State of Karnataka Vs. Senapathy Whitely Ltd. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
karnataka land reforms act, 1961 (karnataka act no. 10 of 1962) - section 79b(1) - company holding agricultural lands on 1-3-1974 prohibited from holding land by operation of law - applicable to lands held on 1-3-1974 as well as subsequently - whether provision prospective or retrospective becomes redundant - land reforms legislation contemplates agrarian reforms of existing system; not futuristic exercise with reference to futuristic system.;from a reading of the provisions of section 79b 1 read with sub-section (2)(a) of section 79b of the act there can be no doubt about the rule of law that the prohibition of holding agricultural land by a company commenced from 1-3-1974.... a harmonious construction of the words in sub-section (ii)(a) 'which holds lands on the date of the commencement of the amendment act' read with the words contained in sub-section (1) of section 79b 'with effect on and from the date of the commencement of the amendment act' confirm the presumption that a company which holds agricultural lands on 1-3-1974 is prohibited from holding the land by operation of law and such a company shall submit a declaration, as contemplated under sub-section 2(a)...the above provision applies not only to the agricultural land held by any company as on 1-3-1974 and also in respect of land if any held by the company subsequent to 1-3-1974. in the light of the clear and unmistakable wordings of the provisions of law, the question whether or not the provisions are retrospective become redundant when the meaning is as plain as a pike-staff.;if the intention of the legislature is to exempt lands held by the company or companies prior to 1-3-1974 it has to be understood that the land reforms legislation did not contemplate agrarian reforms of the existing system at all, but the act was only a futuristic exercise with reference to a futuristic system. such a view would only lead to legislative futility militating against ordinary sense and understanding of the object of the legislature. - sections 13 (1)(ia) & 23 (1)(e): [k.l. manjunath & mrs. b.v. nagarathna, jj] divorce on ground of mental cruelty by wife problem in marital relationship occurred on account of conduct of husband petitioner in having an extra marital relationship, as a result of which, his attitude and behaviour towards his wife respondent became negative and totally averse to a cordial marital life held, it is husband petitioner who has been guilty of misconduct. in vew of section 23 (1)(e) husband petitioner cannot take advantage of his own wrong by filing the divorce petition against wife respondent. section 13 (1)(b): [k.l. manjunath & mrs. b.v. nagarathna, jj] divorce on ground of desertion held, factum of separation and intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi) must be for a continuous period for not less than two years before the presentation of the petition and should co-exist for a period of at least two years. - 758] words are not to be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they should not be embraced or excluded.orderbalakrishna, j.1. this writ petition is directed against the order made by the karnataka appellate tribunal, bangalore, dated 30-10-1984 vide annexure-b setting aside the order passed by the special deputy commissioner, bangalore, dated 24-1-1984 vide annexure-a, which vested the 1st respondent's agricultural land in the state.2. the petitioner is aggrieved by the order of the tribunal because it held that the provisions of section 79-b(1) of the karnataka land reforms act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act') are only prospective in operation and do not apply to the agricultural lands held by the first respondent-company.3. the facts of the case are as follows ; senapathy whitely ltd., achalu, ramanagaram, which is respondent no. 1 in this petition is the owner of 2 acres of agricultural land (dry) in sy. no. 35/1 of achalu village, kailancha hobli, ramanagaram taluk. the said company purchased the land on 9-7-1968 from the vendor thimmaiah alias gettaiah by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 27-6-68 and the company has been in possession and enjoyment of the land ever since the date of purchase. the special deputy commissioner bangalore, initiated proceedings under section 79-b(3) of the act on receiving a declaration filed by the company under the provisions of section 79-b(2)(a) of the act. thereafter, the special deputy commissioner, bangalore, proceeded to pass the impugned order dated 24-1-1984 declaring that the land in question shall vest in the state government free from all encumbrances. power was exercised by him under the provisions of section 79-b(3) of the act. the 1st respondent was aggrieved by the said order and preferred an appeal before the karnataka appellate tribunal, bangalore, in appeal no. 120/1984 (lrf). after hearing the appellant and the respondents, therein, the tribunal reversed the order of the special deputy commissioner and held that the provisions of section 79b are not retrospective and therefore inapplicable to the agricultural land held by the first respondent-company. the petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order of respondent-2.4. the short point which arises for consideration is whether the provisions of section 79-b(1) of the act apply to the lands held by the first respondent-company and whether the non-vesting of the agricultural land of the 1st respondent in the state is valid.5. section 79-b(1) of the act reads as follows:'79-b. prohibition of holding agricultural land by certain persons. -(1) with effect on and from the date of commencement of the amendment act, except as otherwise provided in this act, -(a) no person other than a person cultivating land personalty shall be entitled to hold land; and(b) it shall not be lawful for,(i) an educational, religious or charitable institution or society or trust, other than an institution or society or trust referred to in sub-section (7) of section 63, capable of holding property;(ii) a company ;(iii) an association or other body of individuals not being a joint family, whether incorporated or not; or(iv) a co-operative society other than a co-operative farm,to hold any land.'it is also necessary to refer to section 79-b(2) of the act also. the said provision reads:'(2) every such institution, society, trust, company, association, body or co-operative society, -(a) which holds lands on the date of commencement of the amendment act and which is disentitled to hold lands under sub-section (1), shall, within ninety days from the said date furnish to the tahsildar within whose jurisdiction the greater part of such land is situated a declaration containing the particulars of such land and such other particulars as may be prescribed; and(b) which acquires such land after the said date shall also furnish a similar declaration within the prescribed period.'according to section 79-b(1) of the act, no person other than a person cultivating land personally shall be entitled to hold land; and it shall not be lawful for a company to hold any agricultural land with effect on and from the date of the commencement of the amendment act except as otherwise provided in this act. according to section 79-b(2)(a) every company which holds lands on the date of the commencement of the act and which is disentitled to hold lands under sub-section (1), shall, within ninety days from the said date furnish to the tahsildar within whose jurisdiction the greater part of such land is situated, a declaration containing the particulars of such land and such other particulars as may be prescribed.6. according to sub-section (3) of section 79b of the act, on receipt of the declaration under sub-section (2) and after such enquiry as may be prescribed, the tahsildar shall send a statement containing the prescribed particulars relating to such land to the deputy commissioner who shall, by notification, declare that such land shall vest in the state government free from all encumbrances and take possession thereof in the prescribed manner. sub-section (4) of section 79b contemplates payment of an amount as specified in section 72 in lieu of the land vesting in the state government.7. in the instant case, respondent no. 1-company submitted a declaration, as contemplated, under subsection 2(a) of section 79b of the act and it is only thereafter the deputy commissioner has proceeded to pass the order. a plain reading of the provisions mentioned above make it clear that the prohibition of holding of agricultural land by the company takes effect on 1-3-1974 which is the date of commencement of the amendment act. it is not the case of either the petitioner or the respondents that there is any exception of this provision and that respondent-1 falls within the exception.8. it was contended by the learned high court government pleader that as a result of the prohibition of holding of agricultural land by a company, the statute provides unequivocally that the tribunal was not justified in holding that the provisions are only of prospective nature. such a conclusion is contrary to the letter and spirit of the law as embodied in the provisions of subsection (1) and sub-section (2) of section 79b of the act. in fact, the government pleader contended that the impugned order of the tribunal runs counter to the object of the act. the act has been promulgated to have a uniform law in the state of karnataka pertaining to agrarian relationship, conferment of ownership on tenants, ceiling of land, land holdings and other allied matters. section 79b of the act was introduced by virtue of the amendment act 1 of 1974. it is apparent that one of the intentions of the legislature is to prevent and eliminate the monopoly of agricultural holdings in the hands of non-agriculturists under different names whether directly or indirectly which would frustrate the purpose of the welfare legislation.9. on the other hand, the learned counsel for respondent no. 1 contended that the words of section 79b do not convey the meaning that the prohibition of holding of agricultural land by company is retrospective in nature. according to the learned counsel, the prohibition is wholly prospective and does not apply to the land owned by the respondent-company. i am in entire agreement with the arguments advanced by the learned high court government pleader and hold that the prohibition applies with equal force to agricultural lands undisputedly held by the company as on 1-3-1974. i am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the first respondent that the impugned order of the tribunal is sound and consistent with law. i have to be guided by the plain meaning of the language of the relevant provisions of this act. it must be presumed that when the provisions of law do not admit of any ambiguity and points to only one meaning, the question of interpretation does not arise and only the ordinary and plain meaning is to be gathered from the wordings of the provisions through which the legislature has manifested its intention. according to me, from a reading of the provisions of section 79-b(1) read with sub-section (2)(a) of section 79b of the act there can be no doubt about the rule of law that the prohibition of holding of agricultural land by a company commenced from 1-3-1974 and applies to respondent no. 1-company which has been holding the lands on the date of the commencement of the amendment act. a harmonious construction of the words in sub-section (ii)(a) 'which holds lands on the date of the commencement of the amendment act' read with the words contained in subsection (1) of section 79b 'with effect on and from the date of the commencement of the amendment act' confirm the presumption that a company which holds agricultural lands as on 1-3-1974 is prohibited from holding the land by operation of law and such a company shall submit a declaration, as contemplated under subsection 2(a) of the act to the tahsildar containing the particulars of such land as prescribed. the above provision applies not only to the agricultural land held by any company as on 1-3-1974 and also in respect of land if any held by the company subsequent to 1-3-1974. in the light of the clear and unmistakable wordings of the provisions of law, the question whether or not the provisions are retrospective becomes redundant when the meaning is as plain as a pike-staff. in the instant case, the relevant question is whether the first-respondent company held the agricultural land on the date of the commencement of the amendment act which is 1-3-1974. the learned counsel for the 1st respondent does not dispute the fact that the respondent-company did hold the agricultural land in question as on 1-3-1974.10. if the intention of legislature is to exempt lands held by the company or companies prior to 1-3-1974 it has to be understood that the land reforms legislation did not contemplate agrarian reforms of the existing system at all, but the act was only a futuristic exercise with reference to a futuristic system. such a view would only lead to legislative futility militating against ordinary sense and understanding of the object of the legislature.11. 'maxwell on interpretation of statutes,' 12th edition (tripathi) on page 29 reads as hereunder :'where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise.........where by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be.'[cartledge v. e. jopling & sons ltd. (1963) a.c. 758]'words are not to be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they should not be embraced or excluded.'[white v. james stott ltd., (1949) 1 k.b. 358]'the duty of the court is to expound the law as it stands, and to leave the remedy (if one be resolved upon) to others.'[ sutters v. briggs, (1922) 1 a.c.1 per lord birkenhead - l.c. at page 8]in raj kushna bose v. binod kanungo & others, : [1954]1scr913 , the supreme court observed as follows while applying the rules of construction of the language of a statute :'it is one of the settled rules of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together, and each word or phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the act itself.'12. in the facts and circumstances of the case, applying the above principles, i construe that the ban imposed by the provision of section 79-b(1) applies to the land held by the 1st respondent-company and i hold that the order passed by the tribunal vide annexure-b is contrary to law. i quash the impugned order of the tribunal vide annexure-b and confirm the order passed by the special deputy commissioner vide annexure-a.13. for the reasons stated above, this writ petition is allowed. rule is made absolute.14. in the circumstances of the case there is no order as to costs

Judgment:
ORDER

Balakrishna, J.

1. This Writ Petition is directed against the order made by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, dated 30-10-1984 vide Annexure-B setting aside the order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore, dated 24-1-1984 vide Annexure-A, which vested the 1st respondent's agricultural land in the State.

2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal because it held that the provisions of Section 79-B(1) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') are only prospective in operation and do not apply to the agricultural lands held by the first respondent-company.

3. The facts of the case are as follows ; Senapathy Whitely Ltd., Achalu, Ramanagaram, which is respondent No. 1 in this petition is the owner of 2 acres of agricultural land (dry) in Sy. No. 35/1 of Achalu village, Kailancha Hobli, Ramanagaram Taluk. The said company purchased the land on 9-7-1968 from the Vendor Thimmaiah alias Gettaiah by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 27-6-68 and the Company has been in possession and enjoyment of the land ever since the date of purchase. The Special Deputy Commissioner Bangalore, initiated proceedings under Section 79-B(3) of the Act on receiving a declaration filed by the Company under the provisions of Section 79-B(2)(a) of the Act. Thereafter, the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore, proceeded to pass the impugned order dated 24-1-1984 declaring that the land in question shall vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Power was exercised by him under the provisions of Section 79-B(3) of the Act. The 1st respondent was aggrieved by the said order and preferred an appeal before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, in Appeal No. 120/1984 (LRF). After hearing the appellant and the respondents, therein, the Tribunal reversed the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner and held that the provisions of Section 79B are not retrospective and therefore inapplicable to the agricultural land held by the first respondent-Company. The petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order of respondent-2.

4. The short point which arises for consideration is whether the provisions of Section 79-B(1) of the Act apply to the lands held by the first respondent-company and whether the non-vesting of the agricultural land of the 1st respondent in the State is Valid.

5. Section 79-B(1) of the Act reads as follows:

'79-B. Prohibition of holding agricultural land by certain persons. -

(1) With effect on and from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, except as otherwise provided in this Act, -

(a) no person other than a person cultivating land personalty shall be entitled to hold land; and

(b) it shall not be lawful for,

(i) an educational, religious or charitable institution or society or trust, other than an institution or society or trust referred to in Sub-section (7) of Section 63, capable of holding property;

(ii) a company ;

(iii) an association or other body of individuals not being a joint family, whether incorporated or not; or

(iv) a co-operative society other than a co-operative farm,

to hold any land.'

It is also necessary to refer to Section 79-B(2) of the Act also. The said provision reads:

'(2) Every such institution, society, trust, company, association, body or co-operative society, -

(a) which holds lands on the date of commencement of the Amendment Act and which is disentitled to hold lands under Sub-section (1), shall, within ninety days from the said date furnish to the tahsildar within whose jurisdiction the greater part of such land is situated a declaration containing the particulars of such land and such other particulars as may be prescribed; and

(b) which acquires such land after the said date shall also furnish a similar declaration within the prescribed period.'

According to Section 79-B(1) of the Act, no person other than a person cultivating land personally shall be entitled to hold land; and it shall not be lawful for a company to hold any agricultural land with effect on and from the date of the commencement of the Amendment Act except as otherwise provided in this Act. According to Section 79-B(2)(a) every company which holds lands on the date of the commencement of the Act and which is disentitled to hold lands under Sub-section (1), shall, within ninety days from the said date furnish to the Tahsildar within whose jurisdiction the greater part of such land is situated, a declaration containing the particulars of such land and such other particulars as may be prescribed.

6. According to Sub-section (3) of Section 79B of the Act, on receipt of the declaration under Sub-section (2) and after such enquiry as may be prescribed, the Tahsildar shall send a statement containing the prescribed particulars relating to such land to the Deputy Commissioner who shall, by notification, declare that such land shall vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances and take possession thereof in the prescribed manner. Sub-section (4) of Section 79B contemplates payment of an amount as specified in Section 72 in lieu of the land vesting in the State Government.

7. In the instant case, respondent No. 1-Company submitted a declaration, as contemplated, under Subsection 2(a) of Section 79B of the Act and it is only thereafter the Deputy Commissioner has proceeded to pass the order. A plain reading of the provisions mentioned above make it clear that the prohibition of holding of agricultural land by the Company takes effect on 1-3-1974 which is the date of commencement of the Amendment Act. It is not the case of either the petitioner or the respondents that there is any exception of this provision and that respondent-1 falls within the exception.

8. It was contended by the learned High Court Government Pleader that as a result of the prohibition of holding of agricultural land by a Company, the statute provides unequivocally that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the provisions are only of prospective nature. Such a conclusion is contrary to the letter and spirit of the law as embodied in the provisions of Subsection (1) and Sub-section (2) of Section 79B of the Act. In fact, the Government Pleader contended that the impugned order of the Tribunal runs counter to the object of the Act. The Act has been promulgated to have a uniform law in the State of Karnataka pertaining to agrarian relationship, conferment of ownership on tenants, ceiling of land, land holdings and other allied matters. Section 79B of the Act was introduced by virtue of the Amendment Act 1 of 1974. It is apparent that one of the intentions of the Legislature is to prevent and eliminate the monopoly of agricultural holdings in the hands of non-agriculturists under different names whether directly or indirectly which would frustrate the purpose of the welfare legislation.

9. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 contended that the words of Section 79B do not convey the meaning that the prohibition of holding of agricultural land by company is retrospective in nature. According to the learned Counsel, the prohibition is wholly prospective and does not apply to the land owned by the respondent-company. I am in entire agreement with the arguments advanced by the learned High Court Government Pleader and hold that the prohibition applies with equal force to agricultural lands undisputedly held by the Company as on 1-3-1974. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the first respondent that the impugned order of the Tribunal is sound and consistent with law. I have to be guided by the plain meaning of the language of the relevant provisions of this Act. It must be presumed that when the provisions of law do not admit of any ambiguity and points to only one meaning, the question of interpretation does not arise and only the ordinary and plain meaning is to be gathered from the wordings of the provisions through which the Legislature has manifested its intention. According to me, from a reading of the provisions of Section 79-B(1) read with Sub-section (2)(a) of Section 79B of the Act there can be no doubt about the rule of law that the prohibition of holding of agricultural land by a Company commenced from 1-3-1974 and applies to respondent No. 1-Company which has been holding the lands on the date of the commencement of the Amendment Act. A harmonious construction of the words in Sub-section (ii)(a) 'which holds lands on the date of the commencement of the Amendment Act' read with the words contained in Subsection (1) of Section 79B 'with effect on and from the date of the commencement of the Amendment Act' confirm the presumption that a Company which holds agricultural lands as on 1-3-1974 is prohibited from holding the land by operation of law and such a Company shall submit a declaration, as contemplated under Subsection 2(a) of the Act to the Tahsildar containing the particulars of such land as prescribed. The above provision applies not only to the agricultural land held by any company as on 1-3-1974 and also in respect of land if any held by the company subsequent to 1-3-1974. In the light of the clear and unmistakable wordings of the provisions of law, the question whether or not the provisions are retrospective becomes redundant when the meaning is as plain as a pike-staff. In the instant case, the relevant question is whether the first-respondent company held the agricultural land on the date of the commencement of the Amendment Act which is 1-3-1974. The learned Counsel for the 1st respondent does not dispute the fact that the respondent-company did hold the agricultural land in question as on 1-3-1974.

10. If the intention of Legislature is to exempt lands held by the Company or Companies prior to 1-3-1974 it has to be understood that the Land Reforms legislation did not contemplate agrarian reforms of the existing system at all, but the Act was only a futuristic exercise with reference to a futuristic system. Such a view would only lead to legislative futility militating against ordinary sense and understanding of the object of the Legislature.

11. 'MAXWELL ON INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES,' 12th Edition (Tripathi) on page 29 reads as hereunder :

'Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise.........where by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the Legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be.'

[CARTLEDGE v. E. JOPLING & SONS LTD. (1963) A.C. 758]

'Words are not to be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they should not be embraced or excluded.'

[White v. James Stott Ltd., (1949) 1 K.B. 358]

'The duty of the Court is to expound the law as it stands, and to leave the remedy (if one be resolved upon) to others.'

[ Sutters v. Briggs, (1922) 1 A.C.1 per Lord Birkenhead - L.C. at page 8]

In RAJ KUSHNA BOSE v. BINOD KANUNGO & OTHERS, : [1954]1SCR913 , the Supreme Court observed as follows while applying the rules of construction of the language of a statute :

'It is one of the settled rules of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together, and each word or phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself.'

12. In the facts and circumstances of the case, applying the above principles, I construe that the ban imposed by the provision of Section 79-B(1) applies to the land held by the 1st respondent-Company and I hold that the order passed by the Tribunal vide Annexure-B is contrary to law. I quash the impugned order of the Tribunal vide Annexure-B and confirm the order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner vide Annexure-A.

13. For the reasons stated above, this Writ Petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute.

14. in the circumstances of the case there is no order as to costs