic fuel. The petitioner sells leco for domestic use and to hotels. All these years leco was treated as charcoal and appropriate exemption was being granted under item 29 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The goods enumerated in the Fifth Schedule to the Act are exempted from taxation under section 8 of the Act. Item 29 reads as follows : ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>'Fire-wood or charcoal when sold for domestic use, except to hotels.' ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>The petitioner was served with a notice proposing levy of tax on the sales of leco treating it as coal falling under section 5(4) of the Act, that is, by treating it as a declared goods mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. Item 1 of the Fourth Schedule reads as follows : ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'Coal including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal.' ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Since charcoal is exempted, naturally, the petitioner wants to understand leco as charcoal, while the Revenue wants to levy tax on leco by treating it as coal. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3. The Revenue relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab Coal & Kutti Farm [1981] 47 STC 351. In the said decision Nalidar Coal was held to be coal for the purpose of levying sales tax. Now it is well-known that while interpreting items for the purpose of taxation the court is not concerned with the scientific or the technical meaning of the terms, but to their popular meaning and the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. The scientific process by which an article is obtained loses significance in this context. A Bench of this Court in S.T.R.P. Nos. 9 to 11 of the 1975 decided on 28th March, 1978 had assumed that leco was charcoal. The matter was remanded by the Division Bench only to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner therein had sold the quantity of leco in question for domestic use as to enable him to claim the exemption under item 29 of the Fifty Schedule. The assumptions made by the Division Bench which is the foundation for the aforesaid decision will have to be respected. If the Legislature thinks otherwise the law will have to be amended to clarify the matter. I do not think that I can ignore the above decision and venture upon an investigation again to see whether leco is coal or charcoal. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, leco will have to be held as charcoal and if so the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. Consequently, all these petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>5. Writ petitions allowed. <p>',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 12
$i = (int) 11
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Subject	Sales Tax
Court	Karnataka High Court
Decided On	Jan-04-1991
Case Number	Writ Petitions Nos. 13054 of 1987 and 12656 to 12658 of 1988
Judge	K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.
Reported in	[1992]85STC470(Kar)
Acts	Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 - Sections 5(4) and 8
Appellant	N. Ratanchand Jain
Respondent	Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv
Appellant Advocate	B.P. Gandhi, Adv.
Respondent Advocate	Smt. D. Bhoopathy and ;H.L. Dattu, High Court Government Pleaders

N. Ratanchand JaIn Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle Iv - Court Judgment