Bagi Beedi Factory, Hubli Vs. the Appellate Authority Under the Payment of Gratuity Act and Joint Labour Commissioner, Bangalore and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- karnataka land reforms act, 1961.[k.a. no. 10/1962]. section 48a: [n.k.patil, j] rejection of form no.7-a tribunal dismissed appeal - writ petition - order passed in a cyclostyled format - non-consideration of record of rights for the relevant period - non-speaking order - held, order passed by the assistant commissioner which is affirmed by the karnataka appellate tribunal is contrary to documentary evidence on record. from the record of rights in the original file, it can be seen that for the agricultural years 1963-64 to 2003-04 the names of petitioners are entered in column no.12(2) and the mode of cultivation is shown as 3 which indicates that the petitioners are cultivating the land in question as tenants. impugned orders are unsustainable in the eye of law and the same are liable to be set aside. - the only question that, therefore, arises is whether an employee like the husband of third respondent could be called an 'employee' under the gratuity act. sri somasekhar urges that since the gratuity act emphasises that, for a person to be considered as an employee, he ought to be working in an establishment, that means, within the precincts of the establishment, and since a 'home worker' like the third respondent's husband working at his home, cannot be said to be a person working in the establishment of the petitioner-beedi factory, he cannot be called an employee for the purpose of gratuity act, though he could be called an employee for the purpose of 'beedi act by virtue of sub-clause (i) of clause (f) of section 2 of the beedi act. jain and others (1981)illj402sc ,wherein the supreme court disapproved of the definition of the expression in one act being imported into another. 3(31) defines 'local authority'.it was in that context that the supreme court disapproved of borrowing the definition of 'local authority' in enactments such as the cattle trespass act, 1871, etc. it is in this context that, even persons like third respondent's husband, though working away from the main beedi factory, are nevertheless brought within the definition of 'employees' as a special category as 'home workers' by virtue of sub-clause (i) of clause (f) of sec. therefore, a person like the third respondent's husband would be working in an establishment even though he is working away from the main beedi factory. 2(e) of the gratuity act refers to a person employed on wages in an establishment, it must cover a person like the third respondent's husband also, who was working in an establishment within the meaning of sec. union of india 1985 ii clr 322, wherein the supreme court held the provident funds act as being applicable to 'home workers' like third respondent's husband under the beedi act. 'home worker' like the third respondent's husband as already discussed, is very much a person working in the establishment within the meaning of section 2(e) of the gratuity act since, the place that he rolls the beedies, though situated away from the beedi factory, is nevertheless a part of the establishment within the meaning of section 2(h) of the beedi act, as already discussed.orderg. patri basavana goud, j.1. the third respondent's husband was a 'home worker', and, as such, an employee within the meaning of section 2(f)(i) of the beedi and cigar workers (conditions of employment) act, 1966 ('beedi act' for short). on his death, his widow, the third respondent applied to the concerned authorities under the payment of gratuity act, 1972 ('gratuity act' for short) for payment of gratuity in respect of her husband who had been a 'home worker' for over thirty years prior to his death. petitioner-management of m/s. bagi beedi factory, hubli, contended that the husband of third respondent, though a 'home worker' and an employee within the meaning of section 2(f)(i) of the beedi act, was not an 'employee' within the meaning of section 2(e) of the gratuity act, and, as such, the third respondent was not entitled to gratuity sought for. the authorities rejected this contention of the employer and passed an order in favour of the third respondent. in this petition under article 226 of the constitution, petitioner-employer seeks quashing of the said order. 2. the facts are not in dispute. third respondent's husband had been, at the instance of the petitioner-employer, rolling beedies in his house and delivering them at the premises of the employer and to the satisfaction of the employer. he did so for over thirty years. if he can be called an employee within the meaning of the gratuity act, there is no doubt that his widow would be entitled to gratuity as ordered by the authorities. the only question that, therefore, arises is whether an employee like the husband of third respondent could be called an 'employee' under the gratuity act. 3. certain definitions, both under the beedi act and gratuity act, as also the definition of 'employee' under the employees' provident funds and miscellaneous provisions act, 1952 ('provident funds act', for short) may be extracted. section 2(f)(i) of the beedi act. - (f) 'employee' means a person employed directly or through any agency, whether for wages or not, in any establishment to do any work, skilled, unskilled, manual or clerical, and includes - (i) any labourer who is given raw material by any employer or a contractor for being made into beedi or cigar or both at home (hereinafter referred to in this act as 'home worker'). section 2(h) of the beedi act. - 'establishment' means any place or premises including the precincts thereof in which or in any part of which any manufacturing process connected with the making of beedi or cigar or both is being, or is ordinarily, carried on and includes an industrial premises. section 2(i) of the beedi act. - 'industrial premises' means any place or premises (not being a private dwelling-house), including the precincts thereof, in which or in any part of which any industry or manufacturing process connected with the making of beedi or cigar or both is being, or is ordinarily, carried on with or without the aid of power. section 3 of the beedi act. - 'industrial premises to be licensed - save as otherwise provided in this act, no employer shall use or allow to be used any place or premises as an industrial premises unless he holds a valid licence issued under this act and no such premises shall be used except in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence'. section 1(3)(b) of the gratuity act. - '(3) it shall apply to (a) ........ (b) every shop or establishment within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in relation to shops and establishments in a state, in which ten or more persons are employed, or were employed, on any day of the preceding twelve months.' section 2(6) of the gratuity act. - '2. definitions - in this act unless the context otherwise requires - (a) to (d) ....., (e) 'employees' mean any person (other than an apprentice) employed on wages, in any establishment, factory, mine, oil field, plantation, railway company or shop, to do any skilled, semi skilled, or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work, whether the terms of such employment are express or implied, and whether or not such person is employed in a managerial or administrative capacity, but does not include any such person who holds a post under the central government or a state government and is governed by any other act or by any rules providing for payment of gratuity'. section 2(f)(i) of the provident funds act. - '2. definitions - in this act, unless the context otherwise requires - (a) to (e) ...... (f) 'employee' means any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an establishment, and who gets his wages directly or indirectly from the employer, and includes any person - (i) employed by or through a contractor in or in connection with the work of the establishment'. 4. it is a settled position that an establishment within the meaning of the beedi act is an establishment to which, by virtue of section 1(3)(b) of the gratuity act, provisions of the said gratuity act would apply. reference may be made in this regard to a decision of the supreme court in state of punjab v. the labour court, jullundur and others : (1981)illj354sc . following this decision of the supreme court, a division bench of bombay high court also held so in b. n. sarda private limited v. kisan k. borade 1981 lab.ic 911 (bom.). 5. if some one could be called an 'employee' within the meaning of section 2(e) of the gratuity act, as could be seen from its definition above, he should be an employee on wages in an establishment, apart from fulfilling other conditions referred to thereunder. 6. the main thrust of the arguments of sri somasekhar, learned counsel for the petitioner, is this : it is true, the third respondent's husband was an employee within the meaning of section 2(f) of the beedi act. that was because, even though he was not working in the establishment of the petitioner, he was nevertheless brought within the provisions of the said definition by virtue of sub-clause (i) of clause (f) of section 2 of the beedi act, employees of his nature having been brought thereunder in the peculiar circumstances as 'home workers', they being those who would get raw materials from the employer, take the said raw materials to their homes and bring back the finished products to the satisfaction of the employer - all these being done for wages. sri somasekhar thus seeks to make a distinction between someone being an employee for the purpose of the gratuity act, from some one being an employee for the purpose of the beedi act. sri somasekhar urges that since the gratuity act emphasises that, for a person to be considered as an employee, he ought to be working in an establishment, that means, within the precincts of the establishment, and since a 'home worker' like the third respondent's husband working at his home, cannot be said to be a person working in the establishment of the petitioner-beedi factory, he cannot be called an employee for the purpose of gratuity act, though he could be called an employee for the purpose of 'beedi act by virtue of sub-clause (i) of clause (f) of section 2 of the beedi act. learned counsel for the third respondent, sri s. v. shastry, on the other hand, points out that, under the beedi act, 'establishment' is defined to mean not merely an industrial premises in which manufacturing process is carried on, but also the premises in which any part of such manufacturing process connected with the making of beedies is carried on. sri s. v. shastry, pointedly referred to the fact that the definition of 'establishment' in section 2(h) of the beedi act is an inclusive definition and it includes industrial premises as defined under section 2(i) of the beedi act. learned counsel for the petitioner, sri somasekhar, submits that the definition of establishment under the beedi act cannot be imported for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of the gratuity act since, under the gratuity act, 'establishment' is not defined, and, in this regard, he refers to a decision of the supreme court in union of india and others v. r. c. jain and others : (1981)illj402sc , wherein the supreme court disapproved of the definition of the expression in one act being imported into another. 7. the supreme court, in r. c. jain's case, referred to above, found that the expression 'local authority' had not been defined in the payment of bonus act, 1965, with which act, it had been dealing in the said case. supreme court, therefore, turned to sec. 3(31) of the general clauses act, 1897, for sec. 3(31) defines 'local authority'. it was in that context that the supreme court disapproved of borrowing the definition of 'local authority' in enactments such as the cattle trespass act, 1871, etc., as the high court had done. the definition of establishment' under sec. 2(h) of the beedi act, if to be referred for the purpose of sec. 2(e) of the gratuity act, must be done so if it could be done without offending the principle enunciated by the supreme court in the said decision in r. c. jain's case, supra. 8. sec. 1(3)(b) of the gratuity act, as found earlier, has made applicable the provisions of the gratuity act to an establishment under the beedi act also. 'establishment' is not defined in the gratuity act. it is also not defined in the general clauses act, 1897. this being the position, and by virtue of sec. 1(3)(b) of the gratuity act, if the provisions of the gratuity act are made applicable to an 'establishment' under the beedi act also, in my opinion, we have to inevitably see as to whether a particular person, in respect of whom gratuity is claimed, is a person working in such an establishment in order to be called an employee within the meaning of sec. 2(e) of the gratuity act. it is thus permissible to refer to the definition of 'establishment' under sec. 2(h) of the beedi act, for the purpose of construing whether a person is an employee within the meaning of sec. 2(e) of the gratuity act. 9. as noted earlier, the main premises wherein beedi manufacturing process could be said to be carried on, and as such, is an 'industrial premises' within the meaning of sec. 2(i) of the beedi act, could be referred to as 'm/s. bagi beedi factory, kanchagar galli, hubli'. that would be the industrial premises in respect of which, petitioner would have obviously taken licence under sec. 4 of the act. the persons working in the said industrial premises would be employees within the meaning of clause (f) of sec. 2 of the beedi act. but, the 'establishment' as defined under sec. 2(h) of the beedi act has a much wider meaning in as much as, it not only includes the said industrial premises as defined under sec. 2(i), but also any other premises in which any part of the manufacturing process connected with making of the beedi is carried on. the place where third respondent's husband had been rolling beedies is, therefore, such a place wherein part of manufacturing process connected with making of beedies, was being carried on. the said place also, therefore, is an 'establishment' within the meaning of sec. 2(h) of the beedi act. it is in this context that, even persons like third respondent's husband, though working away from the main beedi factory, are nevertheless brought within the definition of 'employees' as a special category as 'home workers' by virtue of sub-clause (i) of clause (f) of sec. 2 of the beedi act. therefore, a person like the third respondent's husband would be working in an establishment even though he is working away from the main beedi factory. when sec. 2(e) of the gratuity act refers to a person employed on wages in an establishment, it must cover a person like the third respondent's husband also, who was working in an establishment within the meaning of sec. 2(h) of the beedi act. the authorities, therefore, rightly held that the third respondent was entitled to the gratuity. 10. a view similar to the one that i have taken is, earlier taken by a division bench of the gujarat high court in patel hiralal ramlal and co. v. smt. chandbibi pirubhai, 1981 lab. ic 790. 11. sri somasekhar, learned counsel for the petitioner, refers to sections 28, 37, 38 and 39 of the beedi act by which respectively, payment of wages act, 1936, industrial employment (standing orders) act, 1946, maternity benefit act, 1961, factories act, 1948 and industrial disputes act, 1947, were specifically made applicable to the beedi and cigar workers. sri somasekhar therefore urges that, when these enactments are specifically referred to as applicable to the said workers, and when the gratuity act is not so referred to, it must be said that, by implication, the gratuity act is not made applicable. this question no longer arises for consideration for the reason that as earlier noted, by virtue of section 1(3)(b) of the gratuity act, the said act is held applicable even to the workers under the beedi act. reference is already made in this regard to a decision of the supreme court in the labour court's case, supra, and of the bombay high court in b. n. sarda's case, supra. 12. sri s. v. shastry, learned counsel for respondent 3, also referred to a decision of the supreme court in m/s. p. m. patel and sons v. union of india 1985 ii clr 322, wherein the supreme court held the provident funds act as being applicable to 'home workers' like third respondent's husband under the beedi act. sri somasekhar, learned counsel for the petitioner however points out that, that was for the reason that the definition of 'employee' under section 2(f) of the provident funds act covered not only the persons working in the establishment, but also those working in or in connection with the work of the establishment, and, as such, the said decision will be of no help in respect of section 2(e) of the gratuity act which specifically refers to employees working in an establishment, and does not refer to employees working in connection with the work of the establishment also. it is true, the supreme court, in the said decision, laid emphasis on this aspect of the definition of 'employees' under section 2(f) of the provident funds act, namely, the said definition covering not only the employees working in the establishment, but also those working in connection with the work of the establishment. 'home worker' like the third respondent's husband as already discussed, is very much a person working in the establishment within the meaning of section 2(e) of the gratuity act since, the place that he rolls the beedies, though situated away from the beedi factory, is nevertheless a part of the establishment within the meaning of section 2(h) of the beedi act, as already discussed. therefore, when the third respondent's husband was rolling beedies at his place which is also a part of the establishment, then, for the purpose of section 2(e) of the gratuity act, he was working in an establishment, and as such, he is an employee within the meaning of section 2(e) of the gratuity act. 13. petition is dismissed. if the amount concerned is not yet disbursed by the controlling authority to the third respondent, it shall be paid to the third respondent within three months from today.

Judgment:
ORDER

G. Patri Basavana Goud, J.

1. The third respondent's husband was a 'home worker', and, as such, an employee within the meaning of Section 2(f)(i) of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 ('Beedi Act' for short). On his death, his widow, the third respondent applied to the concerned authorities under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 ('Gratuity Act' for short) for payment of gratuity in respect of her husband who had been a 'home worker' for over thirty years prior to his death. Petitioner-Management of M/s. Bagi Beedi Factory, Hubli, contended that the husband of third respondent, though a 'home worker' and an employee within the meaning of Section 2(f)(i) of the Beedi Act, was not an 'employee' within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Gratuity Act, and, as such, the third respondent was not entitled to gratuity sought for. The authorities rejected this contention of the employer and passed an order in favour of the third respondent. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, Petitioner-employer seeks quashing of the said order.

2. The facts are not in dispute. Third respondent's husband had been, at the instance of the petitioner-employer, rolling beedies in his house and delivering them at the premises of the employer and to the satisfaction of the employer. He did so for over thirty years. If he can be called an employee within the meaning of the Gratuity Act, there is no doubt that his widow would be entitled to gratuity as ordered by the authorities. The only question that, therefore, arises is whether an employee like the husband of third respondent could be called an 'employee' under the Gratuity Act.

3. Certain definitions, both under the Beedi Act and Gratuity Act, as also the definition of 'employee' under the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 ('Provident Funds Act', for short) may be extracted.

Section 2(f)(i) of the Beedi Act. -

(f) 'employee' means a person employed directly or through any agency, whether for wages or not, in any establishment to do any work, skilled, unskilled, manual or clerical, and includes -

(i) any labourer who is given raw material by any employer or a contractor for being made into beedi or cigar or both at home (hereinafter referred to in this Act as 'home worker').

Section 2(h) of the Beedi Act. -

'establishment' means any place or premises including the precincts thereof in which or in any part of which any manufacturing process connected with the making of beedi or cigar or both is being, or is ordinarily, carried on and includes an industrial premises.

Section 2(i) of the Beedi Act. -

'industrial premises' means any place or premises (not being a private dwelling-house), including the precincts thereof, in which or in any part of which any industry or manufacturing process connected with the making of beedi or cigar or both is being, or is ordinarily, carried on with or without the aid of power.

Section 3 of the Beedi Act. -

'Industrial premises to be licensed - Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no employer shall use or allow to be used any place or premises as an industrial premises unless he holds a valid licence issued under this Act and no such premises shall be used except in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence'.

Section 1(3)(b) of the Gratuity Act. -

'(3) It shall apply to

(a) ........

(b) every shop or establishment within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in relation to shops and establishments in a State, in which ten or more persons are employed, or were employed, on any day of the preceding twelve months.'

Section 2(6) of the Gratuity Act. -

'2. Definitions - In this Act unless the context otherwise requires

- (a) to (d) .....,

(e) 'employees' mean any person (other than an apprentice) employed on wages, in any establishment, factory, mine, oil field, plantation, railway company or shop, to do any skilled, semi skilled, or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work, whether the terms of such employment are express or implied, and whether or not such person is employed in a managerial or administrative capacity, but does not include any such person who holds a post under the Central Government or a State Government and is governed by any other Act or by any rules providing for payment of gratuity'.

Section 2(f)(i) of the Provident Funds Act. -

'2. Definitions - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires

- (a) to (e) ......

(f) 'employee' means any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an establishment, and who gets his wages directly or indirectly from the employer, and includes any person -

(i) employed by or through a contractor in or in connection with the work of the establishment'.

4. It is a settled position that an establishment within the meaning of the Beedi Act is an establishment to which, by virtue of Section 1(3)(b) of the Gratuity Act, provisions of the said Gratuity Act would apply. Reference may be made in this regard to a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. The Labour Court, Jullundur and Others : (1981)ILLJ354SC . Following this decision of the Supreme Court, a Division Bench of Bombay High Court also held so in B. N. Sarda Private Limited v. Kisan K. Borade 1981 Lab.IC 911 (Bom.).

5. If some one could be called an 'employee' within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Gratuity Act, as could be seen from its definition above, he should be an employee on wages in an establishment, apart from fulfilling other conditions referred to thereunder.

6. The main thrust of the arguments of Sri Somasekhar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, is this : It is true, the third respondent's husband was an employee within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Beedi Act. That was because, even though he was not working in the establishment of the petitioner, he was nevertheless brought within the provisions of the said definition by virtue of sub-clause (i) of clause (f) of Section 2 of the Beedi Act, employees of his nature having been brought thereunder in the peculiar circumstances as 'home workers', they being those who would get raw materials from the employer, take the said raw materials to their homes and bring back the finished products to the satisfaction of the employer - all these being done for wages. Sri Somasekhar thus seeks to make a distinction between someone being an employee for the purpose of the Gratuity Act, from some one being an employee for the purpose of the Beedi Act. Sri Somasekhar urges that since the Gratuity Act emphasises that, for a person to be considered as an employee, he ought to be working in an establishment, that means, within the precincts of the establishment, and since a 'home worker' like the third respondent's husband working at his home, cannot be said to be a person working in the establishment of the petitioner-Beedi Factory, he cannot be called an employee for the purpose of Gratuity Act, though he could be called an employee for the purpose of 'Beedi Act by virtue of sub-clause (i) of clause (f) of Section 2 of the Beedi Act. Learned Counsel for the third respondent, Sri S. V. Shastry, on the other hand, points out that, under the Beedi Act, 'establishment' is defined to mean not merely an industrial premises in which manufacturing process is carried on, but also the premises in which any part of such manufacturing process connected with the making of beedies is carried on. Sri S. V. Shastry, pointedly referred to the fact that the definition of 'establishment' in Section 2(h) of the Beedi Act is an inclusive definition and it includes industrial premises as defined under Section 2(i) of the Beedi Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri Somasekhar, submits that the definition of establishment under the Beedi Act cannot be imported for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of the Gratuity Act since, under the Gratuity Act, 'establishment' is not defined, and, in this regard, he refers to a decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Others v. R. C. Jain and Others : (1981)ILLJ402SC , wherein the Supreme Court disapproved of the definition of the expression in one Act being imported into another.

7. The Supreme Court, in R. C. Jain's case, referred to above, found that the expression 'Local Authority' had not been defined in the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, with which Act, it had been dealing in the said case. Supreme Court, therefore, turned to Sec. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, for Sec. 3(31) defines 'Local Authority'. It was in that context that the Supreme Court disapproved of borrowing the definition of 'Local Authority' in enactments such as the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, etc., as the High Court had done. The definition of establishment' under Sec. 2(h) of the Beedi Act, if to be referred for the purpose of Sec. 2(e) of the Gratuity Act, must be done so if it could be done without offending the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the said decision in R. C. Jain's case, supra.

8. Sec. 1(3)(b) of the Gratuity Act, as found earlier, has made applicable the provisions of the Gratuity Act to an establishment under the Beedi Act also. 'Establishment' is not defined in the Gratuity Act. It is also not defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897. This being the position, and by virtue of Sec. 1(3)(b) of the Gratuity Act, if the provisions of the Gratuity Act are made applicable to an 'establishment' under the Beedi Act also, in my opinion, we have to inevitably see as to whether a particular person, in respect of whom gratuity is claimed, is a person working in such an establishment in order to be called an employee within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Gratuity Act. It is thus permissible to refer to the definition of 'establishment' under Sec. 2(h) of the Beedi Act, for the purpose of construing whether a person is an employee within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Gratuity Act.

9. As noted earlier, the main premises wherein beedi manufacturing process could be said to be carried on, and as such, is an 'industrial premises' within the meaning of Sec. 2(i) of the Beedi Act, could be referred to as 'M/s. Bagi Beedi Factory, Kanchagar Galli, Hubli'. That would be the industrial premises in respect of which, petitioner would have obviously taken licence under Sec. 4 of the Act. The persons working in the said industrial premises would be employees within the meaning of clause (f) of Sec. 2 of the Beedi Act. But, the 'establishment' as defined under Sec. 2(h) of the Beedi Act has a much wider meaning in as much as, it not only includes the said industrial premises as defined under Sec. 2(i), but also any other premises in which any part of the manufacturing process connected with making of the beedi is carried on. The place where third respondent's husband had been rolling beedies is, therefore, such a place wherein part of manufacturing process connected with making of beedies, was being carried on. The said place also, therefore, is an 'establishment' within the meaning of Sec. 2(h) of the Beedi Act. It is in this context that, even persons like third respondent's husband, though working away from the main Beedi Factory, are nevertheless brought within the definition of 'employees' as a special category as 'home workers' by virtue of sub-clause (i) of clause (f) of Sec. 2 of the Beedi Act. Therefore, a person like the third respondent's husband would be working in an establishment even though he is working away from the main Beedi Factory. When Sec. 2(e) of the Gratuity Act refers to a person employed on wages in an establishment, it must cover a person like the third respondent's husband also, who was working in an establishment within the meaning of Sec. 2(h) of the Beedi Act. The authorities, therefore, rightly held that the third respondent was entitled to the gratuity.

10. A view similar to the one that I have taken is, earlier taken by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Patel Hiralal Ramlal and Co. v. Smt. Chandbibi Pirubhai, 1981 Lab. IC 790.

11. Sri Somasekhar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, refers to Sections 28, 37, 38 and 39 of the Beedi Act by which respectively, Payment of Wages Act, 1936, Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, Factories Act, 1948 and Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, were specifically made applicable to the beedi and cigar workers. Sri Somasekhar therefore urges that, when these enactments are specifically referred to as applicable to the said workers, and when the Gratuity Act is not so referred to, it must be said that, by implication, the Gratuity Act is not made applicable. This question no longer arises for consideration for the reason that as earlier noted, by virtue of Section 1(3)(b) of the Gratuity Act, the said Act is held applicable even to the workers under the Beedi Act. Reference is already made in this regard to a decision of the Supreme Court in the Labour Court's case, supra, and of the Bombay High Court in B. N. Sarda's case, supra.

12. Sri S. V. Shastry, learned Counsel for Respondent 3, also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. P. M. Patel and Sons v. Union of India 1985 II CLR 322, wherein the Supreme Court held the Provident Funds Act as being applicable to 'home workers' like third respondent's husband under the Beedi Act. Sri Somasekhar, learned Counsel for the petitioner however points out that, that was for the reason that the definition of 'employee' under Section 2(f) of the Provident Funds Act covered not only the persons working in the establishment, but also those working in or in connection with the work of the establishment, and, as such, the said decision will be of no help in respect of Section 2(e) of the Gratuity Act which specifically refers to employees working in an establishment, and does not refer to employees working in connection with the work of the establishment also. It is true, the Supreme Court, in the said decision, laid emphasis on this aspect of the definition of 'employees' under Section 2(f) of the Provident Funds Act, namely, the said definition covering not only the employees working in the establishment, but also those working in connection with the work of the establishment. 'Home worker' like the third respondent's husband as already discussed, is very much a person working in the establishment within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Gratuity Act since, the place that he rolls the beedies, though situated away from the Beedi Factory, is nevertheless a part of the establishment within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Beedi Act, as already discussed. Therefore, when the third respondent's husband was rolling beedies at his place which is also a part of the establishment, then, for the purpose of Section 2(e) of the Gratuity Act, he was working in an establishment, and as such, he is an employee within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Gratuity Act.

13. Petition is dismissed.

If the amount concerned is not yet disbursed by the Controlling Authority to the third respondent, it shall be paid to the third respondent within three months from today.