Dr. D. Krithiveni Vs. P. Shivaram - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- motor vehicles act (59 of 1988)section 168:[k. sreedhar rao & s.n. sathyanarayana, jj] accident determination of compensation claim by wife of the deceased who has remarried eligibility held, the concept of dependency while awarding compensation is a notional concept. the fact of actual dependency need not be proved in law if one is legally a dependant. it cannot be legally assumed that the remarriage always benefits financially and that the loss of dependency would get fully neutralized. the remarriage of a widow is a not a disqualification for inheritance of the estate. the widow by remarriage if not for dependency would be entitled to seek compensation for loss of estate. the ratio laid down in smt manorama @ monica v v. mohammad & ors. ilr 2006 kar 3929 that widow by.....order1. the defendant in a suit for recovery of money of rs. 2,84,110/- has preferred this revision, questioning the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the trial court in la. under sections 94 and 151 of the cpc directing the defendants to furnish the security for the suit claim.2. it is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant had failed to repay the money taken for the construction of the house at whitefield. she has also borrowed rs. 50,000/- on 16-9-1991 by executing on demand promissory note. when the cheques given by her were dishonoured on presentation, complaint in cc no. 16023 of 1990 was tiled before the viii additional chief metropolitan magistrate. the magistrate in that case ordered to take action against accused under section 193 of the ipc read with section.....

Judgment:
ORDER

1. The defendant in a suit for recovery of money of Rs. 2,84,110/- has preferred this revision, questioning the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the Trial Court in LA. under Sections 94 and 151 of the CPC directing the defendants to furnish the security for the suit claim.

2. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant had failed to repay the money taken for the construction of the house at Whitefield. She has also borrowed Rs. 50,000/- on 16-9-1991 by executing on demand promissory note. When the cheques given by her were dishonoured on presentation, complaint in CC No. 16023 of 1990 was tiled before the VIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. The Magistrate in that case ordered to take action against accused under Section 193 of the IPC read with Section 430 of the Cr. P.O. for tampering the Court records believed to have been committed by the accused to suit the defence. The defendant was originally working as a Gazetted Officer in Government of Karnataka. Now it is represented that she is not in Government job. It is clear from the conduct of the defendant that she would delay and protract the proceedings as she was doing in the Criminal case. On such application, it was prayed that the defendant, be called upon to furnish the security for the suit claim. It was opposed by the defendant stating that the defendant is a responsible lady in the Society. If the Court passes the judgment and decree in favour of the plaintiff, the defendant is known to pay the decreetal amount and the Criminal case where she has been convicted, a Criminal Appeal in No. 40 of 1998 was filed before the Sessions Judge, Bangalore and the same is pending. The case is part heard and necessarily the case is to be disposed of at an early date. On the said averments and the objections made, the Trial Court has chosen to exercise its discretion finding that the defendant is taking time on one pretext or other for cross-examination of P.W. 1 and holding that the plaintiff has got a prima facie case and the conduct of the defendant shows that she is not interested in early disposal of the case or payment of the amount if the decree is passed, passed the impugned order.

3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no necessity to pass such an order especially when the matter is pending and is part heard. The defendant is ready to get along with the case without causing any further delay.

4. Heard the Counsel.

5. Section 94(b) of the CPC reads as follows:

'Direct the defendant to furnish security to produce any property belonging to him and to place the same at the disposal of the Court or order the attachment of any property'.

6. The Trial Court has thought it fit to pass the order directing the defendant to furnish the security to meet the ends of justice and to avoid the same being defeated.

In M/s. Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills Private Limited, Barabanki (Uttar Pradesh) u Kanhayalal Bhargava and Others, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

'The inherent power of a Court is in addition to and complementary to the powers expressly conferred under the Civil Procedure Code. But, that power will not be exercised if its exercise is inconsistent with, or comes into conflict with, any of the powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the other provisions of the Code. If there are express provisions exhaustively covering a particular topic, they give rise to necessary implication that no power shall be exercised in respect of the said topic otherwise than in the manner prescribed by the said provisions. Whatever limitations are imposed by construction on the provisions of Section 151 of the Code, they do no control the undoubted power of the Court conferred under Section 151 of the Code to make a suitable order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court'.

In fact, this Court has considered the granting of such an order under Section 94 in a case in Sampkhand Mandal Panchayat and Another v Kusumakara Vishnu Kodiya and Others, observed that:

'It is granted in aid of the main relief for which the suit is filed or to protect and safeguard the rights of the parties arising in the suit or connected with relief sought, for in the suit'.

In fact, after the amendment, this Court has considered the effect thereafter in Kashinath and Another v Hanumanthappa and Others , wherein it is observed that Section 94 authorises the Court, to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated, in accordance with the rules made, to pass such interlocutory orders as defined under Section 94.

7. In the light of the above principles of law, I do not find any merit and the CRP is dismissed. The defendant is permitted to furnish the security within a period of two weeks from today. The Trial Court is directed to dispose of the case within four months from the date of receipt of the records.