The State by Police Inspector Vs. V. Sejappa S/O. Veeranna, Asst. Executive Engineer, No. 2 Well Boring Sub-division - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
criminal - corruption - section 19 of prevention of corruption act(act) - appeal filed against acquittal of respondent by trial court who was accused of offences under act - held, in instant case respondent was caught red handed while taking bribe - for initiating proceeding under act prosecution took prior sanction of authority as required under section 19 of act - hence, acquittal by trial court deserves to be quashed - appeal quashed - code of criminal procedure, 1973 [c.a. no. 2/1974]. sections 386 & 378: [v. jagannathan, j] appeal against acquittal - appellate court has got power to re-appreciate and reweigh evidence and come to its own conclusion. indian evidence act,1872[c.a.no.1/1872]-- section 3: [v. jagannathan, j] appreciation of evidence - hostile witness held, his evidence cannot be ignored in totality. where the hostile witness is not supporting prosecution case in certain minor aspects which has no bearing on prosecution case, said portion of evidence can be rejected. part of evidence which supports prosecution case will have to be accepted. - ramakrishna retired on 31.10.1997 as special grade junior engineer, well broil boring sub-division of p. , if read together, do not give any impression that the witnesses were reliable and trustworthy as there were several omissions in the evidence of pw-1. the delay in lodging the complaint coupled with the prosecution having not been successful in proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused made his initial demand on 9.12.1997, all these factors were taken together by the trial court and it acquitted the accused of all the offences for which he had been charged. p31 in proper, perspective and lost sight of the fact that the sanction order itself clearly mentions about the factors and material considered by the sanctioning authority i. act, unless it is shown that there is failure of justice, any error or omissions or irregularity in the sanction that is required under sub-section 1 of section 19 cannot have the effect of reversing the sentence passed by a spl. however, it was contended that if for some reasons the sanction order is found to be bad in law that will not render the entire proceedings void. as far as the finding of the trial court that the prosecution has failed to establish that the accused made initial demand on 9.12.97 is concerned, it is submitted that the trial court once again did not properly appreciate the evidence on record and the attendance register ex. p16 produced before the trial court clearly shows that the accused did not sign the attendance between 4th and 8th of december, 1997 and therefore the finding that the accused was attending seminar at bangalore between 8.12.97 and 10.12.97 cannot be accepted and further nothing prevented the accused to produce the documents in proof of he having been deputed to attend the seminar at bangalore. further submission made is that there is nothing like initial demand to be made in order to attract the provisions of section 7 of the p. 11. therefore it is urged that this conduct of the accused clearly shows that he only wanted to cover up his act by putting up a new theory during the trap mahazar and pw-2 colluded with the accused by repeating the same version in his evidence. hence, such an inconsistent stand or defence taken by the accused cannot be permitted and as such the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the demand as well as the acceptance of the illegal gratification by the accused or. 515, 2004 scc (cri) 908, air 1973 sc 2131 and also to the karnataka high court rules, 1969 as well as to the karnataka criminal rules practice, 1969. 15. on the other hand, sri. as regards the demand made by the accused on 9.12.97 is concerned, it is submitted that the trial court has rightly held that the prosecution has failed to prove the initial demand made by the accused on 9.12.97 and the evidence of the prosecution witnesses will make it clear that on the said date, the accused was not present in his office at chitradurga but he was attending seminar at bangalore and in this connection ex. therefore once the prosecution has failed to prove the initial demand said to have been made by the accused on 9.12.97, there can be no cause of action and as such the trial court was justified in not accepting the case of the prosecution. reference was also made to the evidence of the trap officer as well as the other witnesses and to submit that his evidence is not very clear as to where the money has been kept and whether it was found in the drawer or in the diary is not clear. referring to the prosecution pleadings that pw-1 has turned hostile, it was submitted that pw-1 cannot be termed as a reliable witness and the veracity of this testimony cannot be accepted and yet the trial court has rejected the evidence of pw-1-the complainant and other witnesses. if the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. 24. pw-1 has clearly stated that the accused used his right hand for taking the tainted currency notes from the table and also for keeping the said amount in the diary as well as keeping the diary in the drawer of the table. 31 of the paper book, the reasons for treating the pw-1 as hostile are clearly stated and they are the contradictions in the previous submissions made by the complainant with regard to the date of submitting the application for encashment of e. 27. as far as the acceptance of evidence of the hostile witness is concerned, it is a well settled law that that part of the hostile witness which goes well with the prosecution case can be accepted and rejecting only that portion of the evidence which does not support the prosecution case. but, leaving that apart, in other respects, insofar as the preparation of the entrustment mahazar is concerned as well as the trap mahazar being drawn as per ex. 34. the other witnesses examined by the prosecution complete the other aspects of the investigation, like p. p-2 entrustment mahazar as well as ex. 36. the discrepancies in the evidence of these witnesses are not very vital in nature so as to take the view that the discrepancies are of that magnitude which will render the testimony of these witnesses unreliable or untrustworthy. on 17.12.1997. the learned counsel for the respondent as well as the learned trial judge have taken the consistent stand that there was no possibility of the accused or any other official coming to the office before 10.30 a. p-20 clearly establish the fact of the accused being present in his office when the complainant went and met him in his chambers and that the accused accepted the amount of rs. 160 in his 313 statement, has clearly stated that the reason for lodging the complaint against him by p. 1 as well as through the evidence of the i. p-20 trap mahazar, we will not fail to notice that the accused is also a signatory to the said document ex. 43. as far as the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent that the prosecution had failed to prove the fact of initial demand made by the accused is concerned, as rightly submitted by the learned special prosecutor for the state, the concept of initial demand and final demand does not find a place in section 7 of the prevention of corruption act, 1988. the said section reads thus: p-20. hence, i do not find any infirmity in the prosecution case with regard to failure to prove the initial demand made by the accused. no doubt, it is contended by the learned special prosecutor that the very fact that the accused has not signed the attendance register between 4.12.1997 and 10.12.1997, that itself cannot give room to take the view that the accused was officially absent on 9.12.1997. 46. in the like manner, even the accused has not placed any document to show that he was on other duties or that he was deputed to attend a seminar at bangalore on the said date. there fore, notwithstanding the prosecution having proved its case insofar as the demand and acceptance of the illegal gratification by the accused, yet, the success or failure of the prosecution case depends on the validity of sanction. it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out constituting the offence. any case instituted without a proper sanction must fail because this being a manifest defect in the prosecution, the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio, what the court has to see is whether or not the sanctioning authority at the time of giving sanction was aware of the facts constituting the offence and applied its mind for the same; under section 19(3)(a) of 1988 act no order of conviction and sentence can be reversed or altered by a court of appeal or revision even 'on the ground of absence or sanction' unless in the opinion of that court a failure of justice has bean occasioned thereby. tarachand jain 1973crilj1396 ,the apex court has observed that where the facts constituting the offence appear on the face of the sanction order accorded by the chief minister, it is not necessary for the prosecution to lead separate evidence to show that relevant facts were placed before the chief minister and hence, it cannot be said that the prosecution has failed to prove that the chief minister has accorded his sanction, after applying his mind to the facts of the case. 782, the supreme court has held that where there was no material placed to show failure of justice occasioned due to error or irregularity in sanction, the order setting aside conviction was liable to be set-aside. 2, veil boring sub-division, chitradurga. 2, well boring sub-division, chitradurga, appeared before the police inspector, lokayuktha, chitradurga, and complained that sri. 2 well boring sub-division, phe, chitradurga in cr. 2 veil boring sub-division, chitradurga (now under suspension) for the above said offences under section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the pc act, 1988. 65. on going through the contents of the said sanction order, it becomes clear that the government after considering the material placed before it and after examining the documents furnished in respect of the said proceedings and in the circumstances of the case came to the conclusion that the respondent has to be prosecuted in a court of law. i therefore, hold that the finding of the trial court that the sanction order is invalid cannot be sustained both on facts as well as in law and in particular the reasoning given is contrary to the law laid down by the apex court in this regard. the second requirement is satisfied in the instant case by the production of ex. p-20 is the trap mahazar which clearly reveals that the respondent-accused had the first opportunity to make use of, to show his defence if at all the complainant had a grouse against the accused as stated by the accused in his reply to 313 statement. state of kerala 2004 scc (cri) 981 has observed that where the accused failed to make a mention of the advance payment of sales tax due from pw1 for which an official receipt was issued, failure of the accused to mention the said fact to the i. air i960 sc 672. it vas held that where the evidence of the police officer who led the trap was found to be reliable, corroboration is not necessary. 74. on careful analysis of the entire evidence on record, in the light of the proposition of law laid down by the apex court both with regard to the requirement of a valid sanction order and appreciation of evidence of the trap officer, in the instant case, the testimony of pv1the complainant has bean, well supported by the evidence of the investigating officer pw12 in all material aspects 'and pw2 in particular also supports the prosecution case insofar as the respondent accepted rs. 75. the learned trial judge, therefore, erred in not only failing to appreciate the evidence in proper perspective, but also failed to karnataka note of the admissible evidence placed by the prosecution with regard to the accused receiving rs. therefore, the very conduct of the respondent militates against the spirit of the concept of 'public servant'.84. though there have been several legislations in place like the prevention of corruption act, 1988, to prevent public servants from accepting any gratification other then legal remuneration, cases of such nature continue to come up before the courts. i am therefore, compelled to make certain suggestions to the government in order to ensure that public servants discharge their duties befitting the status assigned to them as 'public servant' and this endeavour is made, only with the good hope that such steps will go a long way in preventing the public servant from accepting any gratification other than the legal remuneration not only from their own office colleagues, but even from a member of the public. since it is said that today's child is the future citizen of tomorrow, it is necessary to inculcate values like honesty and integrity in the minds of the children when they are still young so that these values become part of their life and when they grow up, they will stand by the values. though it is said that it is very difficult to change the mind set of an adult, yet, exposure to the need for inculcating such values still can have salutary effect and it will not be too late in ones life to change ones attitude towards the good. lectures from well known speakers on personality development and an opportunity to study or listen to the lives of great people who have walked on this earth would also inspire the officials to follow their foot steps.v. jagannathan, j.1. the state by lokayuktha police inspector has preferred this appeal challenging the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned spl. judge, chitradurga, by which judgment, the trial court had acquitted the respondent/accused of the offences punishable under sections 7, 13(1)(d) r/w section 13(2) of the prevention of corruption act, 1988 ('p.c. act' in short).2. one n. ramakrishna retired on 31.10.1997 as special grade junior engineer, well broil boring sub-division of p.w.d., chitradurga and he approached the respondent/accused v. sejappa, who was then working as asst. executive engineer in the said office and requested the respondent to issue no objection certificate which was required to be submitted to the accountant general's office in order to enable the above said ramakrishna to get his service benefits namely leave encashment benefit, d.c.r.g. and settlement of his pension. the complainant ramakrishna approached the respondent in this regard on 9.12.1997 and on the said date, the respondent demanded a sum of rs. 5,000/- as illegal gratification in order to issue no objection certificate for doing the official favour to enable the complainant to get his pension and other retirement benefits. the complainant was not willing to give the amount so demanded by the respondent/accused. he therefore lodged a complaint with the lokayuktha police on 16.12.1997 and a necessary preparation to trap the accused was made. on 17.12.1997, the complainant went to the office of the accused and between 10.15 a.m. and 10.25 a.m., the accused demanded and accepted illegal gratification of rs. 5,000/- from the complainant and the police officials who were among the raiding party were successful in trapping the accused and it was found that the accused after accepting the amount of rs. 5,000/- kept it in his diary.3. when the lokayuktha police raided the office of the accused, they recovered the said amount of rs. 5,000/- from the accused and the accused also tested positive when his right hand was immersed in the sodium carbonate solution. on completion of the investigation and recording of statements of the shadow witness pw-2, pw-8 the under secretary to the government in connection with the sanction order and pw-12 h.s. gangadharappa, the i.o., and other witnesses, charge sheet was submitted against the accused/respondent for the offences as above mentioned.4. in order to establish its case, the prosecution examined in all 12 witnesses and documents exs. p1 to p34 were marked and m.os 1 to 18 were produced during the trial. after recording the statements of the accused under section 313 of the cr.p.c., he produced the documents exs. d1 to d8 in support of his case defence and did not choose to lead any evidence on his behalf. the learned spl. judge on appreciating the evidence on record found that the prosecution case suffered from several infirmities. at the threshold, the trial court found that the sanction order itself was not valid and secondly, the complainant (pw-1) and the shadow witness (pw-2) did not support the prosecution case. it is further observed that the evidence of pws 1, 2 and 3 and that of the i.o., if read together, do not give any impression that the witnesses were reliable and trustworthy as there were several omissions in the evidence of pw-1. the delay in lodging the complaint coupled with the prosecution having not been successful in proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused made his initial demand on 9.12.1997, all these factors were taken together by the trial court and it acquitted the accused of all the offences for which he had been charged. being aggrieved by the order of acquittal of the accused passed by the trial court the state/lokayuktha police has preferred this appeal.5. i have heard sri. s.g. rajendra raddy, learned spl. counsel for the appellant/lokayuktha and sri. s.v. tilgul, learned counsel for the respondent and carefully perused the entire material on record.6. the learned spl. prosecutor for the lokayuktha, sri. s.g. rajendra reddy, assailed the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court by pointing out at the outset the grounds upon which the trial court has passed its judgment of acquittal. it is submitted that the trial court erred in coming to the conclusion that the sanction order was invalid and the learned trial judge did not examine the sanction order ex. p31 in proper, perspective and lost sight of the fact that the sanction order itself clearly mentions about the factors and material considered by the sanctioning authority i.e., the government and therefore the view taken by the trial court cannot be sustained in the face of the very contents of the sanction order ex. p31. he submits that the evidence of pw-8 was placed in order to prove the sanction order and also confirms the fact that the authority concerned had applied its mind judiciously before granting sanction to prosecute the respondent/accused.7. by referring to the evidence of pw-8, it was submitted that the then p.w.d. minister has granted sanction to prosecute the accused and the sanction order was issued in the name of the government of karnataka through pw-8. therefore referring to the said evidence of pw-8 and also drawing my attention to section 19 of the p.c. act, it was submitted that by virtue of sub-section 3 of section 19 of the p.c. act, unless it is shown that there is failure of justice, any error or omissions or irregularity in the sanction that is required under sub-section 1 of section 19 cannot have the effect of reversing the sentence passed by a spl. judge or altered by a court in appeal. however, it was contended that if for some reasons the sanction order is found to be bad in law that will not render the entire proceedings void. therefore the trial court erred in recording erroneous findings as regards the validity of the sanction order is concerned. considering the delay factor, it is contended that the trial court also found fault with the prosecution because the complaint was lodged by pw-1 almost after seven days and therefore the said delay was fatal.8. it is then submitted that this view of the trial court is contrary to law and more particularly the trial court did not taken into account the type of case that it was dealing and since it is a prosecution under the p.c. act, even if there is some delay in lodging the complaint, the said delay will not affect the case of the prosecution. as far as the finding of the trial court that the prosecution has failed to establish that the accused made initial demand on 9.12.97 is concerned, it is submitted that the trial court once again did not properly appreciate the evidence on record and the attendance register ex. p16 produced before the trial court clearly shows that the accused did not sign the attendance between 4th and 8th of december, 1997 and therefore the finding that the accused was attending seminar at bangalore between 8.12.97 and 10.12.97 cannot be accepted and further nothing prevented the accused to produce the documents in proof of he having been deputed to attend the seminar at bangalore. under the said circumstances, an inference could be drawn is that the accused was very much present on. 9.12.97 when he made the demand on the complainant.9. in this connection, the evidence of pw-1 in particular was referred to. further submission made is that there is nothing like initial demand to be made in order to attract the provisions of section 7 of the p.c. act and all that the said section requires is that the prosecution will have to prove that the accused accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain from the complainant any gratification other than the legal remuneration for doing official act and therefore the question of necessity of proving initial demand does not arise and no such inference can be drawn from reading of section 7 of the p.c. act.10. as far as the accused demanding and accepting the amount on 17.12.97 is concerned, it is submitted by the learned special prosecutor that the prosecution has placed on record the trap mahazar which has been marked as ex. p20. a plain reading of the contents of that exhibit confirms the fact of the accused demanding and accepting an amount of rs. 5,000/- from the complainant although the accused has given his own version with regard to the acceptance of the said amount. referring to the explanation offered by the respondent, when the statement was recorded during the trap mahazar, it is submitted that the first explanation offered by the respondent/accused was that the amount that was received by him from the complainant was in connection with the loan taken by the complainant towards the purchase of diesel. whereas, the accused when questioned under section 313 of the cr.p.c., took a different stand and never mentioned anything about the loan taken by the complainant towards the purchase of diesel.11. therefore it is urged that this conduct of the accused clearly shows that he only wanted to cover up his act by putting up a new theory during the trap mahazar and pw-2 colluded with the accused by repeating the same version in his evidence. hence, such an inconsistent stand or defence taken by the accused cannot be permitted and as such the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the demand as well as the acceptance of the illegal gratification by the accused or. 17.12.97.12. as far as the trial court finding fault with the evidence of pw-1 with regard to certain omissions alleged to have been elicited during the cross-examination of the i.o., it is submitted that the trial court did not carefully go through the contents of the trap mahazar or the complaint in this regard and therefore the said observation of the trial court is totally perverse and contrary to the materials placed on record. hence, there is no discrepancy in the evidence of the material witnesses and the evidence of the trap officer i.e., the i.o., itself is sufficient to prove the casa of the prosecution and in the face of the evidence of the trap officer, no corroboration is also needed to prove the prosecution case. as far as the recovery of the tainted amount is concerned, referring to the record, it was submitted that the amount was recovered from the diary kept by the accused and the sodium carbonate solution test also proved to be positive and hence the prosecution has proved that the respondent/accused did demand and accepted the gratification and by virtue of the presumption available under section 20 of the p.c. act, the trial court could not have disbelieved the evidence placed by the prosecution particularly in the absence of the accused placing contrary evidence in support of the defence taken by him while the statement was recorded during the trap mahazar.13. concerning the testimony of pws 1, 2 and 3 is concerned, the learned spl. prosecutor. sri. s.g. rajendra reddy, submitted that the trial court once again committed serious error by holding that pws 1, 2 and 3 have not supported the prosecution case and this observation of the trial court cannot be sustained because pw-1 in particular has supported the case of the prosecution so far as the substratum of the prosecution case is concerned, only with regard to certain aspects of the case, the prosecution treated pw-1 as hostile, but that itself will not render this testimony being rejected, only because he did not support the prosecution to certain extant.14. therefore, it was argued that the appreciation of the evidence the trial court is erroneous and contrary to the evidence on record and the approach of the trial court in a case of this nature ought to have been slightly different than the approach in a normal criminal case, and as such the said wrongful approach has led unjustified acquittal of the accused. in support of the above submissions, the learned spl. prosecutor placed, reliance on the following decisions reported in 2005 (1) kccr 166, ilr 2004 kar 3058, 2004 scc (cri) 981, (2007) 3 scc 475, 2001 crl. l.j. 515, 2004 scc (cri) 908, air 1973 sc 2131 and also to the karnataka high court rules, 1969 as well as to the karnataka criminal rules practice, 1969.15. on the other hand, sri. s.v. tilgul, learned counsel for the respondent supported the findings of the trial court in all respects and submitted that the trial court has taken great pains to discuss the evidence in minute details and as such its reasoning cannot be faulted and the findings recorded are in accordance with the evidence on record. as far as the sanction order is concerned, the submission made is that the trial court has rightly held that the sanction order is invalid and the decision referred to by the trial court aptly applies to the case on hand as regards the non-application of mind by the sanctioning authority and the evidence of pw-8 also reveals that he is not the competent authority to take a decision relating to grant of sanction to prosecute the accused. it is submitted that the sanction order is not an empty formality and it has to be issued by fulfilling all the requirements of law as laid down by the apex court and once the sanction order is found to be invalid, no cognizance can be taken by virtue of section 19 of the p.c. act. therefore, no fault can be found with the conclusion arrived at by the trial court with regard to the sanction order being invalid in law.16. as far as the ground urged by the appellant's counsel with regard to the validity of the sanction order is concerned, it is submitted that a perusal of the appeal grounds will make it clear that the appellant/state has not taken any ground concerning the validity of the sanction order. he further submits that the said ground cannot be permitted to be urged now by the appellant's counsel. as regards the demand made by the accused on 9.12.97 is concerned, it is submitted that the trial court has rightly held that the prosecution has failed to prove the initial demand made by the accused on 9.12.97 and the evidence of the prosecution witnesses will make it clear that on the said date, the accused was not present in his office at chitradurga but he was attending seminar at bangalore and in this connection ex. d2 was referred to. therefore once the prosecution has failed to prove the initial demand said to have been made by the accused on 9.12.97, there can be no cause of action and as such the trial court was justified in not accepting the case of the prosecution. as far as the complaint is concerned, it is submitted that complaint was lodged on 16.12.97 after a delay of 7 days and no reasons are forthcoming as to why the complainant took such a long time. therefore the possibility of the complainant trying to fix the accused cannot be ruled out.17. hence, it is urged that the tainted money being recovered from, the accused is nothing but a false case having been foisted on the accused. this submission was elaborated by referring to the evidence to contend that it is the case of the prosecution that on 17.12.97, the amount was demanded and accepted by the accused between 10.10 a.m. and. 10.25 a.m. and the question of the accused or any other official coming to the office at that hour is impossible because the office work starts only at 10.30 a.m. therefore the trial court has accepted the arguments of the accused in this regard and has rightly held that it is impossible for anyone to arrive at the office prior to 10.30 a.m. and hence, a false case has been foisted by the complainant with the help of the trap officers to implicate the accused. reference was also made to the evidence of the trap officer as well as the other witnesses and to submit that his evidence is not very clear as to where the money has been kept and whether it was found in the drawer or in the diary is not clear. apart from this, several omissions and improvements have been found in the evidence of pw-1 and these defects have been brought out during the cross-examination of the i.o. and hence pw-1 cannot be believed as a truthful witness.18. regarding the trap mahazar is concerned, it is argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that no panch witness was examined and therefore the trap mahazar ex. p20 cannot be said to have been proved in so far as the contents of the trap mahazar axe concerned. non-examination of panch witness therefore renders ex. p20 unworthy of acceptance. referring to the prosecution pleadings that pw-1 has turned hostile, it was submitted that pw-1 cannot be termed as a reliable witness and the veracity of this testimony cannot be accepted and yet the trial court has rejected the evidence of pw-1-the complainant and other witnesses.19. thus it is contended in conclusion by the learned counsel sri. s.v. tilgul, for the respondent that the appreciation of the evidence by the trial court cannot be termed as perverse. but en the other hand, the learned spl. judge has left no stone unturned in assessing the evidence on record and therefore no inference is called for against the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court. to support the above submission, the learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the decisions reported in 1984 crl. l.j. 1809, ilr 2004 kar 3058, 2001 kccr 1905, air 1979 sc 677 and air 1958 sc 124.20. having heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the respective parties and taking note of the decisions referred to by both the sides, the points that arise for my consideration in this appeal is(a) whether the appellant has made out a case for this court to interfere with the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court and(b) whether it can toe said that there are compelling reasons to interfere with the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court?21. before i proceed to analyse the material on record in the light of the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the parties, i deem it proper to refer to the preposition of law laid down by the apex court with regard to the interference by the appellate court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial court. in the case of anil kumar v. state of u.p. 2005 supreme court cases (cri) 170, the apex court has observed thus:9. there is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused to be adopted. the paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. a miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. in a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. (see bhagwan singh v. state of m.p.) the principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. if the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. these aspects were highlighted by this court in shivaji sahabrao bobade v. state of maharastra, ramesh babulal doshi v. state of gujarat, jaswant singh v. state of haryana, raj kishore jha v. state of bihar, state of punjab v. karnail singh, state of punjab v. phola singh and suchand pal v. phani pal.keeping the above parameters of law in view i proceed to examine the contentions put forward having regard to the evidence placed before the trial court.22. it is the specific case of the prosecution that the accused demanded rs. 5,000/- from the complainant in order to issue n.o.c. to enable the complainant to get pensionary benefits from the accountant general's office and on 9.12.1997, the complainant approached the accused and the demand was made as above. thereafter, the complainant vent to lokayuktha office and lodged a complaint as per ex. p1. it was again on 17.12.97, the accused made the demand and accepted the amount of rs. 5,000/- from the complainant and the lokayuktha police trapped the accused. pw-1 n. ramakrishna is the complainant and he has deposed in his evidence that on 9.12.97, ha met the accused and requested him for sanding the n.o.c. to a.gs office for payment of d.c.r.g. and in that connection, the accused demanded rs. 5,000/- as illegal gratification, which amount pw-1 was not willing to give to the accused. he further deposed to the effect that on 16.12.97, he lodged a complaint with the lokayuktha police as par ex. p1 and on 17.12.97, ha want to the lokayuktha office where the procedure concerning the entrustment mahazar was conducted as per ex. p2.23. than pw-1 goes on to depose in para-7 of his evidence that at about 10.05 a.m. on 17.12.1997 he along with raiding party consisting of pw-2 obadiah, pv-3 srinivas and other staff along with dy. s.p. went to the office of the accused and pw-1 along with pw-2 entered the office of the asst. executive engineer and pw-1 went inside the chamber of the accused and saluted him and then the accused asked him whether he had brought the amount and on being told the amount has been brought, pw-1 kept the tainted currency notes worth rs. 5,000/- on the table in front of the accused and the accused took the tainted currency notes and kept it inside the diary and than the diary was kept inside the drawer of the table which was in front of the accused.24. pw-1 has clearly stated that the accused used his right hand for taking the tainted currency notes from the table and also for keeping the said amount in the diary as well as keeping the diary in the drawer of the table. the accused than told pw-1 that if the amount had bean given earlier, the papers concerning n.o.c. could have been cleared much earlier and sent to the accountant general's office. thereafter, pw-1 goes on to depose about the police inspector and other trap officers coming to the place after seeing the signal given by the complainant and then the police inspector questioned the accused to bring the diary which contained currency notes and kept the diary in front of the police inspector. later on, the police inspector asked pw-3 to count the tainted currency notes. pw-3 verified the same and ha confirmed that the tainted currency notes tally with the numbers found in the entrustment mahazar. this witness also deposed about the test conducted on the accused being positive when the right hand of the accused was dipped into the sodium carbonate solution and the solution turning pink.25. pw-1 was extensively cross-examined on behalf of the respondent/accused and the witness has reiterated that on 17.12.97, he went and met the accused in his chamber and also confirms about the accused asking for the amount and the said amount of rs. 5,000/- being given to the accused and on being placed on the table and then the accused, putting it into the diary and then keeping the diary inside the table drawer. it has also been brought out in the cross-examination of pw-1 that between the dates 8.12.1997 and 10.12.1997, the accused had not attended the office as per the attendance register and that in the diary ex. p19, it is mentioned that the accused had taken a delivery of van on 10.12.97 and the very same documents has also mentioned that the accused has attended the meeting in the divisional office on 8.12.97. however, pw-1 has not accepted the suggestion put to him that the accused was not in his office on 9.12.97 and that. pw-1 did not meat the accused.26. as far as pw-1 being treated as hostile, is concerned the cross-examination of pw-1, it cannot be said that pw-1 did not support the prosecution case in its entirety as has been pointed out by the learned. spl. prosecutor for the state and that only in regard to certain aspects of the prosecution case that the complainant was treated as hostile. at page no. 31 of the paper book, the reasons for treating the pw-1 as hostile are clearly stated and they are the contradictions in the previous submissions made by the complainant with regard to the date of submitting the application for encashment of e.l. and likewise the date of submission of the application for settlement of pension and finally for not coming to give the correct evidence with regard to the identification of the bottles said to contain the resultant hand wash of pw-3-srinivas and the accused. therefore it is not possible to show having regard to the totality of the evidence given by pw-1 that he did not support the prosecution case in its entirety. but on the other hand, it is only with regard to certain aspects referred to above that the witness was treated as hostile.27. as far as the acceptance of evidence of the hostile witness is concerned, it is a well settled law that that part of the hostile witness which goes well with the prosecution case can be accepted and rejecting only that portion of the evidence which does not support the prosecution case. therefore applying such yardstick in the instant case, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the evidence of pw-1 has to be ignored in totality merely because of a witness not supporting the prosecution case in certain minor aspects which do not have any bearing on the core of the prosecution case.28. p.w. 2 n. obadiah is the shadow witness and he accompanied the raiding party to the office of the accused and this witness corroborates the testimony of p.w. 1 in regard to p.w. 1 meeting the accused on 17.12.1997 in hi a office and p.w. 1 giving rs. 5,000/- (ten currency notes of rs. 500/- denomination) to the accused. however, p.w. 2 says that though the amount was given by p.w. 1 to the accused, the said amount was given on the ground that p.w. 1 was giving back the amount which he had taken from the accused for purchase of diesel. this witness also confirms that the police inspector found rs. 5,000/- i.e., tainted currency notes, in the official diary of the accused and the right hand wash of the accused also testing positive while immersed in sodium carbonate solution. further, ha goes on to confirm, that ex. p-20 trap mahazar was drawn and he signed it.29. p.w. 2 was also treated hostile insofar as the reason given by him with regard to the amount that was accepted by the accused. whether the version given by p.w. 2 is the true version or not is the matter to be analysed a little later. but, leaving that apart, in other respects, insofar as the preparation of the entrustment mahazar is concerned as well as the trap mahazar being drawn as per ex. p-20 and p.w. 1 giving the amount of rs. 5,000/- to the accused by placing it on the table and the same amount being put into the diary by the accused and later on the diary being recovered by the police and the hand wash of the accused testing positive are concerned, the said evidence of p.w. 2 corroborates the evidence of p.w. 1 and so also the prosecution case in that regard. therefore, on the vary sauna analogy of accepting the evidence of a hostile witness to the extent that it supports the prosecution case, the testimony of p.w. 2 also will have to be accepted in regard to that part of the evidence, which supports the prosecution case.30. p.w. 3 r.v. sreenivasa, an official working in the office of the district health & family welfare at chitradurga, corroborates the testimony of p.w. 1 with regard to the entrustment mahazar and the trap mahazar is concerned and, particularly with regard to the trap mahazar is concerned, this witness has stated that on 17.12.1997 he, along with p.w. 1 and the raiding party, went to the office of the accused and when the accused was questioned by the police inspector, the accused took out his official diary from the drawer and the diary contained currency notes and the right hand wash of the accused tested positive when dipped in sodium carbonate solution.31. though this witness was also treated hostile by the prosecution, in the cross-examination by the prosecution, p.w. 3 goes on to support the entire case of the prosecution both with regard to the entrustment mahazar and trap mahazar. he further confirms during the course of his cross-examination that when the police inspector questioned about the tainted currency notes, the official took out the official diary from the drawer of his table and kept it in front of the police inspector and the tainted currency notes were found in the said diary. in the cross-examination of this witness, nothing has been elicited serious enough so as to damage his evidence in substance is concerned.32. p.w. 12 h.s. gangadharappa is the i.o. in this case and in his evidence, he has stated that on 16.12.1997, the complainant came and lodged his complaint as par ex. p-1 and, based on that, a case was registered and the f.i.r. was sent to the special judge. as far as the trap incident is concerned, this witness has stated that on 17.12.1997, at about 8.00 a.m., p.ws. 1 to 3 came to his office and than the details of the entrustment mahazar ware explained and the mahazar was drawn as par ex. p-2. thereafter, this witness goes on to depose that they reached the office of the accused around 10.10 a.m. on the same day and took their position within the vicinity of the office and waited for the signal to coma from the complainant. ha has deposed that on getting the signal from the complainant around 10.35 a.m., they went to the chamber of the accused and when the right hand of the accused was dipped in sodium carbonate solution, the solution turned into pink colour and ha collected the same.33. the i.o. has stated that the accused took out the diary from the drawer in front of his seat and produced the currency notes (ten tainted notes of rs. 500/- denomination) and on verification, they found that the numbers tallied with the numbers mentioned in the entrustment mahazar and thereafter, ex. p-20 trap mahazar was drawn. the i.o. then goes on to depose about ail other investigation that was done by him leading upto the filing of the charge-sheet, in the cross-examination of the i.o., certain omissions said to have occurred in the evidence of p.w. 1 when compared to the statement under section 161 of the cr.p.c. were put to the i.o. and the i.o. has stated that the said omissions referred to are not mentioned in the 161 statement.34. the other witnesses examined by the prosecution complete the other aspects of the investigation, like p.w. 4 mohammed shafiulla receiving application from the complainant with regard to the settlement of his pension and leave encashment and furnishing the documents to the lokayuktha inspector, p.w. 5 prabhakara giving the service particulars of the accused as per ex. p-25, p.w. 6 vasudeva rao, proprietor of the petrol bunk, giving the copy of the bill concerning supply of diesel to the lorry of the rig machine belonging to the office of the accused, p.w. 7 pampanna also submitting certain indents and bills to the police inspector, and p.w. 9, a junior engineer working in the office of the accused, preparing a rough sketch of the scene of occurrence as par ex. p-32. p.w. 10 chandrappa speaks to the aspect of delivering the f.i.r. to the special judge, and p.w. 11 rajanna speaks to the fact that he carried ten sealed articles to the f.s.l. for examination.35. thus, on a careful examination of the entire evidence on record, though, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, certain discrepancies were found in the evidence of p.w. 1, 2 and 3, yet, i am of the view that the said discrepancies do not affect the core of the prosecution case insofar as the charge against the accused with regard to demanding and accepting the illegal gratification of rs. 5,000/- from the complainant in order to do an official favour. though the i.o. has stated in his evidence that p.w. 1 has not stated before him certain particulars which are found in the evidence of p.w. 1, on going through ex. p-2 entrustment mahazar as well as ex. p-20 trap mahazar, it cannot be said that the complainant has made material omissions in his evidence when compared to the statement given by him before the lokayuktha police. as already mentioned by me, the core of the prosecution casa has remained unshaken despite p.ws. 1, 2 and 3 having been subjected to lengthy cross-examination.36. the discrepancies in the evidence of these witnesses are not very vital in nature so as to take the view that the discrepancies are of that magnitude which will render the testimony of these witnesses unreliable or untrustworthy. therefore, i see no justification in the trial court rejecting the testimony of the material witnesses p.ws. 1, 2 and 3 coupled with that of p.w. 12 insofar as the accused demanding the money from the complainant and the trap being laid on 17.12.1997 and the amount being recovered from the diary kept by the accused.37. it is the specific defence of the accused that the amount was kept in the diary toy the police officials in order to foist a false case against him. this contention is taken basing on the ground that the raid was conducted between 10. 10 a.m. and 10.25 a.m. on 17.12.1997. the learned counsel for the respondent as well as the learned trial judge have taken the consistent stand that there was no possibility of the accused or any other official coming to the office before 10.30 a.m. and, therefore, a false case has been foisted. i am unable to agree with the above contention put forward by the learned counsel for the respondent and so also with the inference drawn by the trial court in this regard. no evidence is placed by the defence to show that no official and muchless the accused comes to the office before 10.30 a.m. the evidence of the prosecution witnesses particularly p.ws. 1 to 3 coupled with the i.o's evidence and the entrustment mahazar ex. p-20 clearly establish the fact of the accused being present in his office when the complainant went and met him in his chambers and that the accused accepted the amount of rs. 5,000/- and kept it in the diary which was an his table and then put the diary into his table drawer.38. if the accused was not present at that particular hour, as sought to be projected by the prosecution, nothing prevented the accused to take such a defence. on the other hand, the accused takes such contradictory stand which renders his conduct unacceptable and gives the impression that he is not coming out with the truth. as pointed out by the learned special prosecutor for the state, the accused, while replying to question no. 160 in his 313 statement, has clearly stated that the reason for lodging the complaint against him by p.w. 1 is because of the accused stopping the indent being placed with the shop belonging to the son of the complainant. this is the specific defence taken by the accused in his 313 statement. when compared to this stand taken by the accused before the trial court in his reply to question no. 160 of the 313 statement, the stand taken by the accused when his statement was recorded during the trap mahazar tails a different story.39. the trap mahazar, which is marked, as ex. p-20, discloses that on 17-12-1997, when the accused was in his office at 10.00 a.m., he received a phone call from the complainant to the effect that within two minutes, the complainant would arrive there and, therefore, the accused delayed in proceeding for his inspection work. than the accused says that around 10.15 a.m., the complainant came there and met him and gave rs. 5,000/- which the complainant had taken as loan and the accused took the a aid amount in. his right hand and kept it in his 1997 diary.40. it is, therefore, clear from the above statement of the accused given before the investigating officer during the course of recording of the trap mahazar ex. p-20 that the accused does not deny of his presence in his chamber on 17.12.1997 at 10.00 a.m. and meeting the complainant around 10.15 a.m. and accepting rs. 5,000/- from him and keeping the said amount in his diary. thus, the job of the prosecution was rendered much easier by the above stand taken by the accused during recording of the trap mahazar ex. p-20. secondly, the said stand of the accused also reveals another facet of the case viz; that the accused is not coming forward with the truth. though he accepts the fact ox receiving ra. 5,000/- from the complainant, yet, the reason given in the entrustment mahazar ex. p-20 is that the complainant had taken a loan of rs. 5,000/- and the said amount is being returned belatedly. whereas, the reason that is given by p.w. 2 shadow witness, is that the said amount was taken by the complainant towards purchase of diesel.41. if the stand of the accused that the complainant had taken a loan of rs. 5,000/- from him is to be accepted as the correct version, nothing prevented, the accused, who happens to be an assistant executive engineer, to take the very same stand while replying question no. 160 put to him under section 313. we have seen that his reply to the said question was that the complainant was unhappy because, his son did not get the indent being placed with his shop and, therefore, the complainant had a grouse against the accused. it is therefore, vary clear from the above examination of the evidence on record particularly analysing the stand taken by the accused during the trap mahazar ex. p-20 and the stand taken by him when his statement was recorded under section 313 of the cr.p.c. that the accused is not telling the truth insofar as the reason for accepting the amount of rs. 5,000/- from the complainant. the inference that is to be drawn is that the accused somehow wanted to escape from the situation into which he found himself. hence, his defence version that the complainant had a grouse against him cannot be accepted as having necessary support from the evidence on record.42. as far as accepting the trap mahazar ex. p-20 is concerned, the learned counsel for the respondent argued that no panch witness was examined and, therefore, no value can be attached to ex. p-20 and the contents of the said document also cannot be looked into. i see no merit in the said submission made because, the contents of the trap mahazar ex. p-20 have bean proved by the prosecution through the testimony of the complainant p.w. 1 as well as through the evidence of the i.o., p.w. 12. further, when we look at the contents of ex. p-20 trap mahazar, we will not fail to notice that the accused is also a signatory to the said document ex. p-20. it is not the case of the accused that the contents of ex. p-20 are incorrect or false or for that matter, he was forced to sign ex. p-20. therefore, in the face of the material witnesses putting their signatures and attesting the trap mahazar and the accused also endorsing the contents of ex. p-20 by putting his signature, the question of non-examination of the panch witness rendering the trap mahazar unacceptable will not and cannot arise.43. as far as the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent that the prosecution had failed to prove the fact of initial demand made by the accused is concerned, as rightly submitted by the learned special prosecutor for the state, the concept of initial demand and final demand does not find a place in section 7 of the prevention of corruption act, 1988. the said section reads thus:7. public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act. - whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the central government or any state government or parliament or the legislature of any state or with any local authority, corporation or government company referred to in clause (c) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than six months but which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.44. a plain reading of the provisions contained in section 7 as above will make it clear that all that is required to bring the case within the ambit of section 7 is for the prosecution to prove that a public servant accepts ox obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person any gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward for doing any official favour to any person. therefore, in the instant case, the prosecution has established that the accused did demand and did accept rs. 5,000/- from p.w. 1 on 17.12.1997 and this fact is proved through the evidence of the complainant p.w. 1, shadow witness p.w. 2, the investigating officer p.w. 12 and the trap mahazar ex. p-20. hence, i do not find any infirmity in the prosecution case with regard to failure to prove the initial demand made by the accused.45. no doubt, as far as the presence of the accused on 9.12.1997 in his office is concerned, p.w. 1 has stated categorically in his evidence that on the 3aid day, the accused was in the office and demanded gratification of rs. 5,000/- from the complainant. though the prosecution has placed the attendance register as par ex. p-12, as against the data 9.12.1997, the signature of the accused is not found in the said document. no doubt, it is contended by the learned special prosecutor that the very fact that the accused has not signed the attendance register between 4.12.1997 and 10.12.1997, that itself cannot give room to take the view that the accused was officially absent on 9.12.1997.46. in the like manner, even the accused has not placed any document to show that he was on other duties or that he was deputed to attend a seminar at bangalore on the said date. despite the evidence being not conclusive in this regard, yet, having regard to the provisions of section 7 of the p.c. act and the prosecution having proved beyond reasonable doubt that on 17.12.1997, the accused demanded and accepted rs. 5,000/- from the complainant and the further fact that the amount was recovered from the diary kept by the accused and the right hand wash of the accused also being found to have tested positive, the prosecution has established its case against the accused in respect of the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification in a sum of rs. 5,000/- by the accused in order to do an official favour to the complainant in. connection with the issuance of no objection certificate.47. though the prosecution has proved its case against the accused from the evidence placed on record as analyzed above, yet, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent, the question of taking cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the p.c. act will not arise unless there is previous sanction obtained for prosecuting the accused in accordance with the requirement of section 19 of the p.c. act. there fore, notwithstanding the prosecution having proved its case insofar as the demand and acceptance of the illegal gratification by the accused, yet, the success or failure of the prosecution case depends on the validity of sanction.48. both sides have argued at length in regard to this important and vital aspect of this case. the trial court has held that the sanction order ex. p-31 is invalid, whereas it is strongly contended by the special prosecutor for the state that the sanction order is valid and the trial court's finding in this regard is erroneous and contrary to law. i therefore, deal with this important aspect now.49. before examining the material placed by the prosecution in connection with the valid sanction obtained to prosecute the accused, it is necessary to keep in view the position in law as has been laid down by the apex court in particular and also by this court.50. in the case of jaswant singh v. state of punjab : 1958crilj265 , it has bean held that 'the sanction under the prevention of corruption act is not intended to be nor is an automatic formality and it is essential that the provisions in regard to sanction should be observed with complete strictness' and the court also went on to observe that it should be clear from the form of the sanction that the sanctioning authority considered the evidence before it and after a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, sanctioned the prosecution.51. in the case of mohd. iqbal ahmad v. state of andhra pradesh : 1979crilj633 , the apex court has observed thus:it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out constituting the offence. this should be done in two ways; either (1) by producing the original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction and (2) by adducing evidence aliunde to show the facts placed before the sanctioning authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. any case instituted without a proper sanction must fail because this being a manifest defect in the prosecution, the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio, what the court has to see is whether or not the sanctioning authority at the time of giving sanction was aware of the facts constituting the offence and applied its mind for the same; any subsequent fact which may come into existence after the grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to government servants against frivolous prosecutions and must therefore be strictly complied with before any prosecution can be launched against the public servant concerned.52. in the case of cbi v. v.k. sehgal and anr. 1999 crl. l.j. 4593, dealing with section 19(3)(a), of the 1988 act, the apex court has observed thus:it is a further inroad into the powers of the appellate court over and above the trammel contained in section 465 of the code. under section 19(3)(a) of 1988 act no order of conviction and sentence can be reversed or altered by a court of appeal or revision even 'on the ground of absence or sanction' unless in the opinion of that court a failure of justice has bean occasioned thereby. by adding the explanation the said embargo is further widened to the affect that even if the sanction was granted by an authority who was not strictly competent to accord such sanction, then also the appellate as veil as revisional courts are debarred from interfering with the conviction and sentence merely on that ground.53. in a vary recant decision in the case of paul varghese v. state of kerala and anr. : air2007sc2618 , the apex court has laid down the proposition of law that the requirement of prior sanction under the prevention of corruption act, 1988, is a matter of procedure and does not go to the root of jurisdiction and section 19(3)(c) further reduces rigour of prohibition under section 19(1) and in cases under the prevention of corruption act of public servant, sanction is automatic. the court also distinguished sanction under section 197 of the cr.p.c. with the requirement of sanction under section 19(1) of the prevention of corruption act and has observed thus in this regard.it may be noted that section 197 of the code and section 19 of the act operate in conceptually different fields. in cases covered under the act, in respect of public servants the sanction is of automatic nature and thus factual aspects are of little or no consequence. conversely, in a case relatable to section 197 of the code, the substratum and basic features of the case have to be considered to find out whether the alleged act has any nexus to the discharge of duties. position is not so in case of section 19 of the act.54. this court in the case of state of karnataka v. c.s. krishnamurthy : ilr2004kar3058 has held that where there is evidence to show that the authority had applied its mind while issuing sanction order by following the procedure, the sanction order therefore, has to be held to be a proper sanction order.55. as far as the sanction order being issued by the under secretary to the government as ib the case before us, as could be seen from the evidence of p.w.8 is concerned, the observations in the following cases are worth noting.56. in the case of mallikarjun basalingappa balipadi v. state of karnataka 2005 (1) kccr 166, this court has held that where the sanction order is issued by the under secretary in the name of the governor and by order and where it is stated that all the materials were placed before the concerned authorities and after perusal of the of same an opinion has been formed, mere non-production of governmental proceedings by the under secretary may not vitiate the issuance of the sanction order.57. in the case of state of rajasthan v. tarachand jain : 1973crilj1396 , the apex court has observed that where the facts constituting the offence appear on the face of the sanction order accorded by the chief minister, it is not necessary for the prosecution to lead separate evidence to show that relevant facts were placed before the chief minister and hence, it cannot be said that the prosecution has failed to prove that the chief minister has accorded his sanction, after applying his mind to the facts of the case. the court further ruled that the fact that the chief minister signed the sanction for the prosecution on the file and not the formal sanction produced in the court, which bears the signature of special secretary to the government, makes no material difference.58. this court in the case of puttaraja urs v. state of karnataka ilr 2003 kar 618, has held that where it was found that the under secretary has signed the sanction order ex. p14, on the basis of authorisation given by the competent authority, it is not to be construed that it was the under secretary who had granted sanction to prosecute the accused but the competent officer ha3 accorded permission and therefore, sanction has to be held to be a valid one.59. in the case of shivendra kumar v. state of maharashtra 2000 crl. l.j. 4679, the apex court has held that where it was found on fact that secretary to medical education department had passed/signed the order of sanction of prosecution against the appellant who was a lecturer in the government medical college, on behalf of the governor, it follows that the order of sanction was passed by the secretary with the authority of the governor of the state government and the government functions through its officers.60. in the case of state of orissa v. mrutunjaya panda 1990 crl. l.j. 782, the supreme court has held that where there was no material placed to show failure of justice occasioned due to error or irregularity in sanction, the order setting aside conviction was liable to be set-aside.61. this court in the case of state by police inspector, karnataka lokayuktha v. m. manjunda 8001 (3) kccr 1905 has held that it is very important that sanctioning authority must independently peruse the investigation papers, and independently of the police report coma to the conclusion that there is enough material to sustain the charge and the sanctioning authority is required to consider the material before granting sanction and where sanction order is defective, the prosecution is vitiated.62. the decision of the himachal pradesh high court in the casa of bihailal v. state of himachal pradesh 1994 crl.l.j. 1909 is to the effect that without a valid sanction, entire trial including the conviction will have to be held as void-ab-inito.63. having thus kept in view the law laid down by the apex court and also by this court as regards requirement of a valid sanction, in the case on hand, the prosecution has placed the evidence of p.w. 8 sampath who was the then under secretary to the government, p.w.d., and this witness has deposed to the affect that the file pertaining to the present case was sent to the secretary to the government, p.w.d and after going through the papers, they were sent to the secretary to the government and then to the p.w.d. minister and the p.w.d. minister granted sanction to prosecute the accused.64. he has also deposed to the effect that after sanction was granted by the pwd minister, pw-8 issued the order by and in the name of the government of karnataka and it is dated 10.8.1998 (ex. p-21). the said sanction order reads as under:whereas, it is reported that sri. v. sejappa, assistant executive engineer was caught redhanded on 17.12.97 while demanding and accepting rs. 5000-00 from the complainant as illegal gratification to show an official favour regarding processing of pension records of sri. n. ramakrishnappa junior engineer (retired), office of the assistant executive engineer, no. 2, veil boring sub-division, chitradurga.on 16.12.97, the complainant sri. n. ramakrishnappa s/o. narashimappa, retired junior engineer, no. 2, well boring sub-division, chitradurga, appeared before the police inspector, lokayuktha, chitradurga, and complained that sri. v. sejappa, assistant executive engineer demanded rs. 5000-00 as illegal gratification for doing official favour. since the complainant vas not willing to pay the bribe, he requested karnataka lokayuktha police to initiate legal action against the said officer as par law.based on the complaint, a criminal case was registered an 26.12.97 against sri. v. sejappa, assistant executive engineer, no. 2 well boring sub-division, phe, chitradurga in cr. no. 6/97 under section 7, 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the pc act, 1988, by police inspector, karnataka lokayuktha chitradurga and has taken up further investigation and has taken up further investigation. after observing all the formalities in a pre-trap mahazar, a successful trap had been laid by the police inspector, karnataka lokayuktha, on 17.12.97 and sri. v. sejappa, assistant executive engineer (now under suspension) vas caught red handed while demanding and accepting rs. 5000-00 as illegal gratification to do an official favour. the hand wash of the ago and wash of the hairy in sodium carbonate solution has given positive phenolphthalein test, which has been confirmed by the chemical examiner's report. the shadow witness has also observed the transaction between the ago and complainant regarding demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. hence, the accused officer has committed an offence punishable under p.c. act, 1988, and therefore, is liable to be prosecuted in the court of law for the offences punishable under sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of p.c. act, 1988.and whereas, government of karnataka being the competent it authority to remove sri. v. sejappa, assistant executive engineer (now under suspension) from the office, after carefully examining the documents and material evidence on record furnished, in respect of the said proceedings and circumstances of the case, government considers that sri. v. sajappa, assistant executive engineer, should be prosecuted in the court of law for the said offences.now, therefore, government accord sanction as contemplated under section 19 of p.c. act, 1988 for the prosecution of the said sri. v. sejappa, assistant executive engineer, no. 2 veil boring sub-division, chitradurga (now under suspension) for the above said offences under section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the pc act, 1988.65. on going through the contents of the said sanction order, it becomes clear that the government after considering the material placed before it and after examining the documents furnished in respect of the said proceedings and in the circumstances of the case came to the conclusion that the respondent has to be prosecuted in a court of law. therefore, it cannot be said that the sanction order ex. p-21 discloses lack of application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority.66. having regard to the law laid down by the apex court in the aforementioned cases and the under secretary to the government issuing the sanction order on behalf of the governor of the state, no defect can be found in the sanction order that is produced in the instant case. unfortunately, the trial judge did not consider the material placed through the sanction order ex. p-21 and the evidence of pw8 in proper perspective and in the light of law laid down by the apex court with regard to the validity of the sanction order. i therefore, hold that the finding of the trial court that the sanction order is invalid cannot be sustained both on facts as well as in law and in particular the reasoning given is contrary to the law laid down by the apex court in this regard.67. having thus found no defect in the sanction order and the evidence placed also indicating that the government had considered the material placed before it before according sanction, and the under secretary only was carrying out the said decision of the government by issuing the sanction order ex. p-21, this is not a. case where it can be said that the sanction order was passed in a mechanical manner or that it discloses non-application of mind. therefore, the reasoning of the trial court cannot be accepted as being in conformity with the principles laid down by the apex court and also by this court in regard to validity of the sanction order in respect of prosecution of an accused under the prevention of corruption act.68. one other important aspect to be considered at this juncture is, the contention put forward lay the learned counsel for the respondent that the original sanction order was not produced. as far as this submission is concerned, ex. p-21 has been marked in the evidence of pw-8 and as has been held by the apex court, the prosecution will have to either produce the original order or will have to place the evidence to show that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind. the second requirement is satisfied in the instant case by the production of ex. p-21 with the help of evidence of pw8. hence, no defect can toe found in the sanction order mainly on the ground that the original order was not produced.69. as far as foisting of the false case against the accused is concerned, the defence is not able to show that the testimony of the investigating officer suffers from any serious defect or for that matter, the i.o. is biased towards the complainant. as already stated by me earlier, ex. p-20 is the trap mahazar which clearly reveals that the respondent-accused had the first opportunity to make use of, to show his defence if at all the complainant had a grouse against the accused as stated by the accused in his reply to 313 statement. nothing prevented the accused to make use of the said opportunity. but we have seen that the reasoning given by the accused during the recording of the trap mahazar is that a loan was taken by the complainant and the game was returned on 17.12.1997. therefore, it is not open to the respondent now to say that a false case has bean foisted against him.70. the supreme court in the case of a. abdul kaffar v. state of kerala 2004 scc (cri) 981 has observed that where the accused failed to make a mention of the advance payment of sales tax due from pw1 for which an official receipt was issued, failure of the accused to mention the said fact to the i.o. at the first available opportunity showed that the defence taken was not genuine. in the instant case also having regard to the inconsistent stand taken by the accused during the course of the trap mahazar as wall as during his reply to 313 statement, it has to be held that the defence taken in the present case is also not a genuine defence.71. in the instant case, it has not been shown that the testimony of the i.o. pw.12 suffers from serious defect so as to reject the testimony of the investigating officer. therefore, i see no valid reason to reject the testimony of the trap officer. in this context, it is necessary to refer to the law laid down by the apex court in the case of rai mohan mazumdar v. ram. krishna dass and anr. air i960 sc 672. it vas held that where the evidence of the police officer who led the trap was found to be reliable, corroboration is not necessary. the relevant observations are as under:where the evidence of the police officer who laid, the trap is found entirely trustworthy, there is no need to seek any corroboration. there is no rule of prudence which has crystallized into a rule of law, nor indeed any rule of prudence, which requires that the evidence of such officers should be treated on the same footing as evidence of accomplices and there should be insistence on corroboration. in the facts and circumstances of a particular case a court may be disinclined to act upon the evidence of such an officer without corroboration, but, equally, in the fact and: circumstances of another case the court may unhesitatingly fact the evidence of such an officer. it is all a matter of appreciation of evidence and on such matters there can be no hard and fast rule, nor can there toe any presidential guidance.72. in another decision, in the case of state of u.p. v. zakaullah 1998 sc 1474, it has been held that the evidence of the trap officer can be relied on even without corroboration.73. thus, having regard to the above proposition of law laid down by the apex court with regard to appreciation of evidence of the trap officer (i.o.) in the case on hand, it is not shown that the testimony of pw12 lacks credibility or for that matter, pw12 had axe to grind against the respondent. there fore, the contention taken that a false case has been foisted against the respondent also has to be rejected as having no basis.74. on careful analysis of the entire evidence on record, in the light of the proposition of law laid down by the apex court both with regard to the requirement of a valid sanction order and appreciation of evidence of the trap officer, in the instant case, the testimony of pv1the complainant has bean, well supported by the evidence of the investigating officer pw12 in all material aspects 'and pw2 in particular also supports the prosecution case insofar as the respondent accepted rs. 5,000/- from the complainant on 17.12.1997 between 10.10 a.m. and 10.25 p.m. in the chamber of the respondent and keeping the a aid amount in the diary and putting diary into the official drawer and further the test conducted concerning the hand wash of the respondent also turned out to be positive. the defence version has been proved to be not genuine one. the a discrepancies and contradictions referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent from the evidence of the i.o. in particular are not grave enough so as to affect the basic fabric of the prosecution case and the infirmities are too minor and cannot be said to be fatal.75. the learned trial judge, therefore, erred in not only failing to appreciate the evidence in proper perspective, but also failed to karnataka note of the admissible evidence placed by the prosecution with regard to the accused receiving rs. 5,000/- from the complainant on 17.12.1997 arid the further error committed by the trial court is that it totally rejected the evidence of the material witnesses pws. 1 to 3. merely because, a part of their evidence showed that they did not support the prosecution only in regard to certain aspects, leaving the said part of their evidence, the remaining evidence of the said witnesses fully supports the prosecution case and gets corroboration from the evidence of the i.o. in particular and the trap mahazar ex. p-20. i am therefore, of the opinion that there are compelling reasons to interfere with the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court.76. before i conclude, one other ground urged by the learned counsel for the respondent also will have to toe considered. it is argued that the learned counsel for the appellant could not have raised the ground of the sanction order being valid, in the absence of a specific ground taken in the appeal memorandum in this regard.77. as far as this submission is concerned, it is pointed out by the learned special prosecutor for the state that rule 2 of the karnataka high court rules, 1959 says that every appeal shall contain among other contents mentioned in the said rule 2, the grounds of appeal in consecutively numbered paragraphs. therefore, in the instant case also, the grounds having set out at page nos. 5 to 8 of the appeal memorandum, the contention urged does not merit any consideration. i am of the view that the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be accepted for more then one reason. the first one is that, even before the trial court, the question concerning validity of the sanction order was urged and considered by the trial court and declined to accept the submission of the state. therefore, it cannot be said that the state cannot urge the said ground in the course of his argument before this court when the entire judgment of the trial court acquitting the accused is open for consideration by this court.78. secondly, it is also a veil settled law that the appellate court has got the power to re-appreciate and. reweigh the evidence and come to its own conclusion, in the case of girija prasad dead, by l.rs. v. state of m.p. (2007) 3 scc (cri.) 475 dealing with the scope and power of the appellate court under section 386 and 378 of the cr.p.c., the apex court has observed thus:in an appeal against acquittal the appellate court has every power to reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence as a whale before it. it is, no doubt, true that there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and that presumption is reinforced by an order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. but that is not the end of the matter. it is for the appellate court to keep in view the relevant principles of law, to reappreciate and reweigh the evidence as a whole and to coma to its own conclusion on such evidence in consonance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.i, therefore, do not find any force behind the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent in this regard.79. in conclusion, i hold that the prosecution has brought home the guilt of the accused against the respondent in respect of the charge levelled against him and hence, the respondent is liable to be convicted for having committed an offence under section 7, 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the prevention of corruption act, 1988.80. heard the learned special prosecutor for the state as veil as the learned counsel for the respondent on the question of sentence to be imposed. the submission of the appellant's counsel is that maximum sentence be imposed on the respondent having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand, leaves it to the court to pass appropriate sentence.81. this case furnishes another instance of a 'public servant' accepting the gratification other then the legal remuneration. the evil of accepting illegal gratification to render an official favour has grown into a gigantic proportion and it threatens the very atmosphere of clean and transparent public service. this is not a case where the accused being a public servant, accepted illegal gratification from a lay person to do an official favour, but unfortunately in the instant case, the accused demanded and accepted illegal gratification not from an outside parson or one from the general public, but one of his own officials and that too the complainant who had retired from service and wanted to get his pensionary benefits which is the fruit of long service rendered by the complainant to the department.82. the accused-respondent by demanding and accepting rs. 5,000/- from his own office colleague seems to have forgotten importance attached to the expression 'public servant'. merely because the respondent happened to hold a higher position as the assistant executive engineer when compared to the official status of the complainant which is that of a junior engineer, that itself does not mean that the respondent has to act in the manner he has acted in the instant case. whether a person is appointed at the lowest run of the government service as a peon or whether he gets appointed or holds the highest post in the government service, that itself does not take away the said person being 'a public servant'.83. therefore, the very concept of 'public servant' pre-supposes that an official irrespective of the position he holds has to consider himself as a 'servant of the public'. the respondent-accused seems to have forgotten the importance attached to the expression 'public servant' and has chosen to make use of his position in department to exploit the complainant who had retired from the service and was anxious to gat his pensionary benefits. therefore, the very conduct of the respondent militates against the spirit of the concept of 'public servant'.84. though there have been several legislations in place like the prevention of corruption act, 1988, to prevent public servants from accepting any gratification other then legal remuneration, cases of such nature continue to come up before the courts. i am therefore, compelled to make certain suggestions to the government in order to ensure that public servants discharge their duties befitting the status assigned to them as 'public servant' and this endeavour is made, only with the good hope that such steps will go a long way in preventing the public servant from accepting any gratification other than the legal remuneration not only from their own office colleagues, but even from a member of the public.85. despite various steps taken and the lokayukta also sparing no efforts in bringing to light cases of public servants' enriching themselves by illegal means or by accepting gratification other than what they are legal entitled to (corrupt practices), still there is a need for taking some more steps in this direction to eliminate such corrupt practices being carried an by the officials.86. one such measure which will have to be taken is to bring about the internal transformation in the officials by changing their attitude itself. since it is said that today's child is the future citizen of tomorrow, it is necessary to inculcate values like honesty and integrity in the minds of the children when they are still young so that these values become part of their life and when they grow up, they will stand by the values. therefore, in all the schools, steps should be taken by the government to see that value based education also forms part of the curriculum and in today's education much importance is being given to the acquisition of information and knowledge which enable the children to secure jobs/employment.87. but unfortunately, not much emphasis is given to the cultivation of values and to put it in the words of swamy vivekananda, 'the aim of education should be to build the character'. therefore, the said suggestion is made which i hope would be considered with all seriousness by the government.88. as far as the officials working in various departments of the government are concerned, no doubt, they are past their school days. though it is said that it is very difficult to change the mind set of an adult, yet, exposure to the need for inculcating such values still can have salutary effect and it will not be too late in ones life to change ones attitude towards the good. therefore, apart from the usual training that is given to the government officials with regard to their official work is concerned, every government official can be required to attend atleast one or two workshops/course wherein they will get an opportunity to improve their personality as a whole.89. the training in such workshop/seminar should be to bring about inner transformation in the official and to enable him to ensure that he does not become a prey to such corrupt practices. lectures from well known speakers on personality development and an opportunity to study or listen to the lives of great people who have walked on this earth would also inspire the officials to follow their foot steps. all these efforts taken in all earnestness will certainly help the government to enable the officials to discharge their functions in an exemplary manner. a copy of this judgment shall be sent to the secretary to the government education and dpar departments for necessary action.90. having thus made a few suggestions for the government to take note of and implement the same at earliest to ensure clean and unpolluted atmosphere being created in all public offices, i proceed to pass the following order:(i) the appeal is allowed and the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court is set aside.7 of the prevention of corruption act, the respondent is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of rs. 5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo s.i. for a further period of two months.(iii) in respect of the conviction under section 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the prevention of corruption act, the respondent is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of two years and also to pay a fine of re. 10,000/-. in default of payment of fine, he shall undergo s.i. for a further period of six months.(iv) the substantive sentences shall run concurrently.(v) out of the fine amount collected, rs. 5,000/- shall be paid to the complainant (pw1 ramakrishnappa) and the balance be paid to the state.(vi) the respondent-accused shall forthwith surrender before the trial court to undergo the sentence imposed upon him and the learned trial judge shall also take necessary steps to secure the presence of the respondent to undergo the sentence imposed upon him as above.

Judgment:

V. Jagannathan, J.

1. The State by Lokayuktha Police Inspector has preferred this appeal challenging the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Spl. Judge, Chitradurga, by which judgment, the trial court had acquitted the respondent/accused of the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ('P.C. Act' in short).

2. One N. Ramakrishna retired on 31.10.1997 as special Grade Junior Engineer, well broil Boring Sub-Division of P.W.D., Chitradurga and he approached the respondent/accused V. Sejappa, who was then working as Asst. Executive Engineer in the said office and requested the respondent to issue no objection Certificate which was required to be submitted to the Accountant General's office in order to enable the above said Ramakrishna to get his service benefits namely Leave encashment benefit, D.C.R.G. and settlement of his pension. The complainant Ramakrishna approached the respondent in this regard on 9.12.1997 and on the said date, the respondent demanded a sum of Rs. 5,000/- as illegal gratification in order to issue No Objection Certificate for doing the official favour to enable the complainant to get his pension and other retirement benefits. The complainant was not willing to give the amount so demanded by the respondent/accused. He therefore lodged a complaint with the Lokayuktha police on 16.12.1997 and a necessary preparation to trap the accused was made. On 17.12.1997, the complainant went to the office of the accused and between 10.15 a.m. and 10.25 a.m., the accused demanded and accepted illegal gratification of Rs. 5,000/- from the complainant and the police officials who were among the raiding party were successful in trapping the accused and it was found that the accused after accepting the amount of Rs. 5,000/- kept it in his diary.

3. When the Lokayuktha Police raided the office of the accused, they recovered the said amount of Rs. 5,000/- from the accused and the accused also tested positive when his right hand was immersed in the Sodium Carbonate solution. On completion of the investigation and recording of statements of the shadow witness Pw-2, Pw-8 the Under secretary to the Government in connection with the sanction order and Pw-12 H.S. Gangadharappa, the I.O., and other witnesses, charge sheet was submitted against the accused/respondent for the offences as above mentioned.

4. In order to establish its case, the prosecution examined in all 12 witnesses and documents Exs. P1 to P34 were marked and M.OS 1 to 18 were produced during the trial. After recording the statements of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., he produced the documents Exs. D1 to D8 in support of his case defence and did not choose to lead any evidence on his behalf. The learned Spl. Judge on appreciating the evidence on record found that the prosecution case suffered from several infirmities. At the threshold, the trial court found that the sanction order itself was not valid and secondly, the complainant (PW-1) and the shadow witness (Pw-2) did not support the prosecution case. It is further observed that the evidence of Pws 1, 2 and 3 and that of the I.O., if read together, do not give any impression that the witnesses were reliable and trustworthy as there were several omissions in the evidence of PW-1. The delay in lodging the complaint coupled with the prosecution having not been successful in proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused made his initial demand on 9.12.1997, all these factors were taken together by the trial Court and it acquitted the accused of all the offences for which he had been charged. Being aggrieved by the order of acquittal of the accused passed by the trial court the State/Lokayuktha Police has preferred this appeal.

5. I have heard Sri. S.G. Rajendra Raddy, learned Spl. counsel for the Appellant/Lokayuktha and Sri. S.V. Tilgul, learned Counsel for the respondent and carefully perused the entire material on record.

6. The learned Spl. Prosecutor for the Lokayuktha, Sri. S.G. Rajendra Reddy, assailed the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court by pointing out at the outset the grounds upon which the trial Court has passed its judgment of acquittal. It is submitted that the trial Court erred in coming to the conclusion that the sanction order was invalid and the learned trial judge did not examine the sanction order Ex. P31 in proper, perspective and lost sight of the fact that the sanction order itself clearly mentions about the factors and material considered by the sanctioning Authority i.e., the Government and therefore the view taken by the trial court cannot be sustained in the face of the very contents of the sanction order Ex. P31. He submits that the evidence of PW-8 was placed in order to prove the sanction order and also confirms the fact that the authority concerned had applied its mind judiciously before granting sanction to prosecute the respondent/accused.

7. By referring to the evidence of PW-8, it was submitted that the then P.W.D. Minister has granted sanction to prosecute the accused and the sanction order was issued in the name of the Government of Karnataka through PW-8. Therefore referring to the said evidence of PW-8 and also drawing my attention to Section 19 of the P.C. Act, it was submitted that by virtue of Sub-section 3 of Section 19 of the P.C. Act, unless it is shown that there is failure of justice, any error or omissions or irregularity in the sanction that is required under Sub-section 1 of Section 19 cannot have the effect of reversing the sentence passed by a Spl. Judge or altered by a court in appeal. However, it was contended that if for some reasons the sanction order is found to be bad in law that will not render the entire proceedings void. Therefore the trial Court erred in recording erroneous findings as regards the validity of the sanction order is concerned. Considering the delay factor, it is contended that the trial Court also found fault with the prosecution because the complaint was lodged by PW-1 almost after seven days and therefore the said delay was fatal.

8. It is then submitted that this view of the trial court is contrary to law and more particularly the trial Court did not taken into account the type of case that it was dealing and since it is a prosecution under the P.C. Act, even if there is some delay in lodging the complaint, the said delay will not affect the case of the prosecution. As far as the finding of the trial Court that the prosecution has failed to establish that the accused made initial demand on 9.12.97 is concerned, it is submitted that the trial court once again did not properly appreciate the evidence on record and the attendance register Ex. P16 produced before the trial Court clearly shows that the accused did not sign the attendance between 4th and 8th of December, 1997 and therefore the finding that the accused was attending seminar at Bangalore between 8.12.97 and 10.12.97 cannot be accepted and further nothing prevented the accused to produce the documents in proof of he having been deputed to attend the seminar at Bangalore. Under the said circumstances, an inference could be drawn is that the accused was very much present on. 9.12.97 when he made the demand on the complainant.

9. In this connection, the evidence of PW-1 in particular was referred to. Further submission made is that there is nothing like initial demand to be made in order to attract the provisions of Section 7 of the P.C. Act and all that the said section requires is that the prosecution will have to prove that the accused accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain from the complainant any gratification other than the legal remuneration for doing official act and therefore the question of necessity of proving initial demand does not arise and no such inference can be drawn from reading of Section 7 of the P.C. Act.

10. As far as the accused demanding and accepting the amount on 17.12.97 is concerned, it is submitted by the learned Special Prosecutor that the prosecution has placed on record the trap mahazar which has been marked as Ex. P20. A plain reading of the contents of that Exhibit confirms the fact of the accused demanding and accepting an amount of Rs. 5,000/- from the complainant although the accused has given his own version with regard to the acceptance of the said amount. Referring to the explanation offered by the respondent, when the statement was recorded during the trap mahazar, it is submitted that the first explanation offered by the respondent/accused was that the amount that was received by him from the complainant was in connection with the loan taken by the complainant towards the purchase of diesel. Whereas, the accused when questioned under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., took a different stand and never mentioned anything about the loan taken by the complainant towards the purchase of diesel.

11. Therefore it is urged that this conduct of the accused clearly shows that he only wanted to cover up his act by putting up a new theory during the trap mahazar and PW-2 colluded with the accused by repeating the same version in his evidence. Hence, such an inconsistent stand or defence taken by the accused cannot be permitted and as such the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the demand as well as the acceptance of the illegal gratification by the accused or. 17.12.97.

12. As far as the trial Court finding fault with the evidence of PW-1 with regard to certain omissions alleged to have been elicited during the cross-examination of the I.O., it is submitted that the trial Court did not carefully go through the contents of the trap mahazar or the complaint in this regard and therefore the said observation of the trial court is totally perverse and contrary to the materials placed on record. Hence, there is no discrepancy in the evidence of the material witnesses and the evidence of the trap officer i.e., the I.O., itself is sufficient to prove the casa of the prosecution and in the face of the evidence of the trap officer, no corroboration is also needed to prove the prosecution case. As far as the recovery of the tainted amount is concerned, referring to the record, it was submitted that the amount was recovered from the diary kept by the accused and the sodium carbonate solution test also proved to be positive and hence the prosecution has proved that the respondent/accused did demand and accepted the gratification and by virtue of the presumption available under Section 20 of the P.C. Act, the trial Court could not have disbelieved the evidence placed by the prosecution particularly in the absence of the accused placing contrary evidence in support of the defence taken by him while the statement was recorded during the trap mahazar.

13. Concerning the testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3 is concerned, the learned Spl. Prosecutor. Sri. S.G. Rajendra Reddy, submitted that the trial Court once again committed serious error by holding that PWs 1, 2 and 3 have not supported the prosecution case and this observation of the trial Court cannot be sustained because PW-1 in particular has supported the case of the prosecution so far as the substratum of the prosecution case is concerned, only with regard to certain aspects of the case, the prosecution treated PW-1 as hostile, but that itself will not render this testimony being rejected, only because he did not support the prosecution to certain extant.

14. Therefore, it was argued that the appreciation of the evidence the trial court is erroneous and contrary to the evidence on record and the approach of the trial Court in a case of this nature ought to have been slightly different than the approach in a normal criminal case, and as such the said wrongful approach has led unjustified acquittal of the accused. in support of the above submissions, the learned Spl. Prosecutor placed, reliance on the following decisions reported in 2005 (1) KCCR 166, ILR 2004 KAR 3058, 2004 SCC (Cri) 981, (2007) 3 SCC 475, 2001 Crl. L.J. 515, 2004 SCC (Cri) 908, AIR 1973 SC 2131 and also to the Karnataka High Court Rules, 1969 as well as to the Karnataka Criminal Rules Practice, 1969.

15. On the other hand, Sri. S.V. Tilgul, learned Counsel for the respondent supported the findings of the trial Court in all respects and submitted that the trial court has taken great pains to discuss the evidence in minute details and as such its reasoning cannot be faulted and the findings recorded are in accordance with the evidence on record. As far as the sanction order is concerned, the submission made is that the trial Court has rightly held that the sanction order is invalid and the decision referred to by the trial Court aptly applies to the case on hand as regards the non-application of mind by the sanctioning authority and the evidence of PW-8 also reveals that he is not the competent authority to take a decision relating to grant of sanction to prosecute the accused. It is submitted that the sanction order is not an empty formality and it has to be issued by fulfilling all the requirements of law as laid down by the Apex Court and once the sanction order is found to be invalid, no cognizance can be taken by virtue of Section 19 of the P.C. Act. Therefore, no fault can be found with the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court with regard to the sanction order being invalid in law.

16. As far as the ground urged by the appellant's Counsel with regard to the validity of the sanction order is concerned, it is submitted that a perusal of the appeal grounds will make it clear that the appellant/State has not taken any ground concerning the validity of the sanction order. He further submits that the said ground cannot be permitted to be urged now by the appellant's counsel. As regards the demand made by the accused on 9.12.97 is concerned, it is submitted that the trial Court has rightly held that the prosecution has failed to prove the initial demand made by the accused on 9.12.97 and the evidence of the prosecution witnesses will make it clear that on the said date, the accused was not present in his office at Chitradurga but he was attending seminar at Bangalore and in this connection Ex. D2 was referred to. Therefore once the prosecution has failed to prove the initial demand said to have been made by the accused on 9.12.97, there can be no cause of action and as such the trial Court was justified in not accepting the case of the prosecution. As far as the complaint is concerned, it is submitted that complaint was lodged on 16.12.97 after a delay of 7 days and no reasons are forthcoming as to why the complainant took such a long time. Therefore the possibility of the complainant trying to fix the accused cannot be ruled out.

17. Hence, it is urged that the tainted money being recovered from, the accused is nothing but a false case having been foisted on the accused. This submission was elaborated by referring to the evidence to contend that it is the case of the prosecution that on 17.12.97, the amount was demanded and accepted by the accused between 10.10 a.m. and. 10.25 a.m. and the question of the accused or any other official coming to the office at that hour is impossible because the office work starts only at 10.30 a.m. Therefore the trial court has accepted the arguments of the accused in this regard and has rightly held that it is impossible for anyone to arrive at the office prior to 10.30 a.m. and hence, a false case has been foisted by the complainant with the help of the trap officers to implicate the accused. Reference was also made to the evidence of the trap officer as well as the other witnesses and to submit that his evidence is not very clear as to where the money has been kept and whether it was found in the drawer or in the diary is not clear. Apart from this, several omissions and improvements have been found in the evidence of PW-1 and these defects have been brought out during the cross-examination of the I.O. and hence PW-1 cannot be believed as a truthful witness.

18. Regarding the trap mahazar is concerned, it is argued by the learned Counsel for the respondent that no panch witness was examined and therefore the trap mahazar Ex. P20 cannot be said to have been proved in so far as the contents of the trap mahazar axe concerned. Non-examination of panch witness therefore renders Ex. P20 unworthy of acceptance. Referring to the prosecution pleadings that PW-1 has turned hostile, it was submitted that PW-1 cannot be termed as a reliable witness and the veracity of this testimony cannot be accepted and yet the trial Court has rejected the evidence of PW-1-the complainant and other witnesses.

19. Thus it is contended in conclusion by the learned Counsel Sri. S.V. Tilgul, for the respondent that the appreciation of the evidence by the trial Court cannot be termed as perverse. But en the other hand, the learned Spl. Judge has left no stone unturned in assessing the evidence on record and therefore no inference is called for against the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court. To support the above submission, the learned Counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the decisions reported in 1984 Crl. L.J. 1809, ILR 2004 KAR 3058, 2001 KCCR 1905, AIR 1979 SC 677 and AIR 1958 SC 124.

20. Having heard the submissions of the learned Counsel for the respective parties and taking note of the decisions referred to by both the sides, the points that arise for my consideration in this appeal is

(a) Whether the appellant has made out a case for this Court to interfere with the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court and

(b) Whether it can toe said that there are compelling reasons to interfere with the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court?

21. Before I proceed to analyse the material on record in the light of the contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the parties, I deem it proper to refer to the preposition of law laid down by the Apex court with regard to the interference by the Appellate Court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. In the case of Anil Kumar v. State of U.P. 2005 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 170, the Apex court has observed thus:

9. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused to be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) the principle to be followed by the appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharastra, Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana, Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh, State of Punjab v. Phola Singh and Suchand Pal v. Phani Pal.

Keeping the above parameters of law in view I proceed to examine the contentions put forward having regard to the evidence placed before the trial Court.

22. It is the specific case of the prosecution that the accused demanded Rs. 5,000/- from the complainant in order to issue N.O.C. to enable the complainant to get pensionary benefits from the Accountant General's office and on 9.12.1997, the complainant approached the accused and the demand was made as above. Thereafter, the complainant vent to Lokayuktha office and lodged a complaint as per Ex. P1. It was again on 17.12.97, the accused made the demand and accepted the amount of Rs. 5,000/- from the complainant and the Lokayuktha Police trapped the accused. PW-1 N. Ramakrishna is the complainant and he has deposed in his evidence that on 9.12.97, ha met the accused and requested him for sanding the N.O.C. to A.Gs office for payment of D.C.R.G. and in that connection, the accused demanded Rs. 5,000/- as illegal gratification, which amount PW-1 was not willing to give to the accused. He further deposed to the effect that on 16.12.97, he lodged a complaint with the Lokayuktha Police as par Ex. P1 and on 17.12.97, ha want to the Lokayuktha office where the procedure concerning the entrustment mahazar was conducted as per Ex. P2.

23. Than PW-1 goes on to depose in para-7 of his evidence that at about 10.05 a.m. on 17.12.1997 he along with raiding party consisting of PW-2 Obadiah, PV-3 Srinivas and other staff along with Dy. S.P. went to the office of the accused and PW-1 along with PW-2 entered the office of the Asst. Executive Engineer and PW-1 went inside the chamber of the accused and saluted him and then the accused asked him whether he had brought the amount and on being told the amount has been brought, PW-1 kept the tainted currency notes worth Rs. 5,000/- on the table in front of the accused and the accused took the tainted currency notes and kept it inside the diary and than the diary was kept inside the drawer of the table which was in front of the accused.

24. PW-1 has clearly stated that the accused used his right hand for taking the tainted currency notes from the table and also for keeping the said amount in the diary as well as keeping the diary in the drawer of the table. the accused than told PW-1 that if the amount had bean given earlier, the papers concerning N.O.C. could have been cleared much earlier and sent to the Accountant General's office. Thereafter, PW-1 goes on to depose about the police inspector and other trap officers coming to the place after seeing the signal given by the complainant and then the police inspector questioned the accused to bring the diary which contained currency notes and kept the diary in front of the police inspector. Later on, the police inspector asked PW-3 to count the tainted currency notes. PW-3 verified the same and ha confirmed that the tainted currency notes tally with the numbers found in the entrustment mahazar. This witness also deposed about the test conducted on the accused being positive when the right hand of the accused was dipped into the sodium carbonate solution and the solution turning pink.

25. PW-1 was extensively cross-examined on behalf of the respondent/accused and the witness has reiterated that on 17.12.97, he went and met the accused in his chamber and also confirms about the accused asking for the amount and the said amount of Rs. 5,000/- being given to the accused and on being placed on the table and then the accused, putting it into the diary and then keeping the diary inside the table drawer. It has also been brought out in the cross-examination of PW-1 that between the dates 8.12.1997 and 10.12.1997, the accused had not attended the office as per the attendance register and that in the diary Ex. P19, it is mentioned that the accused had taken a delivery of van on 10.12.97 and the very same documents has also mentioned that the accused has attended the meeting in the Divisional office on 8.12.97. However, PW-1 has not accepted the suggestion put to him that the accused was not in his office on 9.12.97 and that. PW-1 did not meat the accused.

26. As far as PW-1 being treated as hostile, is concerned the cross-examination of PW-1, it cannot be said that PW-1 did not support the prosecution case in its entirety as has been pointed out by the learned. Spl. Prosecutor for the State and that only in regard to certain aspects of the prosecution case that the complainant was treated as hostile. At page No. 31 of the paper book, the reasons for treating the PW-1 as hostile are clearly stated and they are the contradictions in the previous submissions made by the complainant with regard to the date of submitting the application for encashment of E.L. and likewise the date of submission of the application for settlement of pension and finally for not coming to give the correct evidence with regard to the identification of the bottles said to contain the resultant hand wash of PW-3-Srinivas and the accused. Therefore it is not possible to show having regard to the totality of the evidence given by PW-1 that he did not support the prosecution case in its entirety. But on the other hand, it is only with regard to certain aspects referred to above that the witness was treated as hostile.

27. As far as the acceptance of evidence of the hostile witness is concerned, it is a well settled law that that part of the hostile witness which goes well with the prosecution case can be accepted and rejecting only that portion of the evidence which does not support the prosecution case. Therefore applying such yardstick in the instant case, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the evidence of PW-1 has to be ignored in totality merely because of a witness not supporting the prosecution case in certain minor aspects which do not have any bearing on the core of the prosecution case.

28. P.W. 2 N. Obadiah is the shadow witness and he accompanied the raiding party to the office of the accused and this witness corroborates the testimony of P.W. 1 in regard to P.W. 1 meeting the accused on 17.12.1997 in hi a office and P.W. 1 giving Rs. 5,000/- (ten currency notes of Rs. 500/- denomination) to the accused. However, P.W. 2 says that though the amount was given by P.W. 1 to the accused, the said amount was given on the ground that P.W. 1 was giving back the amount which he had taken from the accused for purchase of diesel. This witness also confirms that the Police inspector found Rs. 5,000/- i.e., tainted currency notes, in the official diary of the accused and the right hand wash of the accused also testing positive while immersed in sodium carbonate solution. Further, ha goes on to confirm, that Ex. P-20 trap mahazar was drawn and he signed it.

29. P.W. 2 was also treated hostile insofar as the reason given by him with regard to the amount that was accepted by the accused. Whether the version given by P.W. 2 is the true version or not is the matter to be analysed a little later. But, leaving that apart, in other respects, insofar as the preparation of the entrustment mahazar is concerned as well as the trap mahazar being drawn as per Ex. P-20 and P.W. 1 giving the amount of Rs. 5,000/- to the accused by placing it on the table and the same amount being put into the diary by the accused and later on the diary being recovered by the police and the hand wash of the accused testing positive are concerned, the said evidence of P.W. 2 corroborates the evidence of P.W. 1 and so also the prosecution case in that regard. Therefore, on the vary sauna analogy of accepting the evidence of a hostile witness to the extent that it supports the prosecution case, the testimony of P.W. 2 also will have to be accepted in regard to that part of the evidence, which supports the prosecution case.

30. P.W. 3 R.V. Sreenivasa, an official working in the office of the District Health & Family Welfare at Chitradurga, corroborates the testimony of P.W. 1 with regard to the entrustment mahazar and the trap mahazar is concerned and, particularly with regard to the trap mahazar is concerned, this witness has stated that on 17.12.1997 he, along with P.W. 1 and the raiding party, went to the office of the accused and when the accused was questioned by the Police inspector, the accused took out his official diary from the drawer and the diary contained currency notes and the right hand wash of the accused tested positive when dipped in sodium carbonate solution.

31. Though this witness was also treated hostile by the prosecution, in the cross-examination by the prosecution, P.W. 3 goes on to support the entire case of the prosecution both with regard to the entrustment mahazar and trap mahazar. He further confirms during the course of his cross-examination that when the Police Inspector questioned about the tainted currency notes, the official took out the official diary from the drawer of his table and kept it in front of the Police Inspector and the tainted currency notes were found in the said diary. In the cross-examination of this witness, nothing has been elicited serious enough so as to damage his evidence in substance is concerned.

32. P.W. 12 H.S. Gangadharappa is the I.O. in this case and in his evidence, he has stated that on 16.12.1997, the complainant came and lodged his complaint as par Ex. P-1 and, based on that, a case was registered and the F.I.R. was sent to the Special Judge. As far as the trap incident is concerned, this witness has stated that on 17.12.1997, at about 8.00 a.m., P.Ws. 1 to 3 came to his office and than the details of the entrustment mahazar ware explained and the mahazar was drawn as par Ex. P-2. Thereafter, this witness goes on to depose that they reached the office of the accused around 10.10 a.m. on the same day and took their position within the vicinity of the office and waited for the signal to coma from the complainant. Ha has deposed that on getting the signal from the complainant around 10.35 a.m., they went to the chamber of the accused and when the right hand of the accused was dipped in sodium carbonate solution, the solution turned into pink colour and ha collected the same.

33. The I.O. has stated that the accused took out the diary from the drawer in front of his seat and produced the currency notes (ten tainted notes of Rs. 500/- denomination) and on verification, they found that the numbers tallied with the numbers mentioned in the entrustment mahazar and thereafter, Ex. P-20 trap mahazar was drawn. The I.O. then goes on to depose about ail other investigation that was done by him leading upto the filing of the charge-sheet, in the cross-examination of the I.O., certain omissions said to have occurred in the evidence of P.W. 1 when compared to the statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. were put to the I.O. and the I.O. has stated that the said omissions referred to are not mentioned in the 161 statement.

34. The other witnesses examined by the prosecution complete the other aspects of the investigation, like P.W. 4 Mohammed Shafiulla receiving application from the complainant with regard to the settlement of his pension and leave encashment and furnishing the documents to the Lokayuktha Inspector, P.W. 5 Prabhakara giving the service particulars of the accused as per Ex. P-25, P.W. 6 Vasudeva Rao, proprietor of the petrol bunk, giving the copy of the bill concerning supply of diesel to the lorry of the rig machine belonging to the office of the accused, P.W. 7 Pampanna also submitting certain indents and bills to the Police Inspector, and P.W. 9, a junior engineer working in the office of the accused, preparing a rough sketch of the scene of occurrence as par Ex. P-32. P.W. 10 Chandrappa speaks to the aspect of delivering the F.I.R. to the Special Judge, and P.W. 11 Rajanna speaks to the fact that he carried ten sealed articles to the F.S.L. for examination.

35. Thus, on a careful examination of the entire evidence on record, though, as rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent, certain discrepancies were found in the evidence of P.W. 1, 2 and 3, yet, I am of the view that the said discrepancies do not affect the core of the prosecution case insofar as the charge against the accused with regard to demanding and accepting the illegal gratification of Rs. 5,000/- from the complainant in order to do an official favour. Though the I.O. has stated in his evidence that P.W. 1 has not stated before him certain particulars which are found in the evidence of P.W. 1, on going through Ex. P-2 entrustment mahazar as well as Ex. P-20 trap mahazar, it cannot be said that the complainant has made material omissions in his evidence when compared to the statement given by him before the Lokayuktha Police. As already mentioned by me, the core of the prosecution casa has remained unshaken despite P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 having been subjected to lengthy cross-examination.

36. The discrepancies in the evidence of these witnesses are not very vital in nature so as to take the view that the discrepancies are of that magnitude which will render the testimony of these witnesses unreliable or untrustworthy. Therefore, I see no justification in the trial court rejecting the testimony of the material witnesses P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 coupled with that of P.W. 12 insofar as the accused demanding the money from the complainant and the trap being laid on 17.12.1997 and the amount being recovered from the diary kept by the accused.

37. It is the specific defence of the accused that the amount was kept in the diary toy the police officials in order to foist a false case against him. This contention is taken basing on the ground that the raid was conducted between 10. 10 a.m. and 10.25 a.m. on 17.12.1997. The learned Counsel for the respondent as well as the learned trial judge have taken the consistent stand that there was no possibility of the accused or any other official coming to the office before 10.30 a.m. and, therefore, a false case has been foisted. I am unable to agree with the above contention put forward by the learned Counsel for the respondent and so also with the inference drawn by the trial court in this regard. No evidence is placed by the defence to show that no official and muchless the accused comes to the office before 10.30 a.m. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses particularly P.Ws. 1 to 3 coupled with the I.O'S evidence and the entrustment mahazar Ex. P-20 clearly establish the fact of the accused being present in his office when the complainant went and met him in his chambers and that the accused accepted the amount of Rs. 5,000/- and kept it in the diary which was an his table and then put the diary into his table drawer.

38. If the accused was not present at that particular hour, as sought to be projected by the prosecution, nothing prevented the accused to take such a defence. on the other hand, the accused takes such contradictory stand which renders his conduct unacceptable and gives the impression that he is not coming out with the truth. As pointed out by the learned special prosecutor for the State, the accused, while replying to question No. 160 in his 313 statement, has clearly stated that the reason for lodging the complaint against him by P.W. 1 is because of the accused stopping the indent being placed with the shop belonging to the son of the complainant. This is the specific defence taken by the accused in his 313 statement. When compared to this stand taken by the accused before the trial court in his reply to question No. 160 of the 313 statement, the stand taken by the accused when his statement was recorded during the trap mahazar tails a different story.

39. The trap mahazar, which is marked, as Ex. P-20, discloses that on 17-12-1997, when the accused was in his office at 10.00 a.m., he received a phone call from the complainant to the effect that within two minutes, the complainant would arrive there and, therefore, the accused delayed in proceeding for his inspection work. Than the accused says that around 10.15 a.m., the complainant came there and met him and gave Rs. 5,000/- which the complainant had taken as loan and the accused took the a aid amount in. his right hand and kept it in his 1997 diary.

40. it is, therefore, clear from the above statement of the accused given before the investigating officer during the course of recording of the trap mahazar Ex. p-20 that the accused does not deny of his presence in his chamber on 17.12.1997 at 10.00 a.m. and meeting the complainant around 10.15 a.m. and accepting Rs. 5,000/- from him and keeping the said amount in his diary. Thus, the job of the prosecution was rendered much easier by the above stand taken by the accused during recording of the trap mahazar Ex. P-20. secondly, the said stand of the accused also reveals another facet of the case viz; that the accused is not coming forward with the truth. Though he accepts the fact ox receiving Ra. 5,000/- from the complainant, yet, the reason given in the entrustment mahazar Ex. P-20 is that the complainant had taken a loan of Rs. 5,000/- and the said amount is being returned belatedly. Whereas, the reason that is given by P.W. 2 shadow witness, is that the said amount was taken by the complainant towards purchase of diesel.

41. If the stand of the accused that the complainant had taken a loan of Rs. 5,000/- from him is to be accepted as the correct version, nothing prevented, the accused, who happens to be an Assistant Executive Engineer, to take the very same stand while replying question No. 160 put to him under Section 313. We have seen that his reply to the said question was that the complainant was unhappy because, his son did not get the indent being placed with his shop and, therefore, the complainant had a grouse against the accused. It is therefore, vary clear from the above examination of the evidence on record particularly analysing the stand taken by the accused during the trap mahazar Ex. P-20 and the stand taken by him when his statement was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that the accused is not telling the truth insofar as the reason for accepting the amount of Rs. 5,000/- from the complainant. The inference that is to be drawn is that the accused somehow wanted to escape from the situation into which he found himself. Hence, his defence version that the complainant had a grouse against him cannot be accepted as having necessary support from the evidence on record.

42. As far as accepting the trap mahazar Ex. P-20 is concerned, the learned Counsel for the respondent argued that no panch witness was examined and, therefore, no value can be attached to Ex. P-20 and the contents of the said document also cannot be looked into. I see no merit in the said submission made because, the contents of the trap mahazar Ex. P-20 have bean proved by the prosecution through the testimony of the complainant P.W. 1 as well as through the evidence of the I.O., P.W. 12. Further, when we look at the contents of Ex. P-20 trap mahazar, we will not fail to notice that the accused is also a signatory to the said document Ex. P-20. It is not the case of the accused that the contents of Ex. P-20 are incorrect or false or for that matter, he was forced to sign Ex. P-20. Therefore, in the face of the material witnesses putting their signatures and attesting the trap mahazar and the accused also endorsing the contents of Ex. P-20 by putting his signature, the question of non-examination of the panch witness rendering the trap mahazar unacceptable will not and cannot arise.

43. As far as the submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the prosecution had failed to prove the fact of initial demand made by the accused is concerned, as rightly submitted by the learned Special Prosecutor for the State, the concept of initial demand and final demand does not find a place in Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The said section reads thus:

7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act. - whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in Clause (c) of Section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than six months but which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.

44. A plain reading of the provisions contained in Section 7 as above will make it clear that all that is required to bring the case within the ambit of Section 7 is for the prosecution to prove that a public servant accepts ox obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person any gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward for doing any official favour to any person. Therefore, in the instant case, the prosecution has established that the accused did demand and did accept Rs. 5,000/- from P.W. 1 on 17.12.1997 and this fact is proved through the evidence of the complainant P.W. 1, shadow witness P.W. 2, the Investigating Officer P.W. 12 and the trap mahazar Ex. P-20. Hence, I do not find any infirmity in the prosecution case with regard to failure to prove the initial demand made by the accused.

45. NO doubt, as far as the presence of the accused on 9.12.1997 in his office is concerned, P.W. 1 has stated categorically in his evidence that on the 3aid day, the accused was in the office and demanded gratification of Rs. 5,000/- from the complainant. Though the prosecution has placed the attendance register as par Ex. P-12, as against the data 9.12.1997, the signature of the accused is not found in the said document. No doubt, it is contended by the learned Special Prosecutor that the very fact that the accused has not signed the attendance register between 4.12.1997 and 10.12.1997, that itself cannot give room to take the view that the accused was officially absent on 9.12.1997.

46. In the like manner, even the accused has not placed any document to show that he was on other duties or that he was deputed to attend a seminar at Bangalore on the said date. Despite the evidence being not conclusive in this regard, yet, having regard to the provisions of Section 7 of the P.C. Act and the prosecution having proved beyond reasonable doubt that on 17.12.1997, the accused demanded and accepted Rs. 5,000/- from the complainant and the further fact that the amount was recovered from the diary kept by the accused and the right hand wash of the accused also being found to have tested positive, the prosecution has established its case against the accused in respect of the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification in a sum of Rs. 5,000/- by the accused in order to do an official favour to the complainant in. connection with the issuance of no objection certificate.

47. Though the prosecution has proved its case against the accused from the evidence placed on record as analyzed above, yet, as rightly submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent, the question of taking cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the P.C. Act will not arise unless there is previous sanction obtained for prosecuting the accused in accordance with the requirement of Section 19 of the P.C. Act. There fore, notwithstanding the prosecution having proved its case insofar as the demand and acceptance of the illegal gratification by the accused, yet, the success or failure of the prosecution case depends on the validity of sanction.

48. Both sides have argued at length in regard to this important and vital aspect of this case. The trial court has held that the sanction order Ex. P-31 is invalid, whereas it is strongly contended by the special Prosecutor for the state that the sanction order is valid and the trial court's finding in this regard is erroneous and contrary to law. I therefore, deal with this important aspect now.

49. Before examining the material placed by the prosecution in connection with the valid sanction obtained to prosecute the accused, it is necessary to keep in view the position in law as has been laid down by the Apex Court in particular and also by this Court.

50. in the case of Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab : 1958CriLJ265 , it has bean held that 'the sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act is not intended to be nor is an automatic formality and it is essential that the provisions in regard to sanction should be observed with complete strictness' and the Court also went on to observe that it should be clear from the form of the sanction that the sanctioning authority considered the evidence before it and after a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, sanctioned the prosecution.

51. In the case of Mohd. Iqbal Ahmad v. State of Andhra Pradesh : 1979CriLJ633 , the Apex Court has observed thus:

It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has been granted by the Sanctioning Authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out constituting the offence. This should be done in two ways; either (1) by producing the original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction and (2) by adducing evidence aliunde to show the facts placed before the Sanctioning Authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. Any case instituted without a proper sanction must fail because this being a manifest defect in the prosecution, the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio, what the court has to see is whether or not the Sanctioning Authority at the time of giving sanction was aware of the facts constituting the offence and applied its mind for the same; any subsequent fact which may come into existence after the grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to Government servants against frivolous prosecutions and must therefore be strictly complied with before any prosecution can be launched against the public servant concerned.

52. In the case of CBI v. V.K. Sehgal and Anr. 1999 CRL. L.J. 4593, dealing with Section 19(3)(a), of the 1988 Act, the Apex Court has observed thus:

It is a further inroad into the powers of the appellate Court over and above the trammel contained in Section 465 of the Code. Under Section 19(3)(a) of 1988 Act no order of conviction and sentence can be reversed or altered by a court of appeal or revision even 'on the ground of absence or sanction' unless in the opinion of that Court a failure of justice has bean occasioned thereby. By adding the Explanation the said embargo is further widened to the affect that even if the sanction was granted by an authority who was not strictly competent to accord such sanction, then also the appellate as veil as revisional courts are debarred from interfering with the conviction and sentence merely on that ground.

53. In a vary recant decision in the case of Paul Varghese v. State of Kerala and Anr. : AIR2007SC2618 , the Apex Court has laid down the proposition of law that the requirement of prior sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is a matter of procedure and does not go to the root of jurisdiction and Section 19(3)(c) further reduces rigour of prohibition under Section 19(1) and in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act of public servant, sanction is automatic. The court also distinguished sanction under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. with the requirement of sanction under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and has observed thus in this regard.

It may be noted that Section 197 of the Code and Section 19 of the Act operate in conceptually different fields. In cases covered under the Act, in respect of public servants the sanction is of automatic nature and thus factual aspects are of little or no consequence. Conversely, in a case relatable to Section 197 of the Code, the substratum and basic features of the case have to be considered to find out whether the alleged act has any nexus to the discharge of duties. Position is not so in case of Section 19 of the Act.

54. This Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. C.S. Krishnamurthy : ILR2004KAR3058 has held that where there is evidence to show that the authority had applied its mind while issuing sanction order by following the procedure, the sanction order therefore, has to be held to be a proper sanction order.

55. As far as the sanction order being issued by the under secretary to the Government as IB the case before us, as could be seen from the evidence of P.W.8 is concerned, the observations in the following cases are worth noting.

56. In the case of Mallikarjun Basalingappa Balipadi v. State of Karnataka 2005 (1) KCCR 166, this Court has held that where the sanction order is issued by the Under Secretary in the name of the Governor and by order and where it is stated that all the materials were placed before the concerned authorities and after perusal of the of same an opinion has been formed, mere non-production of Governmental proceedings by the Under Secretary may not vitiate the issuance of the sanction order.

57. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand Jain : 1973CriLJ1396 , the Apex court has observed that where the facts constituting the offence appear on the face of the sanction order accorded by the Chief Minister, it is not necessary for the prosecution to lead separate evidence to show that relevant facts were placed before the chief Minister and hence, it cannot be said that the prosecution has failed to prove that the chief Minister has accorded his sanction, after applying his mind to the facts of the case. The Court further ruled that the fact that the Chief Minister signed the sanction for the prosecution on the file and not the formal sanction produced in the Court, which bears the signature of Special Secretary to the Government, makes no material difference.

58. This Court in the case of Puttaraja Urs v. State of Karnataka ILR 2003 KAR 618, has held that where it was found that the Under Secretary has signed the sanction order Ex. P14, on the basis of authorisation given by the competent authority, it is not to be construed that it was the under secretary who had granted sanction to prosecute the accused but the Competent Officer ha3 accorded permission and therefore, sanction has to be held to be a valid one.

59. In the case of Shivendra Kumar v. State of Maharashtra 2000 CRL. L.J. 4679, the Apex court has held that where it was found on fact that Secretary to Medical Education Department had passed/signed the order of sanction of prosecution against the appellant who was a lecturer in the Government Medical College, on behalf of the Governor, it follows that the order of sanction was passed by the Secretary with the authority of the Governor of the state Government and the Government functions through its officers.

60. In the case of State of Orissa v. Mrutunjaya Panda 1990 CRL. L.J. 782, the supreme Court has held that where there was no material placed to show failure of justice occasioned due to error or irregularity in sanction, the order setting aside conviction was liable to be set-aside.

61. This Court in the case of State by Police Inspector, Karnataka Lokayuktha v. M. Manjunda 8001 (3) KCCR 1905 has held that it is very important that sanctioning authority must independently peruse the investigation papers, and independently of the police report coma to the conclusion that there is enough material to sustain the charge and the sanctioning authority is required to consider the material before granting sanction and where sanction order is defective, the prosecution is vitiated.

62. The decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the casa of Bihailal v. State of Himachal Pradesh 1994 CRL.L.J. 1909 is to the effect that without a valid sanction, entire trial including the conviction will have to be held as void-ab-inito.

63. Having thus kept in view the law laid down by the Apex court and also by this Court as regards requirement of a valid sanction, in the case on hand, the prosecution has placed the evidence of P.W. 8 Sampath who was the then Under Secretary to the Government, P.W.D., and this witness has deposed to the affect that the file pertaining to the present case was sent to the Secretary to the Government, P.W.D and after going through the papers, they were sent to the Secretary to the Government and then to the P.W.D. Minister and the P.W.D. Minister granted sanction to prosecute the accused.

64. He has also deposed to the effect that after sanction was granted by the PWD minister, PW-8 issued the order by and in the name of the Government of Karnataka and it is dated 10.8.1998 (Ex. P-21). The said sanction order reads as under:

Whereas, it is reported that Sri. V. Sejappa, Assistant Executive Engineer was caught redhanded on 17.12.97 while demanding and accepting Rs. 5000-00 from the complainant as illegal gratification to show an official favour regarding processing of pension records of Sri. N. Ramakrishnappa Junior Engineer (Retired), Office of the Assistant Executive Engineer, No. 2, Veil boring Sub-Division, Chitradurga.

On 16.12.97, the complainant Sri. N. Ramakrishnappa S/o. Narashimappa, retired Junior Engineer, No. 2, Well boring sub-division, Chitradurga, appeared before the Police Inspector, Lokayuktha, Chitradurga, and complained that Sri. V. Sejappa, Assistant Executive Engineer demanded Rs. 5000-00 as illegal gratification for doing official favour. Since the complainant vas not willing to pay the bribe, he requested Karnataka Lokayuktha Police to initiate legal Action against the said officer as par law.

Based on the complaint, a criminal case was registered an 26.12.97 against Sri. V. Sejappa, Assistant Executive Engineer, No. 2 well Boring Sub-Division, PHE, Chitradurga in Cr. No. 6/97 under Section 7, 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988, by Police Inspector, Karnataka Lokayuktha Chitradurga and has taken up further investigation and has taken up further investigation.

After observing all the formalities in a pre-trap mahazar, a successful trap had been laid by the Police inspector, Karnataka Lokayuktha, on 17.12.97 and Sri. V. Sejappa, Assistant Executive Engineer (now under suspension) vas caught red handed while demanding and accepting Rs. 5000-00 as illegal gratification to do an official favour. The hand wash of the AGO and wash of the Hairy in sodium carbonate solution has given positive phenolphthalein test, which has been confirmed by the chemical Examiner's report. The shadow witness has also observed the transaction between the AGO and complainant regarding demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. Hence, the accused officer has committed an offence punishable under P.C. Act, 1988, and therefore, is liable to be prosecuted in the court of law for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of P.C. Act, 1988.

And whereas, Government of Karnataka being the competent it authority to remove Sri. V. Sejappa, Assistant Executive Engineer (now under suspension) from the office, after carefully examining the documents and material evidence on record furnished, in respect of the said proceedings and circumstances of the case, Government considers that Sri. V. Sajappa, Assistant Executive Engineer, should be prosecuted in the court of law for the said offences.

Now, therefore, Government accord sanction as contemplated under Section 19 of P.C. Act, 1988 for the prosecution of the said Sri. V. Sejappa, Assistant Executive Engineer, No. 2 Veil Boring Sub-Division, Chitradurga (now under suspension) for the above said offences under Section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988.

65. On going through the contents of the said sanction order, it becomes clear that the government after considering the material placed before it and after examining the documents furnished in respect of the said proceedings and in the circumstances of the case came to the conclusion that the respondent has to be prosecuted in a court of law. Therefore, it cannot be said that the sanction order Ex. P-21 discloses lack of application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority.

66. Having regard to the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned cases and the Under Secretary to the Government issuing the sanction order on behalf of the Governor of the State, no defect can be found in the sanction order that is produced in the instant case. Unfortunately, the trial judge did not consider the material placed through the sanction order Ex. P-21 and the evidence of PW8 in proper perspective and in the light of law laid down by the Apex Court with regard to the validity of the sanction order. I therefore, hold that the finding of the trial court that the sanction order is invalid cannot be sustained both on facts as well as in law and in particular the reasoning given is contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in this regard.

67. Having thus found no defect in the sanction order and the evidence placed also indicating that the Government had considered the material placed before it before according sanction, and the Under Secretary only was carrying out the said decision of the Government by issuing the sanction order Ex. P-21, this is not a. case where it can be said that the sanction order was passed in a mechanical manner or that it discloses non-application of mind. Therefore, the reasoning of the trial court cannot be accepted as being in conformity with the principles laid down by the Apex court and also by this Court in regard to validity of the sanction order in respect of prosecution of an accused under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

68. One other important aspect to be considered at this juncture is, the contention put forward lay the learned Counsel for the respondent that the original sanction order was not produced. As far as this submission is concerned, Ex. P-21 has been marked in the evidence of PW-8 and as has been held by the Apex Court, the prosecution will have to either produce the original order or will have to place the evidence to show that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind. The second requirement is satisfied in the instant case by the production of Ex. P-21 with the help of evidence of PW8. Hence, no defect can toe found in the sanction order mainly on the ground that the original order was not produced.

69. As far as foisting of the false case against the accused is concerned, the defence is not able to show that the testimony of the investigating Officer suffers from any serious defect or for that matter, the I.O. is biased towards the complainant. As already stated by me earlier, Ex. P-20 is the trap mahazar which clearly reveals that the respondent-accused had the first opportunity to make use of, to show his defence if at all the complainant had a grouse against the accused as stated by the accused in his reply to 313 statement. Nothing prevented the accused to make use of the said opportunity. But we have seen that the reasoning given by the accused during the recording of the trap mahazar is that a loan was taken by the complainant and the game was returned on 17.12.1997. Therefore, it is not open to the respondent now to say that a false case has bean foisted against him.

70. The supreme court in the case of A. Abdul Kaffar v. State of Kerala 2004 SCC (Cri) 981 has observed that where the accused failed to make a mention of the advance payment of sales tax due from PW1 for which an official receipt was issued, failure of the accused to mention the said fact to the I.O. at the first available opportunity showed that the defence taken was not genuine. In the instant case also having regard to the inconsistent stand taken by the accused during the course of the trap mahazar as wall as during his reply to 313 statement, it has to be held that the defence taken in the present case is also not a genuine defence.

71. In the instant case, it has not been shown that the testimony of the I.O. PW.12 suffers from serious defect so as to reject the testimony of the Investigating Officer. Therefore, I see no valid reason to reject the testimony of the Trap Officer. In this context, it is necessary to refer to the law laid down by the Apex court in the case of Rai Mohan Mazumdar v. Ram. Krishna Dass and Anr. AIR I960 SC 672. It vas held that where the evidence of the Police Officer who led the trap was found to be reliable, corroboration is not necessary. The relevant observations are as under:

Where the evidence of the police officer who laid, the trap is found entirely trustworthy, there is no need to seek any corroboration. There is no rule of prudence which has crystallized into a rule of law, nor indeed any rule of prudence, which requires that the evidence of such officers should be treated on the same footing as evidence of accomplices and there should be insistence on corroboration. In the facts and circumstances of a particular case a court may be disinclined to act upon the evidence of such an officer without corroboration, but, equally, in the fact and: circumstances of another case the court may unhesitatingly fact the evidence of such an officer. It is all a matter of appreciation of evidence and on such matters there can be no hard and fast rule, nor can there toe any presidential guidance.

72. In another decision, in the case of State of U.P. v. Zakaullah 1998 SC 1474, it has been held that the evidence of the Trap Officer can be relied on even without corroboration.

73. Thus, having regard to the above proposition of law laid down by the Apex court with regard to appreciation of evidence of the Trap Officer (I.O.) in the case on hand, it is not shown that the testimony of PW12 lacks credibility or for that matter, PW12 had axe to grind against the respondent. There fore, the contention taken that a false case has been foisted against the respondent also has to be rejected as having no basis.

74. On careful analysis of the entire evidence on record, in the light of the proposition of law laid down by the Apex court both with regard to the requirement of a valid sanction order and appreciation of evidence of the Trap Officer, in the instant case, the testimony of PV1the complainant has bean, well supported by the evidence of the Investigating officer PW12 in all material aspects 'and PW2 in particular also supports the prosecution case insofar as the respondent accepted Rs. 5,000/- from the complainant on 17.12.1997 between 10.10 a.m. and 10.25 p.m. in the chamber of the respondent and keeping the a aid amount in the diary and putting diary into the official drawer and further the test conducted concerning the hand wash of the respondent also turned out to be positive. The defence version has been proved to be not genuine one. The a discrepancies and contradictions referred to by the learned Counsel for the respondent from the evidence of the I.O. in particular are not grave enough so as to affect the basic fabric of the prosecution case and the infirmities are too minor and cannot be said to be fatal.

75. The learned trial judge, therefore, erred in not only failing to appreciate the evidence in proper perspective, but also failed to Karnataka note of the admissible evidence placed by the prosecution with regard to the accused receiving Rs. 5,000/- from the complainant on 17.12.1997 arid the further error committed by the trial court is that it totally rejected the evidence of the material witnesses PWs. 1 to 3. Merely because, a part of their evidence showed that they did not support the prosecution only in regard to certain aspects, leaving the said part of their evidence, the remaining evidence of the said witnesses fully supports the prosecution case and gets corroboration from the evidence of the I.O. in particular and the trap mahazar Ex. P-20. I am therefore, of the opinion that there are compelling reasons to interfere with the Judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court.

76. Before I conclude, one other ground urged by the learned Counsel for the respondent also will have to toe considered. It is argued that the learned Counsel for the appellant could not have raised the ground of the sanction order being valid, in the absence of a specific ground taken in the appeal memorandum in this regard.

77. AS far as this submission is concerned, it is pointed out by the learned Special prosecutor for the state that Rule 2 of the Karnataka High Court Rules, 1959 says that every appeal shall contain among other contents mentioned in the said Rule 2, the grounds of appeal in consecutively numbered paragraphs. Therefore, in the instant case also, the grounds having set out at page Nos. 5 to 8 of the appeal memorandum, the contention urged does not merit any consideration. I am of the view that the submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondent cannot be accepted for more then one reason. The first one is that, even before the trial court, the question concerning validity of the sanction order was urged and considered by the trial court and declined to accept the submission of the state. Therefore, it cannot be said that the State cannot urge the said ground in the course of his argument before this Court when the entire judgment of the trial court acquitting the accused is open for consideration by this court.

78. Secondly, it is also a veil settled law that the appellate court has got the power to re-appreciate and. reweigh the evidence and come to its own conclusion, in the case of Girija Prasad dead, by L.Rs. v. State of M.P. (2007) 3 SCC (Cri.) 475 dealing with the scope and power of the appellate court under Section 386 and 378 of the Cr.P.C., the Apex Court has observed thus:

in an appeal against acquittal the appellate court has every power to reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence as a whale before it. It is, no doubt, true that there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and that presumption is reinforced by an order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. But that is not the end of the matter. It is for the appellate court to keep in view the relevant principles of law, to reappreciate and reweigh the evidence as a whole and to coma to its own conclusion on such evidence in consonance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.

I, therefore, do not find any force behind the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent in this regard.

79. In conclusion, I hold that the prosecution has brought home the guilt of the accused against the respondent in respect of the charge levelled against him and hence, the respondent is liable to be convicted for having committed an offence under Section 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

80. Heard the learned Special Prosecutor for the state as veil as the learned Counsel for the respondent on the question of sentence to be imposed. The submission of the appellant's counsel is that maximum sentence be imposed on the respondent having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Learned Counsel for the respondent on the other hand, leaves it to the court to pass appropriate sentence.

81. This case furnishes another instance of a 'public servant' accepting the gratification other then the legal remuneration. The evil of accepting illegal gratification to render an official favour has grown into a gigantic proportion and it threatens the very atmosphere of clean and transparent public service. This is not a case where the accused being a public servant, accepted illegal gratification from a lay person to do an official favour, but unfortunately in the instant case, the accused demanded and accepted illegal gratification not from an outside parson or one from the general public, but one of his own officials and that too the complainant who had retired from service and wanted to get his pensionary benefits which is the fruit of long service rendered by the complainant to the department.

82. The accused-respondent by demanding and accepting Rs. 5,000/- from his own office colleague seems to have forgotten importance attached to the expression 'public servant'. Merely because the respondent happened to hold a higher position as the Assistant Executive Engineer when compared to the official status of the complainant which is that of a Junior Engineer, that itself does not mean that the respondent has to act in the manner he has acted in the instant case. Whether a person is appointed at the lowest run of the government service as a peon or whether he gets appointed or holds the highest post in the government service, that itself does not take away the said person being 'a public servant'.

83. Therefore, the very concept of 'public servant' pre-supposes that an official irrespective of the position he holds has to consider himself as a 'servant of the public'. The respondent-accused seems to have forgotten the importance attached to the expression 'public servant' and has chosen to make use of his position in department to exploit the complainant who had retired from the service and was anxious to gat his pensionary benefits. Therefore, the very conduct of the respondent militates against the spirit of the concept of 'public servant'.

84. Though there have been several legislations in place like the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, to prevent public servants from accepting any gratification other then legal remuneration, cases of such nature continue to come up before the courts. I am therefore, compelled to make certain suggestions to the government in order to ensure that public servants discharge their duties befitting the status assigned to them as 'public servant' and this endeavour is made, only with the good hope that such steps will go a long way in preventing the public servant from accepting any gratification other than the legal remuneration not only from their own office colleagues, but even from a member of the public.

85. Despite various steps taken and the Lokayukta also sparing no efforts in bringing to light cases of public servants' enriching themselves by illegal means or by accepting gratification other than what they are legal entitled to (corrupt practices), still there is a need for taking some more steps in this direction to eliminate such corrupt practices being carried an by the officials.

86. One such measure which will have to be taken is to bring about the internal transformation in the officials by changing their attitude itself. Since it is said that today's child is the future citizen of tomorrow, it is necessary to inculcate values like honesty and integrity in the minds of the children when they are still young so that these values become part of their life and when they grow up, they will stand by the values. Therefore, in all the schools, steps should be taken by the Government to see that value based education also forms part of the curriculum and in today's education much importance is being given to the acquisition of information and knowledge which enable the children to secure jobs/employment.

87. But unfortunately, not much emphasis is given to the cultivation of values and to put it in the words of Swamy Vivekananda, 'the aim of education should be to build the character'. Therefore, the said suggestion is made which I hope would be considered with all seriousness by the government.

88. As far as the officials working in various departments of the Government are concerned, no doubt, they are past their school days. Though it is said that it is very difficult to change the mind set of an adult, yet, exposure to the need for inculcating such values still can have salutary effect and it will not be too late in ones life to change ones attitude towards the good. Therefore, apart from the usual training that is given to the government officials with regard to their official work is concerned, every government official can be required to attend atleast one or two workshops/course wherein they will get an opportunity to improve their personality as a whole.

89. The training in such workshop/seminar should be to bring about inner transformation in the official and to enable him to ensure that he does not become a prey to such corrupt practices. Lectures from well known speakers on personality development and an opportunity to study or listen to the lives of great people who have walked on this earth would also inspire the officials to follow their foot steps. All these efforts taken in all earnestness will certainly help the government to enable the officials to discharge their functions in an exemplary manner. A copy of this Judgment shall be sent to the secretary to the Government Education and DPAR Departments for necessary action.

90. Having thus made a few suggestions for the government to take note of and implement the same at earliest to ensure clean and unpolluted atmosphere being created in all public offices, I proceed to pass the following order:

(i) The appeal is allowed and the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court is set aside.

7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the respondent is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo S.I. for a further period of two months.

(iii) In respect of the conviction under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the respondent is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of two years and also to pay a fine of Re. 10,000/-. in default of payment of fine, he shall undergo S.I. for a further period of six months.

(iv) The substantive sentences shall run concurrently.

(v) Out of the fine amount collected, Rs. 5,000/- shall be paid to the complainant (PW1 Ramakrishnappa) and the balance be paid to the State.

(vi) The respondent-accused shall forthwith surrender before the trial court to undergo the sentence imposed upon him and the learned trial judge shall also take necessary steps to secure the presence of the respondent to undergo the sentence imposed upon him as above.