Laxman Vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore and Others - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- sections 81, 100(1), 101 & 123: [v. gopala gowda, j] election petition ground of corrupt practice manipulation of software technology of electronic machines with secret software code - held, not a ground enumerated under section 100 (1) or section 101. section 123 deals with corrupt practice relating to undue influence. none of the grounds enumerated under section 123 of the act comply with grounds raised in petition. petition is not maintainable. section 83, proviso: [v. gopala gowda, j] election petition affidavit was sworn subsequent to the date of filing of the election petition thus, petition was not accompanied by sworn affidavit on the date of filing held, petition is not maintainable. - 7,221/-.being not satisfied with the award, the third respondent in the writ petition filed an application under section 18(1) of the act for reference to the civil court.r.p. sethi, j.1. aggrieved by the judgment and award dated 25th of august, 1986, passed by the civil judge, raichur, in l.a.c. no. 115 of 1981, the first respondent herein filed a writ petition in this court, which was allowed by the learned single judge, holding that as the provisions of section 20 of the land acquisition act, 1894 (for short the 'act') had not been complied with the judgment and award impugned were liable to be quashed. the objection of the appellant regarding the non-maintainability of the writ petition in view of the alternative remedy of appeal was rejected by the learned single judge. it was observed that alternative remedy provided under a statute was not an absolute bar for the high court to entertain a petition and grant the relief under article 226 of the constitution. the matter was remitted to the civil judge with a direction to proceed with the reference application afresh after due notice to the writ petitioner.2. the facts of the case are that an extent of 32 acres 12 guntas of land in various survey numbers of raichur village were acquired by the government for the public purpose, namely, for the construction of a divisional office, workshop and allied buildings by the karnataka state road transport corporation. after publication of notice under section 4 of the act and declaration under section 6 of the act, the land acquisition officer passed an award holding the owners entitled to rs. 3,500/-per acre of the land. he also passed an award for a sum of rs. 35,792/- in respect of the wells existing on the land and in respect of the building, mantap, etc., he awarded a sum of rs. 7,221/-. being not satisfied with the award, the third respondent in the writ petition filed an application under section 18(1) of the act for reference to the civil court. after the matter was referred to the civil court it was numbered as l.a.c. no. 115 of 1981 on the file of the civil judge at raichur, who vide his judgment and award dated 20th of august, 1986 enhanced the compensation from rs. 3,500/- per acre to rs. 7,000/- per acre besides holding that the claimant was entitled to solatium at 30% and interest at 9% and 15% per annum as the case may be on the enhanced amount of compensation from the date of taking possession till the date of realisation. the claimant was held entitled to additional amount of 12% per annum on the market value for the period from the date of the preliminary notification till the date of passing of the award or taking possession of the land, whichever was earlier.3. as no notice in terms of section 20 of the act was served upon the writ petitioner, the beneficiary, a writ petition was filed for quashing of the award. the writ petition was allowed as noted herein above.4. it is not disputed that the judgment and award of the civil judge was appealable under section 54 of the act. the filing of the appeal is subject to the law of limitation and court fees act.5. it is true that existence of alternative remedy is not an absolute bar for the high court to exercise jurisdiction under article 226 of theconstitution of india. it is equally true that generally the high court would refuse to grant a relief in exercise of writ jurisdiction, if it is shown that there existed an alternative remedy, equally efficacious and adequate. departure may be made from the general rule, if the grounds are made out by the petitioner to show that the alternative remedy was not efficacious or adequate under the circumstances of the case. no litigant can be permitted to bypass the provisions of a specified statute in general by avoiding payment of court fee or having recourse to the legal remedies within the limitation specified. if the litigants are permitted to invoke the writ jurisdiction of article 226, without assigning any reason much less convincing, the statutory provisions providing for alternative remedy would be rendered infructuous and redundant. it has to be kept in mind that the relief to be granted under article 226 is in general discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right particularly in the existence of alternative remedies.6. in similar circumstances, where the person interested, being beneficiary for whose benefits the lands were acquired filed a writ petition in the high court, a full bench of madras high court in neyveli lignite corporation limited v rangaswamy and others, held that the resort to the remedy of article 226 was uncalled for and the writ petition filed was liable to be dismissed. the court even held that the person or authority for whose benefit the land had been acquired had no right even to file an appeal. we do not agree with the latter part of the judgment of the full bench and are of the opinion that the person interested has a right to file appeal after obtaining necessary permission from the court.7. the apex court in c.a. abraham v income-tax officer, kottayam and another, held that when a right or liability is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedial procedure, resort cannot be had to the writ remedy under article 226 of the constitution. to the same effect are the judgments of the apex court in thansingh nathmal and others v superintendent of taxes, dhubri and others and bhopal sugar industries limited, madhya pradesh v d.p. dube, sales tax officer, bhopal .8. as already noticed and rightly observed by the learned single judge that alternative remedy is not always an absolute bar for the court to entertain the writ petition, but the person invoking such jurisdiction has to show the existence of circumstances justifying the invoking of such jurisdiction. the petitioner in its writ petition had no where specified any circumstance much less convincing or reasonable. the remedy of writ jurisdiction could not be availed of in a casual manner as was done by respondent 1 herein. the learned single judge ignored thisimportant aspect of the matter while allowing the writ petition vide the order impugned in this appeal.9. the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has relied upon judgments of the apex court in neelagangabai and another v state of karnataka and others, u.p. awas evam vikas parishad v gyan devi (deceased) by l.rs and others and n.g.e.f. limited v state of mysore and others and submitted that the filing of the appeal was not necessary and that the action of the authorities could have been challenged under article 226 of the constitution. a perusal of the aforesaid judgments shows that the reliance of the learned counsel is misplaced. even in u.p, awas evam vikas parishad's case, supra, the supreme court had held:'in the event of enhancement of the amount of compensation by the reference court if the government does not file an appeal, the local authority can file an appeal against the award in the high court after obtaining leave of the court'.in a later judgment in the case of union of india and others v special tehsildar (la) and others, the supreme court considered its earlier judgment in u.p. awas evam vikas parishad's case, supra and held that:'the appellants wanted to be impleaded as party in the said appeals. the proper and the only course which should have been adopted was to have applied to the appellate court for being impleaded as a party. instead of doing this, writ petitions for writs of certiorari under article 226 of the constitution of india were filed. presumably, it must have been contended that the appellants should have been impleaded as respondents as they were interested parties because the acquisition was being effected at their expenses and for their benefits. further, no effective relief could, possibly, have been sought by the appellants against the respondents. what was, in fact, desired by the appellants was an order of the court for being impleaded in the appeals which were pending before the high court. the collateral proceedings under article 226 of the constitution of india could not have been instituted and as already observed, the only remedy which was available to the appellants was to apply, in the pending appeals, to be impleaded as a party by moving an appropriate interim application. the high court unnecessarily entertained writ petitions and gave a detailed judgment on the question which, in fact, it could not consider when dealing with a petition under article 226 of the constitution of india. this question should have been considered only if the proper application was filed in the pending appeals for being impleaded as a party. we may here observe that while dealing with merits of the case, the high court did not have the benefit of the judgment of this court in u.p. awas evam vikas parishad's case, supra and the other judgments referred to therein. for the reason that the writ petition for being impleaded as party in regular first appeals, which were pending, was not a proper remedy, the said writ petitions filed by the appellants have to be dismissed. such dismissal will not be regarded as affecting the rights of the appellants in applying to the high court by moving proper applications in the pending appeals for being impleaded as a party. such applications may, if the appellants desire, be filed, they will be considered and disposed of by the high court in accordance with law, keeping in view the law laid down by this court in u.p. awas evam vikas parishad's case, supra and the other decisions which had been relied upon therein'. 10. under the circumstances, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the order of the learned single judge. the rule issued is discharged. the dismissal of the writ petition would however not prevent the respondent 1 herein from filing the appeal under the act after obtaining necessary permission. the respondent 1 herein shall also be at liberty to seek condonation of delay in accordance with the provisions of the limitation act, if so advised. no costs.