Consolidated Coffee Ltd. Vs. Radha - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
(a) payment of gratuity act. 1972 (central act no. 39 of 1972) - section 4 -- ii proviso -- 'season' --denotation -- mode of computation of gratuity : under section 4.(2) for persons employed throughout the year ; under second proviso for persons employed seasonally -- 'season' not an year : to be understood in commercial / business/ operational sense. ;section 4(2) apples to workmen who are employed throughout the year and that is the reason the words 'completed year of service or part thereof in excess of six months' are used in order to enable the workmen to claim gratuity at the rate of 15 days' wages based on the rate of wages last drawn by him. but the second proviso makes a distinction in the mode of computation of gratuity as regards an employee employed seasonally and that is why the legislature has used the words 'for each season' instead of the ward 'year' .... section 4(2) prescribes a mode of computation of gratuity for persons employed throughout the year. the proviso prescribes & different mode of computation for persons who are employed intermittently that is, employed during a particular season. thus understood, the word 'season' cannot be an year....the legislature having used the words 'each season' it obviously means that there could be one season or more than one season. the word 'season' should be understood in the commercial or business or operational sense .... whether a particular seasonal establishment is carrying on its operations over a period of one or two seasons or more than two seasons would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. ;but in the case, we are only concerned with the coffee curing industry set up in the west coast. therefore, it is made clear that the findings of the authorities is applicable to the petitioner's factory set up in the coastal area and not to other factories of the petitioners in other areas. ; (b) construction of statutes - social legislation -- hardship or inconvenience cannot alter meaning of language employed -- court cannot ignore provision to relieve resultant distress but give effect to statute.;hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the legislature if such meaning is clear on the face of the statute or the rules. a result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. a court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. a statute must of course be given effect to whether a court likes the result or not. - labour & services. departmental enquiry:[cyriac joseph, cj & a.n. venugopala gowda, jj] holding of departmental enquiry against a government servant - enquiry set aside by high court and sending the matter back to the authorities - authorities initiating a fresh enquiry new enquiry challenged as un-constitutional - held, new enquiry is not barred. - 5. in my view, it is possible without applying the various canons of construction well settled by the courts in the matter of interpretation of statutes to interpret the proviso in question on its plain language since there is no ambiguity in the language used by the legislature in the said proviso. but the second proviso makes a distinction in the mode of computation of gratuity as regards an employee employed seasonally and that is why the legislature has used the words 'for each season' instead of the word 'year'.it is well-settled rule of construction that when the legislature uses two different words in the same section, ordinarily they cannot be treated as synonymous terms. while dealing the piece of social legislation any inconvenience that may be caused to the employer or anomaly in the computation of gratuity would not be a good ground to depart from the plain meaning of the statute.bopanna, j.1. there petitions are disposed of by a common order since a common point arises for consideration in all these petitions.2. the petitioner-companies who are engaged (among other things) in the business of coffee curing have questioned the correctness of the order of the authorities constituted under the payment of gratuity act, 1972 (in short 'the act') holding that they are liable to pay gratuity to its employees for a period of 14 days at the rate of 7 days wages for each of the two seasons in a year. according to the petitioners, they being seasonal establishments, their employees are entitled to 7 days wages as gratuity on the basis that they work during only one season in a year and not two seasons as found by the authorities.3. on facts there is no dispute between the parties. the case of the petitioners as could be seen from the material placed by them before the authorities is that they open their curing factory after the monsoon period and carry on the curing operations till the end of december and close the same till the arrival of the new crop, that is sometime in january and commence operations till the onset of the next monsoon. on this admitted fact, they have contended that they carry on business during one season only and therefore under the 2nd proviso to section 4 of the act they are liable to pay 7 days' wages as gratuity. that section as it read prior to its amendment by act no. 25/1984 reads as under :'for every completed year of service or part thereof in excess of six months' the employer shall pay gratuity to an employee at the rate of fifteen days' wages based on the rate of wages last drawn by the employee concerned :provided that in the case of a piece rated employee, daily wages shall be computed on the average of the total wages received by him for a period of three months immediately preceding its termination of his employment, and, for this purpose, the wages paid for any overtime work shall not be taken into account;xxx xxx xxxprovided further that in the case of an employee employed in a seasonal establishment, the employer shall pay the gratuity at the rate of seven days' wages for each season.'the authorities while interpreting the words 'each season' came to the conclusion on the evidence on record that there were two seasons in the working of the petitioners' factory and therefore, the employees were entitled to gratuity for a period of 14 days that is, 7 days' wages for each season. the correctness of this decision is challenged by the petitioners in these petitions.4. the learned counsel for the petitioners, mr. kurian, submitted that this proviso to section 4 of the act should be understood in the light of the preceding provisions of section 4, viz., section 4(2) of the act, and thus understood the employees employed in seasonal establishment should not get gratuity exceeding the amount prescribed under section 4(2) of the act to the workers employed regularly in the said establishment throughout the year. according to him, a construction should be put on the proviso which should be consistent with the intention of the legislature to make a distinction between regular workmen and seasonal workmen. he further submitted that the finding of the authorities that the petitioners' factory carried on operation for a period of two seasons, viz., pre monsoon and the post-monsoon is not borne out by the record. he relied on certain decisions of the supreme court on the interpretation of statutes and also on maxwell's interpretation of statutes at page 86. he submitted that the word 'season' should be so interpreted as to mean an year and that would be in conformity with the plain language of sub-section (2) of section 4 of the act. though he did not want this court to rely on the oxford dictionary meaning of the word 'season' for the interpretation of the proviso in question, what he submitted was that the word 'season' could be understood as an year and thus understood, a harmonious construction would be achieved obviating the anomaly of paying more gratuity to seasonal workmen.5. in my view, it is possible without applying the various canons of construction well settled by the courts in the matter of interpretation of statutes to interpret the proviso in question on its plain language since there is no ambiguity in the language used by the legislature in the said proviso. section 4(2) applies to workmen who are employed throughout the year and that is the reason the words 'completed year of service or part thereof in excess of six months' are used in order to enable the workmen to claim gratuity at the rate of 15 days' wages based on the rate of wages last drawn by him. but the second proviso makes a distinction in the mode of computation of gratuity as regards an employee employed seasonally and that is why the legislature has used the words 'for each season' instead of the word 'year'. it is well-settled rule of construction that when the legislature uses two different words in the same section, ordinarily they cannot be treated as synonymous terms. but they should be given two different meanings depending on the intendment of the act and the context in which they are used. section 4(2) prescribes a mode of computation of gratuity for persons employed throughout the year. the proviso prescribes a different mode of computation for persons who are employed intermittently that is, employed during a particular season. thus understood, the word 'season' cannot be an year. therefore, what is a season and how many seasons are there in a year for the purpose of giving effect to the second poviso? the legislature having used the words 'each season' it obviously means that could be one season or more than one season. accordingly it was open to the authorities, to examine the material on record and come to the conclusion that whether there was one season as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners or more than one season. the authorities have come to the conclusion that there are two seasons on the admitted fact that the curing operations commence some-time after the monsoon period with a break for a short while that is, during the month of january. the operations start again with the arrival of coffee crop and come to a halt just before me onset of the next monsoon. so the word 'season' should be understood in the commercial or business or operational sense. thus understood, the authorities, in my view, had rightly come to the conclusion that there were two seasons in coffee curing industry, and therefore, the workmen will be entitled to gratuity at the rate of 7 days wages for each season.6. a reference was made to the decision of the kerala high court in consolidated coffee ltd., tellicherry v. p. uthaman and ors. 1979(2) lic 984. this decision was followed by the authorities for coming to the conclusion that there were two seasons in the petitioners' business. the question whether the workmen were engaged over a period of two seasons in a given year or one season as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners did not arise for consideration in that case. therefore, any observations made by the high court were only obiter.7. the next contention of mr. kurian is that it would be anomalous if the seasons are worked out on the basis of the number of operations carried out by the employers and in a given case if there are more than two seasons, the employees would be entitled to mere gratuity than the regular workers who are employed throughout the year. while dealing the piece of social legislation any inconvenience that may be caused to the employer or anomaly in the computation of gratuity would not be a good ground to depart from the plain meaning of the statute. hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the legislature if such meaning is clear on the face of the statute or the rules, : [1950]18itr569(sc) commissioner or ag. i.t. v. keshab chandra. a result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. a court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. a statute must be of course be given effect to whether a court likes the result or not, : [1966]1scr543 martin burn v. corporation of calcutta. craies on statute law has observed :'the argument from inconvenience and hardship is a dangerous one and is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the statute is obscure and there are alternative methods of construction. lord birkenhead said in surters v. briggs [1922) 1 a.c.1, 8]. 'the consequences of this view (of section 2 of the gaming act 1835) will no doubt be extremely inconvenient to many persons. but this is not a matter proper to influence the house unless in a doubtful case affording foothold for balanced speculation as to the probable intention of the legislature'. in re robbs' contract (1941) ch. 463, 478] lord green m.r. said : 'the inconvenience of the conclusion to which i have come from the point of view of business with bankers and so forth....is obvious....the court cannot allow the existence of that circular to affect its mind in deciding what is the true construction of the section, section 74(2) and (6) finance (1909-10) act, 1910 ; and clauson l.j., said he had made strenuous efforts to avoid the same conclusion 'because i am conscious of the great inconvenience which this decision probably will cause.'8. whether a particular seasonal establishment is carrying on its operations over a period of one or two seasons or more than two seasons would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. but in the case, we are the only concerned with the coffee curing industry set up in the west coast. therefore, it is made clear that the finding of the authorities is applicable to the petitioners' factory set up in the coastal area and not to other factories of the petitioners in other areas.with these observations these petitions are dismissed, parties to bear their own costs.