Sanna Beere Gowda Vs Tahsildar - Citation 378685 - Court Judgment

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			'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
			'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
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			'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Balakrishna, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
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		'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
		'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
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		'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
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		'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.</p><p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p></p><p>',
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			'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
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			'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
			'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Balakrishna, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
		'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
		'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
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		'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.</p><p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p></p><p>',
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karnataka village offices abolition act, 1961 (karnataka act no. 14 of 1961) - sections 5, 6 & 7 - no eviction order until regrant application disposed of - such eviction orders nugatory & unsustainable - inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy & revitalization of fossilized system - masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the karnataka village offices abolition act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; in the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under annexures 'b' and 'c'.....

Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]Code Context                                    }

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs Tahsildar - Citation 378685 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '378685',
			'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
			'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
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			'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Balakrishna, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs Tahsildar - Citation 378685 - Court Judgment | '
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		'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
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		'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
		'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
		'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.</p><p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p></p><p>',
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		'sub' => 'Civil;Property',
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs Tahsildar - Citation 378685 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '378685',
			'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
			'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
			'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Balakrishna, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
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		'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
		'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
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		'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
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		'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.</p><p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p></p><p>',
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orderbalakrishna, j.1.smt. t.n. manjuladevi, learned high court government advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.2. having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in sy.no. 128 of hullekere village, gandasi hobli, arasikere taluk, hassan district, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. the 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in sy.no. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. the lands are stated to be thalavar (kuluvadike) inam lands. the vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village.....

Judgment:

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '378685',
			'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
			'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Balakrishna, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
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		'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
		'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
		'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
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		'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.</p><p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
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ORDER

Balakrishna, J.

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			'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
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			'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
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			'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
			'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
			'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Balakrishna, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => 'ILR1990KAR717; 1989(2)KarLJ245',
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			'respondent' => 'Tahsildar',
			'sub' => 'Civil;Property',
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			'circuit' => null
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	'casename_url' => 'sanna-beere-gowda-vs-tahsildar',
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$title_for_layout = 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs Tahsildar - Citation 378685 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '378685',
		'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
		'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
		'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.</p><p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'ILR1990KAR717; 1989(2)KarLJ245',
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		'respondent' => 'Tahsildar',
		'sub' => 'Civil;Property',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
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1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.

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			'id' => '378685',
			'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
			'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
			'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Balakrishna, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
		'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
		'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
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		'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.</p><p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
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2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.

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			'id' => '378685',
			'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
			'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
			'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
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			'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Balakrishna, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'ILR1990KAR717; 1989(2)KarLJ245',
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		'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
		'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
		'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
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		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.</p><p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p>',
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3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '378685',
			'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
			'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
			'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Balakrishna, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
		'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
		'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.</p><p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'ILR1990KAR717; 1989(2)KarLJ245',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Tahsildar',
		'sub' => 'Civil;Property',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
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4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs Tahsildar - Citation 378685 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '378685',
			'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
			'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
			'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Balakrishna, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs Tahsildar - Citation 378685 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '378685',
		'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
		'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
		'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.</p><p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
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5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.

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			'id' => '378685',
			'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
			'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
			'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Balakrishna, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'ILR1990KAR717; 1989(2)KarLJ245',
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			'respondent' => 'Tahsildar',
			'sub' => 'Civil;Property',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs Tahsildar - Citation 378685 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '378685',
		'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
		'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
		'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.</p><p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'ILR1990KAR717; 1989(2)KarLJ245',
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		'respondent' => 'Tahsildar',
		'sub' => 'Civil;Property',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
)
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6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs Tahsildar - Citation 378685 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '378685',
			'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
			'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
			'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Balakrishna, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'ILR1990KAR717; 1989(2)KarLJ245',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Tahsildar',
			'sub' => 'Civil;Property',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs Tahsildar - Citation 378685 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '378685',
		'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
		'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
		'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.</p><p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p>',
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7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.

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			'id' => '378685',
			'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
			'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
			'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Balakrishna, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
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		'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
		'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
		'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.</p><p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'pubs' => 'ILR1990KAR717; 1989(2)KarLJ245',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Tahsildar',
		'sub' => 'Civil;Property',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
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8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs Tahsildar - Citation 378685 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '378685',
			'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
			'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
			'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Balakrishna, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
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		'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
		'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
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		'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.</p><p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p>',
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The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.

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			'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
			'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Balakrishna, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs Tahsildar - Citation 378685 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '378685',
		'acts' => 'Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar',
		'casenote' => ' KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1961) - Sections 5, 6 &amp; 7 - No eviction order until regrant application disposed of - Such eviction orders nugatory &amp; unsustainable - Inordinate delay in disposal of regrant applications lapse to be averted by resurrection of inert bureaucracy &amp; revitalization of fossilized system - Masters in democracy people not public administrations. ; (i) No eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law. ; In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under
Annexures 'B' and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 [Eviction Orders] are rendered nugatory. Besides, the
orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant
were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ; (ii) The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of
the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners.
If such lapses have to be averted, inert bureau cracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise
its fossilized system to discharge its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite in the context ...Unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizens
legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.  - CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 [C.A. No. 2/1974]. Section 397: [R.B.Naik, J]  Submission of B Report by the Police -Protest Petition - Acceptance of B Report - Challenge to  Revision against  Held,  If the original complainant appears before the court and filed his protest petition to B report and opts to examine himself and other witnesses in support of his case, the legal recourse that is left to the Magistrate is to treat such protest petition as original complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., The B Report, along with the material produced there in looses importance and such material would be of no value. The question of acceptance or rejection of B Report at that stage would arise only in the event the complainant does not make out a prima facie case for issue of process.  Further, The Magistrate, who takes cognizance of complaint when examined upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, in that process, there should be no assistance to the complainant or his witnesses fro any third source and it is the Magistrate alone who shall examine the complainant and his witnesses without the assistance of either prosecutor or any counsel. On facts, held,  On filing of protest petition, the contents of the protest petition and the sworn statement made before the Magistrate by the complainant and his witnesses would alone form integral part of the complaint and the Magistrate will have to proceed as provided under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C., Order of Magistrate was set aside and matter remitted back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage of  filing of protest petition and thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. -  Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. 6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'B.N. Venugopal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1989-05-30',
		'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
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		'judge' => 'Balakrishna, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.</p><p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.</p><p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.</p><p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.</p><p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.</p><p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.</p><p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.</p><p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.</p><p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:</p><p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Balakrishna, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1.Smt. T.N. Manjuladevi, learned High Court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Having purchased 1 acre 2 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village, Gandasi Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, under two registered sale deeds from respondents-3 and 4 for valuable consideration on 14-6-1968 and 1-7-1968 respectively, the 1st petitioner became the owner in possession of the said land. The 2nd petitioner is the owner in possession of 24 guntas of land in Sy.No. 128 of the same village having purchased the said land under a registered sale deed dated 8-2-1968 for valuable consideration. The lands are stated to be Thalavar (Kuluvadike) Inam lands. The vendors of the petitioners-1 and 2 are admittedly' the holders of village office being Thalavars and they had applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Hassan, for regrant of the lands in their possession, in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village. The application was filed on 1D-2-1968 and the same came to be disposed of on 13-3-1981 regranting the lands as prayed for to the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2. Prior to 1981, the impugned eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 alleging that the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands in question in Sy.No. 128 of Hullekere village to the extent of 1 acre 32 guntas. It Is the order passed by the Tahsildar, Arasikere Taluk, on 11-10-1979 directing eviction of petitioners-1 and 2 that has created the cause of action for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is not clear as to when the petitioners received the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C'. But what is clear is that they have approached this Court on 1-4-1982.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the above circumstances, the point for consideration is whether the impugned eviction orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are sustainable in law.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The fact that the impugned orders were passed during the pendency of the application filed by the vendors of petitioners-1 and 2 cannot be disputed. The order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981 is also by the Tahsildar of Arasikere Taluk though it is not definite as to whether the same official has passed the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' in the year 1979. The strange phenomena of the Revenue Officer of the rank of Tahsildar passing a regrant order subsequent to the issue of an eviction notice is encountered in this case. There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land and to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other, regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. The inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant has contributed to the mischief necessitating the petitioners to have recourse to Writ proceedings in order to secure legal redress. Administrative inertia appears to have become the order of the day as demonstrated in this case. What is involved in this case is the legitimate interest of two agriculturists and the threat of eviction during the subsistence of application for regrant, the sound legal principle being that no eviction order ought to be passed against alleged unauthorised occupants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') unless the applications for regrant made by the holders of the land made under the Act are disposed of in accordance with law.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the order passed by the Tahsildar in 1981 conceding regrant of land. Here again is noticeable an Indiscriminate use of the provisions of law without an attempt to precisely state the relevant provision applicable to the facts and circumstances. In the body of the order passed in 1981, three provisions of law have been mentioned and they are Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Just a casual reading of these three provisions of law would convince any reasonable person that what is contemplated under Section 7 of the Act is totally different from what is envisaged under Sections 5 and 6. The manner in which the provisions of law have been mentioned by the Tahsildar makes it appear as if no distinction whatever exists between Sections 5, 6 and 7. Little did he realise that the implications of his order is a product of interpretational confusion of his own making. The learned Government Advocate was at pains to explain that whereas the application for regrant was made by the holders of the land, the eviction notice was Issued to the purchasers who are unauthorised occupants of the land and, therefore, the official did not have the opportunity of correlating the two aspects in order to guard himself against any remiss. Though on initial impression the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seems to be convincing, I am afraid that such a conduct of a qualified revenue official cannot be lightly brushed aside. The stronger provocation emanates from the inordinate delay in the disposal of the application for regrant making the matters worse, to the added misery of the petitioners. If such lapses have to be adverted, inert bureaucracy has to resurrect itself and revitalise its fossilized system to discharge- its accountability towards the citizen. That the people are the masters in a democracy and not the public administrators is apposite In the context. It seems to me that unaccountable bureaucracy and the citizen's legitimate interests are often not on speaking terms.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Coming back to the facts of the case, a careful reading of the order passed by the Tahsildar under Annexure-A on 13-3-1981 persuades me to the inference that it is an order passed under Section 5 of the Act and it is precisely under the same provision the applications were filed by the vendors of the petitioners for regrant. In the light of the order of regrant passed on 13-3-1981, the impugned orders under Annexures 'B'and 'C' dated 11-10-1979 are rendered nugatory. Besides, the orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. It was pointed out by the learned Government Advocate that the principle laid down in CHIKKANARASAIAH v. TIRUPATIAH, : ILR1989KAR1520 is attracted to the facts of this case. I do not think that, the submission is acceptable because what was under consideration in the said case was the effect of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the amendment of the Act in 1978. In the instant case, we are concerned with the effect of an order passed under Section 5 of the Act in respect of an application which is anterior to 1978, but disposed of subsequent to 1978. In the case of LAKSHMANA GOWDA v. STATE, ILR (Kar) 1980(2) 892: 1981(1) KLJ 1 it is made crystal clear that the amendment brought into force in 1978 is only prospective in operation. I am, therefore, convinced that the principle laid down in Chikkanarasaiah's case does not apply to the facts of this case.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>The Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders under Annexures 'B' and 'C' are hereby quashed. The authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioners within a time limit of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances of the case, though I am inclined to award costs against the errant Tahsildar, with a reasonable expectation of improvement in bureaucratic conduct, no. costs are awarded.<p>',
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Subject	Civil;Property
Court	Karnataka High Court
Decided On	May-30-1989
Case Number	W.P. Nos. 13467 and 13468 of 1982
Judge	Balakrishna, J.
Reported in	ILR1990KAR717; 1989(2)KarLJ245
Acts	Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 - Sections 5, 6 and 7
Appellant	Sanna Beere Gowda
Respondent	Tahsildar
Appellant Advocate	B.N. Venugopal, Adv.
Respondent Advocate	T.N. Manjula Devi, Govt. Adv. for R-1 and R-2
Disposition	Petition allowed

Sanna Beere Gowda Vs. Tahsildar - Court Judgment