A.H. Thimmappa Vs. T.H. Ramiah - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
(a) karnataka debt relief act, 1976 (karnataka act no. 25 of 1976) - sections 4(f) & 5 - scope, ambit, amplitude & intendment - no conferment of jurisdiction on sub-divisional magistrate or taluka executive magistrate to determine whether sale transaction, a mortgage in reality - no provision in act, no intendment, beyond purview of act - section 13 of 1980 act clarificatory and confirmatory thereof.;question referred;;whether the taluka executive magistrate under the karnataka debt relief act, 1976 has competence to go beyond the tenor of the deed evidencing the transaction of sale and declare the transaction as one of mortgage?;the 1976 act does not expressly confer jurisdiction on a sub-divisional magistrate or a taluka executive magistrate to determine the question as to.....orderk.a. swami, j.1. differing from the view expressed by a division bench of this court in goudappagouda thimmappa gouda patil v. the sub-divisional magistrate, bailhongal and anr. w.a. 1212 of 1979 dd 21-1-1980, the division bench consisting of hon'ble the chief justice and k.s.b.j., has referred the following question to a larger bench:'whether the taluka executive magistrate under the karnataka debt relief act, 1976, has competence to go beyond the tenor of the deed evidencing the transaction of sale and declare the transaction as one of mortgage?'hence the matter is before us.2. we have heard the learned counsel appearing on both sides.3. in w.a.no. 520/1985, the appellant sold the land bearing s.no. 18/2, measuring 4 acres one guntas of goravankal village, hosadurga taluk, under a.....

Judgment:
ORDER

K.A. Swami, J.

1. Differing from the view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in GOUDAPPAGOUDA THIMMAPPA GOUDA PATIL v. THE SUB-DIVISIONAL MAGISTRATE, BAILHONGAL AND ANR. W.A. 1212 of 1979 DD 21-1-1980, the Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble the Chief Justice and K.S.B.J., has referred the following question to a larger Bench:

'Whether the Taluka Executive Magistrate under the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1976, has competence to go beyond the tenor of the deed evidencing the transaction of sale and declare the transaction as one of mortgage?'

Hence the matter is before us.

2. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing on both sides.

3. In W.A.No. 520/1985, the appellant sold the land bearing S.No. 18/2, measuring 4 acres one guntas of Goravankal village, Hosadurga Taluk, under a registered sale deed dated 9-8-1961 for a sum of Rs. 3,000/- to the respondents 2 and 3. On the coming into force of the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, t976 (hereinafter referred to as the '1976 Act') he filed an application before the Taluka Executive Magistrate, Hosadurga, contending that the transaction evidenced by the deed dated 9-8-1961 was in the nature of a mortgage and he was a 'debtor' within the meaning of the 1976 Act and therefore, the mortgage debt stood discharged and extinguished, hence the mortgage is deemed to have been redeemed; therefore the property should be put in possession of the applicant.

The application was resisted by respondents 1 and 2. The Taluka Executive Magistrate by the order dated 28th October 1980 declared that the transaction evidenced by the document dated 9-8-1961 was a transaction of mortgage because it was not recited in the document that the transaction was and the consideration paid was far less than the actual value of the land.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Taluka Executive Magistrate, respondents 1 and 2 preferred W.P.No. 20854/1980. The learned Single Judge by the order dated 22nd January 1985 allowed the petition and quashed the order of the Taluka Executive Magistrate. One of the reasons for quashing the order of the Taluka Executive Magistrate was that the transaction evidenced by the document was a sale out and out; that the Taluka Executive Magistrate had no jurisdiction to hold that the transaction was not a sale out and out that it was only a it is against this order, W.A.No. 520/1985 is filed.

4. The appellant in W.A.No. 566/85 sold a house property under a registered sale deed dated 12-2-1975 in favour of respondent-1 for a sum of Rs. 5000/-. On the coming into force of the 1976 Act, she made an application before the Taluka Executive Magistrate, Hospet contending that the transaction was one of mortgage and not a sate and that she was a 'debtor' within the meaning of 1976 Act. Therefore, the mortgage debt stood extinguished on the coming into force of 1976 Act. Hence it should be declared as such and she be put in possession of the house in question.

The Taluka Executive Magistrate by the order dated 3-7-1972 rejected the application holding that the transaction was one of sale and as such it was beyond the purview of his jurisdiction. Though the application was filed under 1976 Act, against the aforesaid order of the Taluka Executive Magistrate, a revision was filed before the Deputy Commissioner under Section 14 of the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the '1980 Act').

The Deputy Commissioner held that subsequent to the execution of the deed dated 12-2-1975, there was an agreement entered into by the 1st respondent with the appellant agreeing that if the sale consideration amount is paid with interest before 14-2-1980, the property sold under the sale deed dated 12-2-1975 would be released to the appellant. The Deputy Commissioner also found that the appellant was in possession of the house and no rent was being collected by the 1st respondent. Under these circumstances and also in view of the subsequent agreement referred to above, between the parties, he held that the transaction evidenced by the document dated 12-2-1975 was in the nature a mortgage; that the appellant was a 'debtor' as per Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the 1980 Act. Accordingly, he declared by the order dated 10-1-1983 that the mortgage debt stood discharged. Consequently he set aside the order of the Taluka Executive Magistrate and directed the 1st respondent to produce the sale deed on or before 24-1-1983 for the purpose of making an endorsement of redemption on the deed and forwarding the same to the Sub-Registrar to enable him to register the same.

The order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 10-1-1983 was challenged by the 1st respondent in W.P.No. 1652/1983. The learned Single Judge held that as the agreement of conveyance was not contained in the deed of sale itself the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act was not attracted, therefore, on the basis of such an agreement, the transaction of sale could not be held to be a mortgage. Consequently Section 13 of the 1980 Act also was not attracted. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition and quashed the order of the Deputy Commissioner. It is against this order, W.A.No. 566/85 is filed.

5. The appellant in W.A.No. 590/85 sold the land bearing S.No.107 measuring 4 acres 14 guntas of Taddewadi village of Indi Taluk under a registered sale deed dated 20-8-1970 to one Shidraya for a sum of Rs. 10,000/-. The said Shidraya in turn sold the said land in favour of the 2nd respondent under a registered sale deed dated 20-5-1974 for a sum of Rs. 12,000/-.

On the coming into force of the 1980 Act, the appellant made an application before the Taluka Executive Magistrate, indi for a declaration that the transactions evidenced by the documents dated 22-8-1970 and 20-5-1974 were in the nature of mortgage; that he was a 'small farmer'; therefore, the mortgage debts stood discharged.

The 2nd respondent resisted the application. The Taluka Executive Magistrate by the order dated 27-11-1981 held that the transaction was in the nature of mortgage; that Shidraya had no right to sell the land; that the appellant was a 'small farmer'; that his annual income did not exceed Rs. 2,400/-. Accordingly, the Taluka Executive Magistrate declared that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the 1980 Act and that the sale transactions were null and void.

Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the 2nd respondent preferred W.P.No. 30744/1981. The learned Single Judge held that the transaction of sale dated 22-8-1970 effected in favour Shidraya by the appellant, having regard to the provisions contained in Clause (iii) of Sub-section (5) of Section 13 of the 1980 Act, was beyond the purview of 1980 Act. It was also further held that as the first transaction itself was beyond the purview of 1980 Act, the appellant could not have the sale deed executed by Shidraya in favour of the 2nd respondent declared as a mortgage transaction as the document was a sale out and out and Shidraya had not challenged the same before the Taluka Executive Magistrate. Accordingly, the Writ Petition was allowed and the order of the Taluka Executive Magistrate was quashed by the order dated 7-2-1985. It is against this order, W.A.No. 590/1985 is preferred.

6. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that the Taluka Executive Magistrate has jurisdiction under the 1976 Act to go beyond the apparent tenor of the document and find out whether the document in reality evidences a transaction of mortgage; that the 1976 Act is intended to give relief to small farmers, landless agricultural labourers and weaker sections of the people in the State of Karnataka from indebtedness; that in order to give speedy relief, to the small farmers, landless agricultural labourers and weaker sections of the people in the State of Karnataka, a special jurisdiction is conferred upon the Sub-Divisional Magistrates or any other Executive Magistrates authorised by the State Government in this behalf to declare that the 'debt is extinguished'; that if it is held that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Taluka Executive Magistrate, as the case may be, has no jurisdiction to go into the apparent tenor of the document, the very purpose of the Act will be defeated; that the construction placed on a statute should advance the object of the statute and as such a narrow construction which does not advance the object of the Act should be avoided. In support of these submissions, they have placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Goudappagouda Thimmappa Gouda Patil v. The Sub Divisional Magistrate, Bailhongal and Anr. The learned Government Advocate Sri S.V. Jagannath has also supported the stand taken by the appellants.

7. On the contrary it is contended by the contesting respondents that having regard to the wordings contained in Clause (f) of Section 4 of the 1976 Act, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate authorised by the State Government in this behalf, is empowered only to decide as to whether the mortgage executed by the debtor in favour of a creditor has stood redeemed, and if it is so held in favour of the debtor, put the debtor in possession of the mortgage property, but he has no jurisdiction to determine that a transaction apparently evidencing the sale out and out, is in the nature of a mortgage. The sole object of the Act is to relieve a 'debtor' as defined under the 1976 Act, from indebtedness, The jurisdiction can be exercised only when there is a 'debt' falling within the definition of the expression 'debt' and the applicant is a 'debtor' as defined in Clauses (b) and (c) of Section 3 of the 1976 Act. It is contended that the 1976 Act is a Special Act enacted for providing relief from indebtedness to small farmers, landless agricultural labourers and weaker sections of the people in the State of Karnataka and a special jurisdiction is conferred on a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate authorised by the State Government in this behalf to grant relief from indebtedness as per Sections 4 and 5 of the 1976 Act. The jurisdiction to determine a transaction of sale to be in the nature of a mortgage is normally exercised under the general law of the Country viz., Transfer of Property Act by ordinary Civil Courts; that taking away or exclusion of the jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Court, and entrustment of the same to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate authorised by the State Government, must be expressly provided, and the provisions relating thereto should be strictly construed. It is also further contended that it is also to be borne in mind that neither the Sub-Divisional Magistrate nor a Taluka Executive Magistrate has the requisite legal acumen to decide the complicated questions arising in a proceeding for determining the issue as to whether the transaction is in the nature of mortgage or sale out and out. In addition to this, no legal practitioner is allowed to appear in a proceeding before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Taluka Executive Magistrate. Therefore, having regard to the provisions contained in Clause (f) of Section 4 and Section 5 of the 1976 Act, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Taluka Executive Magistrate can exercise the jurisdiction only in respect of cases wherein there is no dispute as to the nature of the transaction being a mortgage transaction, and he cannot enquire into and hold that in reality, the document which apparently a sale out and out evidences a transaction of mortgage.

8. The applications concerned in W.A.No. 590/85 and W.A.No. 566/85 have been dealt with under the 1980 Act but the applications were filed before the Taluka Executive Magistrate and not before the Assistant Commissioner invoking the jurisdiction under Section 13 of the 1980 Act in accordance with the provisions contained therein. Under the 1980 Act, jurisdiction is conferred upon the Assistant Commissioner only. Therefore, in all these Writ Appeals, the question referred to a larger Bench arises for consideration under the 1976 Act.

9. Whenever a statute does not in express terms confer jurisdiction on an authority to determine particular subject or topic, in order to find out whether such jurisdiction has been impliedly conferred, it is first necessary to examine the scope, ambit, amplitude and the intendment of the statute to find out whether such determination really falls within the true scope of the statute in the instant case, the 1976 Act does not expressly confer jurisdiction on a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Taluka Executive Magistrate to determine the question as to whether a transaction of sale is in reality a mortgage. Therefore, in order to find out whether such a jurisdiction is conferred, it is necessary to examine the true scope and intendment of the 1976 Act.

1976 Act is a special enactment enacted to grant relief to special category of subjects. From the very preamble of the 1976 Act, it is clear that it is intended to provide relief from indebtedness to small farmers, landless agricultural labourers and weaker sections of the people in the State of Karnataka. The 1976 Act defines each category of persons to whom the relief is provided under it. It also defines the expressions 'debt' and 'debtor'. The 1976 Act came into force on 21-10-1975 except Sections 5 and 6 which came into force on 11-11-1975 and Section 9 which came into force on 29-11-1975.

The 1976 Act is enacted to give effect to the principles specified in Article 46 of the Constitution in order to promote with special care economic interest of the weaker sections of the people and in particular of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and protect them from social injustice and ail forms of exploitation. It is only a 'debtor' as defined under the Act who is entitled to the relief from indebtedness under the Act. The expression 'debtor' as defined in the 1976 Act means a small farmer; or a landless agricultural labourer; or a person belonging to the weaker sections of the people. The 1976 Act also lays down the norms for determination as to who are small farmers, landless agricultural labourers and persons belonging to weaker sections of the people. Section 4 of the Act relieves the 'debtor' from indebtedness notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force or in any contract or instrument having force by virtue of any such law and save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act with effect from 21-10-1975. Clause (a) of Section 4 declares that every debt advanced before the commencement of the Act i.e., 21-10-1975 including the amount of interest, if any, payable by the debtor to the creditor shall be deemed to be wholly discharged. Clause (b) thereto takes away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain any suit or proceeding against the debtor for recovery of any amount of such debt including interest. If such suit or proceeding is instituted jointly against the debtor and any other person, the suit or the proceeding can continue only in respect of such other person and not in respect of the debtor. Of course, in such a suit, it has to be proved by the person claiming to be the debtor, as per Section 7 of the Act, that he is a 'debtor' under the Act. In such an event, the burden of proving that the debtor is not entitled to protection of the 1976 Act shifts on to the creditor. Clause (c) further provides that all suits and proceedings including appeals, revisions, attachments or execution proceedings pending on 21-10-1975 against any debtor for recovery of any such debt shall abate. All suits and proceedings relating to sale of any moveable property held and concluded and also the sale relating to immoveable property confirmed before 21-10-1975 are saved. Clause (d) further provides that every debtor undergoing detention in a civil prison in execution of any decree for money passed against him by a Civil Court in respect of any such debt shall be released. Clauses (e) and (f) relate to pledge of moveable property by the debtor and mortgage executed by the debtor in favour of the creditor respectively. Clause (e) specifically provides that every moveable property pledged by a debtor shall stand released in favour of such debtor and the creditor shall be found to return the same to the debtor forthwith and where the creditor fails to do so, the debtor shall on an application made to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate authorised by the State Government in this behalf having Jurisdiction over the place where the debtor resides, be entitled to the return of the same. Similarly Clause (f) provides that every mortgage executed by the debtor in favour of the creditor shall stand redeemed and the mortgage property shall be released in favour of such debtor and where the creditor fails to do so, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate authorised by the State Government in this behalf having jurisdiction over the place where the mortgaged property is situated, may suo motu or on the application of the debtor and after such inquiry as he may deem fit, put the debtor in possession of the mortgaged property. The Explanation to Section 4 however, takes care to ensure that any amount paid by a debtor in the discharge of his debt before 21-10-1975 the debtor will not be entitled for refund of any part of any debt already paid or recover from the creditor.

Section 5 of the Act makes it incumbent upon the creditors to file a statement containing the names of all debtors who have pledged articles with him, the nature and description of the articles pledged, the amount advanced and due as on 21-10-1975 and such other particulars as may be prescribed. As per Sub-section (2) thereof, on receipt of such statement, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate authorised by the State Government in this behalf is empowered to conduct a summary enquiry in the manner provided in the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, as he considers necessary, and by order determine which of the debtors are entitled to relief under Section 4 and direct the creditor to produce on or before the date specified in the order the articles pledged by such debtors. Sub-sections (3) and (4) empower the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate authorised by the State Government in this behalf, to take such coercive steps in exercise of the powers as are invested in him under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, regarding search and seizure to recover possession of the articles pledged from the creditor in case the creditor falls to produce the articles as directed in the order and hand over the same to the debtor, Sub-section (5) relates to mortgages. It also makes it incumbent upon the creditor to file within 45 days from 1st March 1976 before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate authorised by the State Government in this behalf, having jurisdiction over the area where such creditor ordinarily resides, a statement containing the names of all the debtors who have mortgaged properties to him, the full description of such properties, the amount advanced and due as on 21-10-1975 and such other particulars as may be prescribed. On receipt of such statement, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate authorised by the State Government in this behalf having jurisdiction over the area where such creditor ordinarily resides, is empowered to determine by order as to which of the debtors are entitled to the relief under Section 4 and direct the creditor to make an endorsement of discharge on the mortgage deed and deliver the same to the debtor. It also further empowers him to put the debtor in possession of the property if the creditor fails to do so by using such force as may be necessary. The order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Taluka Executive Magistrate as the case may be is made final under Sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act. No legal practitioner is allowed to appear before them. Pending determination, they are also empowered to direct the creditor not to sell or dispose of the articles pledged. In addition to this, Sub-section (9) of Section 5 also enables a 'debtor' to make an application before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Taluka Executive Magistrate, as the case may be, to request them to enter any premises of the creditor and search and seize the articles pledged and arrange for their safe custody and then proceed to determine as to which of the articles so seized are to be released to the debtors and pass orders accordingly. Section 7 relates to burden of proof of which a reference has already been made. Section 8 excepts certain debts and liabilities of debtors from the purview of the 1976 Act. For our purpose, it is not necessary to refer to the same.

10. Thus from the aforesaid survey of the provisions of the 1976 Act, it is clear that in order to give relief from indebtedness to small farmers, landless agricultural labourers and weaker sections of the people under the Act, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Taluka Executive Magistrate as the case may be, is required to decide the following questions:

a) Whether there is a 'debt' as defined under the 1976 Act which includes pledges and mortgages as they are essentially transactions between a creditor and a debtor.

b) Whether the applicant is a 'debtor' as defined in the 1976 Act which includes three categories of persons viz., a small farmer, a landless agricultural labourer or a person belonging to weaker sections of the people.

Each category of a 'debtor' has been specifically defined. Neither Section 4 nor Section 5 provides for determination of the question whether the transaction which is apparently a transaction of sale is a transaction of mortgage. In the case of sale, there is no relationship of a creditor and a debtor. Clause (f) of Section 4 and Sub-section (5) of Section 5 both proceed on the basis that there is a mortgage. Mortgage necessarily involves a relationship of a 'debtor' and a 'creditor' as defined under Section 58(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. Sale is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part promised. The distinction between a sale and a mortgage is well-known. No lack of knowledge or ignorance of this distinction can be attributed to the Legislature. If really the Legislature intended to cover sale transaction it would not have failed to make a special provision in this regard as it has done in the 1980 Act.

11. A close reading of the provisions of the Act, keeping in mind the object, intendment and amplitude of the 1976 Act, the question for determination of a transaction of sale out and out as a mortgage has not been intended by the Legislature and it is beyond the purview of the 1976 Act. Determination of the question as to whether a particular transaction is a transaction of sale or a mortgage is a vexed question. It involves complicated questions of law and facts and a detailed evidence as to the intention of the parties and the other surrounding circumstances existing on the date of the transaction and also the subsequent conduct of the parties in relation to such transaction. Those questions can only be determined by a Civil Court as per the general law of the Country. If really the Legislature intended to cover the determination of the nature of the transaction whether it is a sale or mortgage, and thereby take away the jurisdiction of a Civil Court, it would have specifically provided so and it would have also provided for regular enquiry and not a summary enquiry and would have allowed the legal practitioners to appear and it would have also provided an appeal against the order of the original authority.

12. As already pointed out, the 1976 Act is a special enactment dealing with special topic pertaining to special category of persons. It creates a special jurisdiction and confers that Jurisdiction on a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Taluka Executive Magistrate as the case may be, and to that extent it takes away the jurisdiction of a Civil Court. Therefore, where an ordinary jurisdiction of a Civil Court is statutorily conferred on the Authority which is not a Court, the jurisdiction has to be exercised only within the amplitude of the jurisdiction conferred by the statute and the Authority is not entitled to go outside those provisions and in effect to legislate for itself, or arrogate or clutch at the Jurisdiction which it does not really possess under the statute. Whenever a statute confers a jurisdiction under certain particular conditions, it cannot be understood or interpreted to confer jurisdiction also in cases which do not fall within the ambit of those conditions laid down in the statute. It is not permissible even to expand the scope of such jurisdiction on the basis of an analogy.

13. It is a well-known rule of construction as stated in 'Craies on Statute Law, 1971 Edition' that 'a Statute even more than a contract, must be construed UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT so that the intention of the Legislature may not be treated as vain or left to operate in the air.' The second rule of construction is that a statute is to be interpreted and applied as far as its language admits. In other words, the rule is that the statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made. These rules of construction are stated with approval by the Supreme Court, in DHOOM SINGH v. P.C. SETHI AND ORS : [1975]3SCR595 . It is already pointed out that it does not lie within the amplitude of the 1976 Act to go behind the transaction of sale and find out whether it is in reality in the nature of a mortgage. In fact as already pointed out, the proviso to Clause (c) of Section 4 itself excludes from the purview of the 1976 Act the sale of any moveable and immoveable property held and confirmed before 21-10-1975 and does not specifically provide to cover the voluntary sales. In the light of the provisions contained in the 1976 Act, to hold that the 1976 Act empowers the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Taluka Executive Magistrate to go behind the transaction of sale and determine it as to whether it is in the nature of a mortgage, is to extend the provisions of the 1976 Act to cover a case for which there is no provision made. Thus to hold that such a jurisdiction is conferred on the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Executive Magistrate, as the case may be, is nothing but to legislate under the guise of interpretation which is neither permissible nor lies within the province of the Court.

14. Even if it is felt for a moment, that there is ambiguity in the 1976 Act as to whether Sections 4(f) and 5 confer jurisdiction on the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Taluka Executive Magistrate to go behind the sale transaction and determine as to whether it is in the nature of a mortgage. This doubt can even be cleared-up looking into the later or subsequent enactment on the same subject. On looking into the later enactment on the same subject, it also becomes apparent that the Legislature while enacting 1976 Act did not intend to confer jurisdiction upon the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Taluka Executive Magistrate to go behind the sale transaction and to determine whether it is in the nature of a mortgage. The rule of interpretation permits subsequent legislation on the same subject to be looked into to clear up any doubt or ambiguity and to see that proper construction is put on the earlier enactment. 'Craies on Statute Law, 1971 Edition at page 147,' has on the basis of the decision in ATTORNEY GENERAL v. CLARKSON (1900) 1 QB 156 stated that subsequent legislation may be looked into in order to put proper construction where the earlier enactment is ambiguous or vague. Thus the later enactment on the same subject can be looked into if it throws a light upon the true view to be taken on the provisions of the earlier enactment. The Supreme Court in S.V.P. CEMENT CO. v. G.M.S. PRIVATE LTD : [1977]1SCR359 . also lays down the same proposition thus:

'19. We must here deal with what has been tried to be impressed upon us by Mr. Patel in regard to this aspect of the matter by reading out to us a passage from Craies on Statute Law. The Counsel has strongly urged that since it is not strictly permissible to interpret a statute by reference to what has been said in subsequent statutes, resort cannot be had to the provisions of Section 10A which has introduced in the B.L.R. Act in 1964 while interpreting Section 10 of the Act with reference to the situation obtaining at the relevant time before the introduction of the said Section. We also find ourselves unable to accept this contention and to disregard the well-settled canon that some-times light may be thrown upon the meaning of an Act by taking into consideration 'Parliamentary expositions' as revealed by the later Act which amends the earlier one to clear up any doubt or ambiguity. This principle has to be followed where as in the instant case, a particular construction of the earlier Act will render the later incorporated Act ineffectual or otiose or inept. (See Krikness v. John Hudson & Co. 1955 AC 696 (HL). This view also receives support from the decision of this Court in Yogendra Nath Naskar v. C.I.T. Calcutta ) where approving the authoritative pronouncement in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1921) 2 K.B. 403) that the subsequent legislation may be looked at in order to see the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous, it was held that the language employed in Income Tax Act, 1961 may be relied on as a Parliamentary exposition of the earlier Act (I.T. Act 1922) even on the assumption that the language employed in Section 3 or the earlier Act is ambiguous.'

15. On looking into the subsequent enactment viz., 1980 Act, it is noticed that the object and intendment or both the enactments are the same or similar. Both the Acts are intended to provide relief from indebtedness to small farmers, landless agricultural labourers and weaker sections of the people in the State of Karnataka. Of course, 1980 Act lays down different criteria for determining whether one is a landless agricultural labourer, a person belonging to weaker sections of the people or a small farmer. But Section 3 of the 1980 Act is in pari materia with Section 4 of the 1976 Act. Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the 1980 Act cover the matters covered by Sections 4 and 5 of the 1976 Act, The provisions are more or less similar. But the 1980 Act further makes a specific provision empowering the Assistant Commissioner to declare a transfer purporting to be a sale to be in the nature of a mortgage (See Section 13). It also further provides a right of revision to the Deputy Commissioner against the order passed under Section 13 by the Assistant Commissioner. Further 1980 Act does not affect the 1976 Act. It saves the 1976 Act by making a specific provision viz., Section 15.

16. Thus the later enactment i.e., 1980 Act by making a specific provision in Section 13 empowering the Assistant Commissioner to declare a transfer purporting to be a sale to be in the nature of a mortgage clarifies the doubt and helps to put proper construction and to remove the ambiguity, if any, in the 1976 Act. On a reading of both the enactments, it becomes clear that the Legislature while enacting 1976 Act did not intend to confer jurisdiction upon the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Taluka Executive Magistrate to declare a transfer purporting to be a sale to be in the nature of a mortgage. If it really intended to confer such jurisdiction also, the Legislature would not have failed to make a specific provision in the 1976 Act similar to Section 13 of the 1980 Act.

17. In Goudappagouda Thimmappa Gouda Patil v. The Sub Divisional Magistrate, Bailhongal and Anr., a Division Bench of this Court has held thus:

'The learned Single Judge declined to interfere with the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on the ground that the document executed by the petitioner was a sale out and out and there was no scope to hold that the said document pertained to the transaction of mortgage.

In our view, both the learned Single Judge and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate have taken too narrow a view of the matter. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate should have examined whether in spite of the apparent tenor of the document executed by the petitioner in favour of the respondent, the real nature of the transaction was a mortgage and not a sale. As the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has failed to do so, his order is clearly unsustainable.'

Thus Inferentially the Division Bench was of the view that on a liberal construction of the provisions of the 1976 Act, it was permissible to go behind the apparent tenor of the document and determine as to whether the real nature of the transaction was mortgage and not a sale.

18. It is a Rule of interpretation that a Rule of liberal construction should not be stretched to such an extent so as to strain the language of the statute, The Supreme Court while considering the Rule of liberal construction in PREM RAJ v. RAM CHARAN : [1974]3SCR494 has observed thus:

'14. Counsel for the appellant has strenously attempted to persuade us to give a liberal construction to the word 'application' in Clause 5 of Article 182. We do not think that the Rule of liberal construction gives a free hand to the Court to stretch and strain the statutory language to accord with our abstract notions of justice and fair play. In our view, if the statutory language is susceptible of two constructions, the Rule of liberal constructions should incline the Court to prefer the one which accomplishes the legislative purpose. But where the statutory language will bear one and only one meaning, there is no room for the application of the Rule of liberal construction. Howsoever liberally one may construe the word 'application' it is not possible to regard the written statement of the appellant in Prakash Chandra's suit as an 'application' for it made no request to the Court.'

We do not think that the Rule of liberal construction gives a free hand to the Court to stretch and strain the statutory language. In our view, if the statutory language is susceptible of two constructions, the Rule of liberal construction should prefer the one which accomplishes the legislative purpose but where the statutory language permits only one meaning, there is no room for the application of 'Rule of liberal construction.' The 1976 Act falls under the later portion of the observations of the Supreme Court. Therefore, there is no room for the application of the Rule of liberal construction so as to read something into the 1976 Act which is not actually provided and intended or contemplated by the Legislature. Therefore, we find it difficult to agree with the view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in Goudappagouda Thimmappa Gouda Patil v. The Sub Divisional Magistrate, Ballhongal and Anr.

19. On the contrary, the decisions in B. AMIN BEE v. S.D.M. SAKALESHPUR AND ANR : AIR1980Kant154 . and APPA SHIDDA VANJOLI AND ANR. v. TALUK EXECUTIVE MAGISTRATE, CHIKODI AND ANR ILR (Kar) 1980(1) 289: 1980(1) KIJ 347. contain sufficient discussion on the topic and they specifically hold that it is not open to the authorities exercising power under Section 4 of the 1976 Act in the absence of a mortgage deed, to enquire into the application and find out whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, in substance there exists a mortgage, that the 1976 Act does not provide for re-opening of the sale transaction. In Am in Bee's case, after referring to the provisions contained in Section 4 of the 1976 Act, and also considering the effect of non-obstinate clause with which Section 4 opens, it has been held thus:

'11. Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 4 of the Act in clear terms provide that the authorities functioning under the Act, having jurisdiction over the place where the debtor resides in the case of pledges and where the mortgaged property is situated in the case of mortgages to deal with every moveable property pledged by a debtor and every mortgage executed by the debtor in favour of the creditor. Therefore, it is clear that in the absence of any pledge or a deed of mortgage, the authorities exercising power under Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 4 of the Act shall not have jurisdiction to entertain the application. There must be a document evidencing the mortgage executed by a debtor which is clear from Clause (f) of Section 4 of the Act which provides that every mortgage executed by the debtor in favour of the creditor shall stand redeemed. Therefore, it is not open for the authorities exercising power under Clause (f) of Section 4 of the Act, in the absence of a mortgage deed to enquire into the application in order to find out whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, there in substance exists a mortgage.

12 In this connection, Sri B. Vedanta Iyengar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner in W.P.10820 of 1976 which was also heard along with this Writ Petition, submitted that the aforesaid decision : AIR1967Cal351 is not applicable to the facts of the present case in as much as Section 37(a) of the Bengal Money Lenders Act specifically provided for re-opening the transaction of sale in order to find out whether in reality there was a sale or mortgage. As already pointed out, the Act in question does not provide for re-opening of a sale transaction. Further, while dealing with the cases falling under Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 4 of the Act, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether there is in substance a debt as per the definition of the word 'debt' found in Section 3(b) of the Act, in as much as both in the case of a pledge and a mortgage, there will be a debt and there will be a relationship of creditor and debtor. Therefore, in respect of the cases falling under Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 4 of the Act, it is not necessary to find out whether there is in substance a debt. Thus the aforesaid decision of the Calcutta High Court is not of any assistance and is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand.'

In Appa Shidda Vanjoli's case after referring to Section 4 of the 1976 Act, it has been held thus:

'3 The Taluka Executive Magistrate was of the opinion that there was a relationship of debtor and creditor and as such, the transaction was one of mortgage. To say the least, the reasoning of the Taluka Executive Magistrate cannot at all be sustained. Merely because a part of the consideration was paid by way of an adjustment of the previous loans, the transaction of sale does not cease to be a sale. Added to this as already pointed out, the transaction in question was held to be a sale in the previous proceeding. Further it was not open for the Taluka Executive Magistrate to hold the transaction of sale as mortgage. The jurisdiction conferred upon the Taluka Executive Magistrate under the Act is very much limited. The jurisdiction of the Taluka Executive Magistrate does not extend to cases in which the transactions are evidenced by sale deeds to enquire into the nature of such transactions and to hold that it is a mortgage and not a sale. Once it is found that the deed evidencing the transaction is apparently a sale deed, the Taluka Executive Magistrate ceases to have jurisdiction to deal with the matter and it will not be open for him to go behind the document and enquire into the nature